COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy
An extended study of the interactions of science
and technology with United States foreign policy
Volume I
COMMITTEE PRINT
U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy
An extended study of the interactions of science
and technology with United States foreign policy
Volume I
1 tr
:o
! m
j zr
□
o
o
MARINE
.. c. l.
COMMITTEE PRINT
U.S. House of Representatives
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington: 1977
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 (3-Part Set ; Sold in Sets Only)
Stock Number 052-070-04350-4
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia
E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California
John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff
George R. Berdes, Staff Consultant
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director
William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant
Forrest R. Frank, Subcommittee Staff Associate
La Verne Still, Staff Assistant
(ID
FOREWORD
This publication of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy
represents the culmination of 7 years of research and brings together,
in a current perspective, results previously published in a series of 15
committee prints of this committee and its Subcommittee on Inter-
national Security and Scientific Affairs.
In the foreword to the first of the 15 committee prints — an anno-
tated bibliography published in March 1970 (superseded by an exten-
sive new bibliography in the present collection) — I noted that previ-
ous work by the subcommittee had revealed many instances in which
U.S. foreign policy had lagged behind technological innovations of
worldwide importance. In asking the Congressional Research Service
to undertake the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy re-
search project, the subcommittee sought to move toward improving
xVmerica's performance in this vital area.
It seems appropriate here to recapture some of the thoughts ex-
pressed in presenting other committee prints of the series. Collec-
tively these brief excerpts suggest the broad sweep of the study, the
depth and durability of the committee's concern, and why the subject
is one of compelling urgency and significance for legislators, officials
throughout the executive branch, industrial leaders, scholars, and the
American people :
With the detonation of the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 the
United States and the world entered the nuclear age. The development of the
bomb revolutionized world affairs and set off a strategic arms race. . . . (The
Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age.)
Put to destructive ends by the wrong hands, that discovery [nuclear fission]
represents the potential unleashing of a force capable of destroying civilization.
However, given wise and prudent management, it also represents the release and
increase of human energy capable of opening a new phase in human history.
(Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of American Diplomacy
with a New Technology.)
As our consciousness of the world as a "global village" intensifies, we are be-
coming increasingly aware of the dangers and opportunities involved when tradi-
tional values of time and space are no longer relevant. (The Politics of Global
Health.)
Although our times are often characterized as the Space Age . . ., they might
also be characterized as the Sea Age because for the first time human beings
have begun to explore below the waters of the world. . . . the seabed has become
the object of intense economic, legal, and political interest. This interest is almost
(HI)
IV
directly the result of the increasing capability of nations to exploit the natural
resources which lie beneath the sea. (Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed.)
Today, in many parts- of the earth, there is a food/people imbalance which
causes the lives of millions to he a desperate search for sustenance. . . .
In the helief that the food/population equation can he and should he brought
into balance, modern man is applying scientific knowledge and technical skills.
The United States, through its foreign aid programs, has been in the forefront. . . .
(Beyond Malthus: The Food /People Equation.)
In the minds of many today the idea of science and technology as oppressive
and uncontrollable forces in society is becoming increasingly more prevalent.
They see in the power of science and technology the means of destruction in war-
fare, the source of environmental violation, and the stimulant behind man's grow-
ing alienation. . . . [Often overlooked], however, is the corresponding alterna-
tive these influences present for man's good — for his advancement, for the enrich-
ment of his life, and for world peace. (The Mekong Project: Opportunities and
Problems of Regionalism.)
Science and technology are compelling determinants of the human condition.
In September 1975 the United Nations General Assembly voted to convene an
international conference on science and technology. The intent of this move was
to allow the technologically sophisticated and dynamic elements of the U.N. family
to focus the efforts of the 1979 General Assembly on a concerted program of
global advance. The agenda of this program would include economic, social, polit-
ical, and commercial concerns, but its backbone would be technical and mana-
gerial. . . . Leaders of our diplomatic, technological, and national security
affairs are not devoid of imagination or insensitive to the oppressive weight of
danger and insecurity ahead. However, if these leaders propose to meet future
threats with the same strength of purpose and creative initiative that have largely
marked the first two centuries of American independence, they must seek new
forms and find new applications in a world of growing interdependence. The prob-
lem of how to manage our relationships in such a world resolves in large part into
the problem of managing technological dynamism and directing it to humane ends.
(Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence.)
Our purpose was not just to describe and analyze a specialized set
of diplomatic problems and opportunities ; it was also, and primarily,
to examine America's capability for dealing with these problems and
opportunities and to suggest legislative options for improving that
capability- This aim was the particular focus of the last two studies
of the project : Science and Technology in the Department of State,
by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, the project director, and Science, Tech-
nology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence, a summary
and analysis of the whole series co-authored by Dr. Huddle and the
associate project director, Mr. Warren R. Johnston.
To repeat a further thought expressed in presenting the summary
report: It is my hope and expectation that these analytical contribu-
tions of the Congressional Research Service will prove in a practical
way to have yielded three separate sets of products: (1) specific legis-
lative options and administrative initiatives to strengthen the conduct
of ongoing diplomacy, with its increasingly important and inseparable
technical component; (2) encouragement of a consensus toward
stronger and longer-range planning of technical initiatives in sup-
port of U.S. diplomacy, involving closer cooperation among all ele-
ments of the Federal Government; and (3) a more far-reaching par-
ticipation in the foreign policy process throughout government at all
levels and involving also the academic and technical communities,
private industry, and the public at large.
The findings contained herein are the responsibility of the individual
authors and of the Congressional Research Service and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on Inter-
national Relations.
Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations.
January 1978.
DOCUMENTS IN THE ORIGINAL STUDY SERIES
(These documents are now out of print. They are incorporated, with some
minor revisions, in the present volume. The documents are listed here in the
order of their publication. An explanation of the different order followed in pre-
senting them all together in this volume is given in Chapter Fifteen under the
heading, Methodology of the Study.)
A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of Articles, Books, Documents, Periodicals,
and Reference Guides. (Superseded by Ms. Knezo's bibliography of January
1976/July 1977, reproduced at end of volume III.) Compiled by Genevieve
Knezo. (69 pages.) Issued March 1970.
Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age. An introduction to the entire study
by Franklin P. Huddle. (28 pages.) Issued April 1970.
The Evolution of International Technology. A review of the emergence of tech-
nology as a factor of change in international relations by Franklin P. Huddle.
(70 pages.) Issued December 1970.
The Politics of Global Health. A study of worldwide efforts to prevent epidemic
disease by Freeman H. Quimby. (79 pages.) Issued May 1971.
Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed. A survey of technical, economic, legal,
and political considerations involved in using the natural wealth of land below
the seas by George A. Doumani. (86 pages, plus appendixes.) Issued July 1971.
Beyond Malthus: The Food/ People Equation. A study of the interrelation of food
and population and the resulting impact on international affairs by Allan S.
Xanes. (96 pages.) Issued October 1971.
The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism. A case study
of the accomplishments and failures of the massive Indochina works project
by Franklin P. Huddle. (86 pages. ) Issued May 1972.
The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. A study of an early,
serious attempt to bring atomic energy and weapons under international control
by Leneice N. Wu. (67 pages.) Issued August 1972.
Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe,: The Interaction of American Diplomacy
With a New Technology. Analysis of the interaction during last 30 years
between American diplomacy and the technological development of nuclear
power in Europe by Warren H. Donnelly. (163 pages.) Issued December 1972.
U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology
Transfer, and Diplomacy. An assessment of the linkages in U.S.-Soviet relations
among diplomacy, economics, and technology transfer by John P. Hardt and
George D. Holliday. (105 pages.) Issued June 1973.
The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. An analysis of atti-
tudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed in the IGY as a step toward
detente by Harold Bullis. (64 pages.) Issued November 1973.
U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovern-
mental Scientific Exchange. A study of major Federal programs which send
nongovernment U.S. scientists and technical personnel abroad by Genevieve J.
Knezo. (163 pages.) Issued April 1974.
(VII)
VIII
Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility.
Assessment of the costs and benefits of the migration of technically trained
persons, especially from developing to developed countries, by Joseph G.
Whelan. (272 pages. ) Issued September 1974.
Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical Content
Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations. This concluding study of the series, by
Franklin P. Huddle, analyzes the impact of science and technology on the
Department of State, and describes departmental efforts and opportunities to
relate science and technology to its mission. (180 pages.) Issued June 1975.
Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdependence. A review of
the entire series by Franklin P. Huddle and Warren R. Johnston, with
analysis of implications for improved mechanisms and strengthened procedures
in both executive and legislative branches. (360 pages, plus 132-page bibli-
ography prepared by Genevieve J. Knezo. ) Issued June 1976.
Contents — Volume I
Page
Foreword ni
Documents in the Original Series vii
Organization of the Study xi
Letter of Submittal xin
Acknowledgments xv
Preface xvii
Introduction to the Study as a Whole :
Chapter 1 — Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age ■ 1
Chapter 2 — The Global Context of Science, Technology,
and Diplomacy . • 37
Part 1 — Six Cases :
Chapter 3 — The Baruch Plan : U.S. Diplomacy Enters the
Nuclear Age 53
Chapter 4 — Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The
Interaction of American Diplomacy With a New Tech-
nology 123
Chapter 5 — The Political Legacy of the International
Geophysical Year 293
Chapter 6 — The Mekong Project : Opportunities and Prob-
lems of Regionalism . 361
Chapter 7 — Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed . . . 435
Chapter 8 — United States-Soviet Commercial Relations:
The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and
Diplomacy 525
(IX)
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Volume I
Introduction to the Study as a Whole
Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age
The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy
Part 1 — Six Cases
The Baruch Plan
Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe
The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year
The Mekong Project
Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed
United States-Soviet Commercial Relations
Volume II
Part 2 — Six Issues
The Evolution of International Technology
The Politics of Global Health
Beyond Malthus
U.S. Scientists Abroad
Brain Drain
Science and Technology in the Department of State
Volume III
Introduction to the Analysis and Findings
Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study
Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues
Analysis of the Cases
Analysis of the Issues
Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications
About the Essays to Follow
Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy
Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships
High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy
Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International
Technology
Independence Versus Interdependence
Long-Range and Short-Range Planning
Concluding Observations
Bibliography
(XI)
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
October 28, 1977.
Hon. Clement J. Zablocki,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, B.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman : In response to your request of April 6, 1977,
I am pleased to submit in edited and updated form the entire set of
reports produced for your subcommittee in the Science, Technology,
and American Diplomacy project and published by the committee be-
tween March 1970 and June 1976.
These reports, as originally planned, now form an integrated whole.
Parts 1 and 2 present the 12 individual case and issue studies in full.
Parts 3 and 4 examine the cases and issues from a mid-1977 perspective
to shed light on the capabilities and deficiencies of the Federal Govern-
ment in dealing with technology-based diplomatic issues.
This is the final study phase of the research project that you initiated
with your request to this service in September 1969. Since then the
project has been under the continuous direction of Dr. Franklin P.
Huddle, senior specialist in science and technology, with Mr. Warren
R. Johnston as associate project director. Mr. Johnston, who served as
assistant chief of the Foreign Affairs Division and then as an assistant
director of CRS before his recent retirement, has been responsible, in
consultation with Dr. Huddle, for preparing this edited and updated
version of the study.
The study includes an extensive supplement of July 1977 to the
January 1976 annotated bibliography. Both were prepared by
Ms. Genevieve J. Knezo, Analyst in Science and Technology. In pre-
paring the supplement Ms. Knezo was aided by Mrs. Elaine Carlson,
research assistant to Dr. Huddle.
Let me convey once again the thanks of all concerned for the oppor-
tunity of taking part in this unique research undertaking.
Sincerely,
Gilbert Gude, Director.
(XIII)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It seems fitting on the completion of a research undertaking of the
magnitude of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy for the
project director and associate director to claim the privilege of giving
recognition to the significant contributions to the project.
To begin at the beginning : We are indebted to the Honorable Clem-
ent J. Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Se-
curity and Scientific Affairs, for his foresight in initiating the series
and his dedicated efforts in seeing it through its completion. In addi-
tion, two successive staff consultants of the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Security and Scientific Affairs, Dr. John H. Sullivan and Mr.
George R. Berdes, are to be thanked for their constructive guidance
during the past 7 years and for the unfailingly sympathetic support of
an enterprise that proved more demanding, and extended over a longer
period of time, than was originally foreseen. Mr. Ivo J. Spalatin, who
has now succeeded them in the important role of subcommittee staff
director, and his associates, are also due our thanks for their encour-
agement and support in the final stages of this enterprise.
Apart from the codirectors, there were 10 authors of studies, as iden-
tified at the beginning of this volume under the heading Documents
in the Original Study Series. They deserve recognition and gratitude,
not merely for superior accomplishment but for their tolerance of
strenuous conditions of competing work assignments, their thousands
of hours of volunteered overtime, and their assistance in the review
and updating of material in the final study. Genevieve J. Knezo pre--
pared both the original annotated bibliography for the series and
the current bibliography to be found at the end of this volume.
Dr. Huddle's assistant, Mrs. Elaine Carlson, performed many essential
editorial and research support tasks.
Dozens of others in CRS, over the years, contributed their time and
skills in bibliographic, research, and clerical assistance, and in the re-
view of studies in draft. CRS Coordinator of Research James W.
Robinson reviewed the studies in their entirety and made many helpful
suggestions.
In addition, many scholars and officials outside CRS were generous
with their help in reviewing draft text and providing constructive
criticism. Prof. Edgar S. Robinson of American University submitted
extensive notes in review of Science and Technology in the Depart-
ment of State which were of value in preparing the final study ; he
also served as consultant in the preparation of the latter. To him and
to the other scholars, too numerous to cite individually, appreciation
and thanks are expressed for their assistance in collecting facts, offer-
ing suggestions, and encouraging the ultimate completion of this
undertaking.
A final important acknowledgment : gratitude beyond measure is
due our wives, Clare Scott Huddle and Eunice C. Johnston, for years
of indispensable support and forbearance.
Franklin P. Huddle.
Warren R. Johnston.
(XV)
PREFACE
The finding of this study is that U.S. diplomacy is neglecting two
powerful instruments of policy formation and policy execution : tech-
nological expertise and management skill. Most of the countries of the
world look to the United States as the undoubted leader in both tech-
nological achievement and in the skills of organization and administra-
tion to apply technology effectively. But during the rise of the United
States to technological preeminence, the Department of State has given
slight attention to the implications of technology for foreign policy.
Only meager resources have been spared to search for ways to turn
technology to achievement of diplomatic goals.
The emerging trend toward congressional participation in the diplo-
matic process plays a significant role in this context. The opportunity
is at hand for the Congress to examine the uses of technology made by
the executive branch toward the purposes of foreign policy.
More than that, the study suggests that the necessary teamwork of
the legislative branch with the executive branch in the field of foreign
policy requires that the Congress equip itself with its own resources of
equal diplomatic expertise. The impressive array of technological
implications for U.S. diplomacy further requires that these congres-
sional resources of diplomatic expertise contain a strong technological
element for both current oversight and long-range planning of future
initiatives.
Technology has made intolerable the consequences of failure to at-
tain the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy. But technology
also offers many opportunities for the attainment of these objectives.
No element of national policy and no component of national program
warrants more respect in the short-range or the long-range future of
the United States.
(xvn)
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
AS A WHOLE
<TfO
Chapter 1 — Toward a New Diplomacy in a
Scientific Age
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 5
The Congressional Role 5
Discussion of the Problem 8
1. Purpose of the Study 8
2. Description of the Problem 9
3. Importance of the Problem for the Future 9
4. Growing Recognition of the Importance of Science and Technology
for American Diplomacy 10
5. Impact of Nuclear and Rocket Technologies on World Outlook 12
6. Further Contemporary Evaluations 14
Definitions of Terms :
1. Science and Technology 19
2. Diplomacy 20
The Context of the Study :
1. The Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy Formulation 21
2. Goals of American Foreign Policy 21
3. The Growing Importance of Science and Technology in U.S.
Culture 22
4. Policy Formulation in Science and Technology 24
5. Scientific and Technological Elements in International Relations. 25
Formal Aspects of the Study :
1. Scope and Limitations 27
2. Methodology 27
Plan of the Study 28
1. Criteria for the Selection of Issues 29
2. Format for the Exposition of Issues 29
3. Illustrative Questions Researched 29
4. Enumeration of the Issues 30
5. Criteria for the Selection of Cases 31
6. Format for the Presentation of Cases 31
7. Illustrative Questions To Be Researched 32
8. Enumeration of the Cases Researched 32
9. Organization of the Total Study 33
(3)
CHAPTER 1— TOWARD A NEW DIPLOMACY IN A
SCIENTIFIC AGE
Introduction
This study addresses the interaction of U.S. foreign policy and
diplomacy with modern science and technology.
The hypothesis of the study was that detailed examination of the
dynamics of specific instances of these interactions would provide the
Congress with insights into present arrangements for (a) the uses of
foreign policy to support U.S. science and technology, and (b) the
uses of science and technology to develop and support U.S. foreign
policy.
From the beginning of the history of America as a nation, the
Congress has had a shared responsibility for the formulation and
implementation of foreign policy. Congressional concern with science
and technology has greatly intensified since World War II. Science
and technology, exerting an ever-increasing influence on domestic
public policy, also appear to have a growing effect on the content and
conduct of American foreign policy.
Arts of peace and war alike rest on an increasingly technological
base. Science and technology contribute in a major way to many pro-
grams of Government departments and agencies : For defense, space
exploration, agriculture, industry, transportation, communications,
medicine, meteorology, natural resource development and use, and
management of information itself. Most of these programs have
international as well as scientific aspects. The purposeful coordination
of the international aspects of science and technology presents unusual
difficulties because of their range, complexity, and specialized nature.
The Congress of the United States has many reasons for devoting
attention to the problems of science, technology, and American
diplomacy. Apart from the special constitutional role of the Senate in
giving advice and consent to appointment of principal presidential
advisers and to formal agreements with foreign governments, the
Congress authorizes programs to develop and use technology for inter-
national purposes, funds international programs of the Chief Execu-
tive, and conducts oversight of the executive branch in policy imple-
mentation, program execution, and the observance of law. As science
and technology have become important for American diplomacy, they
have become of corresponding importance for the Congress.
The Congressional Role
The congressional response to the need for public action generated
by such major innovations as atomic energy and artificial earth
satellites was positive and vigorous. Also of importance has been the
(5)
concurrent effort of the Congress to provide itself with the institutional
means for examining important scientific and technological develop-
ments to determine the needs of the public for their support, exploita-
tion, and regulation.
When the Congress in 1946 created the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission it also brought into being the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, a novel and uniquely equipped congressional institution, to
oversee and guide developments in the emerging field of atomic
power, nuclear weaponry, and supporting research and development.
The Joint Committee played a significant role in atomic energy deci-
sions: e.g., in support of President Eisenhower's peaceful atom
initiative, in winning congressional approval for U.S. participation
in the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also participated in the
joint hearings held with the Foreign Relations Committee on the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However, the 95th Congress abolished the
Joint Committee and reassigned its functions and authorities to other
appropriate committees.
The Russian Sputnik evoked a corresponding congressional re-
sponse. The Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics was
created on February 6, 1958, and the House Select Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration was created on March 5. These
undertook a vigorous program of policy formulation. One important
product originated by the House committee was the House concurrent
resolution on the peaceful uses of space, on which hearings were then
held before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Another was the
National Aeronautics and Space Act (NASA) of 1958,1 approved
July 29, which not only established the basic space policy of the Nation,
but blueprinted the organizational form for its implementation as well.
An important feature of the NASA Act, section 205, provided that :
The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may
engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to agree-
ments made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
On the executive side, the President instructed Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to request
the inclusion on the agenda of the 13th General Assembly of a program
for international cooperation in the field of outer space. The resolution
initiated by the United States was introduced November 13, 1958,
and was adopted by the General Assembly December 13 ; it established
a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and instructed
the committee to report on appropriate forms such cooperation
should take.
A permanent standing Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences was established under an amendment to the Standing
Rules of the Senate. January 14, 1959. This committee was abolished
in February 1977; its functions were transferred to the Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee. In the House, action had
already Ix-en taken, July 21, 1958, to establish the standing Com-
mittee'on Science and Astronautics; to this committee was assigned
the broader jurisdiction over astronautical research and development,
the Bureau of Standards. NASA and the National Aeronaut ics and
Space Council, the National Science Foundation, outer space, science
1 72 Stat. 426 ; 42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq., as amended.
scholarships, and scientific research and development.2 (In January
1975, the committee was renamed the Committee on Science and Tech-
nology and was given additional jurisdiction over civil aviation
research and development, environmental research and development,
all energy research and development except nuclear research and
development, and the National Weather Service. At this time, the
committee was also given general and special oversight functions of
reviewing and studying, on a continuing basis, all laws, programs,
and Government activities dealing with or involving nonmilitary re-
search and development.)
Apart from the dramatic impacts of atomic energy and space explo-
ration, science and technology subjects have been incorporated in the
jurisdictions of many standing committees of both Houses of Congress.
In her study of "Congressional Organization for Science and Tech-
nology, 95th Congress," Mauree W. Ayton lists 10 Senate Committees,
10 House Committees, and 2 Ad Hoc Committees with such concerns.3
Among those that apparently combine the concerns of science and
technology with foreign affairs are the following :
SENATE
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Research and Development
Committee on the Budget
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Committee on Environment and Public Works
Committee on Foreign Relations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal
Services
Committee on Human Resources
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research
HOUSE
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Committee on Armed Services
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs
Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary
Policy
- Taking note of the scope given to the House committee, Speaker McCormack later
observed that "The importance attached to science and technology by the House leader-
ship in 1958 was signaled by the fact that as majority leader I was chairman of the select
committee and the minority leader of that period was ranking minority member of this
committee." (Statement of Hon. John W. McCormack, Speaker, U.S. House of Representa-
tives In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. ' Applied
Science and World Economy : Panel on Science and Technology, Ninth Meeting." Pro-
ceedings before the * * * Jannarv 23, 24. and 25. 1968, 90th Congress, second session
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), page 11.)
3 Mauree W. Ayton, "Congressional Organization for Science and Technology, 95tn
Congress : A listing of congressional committees and subcommittees having jurisdiction
over scientific and technological activities." (Scheduled for publication in November 1977.)
8
Committee on the Budget
Committee on Government Operations
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee on International Relations
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Subcommittee on Oceanography
Committee on Science and Technology
AD HOC COMMITTEES
Ad Hoc Committee on Energy
Ad Hoc Select Committee on Outer Continental Shelf
Advisory services on science and technology matters, including
those of an international nature, are provided by a variety of institu-
tional arrangements. These include staff assistants to individual Mem-
bers of Congress; staffs of Congressional Committees; the National
Security and International Affairs Section of the Congressional
Budget Office; the Science Policy Research, Environment and Natural
Resources, and Foreign Affaire and National Defense Divisions of the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; the Office
of Technology Assessment; the International Division of the General
Accounting Office; and the Commission on International Relations
of the National Academy of Sciences.
Discussion of the Problem
1. Purpose of the Study
This study is intended to provide Congress with background mate-
rial useful in strengthening the resources that support the conduct of
American diplomacy. The plan of the study is to describe and analyze
the formulation and administration of American diplomatic policies
having significant science and technology components. Specifically,
the study examines a selected set of particular developments and events
in recent diplomatic history in order to :
— Characterize processes and problems involving the interaction of
science and technology with diplomacy ;
— Define organizational requirements for the effective formulation
of important policies to direct and control activities involving
this interaction;
— Identify ways in which the capabilities of agencies serving at this
interface can be strengthened legislatively or administratively;
and more generally, to
— Discover ways in which science and technology can better support
foreign policy objectives of the United States ; and
— Discover ways in which the conduct of diplomatic activities can
better support the healthy growth of national and international
science and technology.
9
2. Description of the Problem
The interaction of science and technology with diplomacy has wide
ramifications and many challenges. Diplomacy is concerned with
carrying out American foreign policies: The formulation of U.S.
political, economic, and military interests and their representation
in other nations and in international bodies. Traditionally, diplomacy
has been recognized as requiring superior skills and — in the best
sense — sophisticated attitudes in interpersonal relations, negotiation,
persuasion, forensics, perception, cultural empathy, and adaptability
to unfamiliar situations. Science represents generally a somewhat
different environment, a cultural activity whose disciplinary walls are
not easily passed over. It involves systematic understanding of the
fundamentals of man and nature. Technology is still a third area of
human activity, with its own special characteristics of materialistic,
sometimes trial-and-error, evolution of hardware and systems. The
impacts on society of the uses of technology are profound and many-
sided. Accordingly, a study of the interactions of science and tech-
nology with diplomacy presents three-dimensional problems of large
scope, many kinds of specialization, and difficult analysis.
Domestically, science policy has two distinct aspects : ( 1) The use of
science and technology as an instrument to aid in the formulation and
execution of public policy (called "science in policy") ; and (2) the
formulation and execution of Government policy to aid in the exploi-
tation of publicly beneficial science and technology (called "policy
in science").
Public funds have to satisfy so many different needs that support
for basic science encounters budgetary constraints ; the resultant search
for criteria to assure an ordering of the priorities of basic science is
the subject of considerable and unresolved controversy. Questions
remain open as to the priority to be given basic research in fields
with a high probability of opening up new opportunities for socially
useful technology as against fields in which the scientific interest is
high but the results offer no obvious promise of application. There are
also unresolved questions as to the comparative economic and social
costs and benefits of particular technologies (the supersonic transport,
for example) and of competing technologies and their costs and bene-
fits. Will a desalinization plant be socially more cost-effective than an
urban rapid transit system, or a novel waste-disposal system? Clearly,
the formulation of policies to harness science and technology effec-
tively to national need presents many difficulties.
Similar problem areas exist in the field of international science and
technology. In the international field, too, there is "science in policy"
and "policy in science." Moreover, the impacts of science and tech-
nology have made diplomacy itself more difficult by introducing the
factor of dynamic and rapid change, often of great magnitude.
3. Importance of the Problem for the Future
Nowhere are the changes wrought by science and technology more
evident than in international affairs. In his study, "Science, Tech-
nology, and American Foreign Policy," Eugene B. Skolnikoff observes
10
that "* * * scientific and technological developments during and
since World War II have altered former relationships among
nations, overturned traditional measures of power and influence, and
made the future a hostage to the scientific discoveries that are un-
certain in form but sure to come.'" *
Elsewhere, Skolnikoff observes that the relevance today of the
"facts or expectations of science and technology to many foreign
policy issues is not entirely without precedent."
Quite a few foreign policy concerns in the past were heavily conditioned by
technical considerations : fishery matters, treaties on the use of common water
resources, international agreements on weights and measures, and others.
However [he continues], gradually since 1900, and explosively since World
War II, there has been a change in degree of dependence that is tantamount to
a change in kind. Now, not only are many of the central issues of foreign policy —
those that affect the fundamental international position and security of the
Nation — intimately tied to scientific and technological variables, but whole new
areas of policy concern based on science and technology have arisen that demand
the time and attention of senior policy officials.5
Apart from the obvious instances of defense and space technology,
he calls attention to the "* * * need to estimate the future, to examine
the ways in which international relations and perhaps the interna-
tional political system will be altered as science and technology con-
tinue their explosive advance * * *." 6
4. Growing Recognition, of the Importance of Science and Technology
for American Diplomacy
A quarter of a century ago, when the great expansion in scientific
and technological effort in the United States was just getting under-
way, Lloyd Berkner as consultant to the Secretary of State presented
a report on "Science and Foreign Relations" in which he addressed
the dichotomy of science-in-policy and policy-in-science in the inter-
national sphere :
First, how can the potentialities of scientific progress be integrated into the
formulation of foreign policy, and the administration of foreign relations, so that
the maximum advantage of scientific progress and development can be acquired
by all the peoples? Second, how can foreign relations be conducted in such a
manner as to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective progress of
science and technology? 7
A little more than a decade after the Berkner report had urged a
strengthening of diplomatic resources of scientific and technological
expertise, a similar recommendation was made to the Federal Council
for Science and Technology by its International Committee, chaired by
Walter G. Whitman:
Science and its applications in technology are exerting a revolutionary influ-
ence on the destinies of nations and mankind. Our domestic and foreign policies
must lie attuned to this revolution and to its implications of change in the pattern
of world relationships.
4 Eugene I?. Skolnikoff. Science, Technology, and American Foreign Polio/. (Cambridge,
Ma8BaChU8ett8, The M.I.T. Press. 1907), p. .'t.
"Ibid., p. :'.s.r,. Sec also: Eugene B. Skolnikoff. "Scientific Advice In the State Depart
Dient." In William K. Nelson, <•<!. The Politics of Science: Headings in Science. Technology,
and Gorernment. (New York, Oxford inlversity Press, 1968), pp. 884 396.
8 Skolnikoff. Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. •'!!•-.
7 Lloyd viel Berkner, "Science and Foreign Relations : International Plow of Scientific
and Technological Information." (Washington, International Science Policy Survey
Group, U.S. Department of state. I960), p. 2. (Department of state Publication 8860,
General Foreign Policy Series, No. 30.)
11
Not only does our domestic strength rely on a vigorous technological base; our
nation's role as a leader in the international scene will increasingly be deter-
mined by the accomplishments of our scientists and engineers in this country
and by our contributions to the well being of other societies.
[Science, the report continued] possesses an objectivity which transcends dif-
ferences in political and social systems — its language, its methods and its ethics
are universal. It can therefore be a powerful tool for building understanding
among the peoples of the world and towards achieving eventual world
cooperation.
These two potentials of science, which often lead to conflicting conclusions, are
each significant factors in the formulation of policies to guide our international
scientific and technological activities.8
Two months later, Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the
United Nations, in a speech to a scientific group called attention to the
lag of policy behind technological advance :
Scientifically and technically [he said] the world has already become a single
community, yet in our ethical response to this fact and in our political institu-
tions we, governments and citizens, are lagging dangerously far behind you, the
scientists.
You have given us dangerous powers, but we have not yet learned to control
them. You have given us tools to abolish poverty, but we have not yet mastered
them. You have given us means to extend the span of human life, but this may
prove a curse, not a blessing, unless we can assure food, survival, and then health
and a good life for the bodies and minds of our exploding populations. You have
made the world small and interdependent, but we have not built the new institu-
tions to manage it — nor cast off the old institutions which scientific progress has
made obsolete.
Every great change wrought by science is foreshadowed years ahead in the
laboratory and on the drawing board. But it is not until the new device is fully
built and functioning, and has astonished the whole world, that we begin to think
of its human and political implications. We are forever running today to catch up
tomorrow with what you made necessary yesterday.9
Subsequently, Jerome B. Wiesner, in his capacity as Director of
the Office of Science and Technology, told the Military Operations
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations in
1962, the "Swift emergence of science and technology as vital instru-
ments of national policy" involved "forces that will determine our
future, will shape the balance of power among nations, influence our
military security, facilitate our success in achieving foreign policy ob-
jectives, provide the vigor for our domestic economy, and guarantee
the health of our citizens.*' He went on :
In an era of explosive growth and international tensions that evoke an unprec-
edented demand on our total resources — physical and intellectual — there is need
to make most effective use of our total technical resources.
We are faced with two realities : The increasing role of science and technology
in policy decision making, and the increasing federal support for research and
development. These two aspects are sometimes contrasted as the role of science in
government and the role of government in science. While they are clearly related,
it is important to recognize that they often pose quite different problems.10
President John F. Kennedy, in a speech to the National Academy of
Sciences, October 22, 1963, called "wholehearted understanding today
8 U.S. Federal Council for Science and Technology. "International Scientific and Tech-
nological Activities." A report to the Federal Council for Science and Technology by
its International Committee, June 20, 1961. (For Authorized Committee Use, Mimeo,
1961, p. 1.)
9 Adlai E. Stevenson, "Science, Diplomacy, and Peace." Remarks by Adlai E. Stevenson.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Made before the International Astronomical
Union at Berkeley, California, August 15, 1961. Department of State Bulletin (Septem-
ber 4. 1961), pp. 402-3.
10 Jerome B. Wiesner. "The Federal Role in Science and Technology." Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (November 1962), p. 42.
12
of the importance of pure science" the distinguishing feature of the
twentieth century in the United States. It Avas well established, he
said, that progress in technology depended on progress in theory.
Science had emerged from a peripheral concern of Government to
active partnership.
I would suggest that science is already moving to enlarge its influence in three
general ways: in the interdisciplinary area, in the international area, and in the
intercultural area. For science is the most powerful means we have for the unifi-
cation of knowledge, and a main obligation of its future must be to deal with prob-
lems which cut across boundaries, whether boundaries between the sciences,
boundaries between nations, or boundaries between man's scientific and his hu-
mane concerns.
[Continued the President:] Every time you scientists make a major invention,
we politicians have to invent a new institution to cope with it, and almost invari-
ably these days, and happily, it must be an international institution.11
5. Impact of Nuclear and Rocket Technologies on World Outlook
The two principal innovations that intensified awareness of the
relevance of science and technology for diplomacy in the Twentieth
Century were atomic energy and artificial earth satellites. The first led
to creation of the Atomic Enerffv Commission, the Office of Naval Re-
search and other military research agencies, and the National Science
Foundation. The second produced the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the
Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense,
and a much-expanded science organization in the Executive Office of
the President; the emphasis resulting from these actions led in turn
to the designation of a number of Assistant Secretaries for Science
and Technology (or equivalent) in old-line departments. The litera-
ture responding to the two notable scientific/ technological achieve-
ments contains many references to their international impact, of which
the following are representative :
Bernard M. Baruch:
My Fellow-Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and my
Fellow-Citizens of the World,
We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead.
That is our business.
Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hoi>e which, seized upon
with faith, can work our salvation. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect
World Peace or World Destruction."
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles:
The United Nations Charter now reflects serious inadequacies. One inade-
quacy sprang from ignorance. When we were in San Francisco in the Spring of
1945, none of us knew of the atomic bomb which was to fall on Hiroshima on
August 6, 1945. The Charter is thus a pre-Atomic Age Charter. In this sense it
was obsolete before it actually came into force. As one who was at San Francisco,
I can say with confidence that if the delegates there bad known that the mysteri-
ous and immeasurable power of the atom would be available as a means of mass
11 U.S. President (John P. Kennedy). "Address at the Anniversary Convocation of the
National Academy of Sciences." Speech given October 22, 196:5. in Public Papers of the
Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1963. (Washington, r.s. Government Printing Office, 1964),
PP. 802 •".
« Opening salutation by Bernard M. Baruch to United Nations Atomic Energy Com-
mission, June 14, 1040, before Introducing his plan for the International control of atomic
energy.
13
destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament and the
regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic.18
Secretary of State Dean Rusk :
Today the United States has operational weapons in its arsenal hundreds of
times as destructive as that first atom bomb. The Polaris and Minuteman missiles
are armed with warheads tens of times as powerful. The Soviets also have weap-
ons of great destructive power.
The hard fact is that a full-scale nuclear exchange could erase all that man has
built over the centuries. War has devoured itself because it can devour the
world. * * *
No responsible man will deny we live in a world of vast and incalculable
risks. Where decisions may be required in minutes, we must be constantly on
guard against the accident or miscalculation that can lead where no one wants to
go. A local conflict anywhere around the globe in which the interests of the great
powers are engaged might suddenly pose the prospect of nuclear war.14
Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson :
* * * We have lost an important battle in technology. That has been demon-
strated by the satellites that are whistling above our heads.13
Unanimous statement by Senate Preparedness Subcommittee:
We began with a simple — but revolutionary — fact. It was that for the first
time in all history a manmade satellite was placed into orbit around the earth.
There were many who realized that this was an inevitable development of the
march of science. But the circumstances under which it happened were startling
and brought into sharp focus facts which had been known previously but not
fully appreciated.
We had expected to be first with this achievement. In fact, we have yet to prove
second. * * *
From the beginning, however, it developed that there was much more at stake
than the prestige of being "first". * * *
[This achievement by the Soviet Union 1 has two important implications.
First, it demonstrates beyond question that the Soviet Union has the propulsive
force to hurl a missile from one continent to another.
Second, the Soviet Union has gathered basic information about outer space.
* * * It can now be said:
* * * The Soviet Union has led the world into outer space. * * *
We are engaged in a race for survival and we intend to win that race. But the
truly worthwhile goal is a world of peace — the only world in which there will
also be security.
The immediate objective is to defend ourselves. But the equally important
objective is to reach the hearts and minds of men everywhere so the day will come
13 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the American Bar Asso-
ciation, August 26, 1953. However, according to Bernhard G. Bechhoefer ["Postwar Nego-
tiations for Arms Control," Brookings Institution, 1961, p. 28] : "Dulles' statement that
the delegates at San Francisco knew nothing of the bomb is not literally correct." Among
those present who knew were Secretary of State Stettinius, Assistant Secretary of War
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Artemus Gates, Assistant Secretary of
State Clement Dunn, British Ambassador Lord Halifax, and perhaps others.
14 "Statement of Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State." In U.S. Congress. Senate. Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the * * * on
Executive M. 88th Congress, 1st Session. The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on
behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 12, 13, 14, 15, 19,
20, 21. 22, 23, 26, and 27, 1963. 88th Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1963), p. 12.
15 Statement by Chairman Lyndon B. Johnson to Preparedness Investigating Subcom-
mittee Nov. 25, 1957. (The Sputnik had been launched Oct. 4, 1957.) In U.S. Congress.
Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs. Hear-
ings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the * * * Part I. Novem-
ber 25, 26, 27, December 13, 14, 16, and 17, 1957, January 10, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20,
21 and 23, 1958. 85th Congress, first and second sessions. (Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1958), p. 3.
14
when the ballistic missile will be merely a dusty relic in the museums of mankind
and men everywhere will work together in understanding.16
House Concurrent Resolution 326 :
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the
Congress of the United States believes that the nations of the world should join
in the establishment of plans for the peaceful exploration of outer space, should
ban the use of outer space for military aggrandizement, and should endeavor to
broaden man's knowledge of space with the purpose of advancing the good of
all mankind rather than for the benefit of one nation or group of nations. * * * a
Representative John W. McCormack :
Mr. McCormack. Mr. Speaker * * * This resolution represents the unanimous
views of the members of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Explo-
ration. * * * The resolution * * * expresses the sense of the Congress that the
United States should strive, through the United Nations or such other means
as may best be appropriate, for international agreements designed to accomplish
these purposes. * * * But it is impossible to analyze man's forthcoming explora-
tion of space solely in terms of such technological benefits ; its scope and mean-
ing for man and his development far transcend such calculations. Not least
among the possibilities of this great adventure is the potentiality of a reemphasis
in men's hearts of the common links that bind the members of the human race
together and the development of a strengthened sense of community of interest
which quite transcends national boundaries. It is my belief that in such a develop-
ment lies our strongest hope of world peace and the security necessary to live in
happiness and prosperity. * * * But * * * attempts to project nationalistic rival-
ries beyond the earth's boundaries cannot but lead to a perpetuation of exist-
ing world tensions and the increased likelihood of war. * * * Our country must
cast the weight of its great influence and leadership firmly on the side of peaceful
international cooperation * * *.18
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson :
We should, certainly, make provisions for inviting together the scientists of
other nations to work in concert on projects to extend the frontiers of man and to
find solutions to the troubles of this earth. * * * It would be appropriate and
fitting for our Nation to demonstrate its initiative before the United Nations by
inviting all member nations to join in this adventure into outer space together.
The dimensions of space dwarf our national differences on earth.58
6. Further Contemporary Evaluations
The role of science as a medium of international communication was
recognized by Representative George P. Miller, chairman of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, in a statement to a seminar of
the Foreign Service Institute, early in 1965. Said Chairman Miller :
Now, let me proceed to a facet of Congressional relationship with science and
technology that holds great promise to ourselves and is, no doubt, of immediate
interest to you — that is, in the field of international relations. I believe that one of
10 Unanimous statement by Preparedness Subcommittee ("Statement of the Senate
preparedness Subcommittee Issued by Chairman Lyndon I?. Johnson and Ranking Minority
Member Styles bridges at the Direction of the Subcommittee") January ".'(, 1958. in
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile
Programs. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of tin- • * *
Reports of Secretary of Defense on Accomplishments of Defense Department on Recom
■ Herniations of the Preparedness Subcommittee dated January 23, 1 !>;">s. Tart III. Feb-
ruary 26, April .'{, and July 24, 1958. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1958J, P- 2427.
17 House Concurrent Resolution 320, which passed the House June 2, 19T>N, was favor-
ably reported by unanimous vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. June 1<).
1!»TiS, and was agreed to by the Senate on July 2'A, 1958. Ttl I'.S. Congress. Senate. Special
Committee on space and Astronautics. Final Report of the * * * Pursuant to 8. Bee. 856
uj tin H.'ith Congress. Senate Report NO. 100, March 11, 1959. 86th Congress, first session.
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office; 1959), p. 17.
'"John W. McCormack. "Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful
Exploration of Outer space." statement of the lion. John \v. McCormack on the floor
Of the House, in support of House Concurrent Resolution '.W>, June 2, 1958. Congressional
Record (June 2, 1958), p. 9912.
' • Address by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before a meeting of the Columbia Broad-
casting System Affiliates, Shoreham Hotel. Washington, i>.c. January 14, 1958. At that
time he was chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics.
15
the most important characteristics of science is that it can be, and usually is,
outside the realm of politics. It has provided us areas of peaceful dialogue and co-
operation between ourselves, our friends and our potential enemies that have
hardly been possible in any other field of activity. The International Geophysical
Year programs were great testimony to this fact.20
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
who had been the first Presidential science adviser following the Sput-
nik success of the Soviet Union, told the same Seminar that the inte-
gration of science and technology into foreign policy was a practical
imperative. There was a "diplomatic opportunity to grasp a powerful
new lever to advance our national interest in the world arena."
The United States [he continued] has exceptional technical resources that are
understood all over the world, both by advanced peoples and by less-advanced
peoples. This scientific and technological strength is among the most conspicuous,
most admired, and most persuasive features on the American landscape * * *.
In this technology and the education which supports it, lies a unique diplomatic
opportunity, if we can but cultivate the complicated skills and understanding
required to exploit it, and create the condition where this skill and understanding
can be made really at home in agencies concerned with affairs abroad. The power
of our science and technology to serve national goals at home and abroad also
presents to the Department of State a compelling reason to pursue policies
designed to maintain and augment this quality.21
However, Dr. Killian also took note of the fact that fewer than 150
of the members of the Foreign Service have "majored in the sciences,
engineering, or mathematics"; he called this number "disappointingly
small."
Scientists in the United States have become keenly aware of the
expanding scope and reach of scientific inquiry. A report by the Com-
mittee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, of the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science, in 1965, warned
that "The entire planet can now serve as a scientific laboratory." 22
Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, in a speech in 1966, called attention to the essential international-
ism of science, which he said "may ultimately be mankind's greatest
blessing." He offered two reasons for this belief.
The first, and more obvious, is that international cooperation in science will
accelerate those advances of mankind which, if applied wisely and equally around
the world, will help to eliminate the causes of political and economic strife.
The second idea is that internationality in science extends the rational
processes of science to other human activities in all countries, and that the
ascendancy of scientists within their respective countries will influence national
leaders and their people to deal with problems in a more rational and hence more
peaceful and productive way * * *. If we view science in its broadest terms, that
is, as a highly organized and penetrating pursuit of knowledge and truth, some
good is going to come by having the attitudes and approaches of science applied
to other areas.
As an example of necessary international cooperation, he called
attention to the growth of "big science," whose researches "demand
20 Hon. George P. Miller. "Legislative Scientific Committees." Address by the Hon.
George P. Miller, Chairman, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, January 12,
1965. Made at Foreign Service Institute Seminar. In U.S. Department of State. Science,
Technology, and Foreign Affairs. Report on the Seminar held at the Foreign Service
Institute, January 11 to February 2, 1965. Prepared by L. R. Audrieth, Visiting Pro-
fessor of Science Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute, and H. I. Chinn, Science Officer,
International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State. (Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5.
21 Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., "Science in the State Department: A Practical Impera-
tive." Address by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation, M.I.T., Janu-
ary 11. 1965. Made at Foreign Service Institute Seminar. In Ibid., pp. 42—43.
22 "The Integrity of Science : A Report by the AAAS Committee on Science in the Pro-
motion of Human Welfare." American Scientist (No. 53, 1965), p. 191.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1
16
large facilities and expensive equipment, beyond the financial means
of many individual scientific organizations and even many nations." **
Speaking as Secretary of State to the Panel on Science and Tech-
nology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Jan-
uary 24, 1967. Dean Rusk described the need to deal more explicity with
the "uncharted region where the interests of science and foreign policy
meet" :
For any American involved in public affairs today [he said], scientific literacy
is a must ; and that is particularly so in foreign affairs. We are firmly convinced
that the Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts,
and the purposes of science. He should be able to grasp the social and economic
implication of current scientific discoveries and engineering accomplish-
ments. * * *
But the burden is not all on one side. Scientists and engineers must, of course,
recognize very real progress in many fields outside their own specialties, and they
should be conscious of the difference between the values of society and the verifi-
able truths of the natural sciences. For such men there is a role in the foreign
policy process.
Secretary Rusk also spoke of the need to look ahead, in appraising
future prospects and opportunities in science and technology as these
impact on the foreign policy process : "We cannot clearly foresee the
advances, discoveries, and innovations which lie ahead, but the uses to
which we put the new knowledge in our human relationships may well
be critical." It was necessary to "* * * examine some aspects of the
changing modern environment which are of direct concern to foreign
affairs, many of which can only be dealt with internationally." As
examples, he suggested the pollution of the atmosphere, population
pressures, the spread of nuclear power reactors, the need for a "co-
operative assault on the treasure chest of the seas," the "challenges of
our space environment," and assistance to the developing countries in
building a base for their technological competence. He also called for
an "alliance of the natural sciences with the social sciences in meeting
new facets of old problems in the world laboratory." **
Caryl P. Haskins, president of the Carnegie Institution of Wash-
ington, has called for a "scientific revolution" among the developing
countries as a means of spurring their advance. While there were
material reasons for his proposal, it was in the "* * * qualities of
science as a structure of communication, of philosophy, of faith that
we find the deepest reasons."
Without a living science, the new countries will have no access to the cultural
world fraternity that the fabric of scientific understanding implies. They will not
share in the lofty concepts that form the priceless heritage of the scientifically
literate peoples. They will be denied access to one of the significant assurances that
there is an inherent logic, an underlying stability, unifying the currents of scien-
tific and technical change that so alarmingly threaten to engulf them. * * *
Finally, an original science demands, as it also stimulates, the development of
the critical and creative habits of mind that are essential to the leadership of the
23 Glenn T. Seaborj,'. "What's Ahead for International Science V Article based upon
• i Bpeech delivered at the International Conference on Nuclear Physics held in Gatlinburg,
Tennessee, September 13, 1966. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1067), \>. 26.
-'Dean Kusk. "Science and Foreign Affairs." Keynote address made before Hie eighth
annual Panel on Science and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, by the Hon. Dean Kusk, Secretary of State, January 24, 1!»<!7. Department of
state Bulletin (February 13, 19G7), pp. 238-242.
17
new nations in every field — the unfettered, flexible, empirical view so essential
if the nations they lead are to survive and grow.83
On a related subject, Herman Pollack, as Director of International
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, has ob-
served that
The realization that the vigor of a nation's economy is now largely dependent
upon the quality of and the use to which it puts its science and technology has
given rise to international comparisons of technological proficiency and in turn
to the problem of the "technological gap." This today is as meaningful to a diplo-
mat as were comparisons of the size of standing armies several generations ago.
The brain drain is no longer merely an interesting phenomenon. It has acquired
the status of a political issue and a fairly hot one, at that.26
President Nixon, in a formal statement on "United States Foreign
Policy for the 1970's," addressing himself mainly to the political
aspects of the subject, called attention to the importance of science
and technology for international relations. In military science, he
observed that "We are now entering an era in which the sophistica-
tion and destructiveness of weapons present more formidable and
complex issues affecting our strategic posture." In the field of arms
control, he warned that "Modern technology makes any balance
precarious and prompts new efforts at ever higher levels of com-
plexity." Moreover, "The spread of technological skills knows no
national boundaries; and innovation in weaponry is no monopoly of
the superpowers." And more generally, "Unprecedented scientific
and technological advances as well as explosions in populations,
communications, and knowledge require new forms of international
cooperations." 27
Earlier, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly,
Sept. 2, 1969, the President had urged that body to come to grips
with several important challenges with an important scientific and
technological content. Said the President, in part:
We can only guess at the new scientific discoveries that the seventies may bring.
But we can see with chilling clarity the gap that already exists between the
developed economies and the economies of the developing countries and the urgent
need for international cooperation in spurring economic development.
If in the course of that Second Development Decade we can make both signifi-
cant gains in food production and significant reductions in the rate of population
growth, we shall have opened the way to a new era of splendid prosperity. If we
do only one without the other, we shall be standing still ; and if we fail in both,
great areas of the world will face human disaster.
Increasingly, the task of protecting man's environment is a matter of inter-
national concern. Pollution of air and water, upsetting the balance of nature —
these are not only local problems, and not only national problems, but matters
that affect the basic relationships of man to his planet.
25 Caryl P. Haskins. "Technology, Science, and American Foreign Policy." Foreign
Affairs (January 1962), p. 239.
26 Herman Pollack. "Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department." Address at
the University of Illinois Centennial Colloquium on Science and Human Affairs, May 17,
1967, by Herman Pollack, then Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological
Affairs, Department of State. Reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, June 19,
1967. In "Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department," Reprint. Department of
State Publication 8204 (July 1967), p. 3.
27 l\S. President (Richard Nixon), United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New
Strategy for Peace. A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 18,
1970. Released from Office of the White House Press Secretary, Mimeo (February 18,
1970), pp. 7, 106, 110-111.
18
The United Nations already is planning a conference on the environment in
1972. I pledge the strongest support of the United States for that effort. I hope
that even before then we can launch new national and international initiatives
toward restoring the balance of nature and maintaining our world as a healthy
and hospitable place for man.
Of all man's great enterprises, none lends itself more logically or more eom-
pellingly to international cooperation than the venture into space. * * * We are
just beginning to comprehend the benefits that space technology can yield here on
earth. And the potential is enormous.
For example, we now are developing earth resource survey satellites, with the
first experimental satellite to be launched sometime early in the decade of the
seventies.
Present indications are that these satellites should be capable of yielding data
which could assist in as widely varied tasks as these : the location of schools of
fish in the oceans, the location of mineral deposits on land, and the health of agri-
cultural crops. * * * We shall be putting several proposals in this respect before
the United Nations.28
Columnist James Reston epitomized the matter : "The New Science
has created a New Diplomacy." 29
In summary, science and technology have effected changes in the
substantive tasks of foreign policy, in the methodology of diplomacy,
in the management of information on which diplomacy is based, in the
intellectual training of diplomats, in the range of present options of
negotiators, and in the prospects for future evolution of diplomacy,
foreign policy objectives, and the international political system.
Science and technology cannot be mere disciplines added to the cur-
riculum of Foreign Service Officers, or services to be rendered by an
appointed officer or unit of country teams. On the contrary, they are
an essential and major ingredient of many aspects of foreign policy,
diplomatic relations, and international behavior. The need is clearly
evident for improved understanding of the underlying and future
significance of scientific and technological developments and their
relation to basic patterns in the formulation and conduct of interna-
tional policy.
Accordingly, Chairman Clement J. Zablocki of the House Commit-
tee on International Relations and its Subcommittee on International
Security and Scientific Affairs (acting as chairman of the latter, then
named the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments) , in a letter of September 1969 to the Director of the
Legislative Service, called for this study in the following terms:
Hearings held by the Sul)eommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments during the past year while I have been Chairman have convinced
me of the pressing need for greater coordination between science and diplomacy
if the United States is to conduct a successful foreign policy. Time after time the
Subcommittee has been told of scientific and technological developments with
significant international ramifications, for which little or no policy planning
has been done.
The current conditions cannot continue if the United States is to maintain a
posture of resi>onsible leadership in international affairs. We must begin to
do the hard thinking necessary to bring our technical abilities and our diplomatic
skills into concert.
28 U.S. President (Richard Nixon). "Strengthening the Total Fabric of Pence." Address
made before the "4th session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, NY.,
on Sept. 18, 1!m;9. Department of State Bulletin (October C, 1969), p. 301.
™New York Times (Sunday, Dec. 13, 1964), p. 8E.
19
Definitions of Terms
1. Science and Technology
Every study that treats of the interactions of science or technology
with culture encounters the same problem of characterizing the various
descriptive terms relating to science and its exploitation. In an earlier
study by the Legislative Reference Service, an effort was made to
clarify the relationship of basic and applied research with technology.
The concept expressed there was that basic research has as its goal the
discovery of facts about nature. It was structured into such disciplines
as physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy; into such subdisci-
plines as solid state physics, inorganic chemistry, and solar astronomy ;
and into such integrating disciplines as physical chemistry, astro-
physics, and ecology.
Applied research was defined as the use of information about nature,
derived from basic research, and employed to make feasible some
social goal or to create new technological options for man. It was
structured in two ways: (1) into loose categories of like fields or sub-
ject disciplines, such as meteorology, metallurgy, electronics, agron-
omy; these overlapped with (2) subject categories suggesting purpose
or mission, such as transportation, communications, materials, and
standards. All goals of applied research were observed to aim at a
single overriding objective, which was to develop ways to improve
man's compatibility with his environment.
The products of applied research are thus options which man can
exploit by means of technology. Broadly, these options appear to fall
into four categories of technology, as follows:
1. Physical modification of man. — An improvement in the
feasibility of man's capability to adapt himself to his environment
by physical changes of his own structure.
2. Application of natural resources. — An improvement in the
feasibility of man's exploitation of the resources of nature to
change the physical environment to render it more compatible
with man.
3. Environmental restoration. — An improvement in the feasi-
bility of corrective actions to restore the physical environment by
reversing impairments wrought by man or by natural forces.
4. The, social environment. — An improvement in the feasibility
of actions by man to enhance his compatibility as an element of
the changing social/human environment.30
In this concept, the effects of basic science take the form of con-
tributions to culture — an appreciation of the universe of man in all
its natural laws and relationships. The effects of applied research are
30 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Technical Information
for Congress. Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the
* * * Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress, April 25, 1969. House Document No. 91-137, 91st Congress, first ses-
sion. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969). p. 11. For a more extended
definition of the terms "basic research," "applied research," and "technology," see : U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Science Policy : A Working Glos-
sary [Third Edition — 197-6], Prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research and
Technology by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service,
Librarv of Congress, March 1976. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Com-
mittee print.) pp. 56, 57, 82.
20
opportunities. Only in technology does the system of science make
tangible and material impacts upon human affairs. Technology is
thus the cutting edge of science, the point at which economic and
political decisions are required, as to whether an innovation is com-
patible with the needs and limitations of society. Basic science can
reveal information about the passage of pure water through a mem-
brane; applied science can develop information as to which mem-
branes work best to separate water from dissolved salts; technology
provides a desalting plant.
The relationship of technology to domestic and foreign affairs is
limitless. It encompasses almost all forms of foreign aid, military
hardware, arms control, the extraction of minerals, agricultural tech-
nology, transportation and communications systems, exploitation of
the seas and the ocean floor. It raises questions as to the reshaping
of social institutions to accommodate new capabilities of man, whether
to feed his expanding numbers by the "Green Revolution" or to achieve
peace through "balance of terror." Industrial production and gross
national product are only two of many measures of the application of
technology; others are the satisfaction man can take from his control
or his preservation of his own environment.
Almost all forms of technology pass over international boundaries.
The beneficial effects are eagerly sought in East and West. Moreover,
the sometimes adverse second-order consequences of technology (such
as pollution, noise, risk of accident, and the like) are felt in all countries
where technology takes root. As with science, the interest in technology
is international, and diplomatic concern is warranted for both its
benefits and its costs.
2. Diplomacy
The word diplomacy in this study stands for the broad function of
making and carrying out foreign policy, and the word diplomat is used
for a person engaged in this function. While scientists may sometimes
be diplomats, in this study the term will be used to identify those
whose primary training, interest, and work is in international political
problems as apart from scientific or technological problems. It includes
not only those who negotiate with other nations directly but also
participants in the foreign policy making machinery within the United
States.
The background of diplomats, in this sense of the word, may be
quite varied. The preparation for a traditional diplomatic career in
the Foreign Service has been a liberal arts education, with much of the
specific knowledge and skills acquired through experience in the State
Department or at posts abroad, supplemented by brief courses at the
Foreign Service Institute. However, many who are engaged in the
political and economic aspects of foreign policy are not in the Foreign
Service and have never served abroad. They may be generalists or
specialists in some geographic area or functional field, and some —
including the President, many ambassadors, heads of agencies, and
.Members of Congress — may have achieved their influential positions
in the making of foreign policy primarily because they were active in
politics, lather than because of their academic background or expert-
ness in any international activity.
21
The Context of the Study
1. The /Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy Formulation
The classical method of the conduct of international relations by the
United States as well as other nations was through diplomatic repre-
sentatives stationed in national capitals. The President was in charge
of the dealings with other countries, assisted primarily by the Secretary
and Department of State. From the beginning, however, the making of
foreign policy in the United States has not been a simple matter of
information and decisions flowing up and down a chain of command
within the Executive Branch. In establishing a democratic republic,
the drafters of the Constitution built checks and balances into the
system of making foreign policy as well as into other areas. Senatorial
approval was made a requirement for all treaties and appointments
of ambassadors. Congress as a whole was given several major powers
directly related to foreign policy, such as the power to declare war, to
raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and to
regulate foreign commerce, as well as the responsibility for making all
laws and appropriating funds. The people of the United States could
also make their voice heard through communications and elections
and thus were an important factor.
As profound technological and political changes occurred in the
middle of the twentieth century and the United States increased its
participation and leadership in world affairs, the conduct of Ameri-
can diplomacy became far more complex. New agencies such as the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency, were established to cope
with specific problems or handle special programs in the foreign
affairs field. Older agencies such as the Department of Agriculture,
the Department of Commerce, and the defense establishment found
themselves increasingly involved in foreign affairs. The National
Security Council and other groups were formed to help advise the
President or to coordinate activities relating to foreign affairs spread
throughout the Government.
Official contacts with foreign governments were no longer made
almost entirely through ambassadors and other members of the foreign
service. Large numbers of Americans traveled abroad in a wide
variety of capacities, and an increasing number of foreign visitors
came to the United States. Membership in numerous international
organizations, such as the United Nations, made multilateral diplo-
macy increase vastly in importance. Rapid transportation facilitated
meetings between chiefs of state and other high government officials,
and instantaneous communication made it possible for messages of
foreign policy importance to be carried directly between both the lead-
ers and the people of different nations outside of traditional diplomatic
channels. Diplomacy, once the narrow task of a few high officials and
a select few in the Foreign Service, expanded into a broad effort
involving a large part of the Government as a whole.
2. Goals of American Foreign Policy
Before taking up the question as to the place of science and tech-
nology in advancing the goals of American diplomacy, it may be
22
useful to explore some relevant goals of American foreign policy.
There are overall goals, variously expressed, of American foreign
policv toward which all foreign policy actions are more or less directed,
but they may seem too vague or Utopian to be helpful. While there is
no single document accepted by all Americans as the official declara-
tion of foreign policy goals, there is a consensus on what the ultimate
goals are. These might be summarized as a world of peace and freedom,
or a peaceful world order in which justice and freedom prevail, or a
world in which the United States may exist in peace and security.
Within these broad goals there are more specific objectives. The
promotion Qf mutual understanding and friendly relations, further
progress toward a sound and expanding world economy, the wider
application of international law, the reduction and control of arma-
ments and the building of collective security systems, for example, are
objectives through which the United States is seeking to attain a
world of peace and freedom. These objectives in turn may be broken
down into still more specific components such as, in the case of the
reduction and control of armaments, regulation of the military use
of the ocean bed or outer space. Defining foreign policy goals in each
case will go hand in hand with the process of determining how science
and foreign policy are interrelated. Among the questions which might
be asked are: To what degree are the goals of science and foreign
policy in specific cases the same or different ? Who formulates the goals
in each case? Can foreign policy goals be as clear as scientific goals?
How are priorities determined when there is conflict between a scien-
tific goal and a foreign policy goal, or between different foreign policy
objectives when science and technology can be applied to strengthen
one or the other?
3. The Growing Importance of Science and Technology in U.S. Culture
The importance of basic science for technological advance is well
established: it provides essential new information and ideas, training
in underlying principles and new concepts of hardware, laboratory
skills, and an attitude of receptivity of innovation. In the long run,
the disclosures of basic scientific research may be the most momentous
factor in social change, and political decisions concerning the support
of this research may be of the highest consequence. However, the
effects on society of technology are more obvious and immediate than
those of science.
Agricultural technology in this century has brought farm families
down from 50 percent to less than 5 percent of the population while
cultivated land shrank and production rose. The application of tech-
nology to personal transportation brought into being the dominant
industry in the Nation, restructured the city and altered the social
role and values of the family. Public health, medical drugs, and pesti-
cides have enabled a worldwide increase in populations, raising life
expectancy almost everywhere. Communication technology has
spawned business enterprises extending into many political jurisdic-
tions, a large television industry for home entertainment, and infor-
mation flows that are national — and often international — in their
reach. The coupling of computers with wire communications serves as
an ever-increasing part of the population with bank records, billings,
23
and access to data bases, giving to the time-sharing computer network
the character of a public utility. Abundant electrical energy is taken
for granted in modern society.
Government concern with the stimulation of science and the uses of
technology has greatly intensified in the Twentieth Century. Basic
scientific research, mainly in the universities, relies to a large extent
on Government sponsorship. In fields of applied science and techno-
logical development, virtually every agency of Government has found
some role to play. For many well-established technologies, Govern-
ment regulation has been found necessary, such as with rail and air
transport, electric power, radio, and pharmaceutical preparations. An-
other main interest of Government is in the stimulation of new tech-
nologies; specific technological tasks have been widely assigned within
the Government, such as weather modification, water desalting, coal
utilization, helium conservation, weather satellites, highway construc-
tion, high-speed trains, rapid excavation, communications satellites,
and marine resources exploitation.
On the other hand, defects or "second-order consequences'' of mod-
ern technology are receiving increasing public attention and present a
challenge to engineers to reduce the adverse effects of their innova-
tions. Modern issues center on pollution of the air ; pollution of streams,
oceans, and ground water; the spread of pesticides; eutrophication of
lakes ; disposal of solid wastes ; the effects of noise ; toxic chemicals in
general public use; the information explosion; invasion of personal
privacy ; the hazards of radiation ; the upsetting of the ecological bal-
ance ; automobile unsafety ; and, currently, the complex problems
created by a growing energy shortage relative to a dynamically ex-
panding pattern of energy utilization.
Cogent description of the organization of scientists and engineers
is beyond the scope of the study. The disciplines of science are prac-
ticed in the universities and foundations, in some Government labora-
tories, and to a degree in private, industry. Organizations of scientists,
mainly to exchange and disseminate information, are largely by dis-
ciplines, although interdisciplinary academies of sciences are active in
many regions. A large and loose federation of scientists and scientific
societies exists in the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. A more formal interface between science and Government is
provided by the National Academy of Sciences, which has access to all
scientific and technical societies through the medium of the National
Research Council. Contact of U.S. scientists with those abroad takes
many routes: direct person-to-person communication, through the
Scientific Unions, and through scientific groups under the aegis of the
United Nations, among others.
Organization of technologies is still further diversified. Technical
societies, along roughly disciplinary lines, abound — such as the Ameri-
can Society for Metals, the Society of Plastics Engineers, and the In-
stitute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. Other technological
societies have been formed along "mission" lines, such as the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, American Ordnance Asso-
ciation, and the American National Standards Institute. Since tech-
nology is a major activity in most private industrial corporations, its
24
concerns interlock with the economic interests of the business com-
munity generally. The increasing use of technology to support Govern-
ment programs has brought many agencies into direct working con-
tact with the complex private networks of technologists.
Since military programs absorb the bulk of governmental invest-
ment in technology, the organizational consequences are profound;
they include:
— The evolution of a "military-industrial complex*' with specialized
capabilities and needs ;
— The development of "systems techniques'' to make possible the
design and construction of advanced military weaponry of great
cost, complexity, and sophistication ;
— The evolution of numerous "think tanks'' using mathematical and
other analytical techniques to forecast requirements, develop
weapons concepts, examine alternative solutions to problems, and
evaluate progress.
The technologists also have their more formal point of contact with
the Government through the offices of the National Academy of En-
gineering, which shares with the Academy of Sciences the facilities
and resources of the National Research Council.
4,. Policy Formulation in Science and Technology
A study of "American science policy" by Wallace S. Say re, some
years ago, concluded that it was fragmented and unsystematic and
perhaps necessarily so. He wrote :
Unity and comprehensiveness are * * * not likely to be the hallmarks of
American science policy. Talk of a single, comprehensive "American science
policy" has an essentially fictitious quality. There will be many science policies,
rather than a master science policy. Diversity, inconsistency, compromise, experi-
mentation, pulling and hauling, competition, and continuous revision in science
policies are more predictable continuing characteristics than their antonyms.
This has been the history of American science policies and this describes their
present state of affairs as deplorable. But to live with diversity and accommoda-
tions of policy, and yet to be impatient of them, may be the process by which a
democratic society achieves progress in science as well as in other fields. In any
event, the future seems to offer American scientists more dilemmas than un-
equivocal answers in science policy.31
More recently, a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, in its "Reviews of National Science
Policy" series, concluded similarly, although its view of science in-
corporated both research and development. Said the OECD report:
The vast research and development enterprise, as it exists today [in the United
States], does not, therefore spring from a deliberate, coordinated endeavor to
make the most of the country's potential resources, but rather from scattered
initiatives, taken in haste to meet an emergency and prolonged by limited pro-
grammes. In many instances, the mobilisation of men and institutions and the
establishment of the necessary framework of political structures, have been
improvised ad hoc, as and when the needs dictated by the international situation
have been recognised. The goal of the United States, asserted since the Second
World War, has now become the maintenance and strengthening of its political,
economic, scientific and technical leadership. * * *
n Wallace 8. Bayre. "Scientists and American Science Policy." ( Reprinted from Science.
Vol. 133, Nil 3456, March 24, 1961, pp. 859 864.) /" Bernard Barber and Walter Hlrscb;
eds. The Sociology of Science. (New York. The Free Press of Qlencoe, 1002), p. 602. How-
ever, by Title I, "National Science. Engineering, and Technological Policy and Priorities",
of P.L. 94 2S2. approved May 11. 1!>7»>. the Congress undertook to reverse the position
taken by Sayre toward a "master" science policy.
25
The Federal Government has thus come to look upon the scientific and tech-
nical effort as a valuable instrument for achieving its political aims and it has
been led to assume primary responsibility for the development and success of
this undertaking.8"
With respect to the organization of policy institutions within the
Federal Government to effect this general aspiration, the OECD
report noted that there was a "plurality of institutions" without an
overall plan. It said :
The Executive and the Legislature have each laboured in their own field to
develop the scientific enterprise. They have done so in the light of their own
concrete problems, of defense or national security, of the country's prestige or
its internal affairs. Their concerns have not always been identical, and the priori-
ties adopted by the one have not always commended themselves to the other.
These different wills, though very often complementary, partly explain the
institutional diversity of the Federal science policy mechanism.
This Federal mechanism thus embodies two sets of bodies. The first forms part
of the inner workings of the Presidency, and especially of the Executive Office,
which takes a direct part in preparing the decisions of the President. The second
originates in the structure of Congress itself, which has equipped itself with
specialised bodies to carry out its mission of keeping a watch on the Administra-
tion and enforcing its own priorities. The two groups are engaged in a continuous
dialogue on the methods, means, and aims of the scientific enterprise.33
Although national science policy is a diffused responsibility, the
policy regarding technology is much more so. The exploitation of
technology is the business of most private companies, and is involved
in the programs of nearly every agency of Government. Accordingly,
almost every committee of Congress encounters technological issues
at some time. Technology is the physical means to many national
ends. Political leaders in the Congress and in the executive branch tend
to look to the. capabilities of technology — with its support in the more
basic sciences — to wipe out disease, achieve military security, extend
man's life, control the numbers of his progeny, eliminate the hazards
of accident and environmental degradation, insure economic growth
and stability, erase pockets of poverty, expand the utility of leisure
time, explore and utilize the oceans and outer space, and perpetuate
the resource base needed to feed, clothe, house, and equip man for
safety, comfort, and happiness.
5. Scientific and Technological Elements in International Relations
Science and technology are both a part of the substance of inter-
national relations and an influence on the processes of international
relations; they create objectives, influence the environment surround-
ing and conditioning issues, and open up future prospects for signifi-
cant further change that the process and conditions of diplomacy
must accommodate.
Substantively, science and technology create opportunities and
problems in the achievement of diplomatic goals, and sometimes
both together. In the exploitation of the seabed, for example, science
and technology provide stimulus for global research and cooperative
developmental ventures in a traditionally international environment,
and problems concerning soverign jurisdiction of new "territory." The
global spread of such polluting materials as DDT, radioactive wastes,
and the lead additive in hydrocarbon fuels, result from expanded
32 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "Reviews of National
Science Policy: United States." (Paris, OECD Publications, March 1968), pp. 23, 25.
33 Ibid., p. 62.
26
opportunity in agricultural production, energy generation, and human
mobility. However, their second-order effects as global pollutants have
begun to motivate concerted action among nations to preserve and
restore the world's natural environment. Science and technology are
called upon to contribute to the solution of such human problems as
the worsening food/population balance, the "information explosion."
and the worldwide problem of water resource management. Science
and technology have generated such diplomatic problems as the control
of atomic weaponry and radiation, the rapid spread of diseases vec-
tored by modern aircraft transportation, and the occurrence of crises
resulting from the instant global communication made possible by
modern electronics.
Science and diplomacy are intertwined in many other ways. The
multiplication of such global science programs as the International
Geophysical Year, World Weather Watch, and the International Bio-
logical Program, invariably have their diplomatic aspects. The IGY,
for example, led a chain of events that included the Antarctic Treaty,
progress in the use of satellites for space exploration, and the "Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,
and Under Water." The travel of scientists to frequent international
meetings, or personal consultation, or research abroad, increases the
need for services by the Department of State to help and support
American scientists in these activities. Scientists themselves participate
in unofficial, exploratory investigations of possible future diplomatic
opportunities, in such ventures as the "Pugwash Conferences.'' All
these international contacts among scientists and engineers are difficult
to evaluate as to their diplomatic consequences, but they are cerrainly
significant.
The methods of science and technology also offer support for the
conduct of diplomacy in the analysis and solution of international
problems. Investment in research is a continuing function of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for example. The factfind-
ing and hypothesis-testing methods of science have been advanced as
offering possible methodologies for the study of strategy, decisionmak-
ing, and information dissemination. Engineering techniques are com-
ing into use in the establishment and achievement of goals in foreign
aid and communications management. The use of cybernetics, systems
analysis, and PERT (program evaluation and review technique)
network analysis are suggested as having application to the manage-
ment of the huge flow of diplomatic information.
In view of the deep penetration of the substance, the problems, and
the methods of science and technology into American diplomacy, a
number of questions become salient. To what extent have the problems
generated by science and technology been assessed by the institutions
created to maintain U.S. diplomacy \ I low adequately stalled and sup-
ported are these institutions to exploit the potent ia lit ies of science and
technology in support of the objectives of U.S. diplomacy? What
problems and opportunities for the future are discernible as a result
of the great increase in the Government sponsorship of science and
technology? In what ways are the results of this expanded science and
technology beneficial for American diplomacy? In what ways are the
results injurious, or potentially so ( And again, what can be done for
the future \
27
Formai, Aspects of the Study
./. Scop* and Lim itations
As noted earlier, this study was undertaken at the request, in 1969, of
the then Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the
House International Relations Committee) . Thus, the focus throughout
is on the kinds of issues and outcomes that are of particular interest
to the committee and involve institutional mechanisms or policy con-
siderations particularly amenable to congressional review and per-
haps action. The substantive issues chosen for study are of importance
in terms of the recent past (since World War II), and involve ques-
tions in which some consensus has already been reached. Some em-
phasis has been placed on the roles, policies, and problems of U.S.
Government agencies participating in international scientific and
technological programs, and of international organizations (both gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental) in which the United States partici-
pates officially or nonofficially.
Subjects have been avoided in which the essence of the situation in-
volves extensive analysis of information denied to the general public,
although some classified information was reviewed for purposes of
background. Covert international activities, such as of the Central In-
telligence Agency, and Department of Defense international scien-
tific and technological policies and programs, also are not treated.
2. Methodology
The methodology used in this project is the case study approach.
By examining a selected set of cases and issues illustrating interac-
tions of science and technology with diplomacy, it may be possible
to derive insights for the Congress on how to devise policies and
mechanisms to improve U.S. resources for the management of these
interactions.
Use of the case study method enables different researchers to use
common and accepted concepts important in explaining decisionmak-
ing, and it facilitates critical review of the findings of each case by stu-
dents of policymaking. It also permits the surfacing of similar ob-
stacles, problems, and inefficiencies at the intersections of the Depart-
ment of State and other institutions, governmental or scientific, with
an international program content.
The case study method, in this project, is used to assess two kinds .
of interaction of science and technology with diplomacy ; one episodic
(called "cases"), the other continuing (called "issues"). The subjects
to be studied were chosen to provide an appreciation of the ways in
which modern science and technology have altered the environment,
the goals, the substance, the methodology, the organization, and the
personnel qualifications of American diplomats. The choice of items
for study has been guided by the following considerations :
(a) To point the way to a strengthening of support of the
diplomatic process over a broad spectrum of problems salient
and meaningful to the Congress ; and
(b) To demonstrate the workings of the various administrative
mechanisms that contribute to diplomacy, including factfinding,
28
information management, communication, problem-identification,
problem-analysis, policy decisionmaking, negotiation and media-
tion, and implementation feed-back.
Cases are defined as discrete, coherent, and manageable episodes
involving the interaction of science and technology with foreign
policy, which are, or are capable of being, encompassed within a single
program. Interactions of science and technology with diplomacy take
many forms. Episodic subjects chosen to represent these various inter-
actions are the international control of atomic energy; commercial
uses of atomic energy in Europe ; the Mekong Regional Development
Proposal; the United Nations and the sea bed; the International Geo-
physical Year; and United States-Soviet relations and technology
transfer.
The continuing issues are recurrent international problems or condi-
tions, with general, long-range goals and incremental or partial ease-
ments. They are discussed by the late Charles O. Lerche in the follow-
ing terms :
Within American foreign policy today there are a number of "continuing
issues." These are problems stemming from the general policy line the United
States has been pursuing that are peculiar in that they do not seem to permit
of any final resolution. Each has been met often within the context of a given
set of circumstances, but each change in the situational milieu has required that
new answers be given to the old questions.34
Among the examples suggested by Lerche were strategic weaponry
policy, arms control, foreign assistance, trade and tariff policy, and
psychological factors.
The continuing issues chosen for intensive analysis in this study are
expressed in such terms as understanding the evolution and interna-
tional political impacts of technology; influencing the level of world
health; achieving improvements in the food/population balance on a
global basis; understanding, evaluating, and redirecting the flow of
scientific and technical personnel from one country to another; ex-
amining the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Government programs
for sending U.S. scientists abroad; and improving the diplomatic
skills of scientists and the scientific understanding of diplomats.
Each of these cases and issues is dealt with in a separate chapter.
Parts 3 and 4 of the study entail analysis of all the "issues" and
"cases" to ascertain what generalizations might be drawn as to present
measures and resources for constructively relating science or technol-
ogy and American diplomacy.
Plan of the Study
In general, the issues selected for study are definable but open-
ended, of a continuing nature. They Have wide ramifications, and
require a careful selection of data to bring them into focus. Instead of
an outcome, they may reveal a general tendency or direction. The
cases, by contrast, are set in a shorter time frame. They tend to
be more sharply defined and discrete as problems, more precise in
scope, with some more measurable consequences. For the most part
they are essentially resolved as to their outcome.
** Charles 0. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People. Third Edition. (Englewood
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1U07), p. 223,
29
1. Criteria for the Selection of Issues
The specific criteria to be satisfied by each subject for study, as estab-
lished at the outset, are four in number. First. The subject should be
of substantial moment, and be regarded as such. Second. The subject
should have a significant technical content, so that it involves a prob-
lem of communication between the expert in the field and the gen-
eralist concerned with the diplomatic implications. Third. The prob-
lem should involve some aspect of "science in policy" or "policy in
science" ; that is, it should deal with the application of science or tech-
nology to advance some international policy of the United States, or
it should deal with some way in which U.S. science or technology is
sought to be strengthened by diplomatic action. Fourth. The subject
should have had sufficient continuity and persistence as a problem be-
fore the diplomatic community to enable observation of changes that
have occurred as a result of national action.
2. Format for the Exposition of Issues
An effort was made to achieve some degree of uniformity in the
organization of the various chapters on issues. The format adhered to,
as planned at the beginning of the project, is in general the following:
(a) Definition of the issue to be studied ;
(b) Significance of the issue in present and future contexts;
(c) How the issue developed;
(d) U.S. involvement in the issue;
(e) Congressional concern with the issue;
(/) Formulation of policy to influence the issue;
(g) Options available to the policymakers and prospects for
the future ; and
(h) Further questions posed by the issue.
Although consistency in treatment is advantageous, both for con-
venience in reading and for ease in subsequent comparison and analy-
sis of cases, nevertheless variation has been unavoidable. Respect for
the subject matter as well as independent authorship has inevitably
compelled some degree of departure from a superimposed outline.
3. Illustrative Questions Researched
In developing the individual discussion of the issues to be re-
ported on, attention was given to such questions as the following:
(a) In what different ways has the issue been characterized? What
conflicts arise out of different perceptions of it? Is there some kind of
time frame in which these different perceptions predominate?
(b) What is the place of the issue in the general matrix of foreign
policy? What priority of attention has been assigned to it at different
times?
(c) What are the significant interactions of the issue in question
with other policy elements? Does it benefit or threaten other national
policies or programs ?
(d) Has response to need been comprehensive or incremental? Is
the effort mounted to influence the issue a powerful and motivated
national effort, or is it being tackled bit by bit ?
(e) Has a clear and positive U.S. policy been evolved respecting the
issue? What is its place in the general structure of foreign policy?
(/) Has a technically sophisticated mechanism been developed for
choosing among alternative courses or options in achieving progress
30
in the problem ? Has the scientific-technological community been en-
listed in the development of a program? What does the literature of
this community say about the way the program has been developed,
and about its outcome ?
(g) What interactions have occurred between the United States and
multinational bodies, or foreign countries, in respect to the issue?
What is the documentation of international conversations? What sort
of joint action has been found feasible? What degree of understanding
as to methods and expected results ?
If.. Enumeration of the Issues
Six issues were chosen for study. They are as follows :
(1) Evolution of international technology. — A review of the emer-
gence of technology as a factor of change in international relations.
Under this heading are considered such factors as : The growing aware-
ness of the relevance of technology for diplomacy ; the practical separa-
tion of technology from science ; the relations between the international
exchange of technology and governmental and economic forms of
social organization; problems of technological transfer (from whom,
what, to whom, and how) ; U.S. organizations and programs to exploit
technology for advancement of foreign policy goals; recruitment and
training; successes; prospects.
(2) World medicine. — Long-range consequences of worldwide appli-
cation of medical sciences. Considered under this heading are such
factors as: An overview of medical advances of the past and their
impact on the world society, cultural and medical standards, perspec-
tives on the present state of medical knowledge, the dilemmas of
world medicine and national policy, national and international medical
organizations and programs, problems and prospects for the future.
(3) Food and population. — A study of the changing food/popula-
tion balance in developing countries. Under this heading will be con-
sidered such factors as : A review of historical evolution of formulation,
coordination, and administration of U.S. foreign assistance policies to
provide for adequate food resource development and management,
public-health services, stabilization of the population growth rate,
direct transfer of American technological expertise, U.S. policies in
support of the development of indigenous E. & D. capabilities to ad-
dress questions of the food/population balance, and obstacles (cultural,
social, political, economic, technical) to successful design and imple-
mentation of U.S. programs.
(4) Programs for sending U.8. scientists and technical personnel
abroad. — A study of the purposes, scope, accomplishments, problems,
and needs of the various Federal programs that sponsor the movement
of nongovernment scientists and technologists.overseas to teach and to
study.
(5) The "brain drain''' problem-. — Occurrence, consequences, and
issues of one-way flows of scientific manpower (including in this con-
text the entire array of basic and applied sciences and associated
technologies). Under this heading are considered: The development
of trained scientists at home and abroad, factors attracting scientists
to new areas, consequences of outflows and inflows of scientists, prob-
lems of retention and use of scientists, and administration of the forces
that influence scientist migrations.
31
(6) Science and technology in, the Department of State. — Under
this heading are considered such factors as: State Department organ-
ization and procedures for marshaling science and technology in sup-
port of both short-range and long-range U.S. foreign policy objectives,
educational programs and briefings on science and technology- for the
Foreign Service at home and abroad, organization of specialists in
science and technology within the Department of State and their re-
lations with generalists in the Department, opportunities and prob-
lems, and prospects for the future.
5. Criteria for the Selection of Cases
Being time-oriented and discrete, the cases are concerned with op-
erational matters and action decisions, and with the consequences of
these. They afford a somewhat different outlook from *he studies of
issues in the ways in which foreign policy is determined and imple-
mented in a variety of specific problems. Nevertheless, most of the
criteria applicable to the selection of issues for study apply also to the
cases. They need to be consequential, and regarded as such. They need
to have a substantial technical content. And they need to involve de-
cisions as to the uses of science or technology to further policy, or as
to the use of diplomatic measures to further some basic capability or
activity of science or technology.
Some additional criteria are of particular relevance in the selection
of the cases. Inasmuch as a number of fields involve sensitive and
classified matters, for which documentation would be difficult in an
unclassified study, these will be avoided. Then, the cases need to deal
with subjects that yield explicit findings of actions taken and their
results. They should illustrate both geographically-oriented and disci-
pline-oriented problems. Care has been taken to select a range of
cases to illustrate a range of institutional structures, kinds of tech-
nical expertise, and administrative concepts. Finally, the cases selected
all present the problem of time orientation in a dynamic subject-area;
that is, the timing of the action-decision and the timing of its imple-
mentation are relevant to the action and its results.
6. Form-at for the Presentation of Cases
An effort parallel to that applied to the issues was made to achieve
some degree of uniformity in the organization of the various chapters
dealing with cases. The format adhered to is in general the following :
(a) The environment of the case and its historical evolution;
(b) Definition and development of the problem;
(c) Organizational framework involved in dealing with the
problem ;
(d) Chronological account of the development of the problem;
(e) How the problem came to the attention of the decision-
making institution;
(/) Methods and procedures employed in the decision process;
(g) Description of the ultimate decision;
(h) Subsequent developments that flowed from the decision (its
implementation and the responses evoked) ;
(i) Evaluation of the decision in terms of the ultimate outcome ;
(j) Evaluation of the decisionmaking process, with particular
attention to its technical aspects;
(k) Further questions raised by the case.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-4
32
Here again, some departure from the outline has been unavoid-
able and probably desirable. The 6 cases have different authors and dif-
ferent content, and the subject matter has tended to determine the
organization and exposition of the findings.
7. Illustrative Questions To Be Researched
In documenting and analyzing the respective cases, authors were
guided by the following questions :
(a) How was the problem identified and characterized? Was its im-
portance perceived at the outset, or did it go through an evolutionary
process? Was the problem correctly identified at first, or did it emerge
from initial concern for some different issue ?
(b) How timely was the identification of the problem? Was it per-
ceived in time to take effective, constructive action or action after the
fact? How did the identification of the problem relate to the con-
temporary political climate and the climate of public opinion ?
(c) What difficulties were encountered with communication in ap-
proaching and analyzing the problem ? Did technical content obscure
the political question or did political content obscure the technical
problem ?
(d) What difficulties were encountered in separating, and giving
separate treatment to, the technical and political aspects? Were the
decisionmakers able to coordinate the treatment of both together?
(e) What was the nature of the decision, and how did it relate to the
various possible alternatives available ? Were the various alternatives
fairly evaluated? Were the decision criteria appropriate to the prob-
lem ? Were all voices heard ?
(/) How timely was the decision? Did the technical difficulties delay
action unnecessarily ? Were opportunities lost ?
(g) How stable has the decision proved to be? Were the intended
purposes accomplished ? Have alternatives emerged subsequently that
later opinion would have preferred ?
(h) How effective was the decisionmaking process used? Did it deal
comprehensively and accurately with the alternatives, their technical
assessment, and their political evaluation ?
8. Enumeration of the Cases Researched
The 6 cases chosen for study are as follows :
(1) The international control of atomic energy. — The events follow-
ing the initial use in warfare of atomic weaponry, and the evolution of
the Acheson report and the Baruch plan.
(2) Commercial uses of atomic energy in Europe. — Events sur-
rounding the Eisenhower initiative for nuclear sharing, the evolution
of the International Atomic Energv Agency, and the events that re-
sulted from these actions.
(3) The International Geophysical Year. — Interactions of the In-
ternational Council of Scientific Unions, national scientific institu-
tions, and national governments. Origins of the program. Conduct of
the planning process. The roles of the Department of State, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. As-
sessment of t lie scientific and political consequences.
(4) The Mekong Regional Development Proposal,— Events that led
to the proposal by President Johnson for a comprehensive, integrated
multinational, aid program for Vietnam, as an initiative to end the
33
conflict there, expressed in his speech at Johns Hopkins University.
Assessment of the Mekong project itself as example of the opportuni-
ties and problems of the multinational regional approach to integrat-
ing technological achievement and social policy.
(5) The United Nations and the Seabed. — Interactions of national
sovereignty with international technology in an international environ-
ment. Attempted resolution of the issue of territorial limits. Problems
created by the case seen as political and diplomatic rather than techno-
logical, although it is technology that makes the case important.
(6) U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations. — Exploratory assessment of
the political and economic costs and benefits of the emerging trade re-
lationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and of the
transfer of technology from the former to the latter.
9. Organization of the Total Study
A comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 12 individual studies
(6 cases and 6 issues) and their findings is given in parts 3 and 4. The
methodology of the analysis is described in chapter 14.35
A word might be said here about the working philosophy which has
governed the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy research
project. Authors were encouraged to conduct and present the analysis
of each case or issue with two perspectives continuously in mind : that
of the case or issue as a worthy subject in itself, as well as that of its
relationship to the broad theme of the overall study : i.e., the interac-
tion of science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy.
The returns are in for the first of those two complementary aims —
to make available to the congressional (and in general the public
affairs) community the analysis and findings of specific cases and is-
sues, on their individual merits ; the results are gratifying. All 12 stu-
dies have served significant congressional or other governmental pur-
poses relating to their specific themes; all have received serious atten-
tion in academic circles as well; most have had to be reprinted to
satisfy a demand which persisted for some years after the date of
publication.
But it was the second and larger aim that prompted Chairman
Zablocki to request this extended research undertaking to begin with,
and to seek the critical reactions of knowledgeable persons in and out
of government for the benefit of Congress. This was the aim of making
an empirical examination, by the case study method, of representative
instances of the interplay of science and technology with diplomacy
for the light they might shed on how the U.S. Government could bet-
ter equip itself to meet the compelling challenges posed by that inter-
play. To see this problem whole, it was planned at the outset to bring
all of the research results together in one collected study. The present
document represents fulfillment of that plan.
« Numerous references to material In the 12 basic studies occur throughout the overall
study In both text and footnotes. These references cite pages of the overall study rather
than the original page numbers.
-.1 PhaPter-study equivalents are as follows (for full citations of individual studies, see
list Of documents in the original study series, p. VII.
Chapter 1 — Huddle. Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age
Chapter 3 — Wu. The Bamch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the'Nuclear Age.
Chapter 4 — Donnelly. Commercial Nuclear Poner in Europe: The Interaction of
American Diplomacy With a New Technology.
(Continued)
34
The empirical approach followed in the project, and the broad
matrix analysis of project findings in chapters 18 through 23, have
resulted in a research product of somewhat formidable proportions.
A certain amount of unavoidable repetition has also resulted. (On
the other hand, many of the insights scattered through the 12 individ-
ual studies could not be captured in the concluding analysis without
distracting from the latter, with its main focus on the shortcomings
of American institutions for coping with global issues; the individual
studies therefore remain unique and useful resources in themselves.)
The complete study consists of 24 chapters (the major subdivisions
of which, identified by Roman numerals, are referred to as sections)
organized into a general introduction and 4 parts. A short chapter
introducing the main analytical portion of the study intervenes be-
tween parts 2 and 3. Following two introductory chapters at the be-
ginning, part 1 contains a separate chapter for each of the six case
studies. Part 2 is made up of six chapters presenting the studies of
continuing issues. Part 3 is devoted to a comprehensive analytical
review of the preceding 12 studies, taken individually. Part 4 ex-
amines the studies collectively under G cross-cutting headings reflect-
ing broad policy concerns, with concluding observations as to policy
options for the Congress and the executive branch. The study ends
with an extensive annotated bibliography.
As noted in Chapter 15 under Methodology, the order followed in
presenting the cases and issues — both at large in the overall study
and, in parallel, in the analysis of parts 3 and 4 — was established by
the subject matter itself, independently of the date of publication of
the particular study. The aim in any given case is to focus on enduring
problems and underlying relationships, not to provide up-to-the-
minute details. (As a practical matter, the basic studies — chapters
3 through 14 — have not been updated for inclusion in the full study
collection; Chapters 1, 2, and 15, however, have been revised from a
mid-1977 perspective, and to the extent deemed useful chapters 16
through 24 also have been brought up to date.) The appropriateness
of this approach seems borne out by the fact that, in general, the in-
dividual studies have not been outdated with the passage of time, and
that virtually all of their findings remain valid and relevant.
The foregoing introduction has been a restatement of the original
project prospectus.3" The latter is here modified only to reflect the
Continued)
Chapter 5 — Rullis, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year.
Chapter 6 — Huddle, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism.
Chapter 7- — Doumanl, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed.
Chapters — Hardt and Holllday, U.S. -Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of
Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy.
Chapter 9 — Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology.
Chapter 10 — Quimby, The Politics of Global Health.
Chapter 11 — Nanes, Beyond Malthas: The Food/People Equation.
Chapter 12 — Knezo, U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for
Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange.
Chapter 13 — Whelan, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International
Scientific Mobility.
Chapter 14 — Huddle, Science and Technology in tlic Department of Stat< : Bringing
Technical Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations.
Chapters 15 through -i (and Chapter 21 Huddle and Johnston, Science, Technology,
ami Diplomacy in the Vge of Interdependence.
"U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in a
scientific Age, in the series Selenee, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Hud-
dle, Science Policy Research Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., c.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, 28 p. (Committee print.)
35
facts of work completed in place of the intentions of work in pros-
pect. In the final reckoning, each user of the study can judge how
the original goals of the project have been met, as expressed in the
closing words of that prospectus. The project, said the latter, will —
. . . involve an identification of the underlying principles of policy, organiza-
tion, and methodology in the uses of science and technology as instruments of
diplomacy, and the concurrent principles in the uses of diplomacy to strengthen
U.S. goals in science and technology. It will be a search for opportunities for
new initiatives, a search for areas of organization and administration needing
more emphasis or support, and the identification of unresolved issues of policy.
Beyond this, it is hoped that the intrinsic merit of each of the case studies
will make it stand alone, as a study of policy on an important matter, and that
restatement of the findings will serve as a useful compendium and index of
the whole enterprise.
Chapter 2 — The Global Context of Science,
Technology, and American Diplomacy
CONTENTS
Page
Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R 41
Deterrence 42
Weaponry 42
The P.R.C 42
Isolationism 43
U.S. Economic Burdens 43
The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy 43
The Shaky Global Economy 45
Atomic Energy 45
Populations 46
Food 46
Oceans 47
Resource Allocation 47
Multinational Corporations 48
Nationalism 48
United Nations 48
Regionalism '. 49
Shrinking World Community 49
Global Flows 50
Disorientation 50
(39)
CHAPTER 2— THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
U.S. foreign policy today as never before is confronted by a world
of restless strivings and uncertain directions. The modern world
presents a complex mixture of dynamic new forces and drift, of active
or potential conflict and detente, of wayward nationalism and a grow-
ing curriculum of multinational cooperative activities. The 200th
anniversary of the beginnings of history's most successful experiment
in political democracy finds the Nation pondering the question of how
to define and advance those aspects of its heritage of independence
that are valuable in a world of growing interdependence. The mid-
1970s are thus a pivotal time: a time of reassessment of U.S. foreign
policy, a time to search for a new and more stable, more durable world
structure that could be realized by creative diplomatic initiatives,
built deliberately according to a purposeful and coherent design. The
resources that the United States can mobilize to meet this challenge
are mainly the technology and managerial skills in which the Nation
enjoys an unchallenged superiority. These two strengths, by a con-
venient fact of history, are precisely those needed by most of the
other nations of the world in order to achieve progress toward their
own internal national aspirations.
However, elements of this changing world do not automatically
simplify or facilitate the exercise of U.S. leadership in applying these
needed skills toward the achievement of a more stable, more durable
world structure of cooperative and peaceful nations. The enormous
complexity of the world of the 1970s derives from the great variety
of nations and groupings of nations, each with its own rate and direc-
tion of political, economic, and technological change, leading in turn
to changing goals and national attitudes. Change can generate conflict
or it can promote harmony and cooperation. All of diplomacy resolves
ultimately into the balancing of these opposites. Whether by bold
creative moves or by slow and cautious increments, the largely un-
recognized challenge facing the United States is to use its skills of
technology and management to assemble the elements of the present
changing world into the more constructive and reliable order on which
the future of civilization so manifestly depends.
As the first consideration, what are the salient elements of the
modern world? Some of them are the following:
Detente Vis-a-Vis the U.S.S.R.
The rigidities of the cold war are being replaced by a new flexibility
in which the still-potent, still-dangerous adversary relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union is moderated by an
uneasy and partial truce. This truce is marked by trade agreements,
grain transactions, agreements on scientific and technological co-
operation, technology transfers, and other unwarlike dealings epit-
omized by the term "detente."
(41)
42
Deterrence
The underpinning of detente remains the possession by both the
United States and the Soviet Union of an overwhelming nuclear
destructive capability sufficient to deny survival to either party in the
event of its use. Having learned to live with this fact for nearly two
decades, leaders of each nation, while still maneuvering for some slight
and transitory technological advantage.1 are mainly seeking a pattern
of beneficial relationships for their own country — recognizing that it
may incidentally be beneficial to the adversary, but in the nonmilitary
sphere. Emerging out of this uneasy truce may possibly be a more or
less conscious balance of cooperation and conflict reflecting both
ideological opposition and mutual anxiety over survival.
Weaponry
The purpose of weaponry is national security. However, the enor-
mous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons accompanied by
irresistible delivery system possessed by the United States and the
Soviet Union has created an impasse. Both parties continue to invest
scientific talents and resources in further refinements of nuclear
weaponry but after a epiarter century of this arms race the impasse
continues, the destructive capability on both sides has increased, and
the national security on both sides has diminished. Beneath this
nuclear umbrella that makes overt conflict between the two super-
powers an act of insanity, the adversaries have experimented with
various kinds of war by proxy. Experiments in limited war by the
United States in Korea and Vietnam showed that U.S. high technology
weaponry had limited utility against a determined adversary in open
warfare. Competitive supply of weaponry to the opposing sides in the
Middle East has raised the level of intensity of that conflict and in-
creased the risk of confrontation between the superpowers. Exports
of U.S. weaponry to Latin America, Iran, Jordan, and other countries
has multiplied the potential destructiveness of warfare involving
these recipients; the gain to the United States has been measured in
favorable balanee-of-paymenis increments and varying degrees of
transitory influence, but the cost has frequently been diminished
national security for the United States. Proliferation of subnuclear
weaponry continues but the ultimate consequences appear to offer no
significant benefit to the United States while making small wars more
lethal and draining the resources of -mall States to maintain their
arsenals of high technology.
The P.R.C.
Emergence of the world's most populous nation from the self-im-
posed isolation of the period of painful transition to ;i Communist
dictatorship i- now in process. The growing military and economic
power of t hi- former "sleeping giant" gives indication that in time the
People's Republic of China will become, in some respects at least,
the coequal pa rt ner ad \ er-a ry of holh the United States and the
Soviet Union. Meanwhile the l\ \i.(\, currently more hostile toward
the Soviel Union than toward the United Slate-, seeks to persuade
t he la t ter of the dangers of Soviel aggressive designs.
1 A major technological advantage by either adversary would be Intolerable to th<> othor,
iiikI wniiiil pose :i serious Invitation t" preemptive attack before the new weapon could \w
deployed.
43
Isolationism
One lively dispute that divided Americans in the period between the
two great wars concerned the extent to which this country could re-
main aloof from European conflicts. The rise of Nazi Germany made
the dispute salient but it was not resolved until Japanese ambitions
for Asiatic hegemony precipitated a conflict halfway around the
world from the initial theater of war. Thereafter, the ties among the
Axis Powers undercut the position of those who favored U.S. isolation.
The views of the interventionists were confirmed by events: It became
fixed in U.S. foreign policy that the United States had an inescapable
role, a compelling interest, and a great power responsibility in assur-
ing world peace and stability. During the cold war, this theme domi-
nated U.S. dealings abroad. An attempt to withdraw from this re-
sponsibility on the mainland of Asia led to the Korean war. The
attempt to assert it led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The
declining fortunes of the United States in Vietnam led to renewed
questioning of the extent of U.S. responsibility for maintaining
peace and stability abroad, and even to a denial of such respon-
sibility.
The rationale of great power control over small-country wars and
internal disturbances remains ill-defined, but recent events in the
Middle East have demonstrated the hazard of a unilateral withdrawal
of one great power from the scene, and the perhaps equal hazard of
several great powers' committing themselves to opposing causes of
small nations. Several lessons can be drawn from this sequence.
The most obvious is that the diplomatic reaction to this kind of crisis
is necessarily ad hoc and governed by circumstances; rigid adherence
to either isolationism or interventionism would invite disastrous
consequences. A less obvious but more fundamental lesson is that the
most successful kind of diplomacy is that which anticipates, and
devises initiatives to keep small crises from developing. It is note-
worthy that such successes generate no headlines and create no
popular heroes, and are recognized only in a small community.
U.S. Economic Burdens
Since World War II the U.S. dollar has remained the primary —
and until recently the strong and stable — currency of international
commerce. U.S. assistance has been extended to many nations abroad
in the form of nuclear deterrence, trained soldiery, and arms ship-
ments to treaty allies and developing nations. These economic bur-
dens have been increased by U.S. efforts to raise the technological
levels of developing countries and by commitments to supply ag-
ricultural products to needy countries at less than market value.
Efforts to persuade other developed countries to shoulder more of the
burden of maintaining an international currency and credit system
and to evolve, with the Soviet Union, a less demanding level of
armament programs are features of the contemporary economic
scene. However, the abrupt rise in world petroleum prices, unease in
the Middle East, and persistent ideological and organizational ob-
stacles to U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation tend to perpetuate the U.S.
economic burdens.
The Changing U.S. Industrial Economy
The word "developed" applied to the U.S. national economy means
that a large territory was settled, and that the predominant form of
44
productive activity changed from agriculture to manufacturing during
the first third of the 20th century, and from manufacturing to services
in the second third. The products of agriculture and other extractive
industries are food, fiber, lumber, and minerals; those of manufacturing
are the highly diversified items ranging from clothing to automobile-;
those of services industries are information and noncommodity-
related activities. This sequence is probably not reversible, and the
future health of the U.S. economy depends on the development of the
services industries and the enhancement of their productivity. How-
ever, much of the services industry is in Government services which
consume but do not generate income: Teachers, police, firemen, other
State and municipal employees, Federal workers, and those in military
service.
The trend in the United States toward services industries is the
central feature in a complex of developments that include increased
emphasis on the quality and quantity of security services that are
provided by governments, such as protections against crime, unem-
ployment, old age, and medical costs. Environmental protection has
recently been added to this list. These services are costly and most of
them are tax-supported instead of yielding tax revenues. Even as
population movements toward urban centers have increased, erosion
has occurred in the urban tax base as the wealthier segment of the
urban population — and industry as well — has left the central city for
the suburbs.
Another complicating factor, perhaps more transient, is the shift
in the demographic distribution of population toward the young and
old parts of the lifescale; these are less productive than persons in
the middle range but absorb services at a higher rate.
The U.S. tax structure, which is effective in an expanding economy,
tends to amplify cycles of high and low economic activity.
In turn, depression of the economy tends to worsen all the other
economic problems that appear as the Nation proceeds further into
the "services" phase. As the tax base shrinks and the service- industries
grow, the ability of the Federal Government to support ambitious
programs diminishes, while the demand for services and payment for
them continues to grow.
The extractive industries in the United States (accounting for half
the labor force in 1890) now employ less than 5 percent of the labor
force; manufacturing perhaps another 25 or 30 percent: and services
the rest. The trend is toward further shrinkage of the first two and
expansion of the third.
Shrinkage of the tax base and expansion of tax-supported activities
have important implications for diplomacy: as to ability to fund
military programs, support foreign assistance, contribute to United
Nation-, agencies a major fraction of their support, and invest in large
re earch and develop nt efforts whose product is increasinglj resisted
h> the industrial sector as profit margins narrow. The pattern of U.S.
trade is likewise disrupted by internal economic dislocations. Stag-
flation, decline in the value of the dollar, and increasing compel it ive
difficult} of U.S. industry all lead, in turn, to balance-of-payments
deficit-, making funding of U.S. programs abroad difficult.
A public stniithiKi in services and welfare rise, demands grow for
a afer and more wholesome environment, control over hazardous
condil ion in indust rj , and reduced impacts of mining and forestry on
wilderness area-.
45
While these brakes on industrial growth and productivity have not
yet reached full strength, they have served to warn that these rising
long-term and incremental costs in the industrial economy are ap-
proaching a serious stage. When such costs were coupled with the im-
pact of the petroleum embargo and price increases from 1973 on, the
observable result was a mixed situation of recession combined with
inflation. The effects of these forces were felt most keenly in areas of
largest populations, notably New York City. Escape from this dilemma
is vital to the future health of the U.S. diplomatic posture in the
world — as indeed also for U.S. domestic economic health — but the
escape route remains undefined. The economic surplus needed to fund
past levels of global programs may be a product of the U.S. past. U.S.
foreign policy may rest more in the future on the skill of its diplomacy
than on the weight of its economic programs.
The Shaky Global Economy
Economic interdependence has long prevailed in international re-
lations. In the 19th century, Central Europe fed on American grain;
agricultural nations relied on Chilean nitrates; England supplied
capital to develop rail transportation systems in Argentina, India, the
United States, and China ; English textile mills wove cloth with United
States and Indian cotton; and so on. During the 1920s efforts to restore
this global economy conflicted with internal efforts to stabilize na-
tional economies and employment; the global monetary system col-
lapsed in the face of stiff tariff barriers, competitive devaluations,
multiple currency schemes, and quotas. Restoration of the global
economy was a high-priority U.S. goal after World War II but, despite
real progress, its achievement was obstructed by cold war divisiveness,
nationalistic tendencies of former colonial regions, and — ultimately —
the inability of the dollar to serve as a global currency in place of the
long-defunct gold standard. Achievement of a stable global economy
continues to be a U.S. goal. D6tente with the Soviet Union was con-
sidered a positive move toward its achievement. But many old and
some new forces obstruct progress toward the goal: internal obligations
of developed countries to sustain economic growth and high levels of
employment; resistance of developing countries to terms of trade
which they see as blocking their escape from economic colonialism;
and most recently the exploitation by the OPEC countries of a
(probably temporary but severely acute) monopoly position in world
petroleum supply. Efforts at reaching international agreement on a
new world economic structure were underway at the time of this
writing but the issue remains in doubt.
Atomic Energy
Atomic energy places such extreme demands on technology that
its advance in competition with fossil fuels as a source of electrical
energy has been slow. However, the manipulated rise in petroleum
prices by OPEC and the complex environmental problems in the
return to coal as a principal energy source are making atomic energy
potentially more attractive for the future. This trend makes more and
more difficult the maintenance of control over fuel elements and by-
product plutonium to protect the world and its peoples against en-
vironmental insults and irresponsible conversion of plutonium into
weapons. Since the early 1960s a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy
has been prevention of nuclear proliferation. The economics of energy
now places that goal in serious jeopardy. Scientific efforts to develop
46
a safer form of energy from nuclear fusion are proceeding but the prob-
lem is one of greatT technical difficulty and the estimates of time to
achieve success range from 20 to 50 years. Half a century of uncon-
trolled nuclear proliferation as a consequence of supplying electricity
to mankind is a fearsome prospect.
Populations
The ultimate concern of all governments, in terms of both ends ;md
means, is people. Of growing concern is the relationship between total
available resources and population in the entire world, but especially in
the most populous regions and those in which the rate of population
increase is sharpest. Populations are significant in relation to resources
of arable land and materials, ability to buy food, levels of consumption
of all goods, rates at which environmental pollution occurs, and ability
to extend governance. As populations increase, problems worsen in all
these categories unless means are found to exert strong positive con-
trols or motivations. In an interdependent world, population problems
in any country have effects on all countries. Rates of population
increase of different countries in the contemporary world tend to be in
inverse proportion to achieved levels of development. Technology is
available to feed large increases in populations as well as to control the
rates of increase, but the enlistment of technology toward either
purpose requires institutional support which is generally inadequate.
Many forces are at work that cause population increases while few
forces have been devised to inhibit population growth in poor coun-
tries, other than food deprivation as a consequence of food/population
unbalance. International tensions resulting from population pressures
are regarded as serious and worsening but international agreement on
the resolution of the problem is lacking. The dilemma facing the world
is that governments of poor countries call for aid from developed
countries to secure the rights of their citizens to living standards
achieved by developed countries, but cannot reconcile these expecta-
tions with their practical impossibility in the face of uninhibited
increases of populations.
Food
As with population control, the limiting factor on food supply is not
primarily technological but institutional. Wider exploitation of well-
established technology of plant genetics, fertilization, storage, process-
ing, and marketing could treble or quadruple the available food supply
of the world. But the institutional remedies for the almost inevitable
increase of famine conditions in the closing quarter of the 20th century
must deal with food production and distribution as only one ingredient
in a pattern of development that encompasses health and education,
nonagricultural employment opportunities in urban and rural area-,
stable currencies and' international exchanges. Land management
reform, and stable institutions of government able to administer
effective tax and investment programs. Failing achievement of these
conditions, the poor countries will need to rely increasingly on imported
supplies of food of which the United States is the leading exporter.
For the United Slate, the options include (a) short-term economic
advantage by sales to the best market, (b) stern compulsion on the
poor countries to effect reforms by deliberate choice of markets to
reward the countries that do so, ami (c) compassionate doling out of
dwindling food reserves to populations on the basis of relative extremes
of need. Averting so painful a decision rests not with the United States
47
alone but with all potentially food-deficient countries as well. But if
effective means of cooperation in development are not achieved, the
ultimate decision will rest inescapably with the leadership of the most
productive country, the United States.
Oceans
The status of the three-fifths of the globe covered by oceans was in
question in the mid-1970s. Squabbles over fishing rights and seaward
extent of national sovereignty were frequent. U.S. entrepreneurs
impatiently waited for some sort of legal determination of seabed
sovereignty and property rights in order to exploit emerging tech-
nologies for securing the petroleum and metallic wealth of this remain-
ing frontier. Naval use of the international medium of the oceans
remained a plausible exercise of national power, but question was
being raised as to U.S. supremacy at sea, once taken for granted and
now seriously challenged. Environmentalists were vocal in denuncia-
tion of Japanese and Soviet overfishing of the dwindling population of
whales and of the pollution of the oceans by oil spills and chemical
effluents. Failure of the maritime nations to agree on a new law of
the sea in pending negotiations threatened to leave the ocean commons
in a state of anarchy, instead of leading to a system of cooperation to
maximize the management of the oceans as a sustained source of food
and mineral wealth.
Resource Allocation
Consumption of minerals and fossil fuels is proportional to the
level of economic development of nations, and levels of development
differ greatly. Production of minerals and fossil fuels is related to their
occurrence in the earth, and they are unevenly distributed among
nations. Since extractive industries are first to be attempted by
developing nations, the effect is that of a flow of materials from the
poor countries to the rich, and a flow of processed goods from the
rich countries to the poor. Efforts by poor countries to correct these
evidently disadvantageous terms of trade have brought controversy
into the United Nations and other forums. For all poor countries to
reach the levels of materials consumption already achieved by the
developed countries would far exceed the available reserves of the
earth. Demands by the poor countries for a larger share of the benefits
of the wealth from their mines and oil fields signal the need for eventual
agreement among nations as to an equitable allocation of these
resources. The wealth of developed countries is in the form of tech-
nology, management, a built industrial plant, and investment
capital. It remains to be determined how much of a transfer of the
technical resources of the rich nations to the poor will be acceptable,
and how large a share of raw materials the poor nations will insist
on retaining. Clearly, the developed nations will need to practice a
greater conservation of imported resources and the developing coun-
tries will need to moderate their expectations of equaling the con-
sumption levels achieved by the rich. There is simply not enough to
go around. But by the mid-1970s, these constraints were insufficiently
appreciated in either the rich or the poor countries. An attempt to
ascertain the limits to growth, though usefully signaling an alert, had
foundered on dubious assumptions while neglecting the practical
question of how high a standard of consumption was achievable
over the entire globe with its inexorably increasing population.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-5
48
Multinational Corporations
In response to efforts by many foreign nations to protect their
own balances of international exchange by restricting the penetration
of foreign corporations, a form of international commercial institution
has rapidly proliferated. This form, the multinational corporation
or MNC, is designed to accomplish the age-old dream of the economist :
to minimize the economic significance of national boundaries. It
does help to alleviate once-potent economic causes of international
disputes, and it can be an effective agent of technology transfer,
but it also generates new causes of conflict and frustration. Charac-
teristically, the MNC moves capital, materials, credit, managerial
expertise, technological skills, intellectual property, and even trained
labor from country to country in order to maximize its total overall
and long-term profit. In the process it erodes the national sovereignty
of host countries, diverts capital and labor from nationally planned
economic allocations, and competes for economic and even political
power, while preserving its own economic and technological power
base remote from the countries it penetrates. At the same time,
because of the complex and farflung nature of its operations, it tends
to elude controls which the base country seeks to impose, or even at
times to outpace the base country's perception that certain controls
may be needed in its own national interest. In so doing it tends to
neglect political, social, and institutional costs of its operations.
As an institution the MNC offers the capability of influencing con-
structively the evolution of a stable world economy and the develop-
ment of lagging economies. But as the MNC currently operate-, it
excites resentment among U.S. labor unions as an instrument to
cause unemployment at home; it excites resentment in developed
countries by superimposing foreign management over domestic
labor; and it excites resentment in developing countries by co-opting
labor and resources to feed into technologies which are often inap-
propriate to, and tend to distort, the development process in those
countries.
Nationalism
The disintegration of 10th century colonial empires has resulted in a
large increase (to L59 as of mid-1977) in the number of separate
sovereign slate-, each groping toward independence, governance, self-
determination of national policy, and coherence. Some of these states
have discovered the ancient formula whereby nationalism, in term- of a
contrived hostility toward their own neighbors, toward other groupings
of states, or toward one or another of the great powers, can serve to
unify and promote coherence of their own political structures. At the
same time, claims turn into "rights" and exchanges of values become
"exploitation," creating an attitude of manifesl destiny of the poor.
I rnited Nations
Bom in an epoch of hope for a cooperative world of peaceful tuitions,
the United Nations has degenerated into a cockpil of parochial squab-
bles. Since the penalty for intransigence in the United Nations is
inconsequential, the motive for compromise has disappeared and deci-
sions without practical effect are arrived at in the U.N. General
Assembly by counting the votes of the ministates. Effectiveness of the
U.N. Security Council is largely nullified by exercise of the veto power
by the leading permanent members. Constructive programs of the
49
World Bank and the World Health Organization offer a glimmer of
hope but the intransigence evident in the General Assembly has found
its counterpart in UNESCO and ILO. By the mid-1970s, respect for the
United Nations in the United States had been seriously impaired and
the cost benefit of the association of nations was widely qtiestioned.
The very substantial contributions of the U.N. system were largely
unseen while its futilities were highly visible. Whether public opinion
would be content to tolerate this unsatisfactory state of affairs long
enough to evolve a more workable and useful U.N. structure remained
to be seen.
Regionalism
A basic building block available to U.S. diplomacy in the balancing
of cooperation and conflict is the circumstance that many contiguous
nations share common geographic and economic problems and oppor-
tunities. Many such multinational regions exist throughout the world
but their effect on the nations that share them varies widely. Some, like
the Scandinavian countries, have established cooperative relations;
others, like the nations of former French Indochina, have a long history
of strife; some, like the States of Central America, are groping toward
cooperation; and some, like the Middle East, are fiercely divided by
religion and ideology. The opportunity for economic and social benefits
to such regions is great but largely wasted; cooperative planning,
division of labor in the development and testing of useful technology,
shared infrastructures, and the recognition of commonality of prob-
lems, opportunities, goals, and approaches, are all available as elements
to reduce the economic significance of national boundaries. Reasons
for the neglect of this opportunity to strengthen international amity are
easy to find, but the want of effort to this end seems hard to justify.
Shrinking World Community
Instant global communications, verbal and visual, bring the whole
world into the living room. A terrorist attack in the Middle East or
Northern Ireland, an earthquake in Chile or Turkey, an election in
Australia or Portgual, is described or shown minutes later everywhere
else. The infinite variety of events inviting global attention over-
loads the receptors of the individual and the time or space of the
communicators. Censorship is inherent, not only for reasons of na-
tional policy or economic advantage but because limited capacity
compels selection according to some policy or principle. "Newsworthy"
events — like war or unrest in Morocco, Angola, Belize, Ethiopia, Por-
tugal, Cyprus, Lebanon, or elsewhere — are reported while crop statis-
tics, new schools, technological developments, and other constructive
events are ignored. Even so, the individual is told more than he can
assimilate. Excessive demands are placed on his enthusiasm and indig-
nation. In response, the individual tends to dismiss the information
flow as irrelevant to his own interests, and to rely on the "experts"
to deal with these hopelessly numerous and complex matters. Or else,-
in support of his own tradition or esthetic sense, the individual may
seize on some one conflict as his own, choosing a side for reasons of
moral predilection or ethnic, religious, or national origin. Even so,
the average American in 1977 is more aware of the world outside his
own country than ever before but perhaps more depressed by what
he perceives.
50
Global Flows
Information on current events is only one of many kinds of flows
that cross national boundaries. The entire globe is a complex network,
bound together by systems of transportation and communication by
land, sea, air, and electronic linkages. Almost all nations contribute
to and receive these flows, and the traffic along the various media
continues to grow. The flows include trained persons moving to new
homes, students seeking further education, tourists learning about
the world, business people looking for opportunities for profit, scien-
tists seeking to exchange knowledge, and diplomats bent on facilitating
the conduct of international relations. Transactional flows also take
place, in the form of credit, materials and products, ideological views,
information, diplomatic influence, and expressions of national interests
and goals. Still other flows, ranging from highly destructive to some-
thing less than constructive, take the form of terrorist attacks, dis-
semination of weaponry, the international movement of dangerous,
drugs, the spread of disease epidemics, hostile signals and threats,
guerrilla and "underground" movements, and covert operations.
Encouragement and discouragement of various of these flows is the
business of every government, some more than others. Together with
the responses to them that feed back to the original source country,
these flows aggregate into what is called "foreign relations." Since
most flows are on the increase, it can be said that foreign relations
are progressively intensifying for all countries. In the case of the
United States, the indices of size, wealth, economic activity, military
strength, and other measures of a dynamic society, are all surpassingly
high; U.S. foreign relations are accordingly more intensive and com-
plex than those of any other country in the world.
However, U.S. institutional mechanisms to manage, plan for, or
even keep track of these increasing flows are not growing correspond-
ingly. This fact suggests that the United States is less and less able
to administer a more and more demanding responsibility for foreign
policy. It is also probable that the same deficiency exists in other
highly dynamic developed countries.
Disorientation
Rarely, if ever, has U.S. foreign policy faced so many fundamental
changes — in the power base of its own political system, in the com-
plexities of the external world, and in the challenges and obstacles to
be met in furtherance of its goals. Disorientation is not too strong a
term for the state of U.S. foreign policy in the mid-1970s.
The Nation has recently emerged from a tragic, divisive, and in the
minds of ninny a futile, war. National attitudes are mixed toward
further exercise of U.S. power and influence in the world, even to the
revival of the isolationism of the 1930s. Domestic issues are most
salient : worries oxer unemployment and inflation, apprehension over
threatened shortage of energy, concern for the deteriorating environ-
ment.
A long list of disrupt ions abroad have also been of public and official
concern: the festering and periodically explosive A.rab-Israeli con-
did, the revolt of the Third World in the U.N. General Assembly.
Third "World economic challenges to prevailing patterns of commerce,
periodically renewed concern over the global increase in populations
51
relative to global food supply, assertions of nationalism and intran-
sigence by the many new nations, incidents of bombing and terrorism
around the world, hijackings and kidnapings, urban guerrilla move-
ments in several countries, religious conflict in Northern Ireland and
communal conflict in Cyprus and Lebanon, power shifts or active
contests at many points in Eurasia and Africa, unease over prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons and the stability of the nuclear deterrent,
frustration over the issue of seabed sovereignty, growing awareness of
the disintegration of the world monetary structure erected after World
War II and of the possibility of world monetary collapse, and a general
sense that national goals of the many old and new nations of the world
were at cross-purposes.
The want of coherence and shared common purpose in the United
Nations, the superpowers, NATO, and other groups of nations that
once found opportunities for cooperation is a distressing characteristic
of the contemporary world. It is a time for rebuilding and new leader-
ship toward purposes that all can share. That is the prime challenge
of American diplomacy in the final quarter of the 20th century.
PART 1— SIX CASES
Chapter 3 — The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy
Enters the Nuclear Age
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction 57
Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study 57
II. A Short Chronology of Atomic Control Diplomacy After World War II _ 59
Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations
To Negotiate 59
Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations 60
The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Post-
war Years 60
III. The Postwar Paradox: Cold War and Internationalism 62
Preparation for International Control Efforts 62
Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States 63
Domestic Control 64
Hasty Demobilization of U.S. Military Forces 65
Formulation of U.S. Policy on International Control 66
Early Efforts 66
Preparations for Negotiations in the UNAEC 68
The U.S. Negotiator and Final Steps to Define Policy. _ 69
Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control 71
The U.S. Proposal 71
The Soviet Proposal 72
Debate and Impasse 73
IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear Technology. 76
Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy 76
The Form and Purposes of International Control 80
Proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 80
The Board of Consultants' Position Against Inspection. 80
International Ownership and Operation of Dangerous
Activities. _ 82
Retention of "Safe" National Activities 84
Inspection Provisions in the Report 85
Reactions Among U.S. Policymakers to the Proposals of the
Board of Consultants 8.6
Trend Toward Control in U.S. Policy 87
U.N. Stalemate Over Control and Inspection 88
Soviet Reaction to Proposed Internationalization 88
Action by the UNAEC 89
The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control 93
The Political Basis for Proceeding by Stages 94
Insistence by Acheson Committee on Step-by-Step
Approach 95
Origins of the Discussion 95
Final Version — Some Technological Considerations 97
Inconclusive Treatment of the Transition Issue by UNAEC. 99
The Issue of Enforcement: Sanctions and the Veto 103
Determining U.S. Policy on Sanctions 103
U.S. Policy on the Veto: Its Relation to Enforcement 104
Political Unacceptability of Veto-Free Control in the Nego-
tiations 107
Recapitulation of the Three Issues of Atomic Control 108
V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations 110
Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan 110
Lack of U.S. Attention to Soviet Requirements 111
Soviet Calculation of U.S. Position 112
(55)
56
V. Some Distintive Features of the Negotiations — Continued PaK«
One Attempt at Technical-Diplomatic Coordination 113
Underlying Misconceptions in U.S. Policy 114
VI. Concluding Observations 118
Impact of New Technologies on International Relations 118
The Diplomatic Task: Combining Effectiveness and Acceptability. 119
U.S. Attitudes in the Conduct of the Negotiations 122
CHAPTER 3— THE BARUCH PLAN: U.S. DIPLOMACY
ENTERS THE NUCLEAR AGE
I. Introduction
This study is concerned with the first international negotiations on
the control of atomic energy, during the years immediately following
"World War II. The arrival of the atom bomb was a technological
event of unparalleled significance for international affairs. The ulti-
mate meaning of the bomb itself, as distinct from the possible peaceful
applications of atomic energy, was that it raised the cost of general
war for total victory to an unacceptable level. This fact radically
altered the basis for the positions of the diplomats at the bargaining
table, and brought with it the problem of how to evaluate and to com-
municate the significance of the new development. At the same time,
a changed pattern of relations among nations had emerged as a result
of the worldwide upheaval of World War II. Participants in this new
configuration of power faced the unique technological and diplomatic
situation created by atomic energy.
Technological advances in the field of atomic energy added a new
dimension and a new vocabulary to world affairs through such con-
cepts as mutual deterrence and preemptive strikes. The dynamics of a
nuclear arms race were dimly perceived at the outset of the nuclear
age; even so, it is not clear that awareness of this potential would
have prevented its development. In retrospect, it is understandable
how the atom bomb, a product of science and technology and a tool of
diplomacy, prompted a world drive for control.
More important to this study is the fact of failure in the initial
efforts of this drive. Despite the strong impetus for diplomatic initia-
tive in response to a great technological achievement, the negotiations
got nowhere then and have made little progress since. A principal aim
of the study is to examine the causes of this costly failure in order to
provide insights into the interactions among science, technology, and
diplomacy when they are confronted with a technological development
of the first magnitude — in this case, one with urgent implications for
the future of all mankind.
Definition of the Problem and Scope of the Study
Because these early efforts to control nuclear weapons occurred more
than 25 years ago, much historical discussion has accumulated in pub-
lished sources. In light of this fact and considering the purpose of this
series of reports, the study will not duplicate the history of these early
international negotiations. Rather, it will focus on issues associated
with the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy.
The advent of the atomic weapon in 1945 represented a unique tech-
nological advancement: applications of the newly acquired knowledge
regarding atomic energy could serve either constructive or destructive
purposes. This factor, combined with the immediate recognition of
atomic energy development as a great step forward in man's inquiry
into scientific knowledge, signified that such development had political
implications of global proportions. Further recognition of the im-
portance of the technological development of atomic energy for U.S.
Note : This chapter was prepared in 1972 by Leneice N. Wu. ,
(57)
58
foreign policy was inevitable. Its significance was enhanced by the
fact that the first demonstration of the technology was its use as a
weapon in actual warfare. Considering the decisive role which the
atomic weapon played in ending the war with Japan, its use gave rise
to a number of questions for the United States on both the international
and national levels.
On the international level, the nations of the world recognized a
need to prevent proliferation of atomic energy weapons technology
and capabilities. Questions were raised in official quarters both at home
and abroad with regard to the intentions of the United States, as sole
owner of atomic weapons, and how this fact would affect its relations
with the rest of the world. Officials in the U.S. Government perceived
the urgency of devising a policy regarding the U.S. contribution to an
international arrangement for the control of atomic energy to pre-
vent its employment for weapons purposes, and also perceived the need
for monitoring by some international means the country-by-count re-
development of atomic energy.
The new nuclear science and its early technology also offered the
potential for development of atomic energy to serve beneficial pur-
poses, national and international. Traditionally, scientific advance-
ments are shared readily within the scientific community without re-
gard to national boundaries. However, the military implications of
atomic energy generated pressures to prevent traditional free com-
munication in this instance.1
Moreover, concern for the military applications of atomic energy
necessarily overrode attention to peaceful uses. In turn, these military
security factors presented obstacles and limitations for the hoped-for
international cooperation in developing peaceful uses, for the formu-
lation of a U.S. policy regarding its role in international cooperation,
and for a program within the United States itself to pursue peaceful
exploitation.
What challenges did the innovation of the atom bomb present to
traditional concepts of diplomacy ? Did the policymakers in the United
States or the diplomats of the negotiations meet them ? Were the scien-
tific and technological factors of the situation used to support or to
correct established principles of U.S. foreign policy? What steps were
taken by diplomats and scientists to understand each other's points of
view ? Were they successful ? How did they fail?
These are a few of the salient questions to which this study is ad-
dressed. The following discussion offers a brief historical overview
mikI an explanation of the political, military, and technical factors of
(he atmosphere in which the negotiations took place. During the nu-
clear policymaking process in the United States and in the interna-
tional negotiations, certain issues arose which are pertinent to this
series of studies on science, technology, and American diplomacy. The
study examines the development of these issues from (he I'.S. policy
deliberations through their outcome in the negotiations. Finally, it
discusses a number of prominent features in the negotiations and sets
forth some general concluding observations.
1 It was the early nuclear scientists themselves who adopted a policy of secrecy In the
United States, well before the start of the Manhattan Project, the wartime Rovernment
effort which developed the atom bomb.
II. A Short Chronology or Atomic Control Diplomacy After
World War II
A chronological summary of the sequence of early developments
aiming toward international controls may be helpful in. setting the
stage for consideration of the international negotiations and why they
failed.
Deliberations on U.S. policy in light of the development of the atom
bomb had been initiated as early as May 1945, when Henry L. Stimson,
the Secretary of War, led a committee which reported to President
Truman on the subject. Shortly thereafter, in June, the stage was set
for the machinery to handle the international negotiations on the con-
trol of atomic energy, with the signing of the United Nations Charter.
Two months later the weapon was actually used on Hiroshima on
August 6, 1945.
Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been
demonstrated, the Administration took action to publicize as much in-
formation as was judged appropriate to contribute to public under-
standing of the weapon and its significance for the United States. An
important step in this direction was the publication in August 1945 of
the Smyth report,2 which explained the basic scientific information on
the bomb but kept its disclosures within the limits defined by security
considerations. President Truman took initial steps to enunciate U.S.
atomic energy policy at both the national and international levels in
two major addresses in October 1945. 3
Preliminary Agreements on Nuclear Sharing; U.S. Preparations To
Negotiate
Public attention shifted to international activity during the closing-
months of 1945. On November 15, an agreement was concluded by the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Called the "Three
Nation Agreed Declaration," this agreement laid a foundation for in-
ternational action to control atomic energy. The Soviet Union was in-
cluded in this endeavor when the Moscow Declaration was signed the
following month, as a result of meetings of representatives of the
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. In the
United States, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been
appointed earlier in December to head a committee to report to the
Secretary of State on U.S. policy for the international control of
atomic energy.
In January 1946, the newly formed United Nations created an orga-
nization to deal with the specific problem of controlling atomic energy
when it drew up the terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic
2 Henry D. Smyth. A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic
Energy for Military Purposes Vnder the Auspices of the U.S. Government, 1940—^5.
(Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.)
3 President Truman delivered a message to Congress on atomic energy on Oct. 3, 1945,
and elaborated on U.S. atomic energy policy in his Navy Day address on October 27, in
New York. Complete texts of both can be found in Public Papers of the President of
the United States, 1945. (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).
pp. 362-366, 431-438.
(59)
60
Energy Commission (UNAEC). At the same time, the deliberations
of Acheson's group were getting underway as an additional group of
policymakers, largely from the scientific community, provided the
technical advice necessary to an understanding of the problem and
to formulating an appropriate policy. This group, known as the Board
of Consultants, was led by David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennes-
see Valley Authority.
The findings of these two groups, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal
report,4 were released in March 1946. In the same month, Bernard
M. Baruch was appointed by President Truman to speak for the
United States in the UNAEC. Combining his own views on interna-
tional control of atomic energy with the proposals set down in the
Acheson-Lilienthal report, Baruch presented the U.S. proposal, which
became known as the Baruch plan, at the opening session of the
UNAEC on June 14, 1946.
Impasse of Negotiations in the United Nations
Opening proposals of the Soviet Union were presented to the
UNAEC on June 19. The extensive differences between the policies
of the two countries were to undergo few modifications during the
negotiations to follow. Once the initial proposals of the major powers
had been made, procedural arrangements of the UNAEC were devised
and implemented. An important group was the Scientific and Tech-
nical Committee, which examined the technical feasibility of con-
trol. The report of this group was issued to a major organ of the
UNAEC, called Committee Two, in October 1946. Following discus-
sions by this latter body, a report of the whole UNAEC was made
to the United Nations Security Council on December 31, 1947.
The Security Council did not resolve the questions raised by the first
report of the UNAEC on international control of atomic energy, and
referred the problem back to the UNAEC in March 1947. The second
session of that body had been underway since January 1 and continued
until September 1947, when a second report was issued to the Security
Council. Again, decisive action was not forthcoming from the Security
Council, and further deliberations were carried on by the UNAEC,
which issued its third and final report on May 7, 1948. This document
recorded the admission by the negotiators that their deliberations had
reached a stalemate. The General Assembly pressed for continuation
of the discussions, but they were finally suspended in November 1949.
In the meantime, an important event substantially altered the char-
acter and outlook of the negotiations and added to the existing diffi-
culties of an extremely complex international problem. This event was
the explosion by the Soviet Union on September v2.">. L949, of its own
nuclear device.
The Historical Context of the Negotiations; the Turbulent Postwar
Years
The events reviewed in this study occurred during a turbulent I
years during which the great powers and the lesser powers moved
to establish post war mechanisms and configural ions of power, security.
and influence. The splitting of Europe occurred ns Bulgaria (Septem-
u IS Department of State t Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,
Publication No. 2498 (Washington, D.C U.S. Government Printing Office, 1040), re-
ferred to as the "Acheson Lilienthal Report."
61
ber 1946), Czechoslovakia (June 1948), Hungary (August 1949), and
East Germany (October 1949) became Communist People's Republics.
The Greek civil war raged through the early postwar years; the
Truman doctrine and Marshall plan proposals came in March and
June 1947 ; the Berlin blockade and airlift began in mid-1948 ; and the
NATO Treaty was signed in April 1949.
The Far Eastern world was no less in flux. Indochina and Indo-
nesian anticolonial wars were in progress by 1946. The Philippines,
India, and Pakistan attained independence in 1946 and 1947. U.S.
dominance in the Pacific was consolidated from Hawaii to occupied
Japan. And the Chinese civil war ended in 1949 with Communist
ascendency over the mainland.
The rapidly changing system of international power relationships
and national interests in the postwar world made more difficult the
analysis of policy alternatives in the national and international con-
trol of the atom. Viewed as the most commanding source of military
power in the postwar world, the atomic weapon altered the world
power structure immeasurably, and the United States tried to use the
fact of its possession as a surrogate for great troop strength. But its
very potency made it an unusable weapon in influencing the shifts of
power alignment during these years. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union
sought to blunt the bomb's influence in diplomacy while striving
vigorously to secure its own nuclear capability. Taking into considera-
tion all these parallel developments, it is clear why the negotiations to
bring the new force under international control yielded no useful
diplomatic product.
III. The Postwar Paradox : Cold War and Internationalism
The historical setting for U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at the inter-
national control of atomic energy contained two opposite and irrecon-
cilable trends. On the one hand, the end of World War II had wit-
nessed the emergence of two great powers, the United States and the
Soviet Union, whose basic ideologies were intrinsically at odds with
one another. The early years of the postwar period when the Baruch
plan was being negotiated were to reveal a growing antagonism in
United States-Soviet relations which was to become known as the cold
war. On the other hand, there also emerged a widespread attitude of
international cooperation in world affairs, as, in June 1945, the diverse'
powers attempted to establish a framework for peace through the
United Nations, an organization which was to receive a serious chal-
lenge in its attempts to establish international control of atomic energy.
And despite the increasing awareness of the widening breach between
the United States and the Soviet Union, efforts were made to achieve
some measure of cooperation between the two countries, e.g., the post-
war conferences of ministers.
Preparation for International Control Efforts
On the international level, a major concern was the control of atomic
energy, both as a means of destruction and as a new power which
could benefit mankind, and the nations of the world acted to set up
international machinery to cope with this problem. The first step was
an agreement among those powers which had been involved in the
development of atomic energy during the war, the United States,
Great Britain, and Canada. Meetings were held in Washington among
President Hairy S. Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee,
and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King; as noted above,
the resulting agreement of November 15, 1945 is known as the Three
Nation Agreed Declaration. In it, the three countries declared their
intention to share with all nations the scientific information associated
with atomic energy for peaceful purposes. However, the Declaration
acknowledged the dilemma posed by the practical applications of
atomic energy, in that much of the information necessary to carry out
the industrial applications was virtually the same as that needed for
weapons production. It was agreed, therefore, that it was necessary to
withhold this information until appropriate safeguards could be es-
tablished to insure that it would be used only for peaceful purposes.
To this end, the three heads of state suggested that the United Nations
Organization set up a Commission which would make recommendations
on the question of international control to the United Nations.5
Russian agreement to the principles of the Three Nation Agreed
I teclaration was obtained the next month, at the Conference of Minis-
ters in Moscow, and was made public on December 27 in the Moscow
'For a complete text of the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, sre U.S. Department
of State The international Control of Atomic Energy, drouth of a Policy, Publication
•J702 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing office, 1946), pp. 118-120.
(62)
63
Declaration, a Soviet-Anglo-American statement. In addition to sup-
porting the idea of establishing a Commission in the United Nations,
the Moscow Declaration contained the text of a proposed resolution
to establish the organization, and invited Fiance, China, and Canada
to cosponsor it at the first session of the U.N. General Assembly in
January 1946.° The text of the Moscow Declaration was incorporated
unchanged in a resolution which was passed by the General Assembly
without a dissenting vote on January 24, 1946, and which thereby es-
tablished the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) .
Under the terms of the resolution, the UNAEC was to operate
closely within the framework of the Security Council, with its provi-
sion for the veto power, a fact with significance for subsequent nego-
tiations on the control of atomic energy. The Commission was to be
composed of one representative of each country on the Security Coun-
cil and receive directions from the Council "in matters affecting secu-
rity." The resolution added, "On these matters, the Commission shall
be accountable for its work to the Security Council," a provision which
was included as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union at the
Moscow Conference. The rationale behind this approach rested on the
assertion that the most important aspect of the control question was
the assurance of security. Even at this early stage, the concern over
the military applications of atomic energy dominated the discussions,
diverting attention from ways to share knowledge necessary in the
economic or industrial applications of atomic energy.7 The resolution
also set down the terms of reference for the Commission's proposals
as follows :
(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of
basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary
to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes ;
(c) For the elimination from national armaments of
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable
to mass destruction ; and
(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and
other means to protect complying States against the hazards
of violations and evasion.8
Formulation of Atomic Policy in the United States
The commanding position of the United States as a world power
resulting from its role in World War II and in helping to shape the
postwar world led to an unprecedented involvement in international
relations. As the nation in sole possession of atomic weapons, the
United States bore an added responsibility to seek international con-
trol over this new and terrible form of destruction.
Not onlv was it necessary to define national policv on international
control, but it was also important to determine an appropriate means
of domestic control, a responsibility which had been given to the Army
6 See Ibid. pn. 125-127 for the text of the Moscow Declaration.
7 Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, The Struggle to Control Atomic
Weapons, 191,5-1,9 (Boston, Mass. : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 213.
8 "Establishment of a Commission to Deal With The Problems Raised by the Discovery
of Atomic Energy," United Nations General Assembly Resolution I, Resolutions Adopted b?/
the General Assembly During the First Part of Its First Session from 10 January to 11,
February 191,6, United Nations Document A/64 (London, England: Church House, 1946),
p. 9.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-6
64
during the war. National control of weapons production and disclos-
ure of information necessary for this purpose posed controversy. In
addition, consideration was given to the role of U.S. domestic control
in relation to international negotiations and control.
DOMESTIC CONTROL
The congressional controversy over domestic control of atomic en-
ergy occurred during the early stages of formulation of U.S. policy
on international control and during the first months of the negotia-
tions in the United Nations. A prominent issue in the vigorous public
debate concerned the extent of the military role in U.S. atomic energy
programs. Proposals ranged from a military-dominated commission
responsible for U.S. development of atomic energy to complete ex-
clusion of the military. Equally difficult was the issue of the kind of
control to be placed on the release of information on industrial appli-
cations, that is, data which could apply to weapons production as well,
without obstructing the exchange of information within the scien-
tific community necessary to foster maximum development of atomic
energy.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, approved July 26, provided for a
full-time civilian Atomic Energy Commission whose members were
to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. It also established the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
of the Congress to oversee atomic energy matters. Provision was made
for consultations with and recommendations from a Military Liaison
Committee on "'matters relating to military applications,"9 but final
decisions were left to the civilian Commission. As far as dissemina-
tion of information was concerned, the law set up a category called
"restricted data,"" which included primarily data associated with
atomic weapons and fissionable materials. The law then set down the
nature of the punishments to be used against those convicted of trans-
mitting restricted data for the purpose of injuring the United States
or for granting an advantage to a foreign country. Exchange of in-
formation with foreign countries on the use of atomic energy for in-
dustrial purposes was forbidden until Congress declared "by joint
resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards
against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been
established."10
One section of the law was devoted to the relationship between do-
mestic control and any international control arrangements which
might be concluded. The law defined "international arrangement" as
a t reaty approved by t he Senate or ( )ongress, and recognized the possi-
bility t hat portions of the U.S. law might be inconsistent with such an
arrangement. If this should be the case, according to the law, the pro-
visions of the international arrangement would take precedence as
long as the agreement was in force. Moreover, tin- Commission was to
"give maximum effect to the policies contained in any such interna-
t ional arrangement." "
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 may have had some effect on foreign
perceptions of ih<> U.S. position in the negotiations on international
" Sec. •_'(<■). nil Stat. 757.
"■ Sec 10(a)(1). «;<> stat. 7<;<;
" Soc 8(C), 00 Stat. 765
65
control. For example, an argument in the United States which favored
complete civilian control had been the assertion that a military-con-
trolled program might convey the impression that the general purpose
of U.S. atomic energy programs was oriented toward weapons pro-
duction, thereby presenting an unfavorable prospect for U.S. willing-
ness to seek or accept international control. As the bill was finally
passed by the Congress, the emphasis on civilian control may have
helped avoid such an impression. Moreover, the law marked an un-
precedented intrusion of the Federal Government into private enter-
prise through its provisions for Government ownership and control
over fissionable materials and provisions for various licensing powers
with respect to facilities and activities. Thus, by these provisions the
Congress demonstrated its awareness of the unprecedented importance
and dangers of the development of atomic energy. The section on
international control may have served to show a positive U.S. view
toward international control and preparedness to implement it.
However, the considerable precautions which were taken regarding
release of information may have served to reflect a U.S. desire to retain
its atomic monopoly. Although these precautions were also based on
U.S. security considerations and on U.S. suspicions of how other coun-
tries might use atomic weapons once they had acquired them, nonethe-
less, the debate on this issue and the resulting provisions in the law may
have inspired doubts in other countries as to the sincerity of U.S.
pledges to relinquish its monopoly to an appropriate international au-
thority. In any case, the following conclusion of a State Department
publication seems applicable:
The evolution of a policy for domestic control not only pro-
vided parallels for the problems that were certain to be met
in international planning, but it illustrated as no other
process could the magnitude and complexity of the task that
awaited inter-Governmental collaboration.12
HASTY DEMOBILIZATION OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES
A relevant consideration in the evolution of early U.S. policy for
the atom is the overall state of the U.S. defense posture in 1945 and
1946.13 With the advent of peace, the American public and the troops
themselves clamored to bring the armies home, on the grounds that
there was no longer a need to maintain the wartime level of military
manpower. Besides being influenced by the euphoric atmosphere
brought on by the end of war, many people looked to the newly de-
veloped atomic bomb as a sufficient source of military strength. A
week after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945.
President Truman responded to public and congressional pressure,
and announced that inductions would drop from 80,000 to 50,000 per
month and that within 12 to 18 months, 5i/2 million men would be
released from the service. By April 1946, the number of those dis-
charged from the Army had reached nearly 7 million. By June 30,
1946, out of a total of about 3 million military personnel remaining on
12 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 21.
"The following discussion is based primarily on Lieberman. The Scorpion and the
Tarantula, pp. 227-234.
66
active duty in all of the U.S. armed services combined, approximately
1.4 million were in the Army.14
Many U.S. Government officials, especially among the military
services, had opposed such rapid demobilization of the armed forces
because of their mistrust of the Russians. One historian cites the
power vacuum in Europe which resulted from rapid U.S. withdrawal
as at least one reason for the imposition of Soviet hegemony in East-
ern Europe during this period.15 The dramatic cuts in the armed
forces also were to have an effect on the negotiations for the control
of atomic energy. One source interprets the situation as follows :
As the nation's conventional military resources grew
wTeaker and weaker at a time when Soviet dynamism made
it imperative that the United States be strong, the place of
atomic weapons in the overall American military posture
would naturally become more critical and worthy of
protection.16
FORMULATION OF U.S. POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
Early efforts: Even before the first atomic bomb was used during
the war-, some persons in the United States were aware of the potential
need for control of atomic energy and encouraged the Administration
to initiate action to formulate its policy on the subject. Largely at the
recommendation of Vannevar Bush, a scientific advisor to President
Truman and Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Devel-
opment, and another presidential advisor, Harvard University Presi-
dent James B. Conant, Truman called on Henry L. Stimson, Secretary
of War, to appoint a group to consider the future needs in the area of
control, on both the international and domestic levels. Stimson recog-
nized that to deal with the unique situation created by the development
of the atomic bomb required knowledge in both science and politics;
he gathered advisors from these areas, including Bush and Conant,
Ralph Bard, the Undersecretary of the Navy, William L. Clayton,
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and James F.
Byrnes, who would become Secretary of State two months later, to
serve as the President's personal representative on the Committee.
Other members were George Harrison, president of the New York
Life Insurance Company and a Special Assistant to Stimson, Karl
Compton, a physicist and president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and several scientists who had led in the development of
the bomb: Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Dr.
Arthur II. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. The unpublished report
of what is known as the Secretary of War's Interim Committee, which
nut during May L945, reached a number of conclusions affecting inter-
national control which were to remain at, issue in future attempts
toward such control.
Within a month after the first atomic weapons were used, in August
194.">, a report w as issued which explained the basic scientific facts asso-
ciated with the development of atomic energy. Prepared in 1944 by a
physicist who had been involved in the bomb effort, Dr. Henry I).
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C. : U.S.
Government Printing Office, l!»7i >. p. lit.
16 Thomas A. Bailey, ' Dlplomatio History of the American People (New York : Appleton-
Century Crofts, 1964), p. 778.
19 Lleberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 234.
67
Smyth of Princeton, the report was released to avert any misconcep-
tion or wild speculation by the public concerning the new weapon.
Moreover, it v as hoped that by supplying a substantial amount of in-
formation at this time, the report would alleviate public pressure, espe-
cially from the scientific community, for release of all pertinent infor-
mation. The Smyth report supplied basic facts, but not enough to aid
rival efforts to develop an atomic weapon.17
The decision to release the Smyth report was much debated within
the Administration, but the reasons noted above prevailed. The Smyth
report was later used as a basic source for the discussions in a Scien-
tific and Technical Committee of the UNAEC. The conclusion of the
report is often cited when the study is considered in relation to inter-
national control :
We find ourselves with an explosive which is far from
completely perfected. Yet the future possibilities of such
explosives are appalling, and their effects on future wars and
international affairs are of fundamental importance. Here is
a new tool for mankind, a tool of unimaginable destructive
power. Its development raises many questions that must be
answered in the near future.
* * * These questions are not technical questions ; they are
political and social questions, and the answers given to them
may affect all mankind for generations * * * In a free country
like ours, such questions should be debated by the people and
decisions must be made by the people through their repre-
sentatives. This is one reason for the release of this report. It
is a semi-technical report which it is hoped men of science in
this country can use to help their fellow citizens in reaching
wise decisions. The people of the country must be informed
if they are to discharge their responsibilities wisely.18
Among the initial public statements of U.S. policy on arrangements
for international control was President Truman's address to Congress
on October 3, 1945. Affirming the U.S. commitment to seek interna-
tional control of atomic energy and the U.S. desire to share informa-
tion for peaceful purposes, the President announced the impending
discussions with Canada and Great Britain which were to result in the
Three Nation Agreed Declaration. On October 27, 1945, he further
defined U.S. policy by enunciating five basic principles which, for
the most part, had originated with Stimson's committee. These con-
clusions might be viewed as a combination of the primary technological
and political factors which would condition the evolution of the U.S.
plan for international control and the negotiations to achieve such
control. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, associated with early U.S. arms con-
trol negotiations in the Department of State, has summarized these
principles as follows :
1. No nation can long maintain a monopoly of atomic
weapons.
2. No nation could long maintain or morally defend a
monopoly of peaceful benefits of atomic energy.
17 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar B. Anderson, Jr. The New World 1939/191,6, A History
of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. I (University Park, Pa. : Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, 1962) pp. 400-407.
18 Smyth, General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for
Military Purposes, p. 165.
68
3. For the foreseeable future there can be no adequate
military defense against atomic weapons.
4. All the initial processes in the production of fissionable
materials and certain subsequent processes are identical
whether their intended use or purpose is peaceful or military.
5. The nuclear chain reaction required for the release of
atomic energy is now based upon uranium or thorium as the
only suitable raw materials occurring in nature. Ores contain-
ing these materials are only relatively rare. Although rich de-
posits are not numerous, the lower concentrations of the ores
have a wide geographical distribution.19
Preparations for negotiations in the UNAEC : In January 1946,
1 month after the conclusion of the Moscow Declaration, James F.
Byrnes, Secretary of State, announced that he had appointed a com-
mittee "to study the subject of controls and safeguards necessary to
protect this 00^-61-11™^!!^' during the international negotiations on
atomic energy. Assistant Secretary Acheson had been named chair-
man; the other members were Bush, Oonant, General Leslie Groves —
head of the Manhattan project which had developed the atomic bomb
during the war — and John McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of
War. Although the members of the committee had some knowledge of
atomic energy matters from the standpoint of both its technological
and political aspects, Acheson suggested appointing a Board of Con-
sultants to advise the committee on the technological aspects of inter-
national control. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, was given the task of leading the Board. Its other members
were Chester Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone, who
had been active in the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ;
Harry A. Winne, an engineer and a vice president of General Electric
Company, who had participated in the Manhattan Project ; and Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who had directed the weaponry
installation of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico.
The composition of the two groups was intended to provide the talents
necessary to consider both the political and technological aspects of
the problem of providing a basis for a workable system of international
control.
In the course of the next two months, the Board drafted a basic plan
for international control. Following a series of meetings with Ache-
son's committee, which led to certain modifications and additions, it
produced a document entitled "A Report on the International Control
of Atomic Energy." Known as the "Acheson-Lilienthal report," the
study set down the basic technological factors involved in the develop-
ment of atomic energy, particularly those which would affect the na-
ture of the international control system. Once these considerations had
been provided, the Hoard outlined the basic features of a control plan,
governed primarily by the technological data. ( )n the whole, the Board
regarded its work "not as a -final plan, but as a place to begin, a foun-
dation on which to build."20 The report was released in late March
1!» H'» as a basis for public discussion.
'•Bernhard G. Ftwhhtiofer. I'ostwar Xcaotintionfi for Arms Control (Washington, D.C. :
Brookings, 19fil), p. :{.'{.
* State Department "Aeheson-Llllenthal report," p. vlii.
69
Writing in 1948, J. Robert Oppenheimer summarized the general
trend of thinking within the scientific community toward the atomic
challenge which confronted U.S. diplomacy :
The control of atomic weapons always appeared possible
only on the basis of an intensive and working collaboration
between peoples of many nationalities, on the creation * * *
of supra-national patterns of communication, of work, and of
development. The development of atomic energy lay in an area
peculiarly suited to such internationalization, and in fact re-
quiring it for the most effective exploitation, almost on tech-
nical grounds alone. The development of atomic energy lay in
a field international by tradition and untouched by pre-exist-
ing national patterns of control. Thus, the problem as it ap-
peared in the summer of 1945 was to use our understanding of
atomic energy, and the developments that we had carried out,
with their implied hope and implied threat, to see whether in
this area international barriers might not be broken down,
and patterns of candor and cooperation established which
would make the peace of the world.21
The U.S. negotiator and final steps to define policy : In the mean-
time, on March 18, 1946, to bring the issue to the United Nations, the
President named Bernard M. Baruch U.S. representative to the
UNAEC. One source offers the following description :
Bernard Mannes Baruch * * * had by his 75th year become
a symbol of America to his fellow Americans as well as to
people all over the world. An immensely successful financier
who had built a fortune in the lusty days of business boom,
a public servant and sought-after counselor to Presidents of
both political parties, Baruch was one of the most trusted men
in all of America. The fact that he was Jewish seemed to
assure his place in the public mind because it gave his life that
quality of equal opportunity realized, of Horatio Alger, that
is so important to America's self-image.22
Included in the delegation to the UNAEC were Baruelvs choices
from leading members of the banking business : Herbert Swope, John
M. Hancock, and Ferdinand Eberstadt ; the fifth member of the dele-
gation was Fred Searls, a mining engineer, formerly a journalist, and
head of the New York State Racing Commission. Richard C. Tolman,
who had served as a scientific advisor to General Groves, was chosen
for the same role in Baruelvs delegation.
Aside from the fact that Baruch spoke for U.S. policy on inter-
national control of atomic energy, his appointment might be consid-
ered in two respects with regard to the central issues of this study : the
primary motives behind the appointment and his role in the policy-
making process. As to the reasoning behind the appointment of Ba-
ruch, at this time the issues surrounding the domestic control of atomic
energy were far from resolved, and prominent among them was the
possibility of excessive restrictions on the release of information. Con-
gressional hesitation to allow a free flow of information had been ex-
a J. Robert Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, v. 4. no. 2 (February 1948), pp. 41-42.
83 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the tarantula, p. 261.
70
pressed sufficiently to make it reasonably clear that the United States
would be limited, if not completely crippled, in its ability to meet its
secret agreements with the British for postwar collaboration on atomic
energy matters.23
His appointment was apparently motivated by a belief that he could
help enlarge the Administration's freedom of action in the field of
international negotiation. Baruch represented the kind of public
servant who could be entrusted with America's security, as well as
one who was respected in international circles. Indeed, the chairman
of the Senate Foreign Eelations Committee pledged Baruch's con-
firmation without a hearing, once he had assured the committee in
writing that "there would be no treaty and no disclosures without safe-
guards, and that no agreement of any kind would be entered without
the consent of Congress." 24
The appointment and acceptance of Baruch appear to have been
based primarily on respect for his political acumen. At any rate, the
motivations behind the choice of the chief negotiator were not of the
same character which prompted the appointment and work of Ache-
son's committee and the Board of Consultants. Indeed, by some per-
sons, Baruch was not thought to be qualified for the job. The members
of the Board and Acheson's committee declined to continue in these
groups under Baruch, partly on the grounds that if Baruch pursued
policies with which they disagreed, they wanted to retain the right to
voice their opposition.25
One member of Baruch's group — namely, Hancock — reacted nega-
tively to Baruch's suggestion that the Board of Consultants continue
its work under the auspices of the State Department. Hancock stated :
These problems are not often purely scientific problems.
They blend very quickly into political problems * * *. The
scientists tend to be unbending and calculating in the field
of science — which is natural — but they carry over their in-
elasticity into arguments in the field of international affairs,
politics in the proper sense, and negotiation.26
Apparently there was little common outlook between those represent-
ing mainly a scientific approach, who had developed the recommen-
dations for a policy of international control of atomic energy, and
those representing chiefly a political approach, who were responsible
for conducting the diplomatic negol iations to implement the emerging
policy.
2n In August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had signed an executive agreement, known
as thi' Quebec Agreement, which was nol made public, and affirmed Anglo-American coop
eration on atomic energy during the war. A year later, the two leaders signed an aide-
memoire to supplement the earlier agreement, which provided for full collaboration between
the two countries following the war. Attempts were made to renegotiate the agreement
al the time of the Truman-Attlee-Klng conference, when the Americans asserted that active
collaboration could not be carried out through an executive agreement. Nonetheless they
agreed, at least in principle, to the idea of equal partnership, in the form of "full and
effective cooperation." Eventually In April 1!)4<;. when the British pressed for further
fulfillments, Truman Informed them thai he Interpreted this phrase to Include only the
field Of hasic scientific Information, and thereby finalized the U.S. decision to withdraw
from any arrangement which WOUld have Involved lending practical assistance to endeavors
such as building ami operating production plants. The primary rationale behind thi^ policy
was that the agreement could aol be kept secret under the provisions of the U.N. ("barter
and public control efforts which were about to begin, Afte. the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
was passed, compliance with the agreements, as the British Interpreted them, would have
been legally forbidden. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission, pp, i'7s 280, 177 I7:i
-' Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 264
"■Hewlett and Anderson. History of tin United States Atomic Energy Commission,
p. 560.
" Llebennan. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 291.
71
As to Baruch's role in the policymaking process, the negotiator's own
view of the part he should play, as well as that of his advisors, would
have a substantial influence on the shape of U.S. policy, and on the
course of the negotiations. He resented the fact that the Acheson-
Lilienthal report had been published, lest it be regarded as a statement
of U.S. policy, thus placing him in the role of a mere "messenger boy."
Only after consultations with the President and Byrnes was Baruch
satisfied that his personal views on atomic energy control would be
considered, although later accounts by Truman and Baruch differ re-
garding their perceptions of the extent of Baruch's powers at that
time. 27
Although Baruch had asked Acheson's committee and its Board of
Consultants to remain at his disposal during the negotiations, this ar-
rangement did not materialize. Some meetings were held between
Baruch's delegation and the two groups. These encounters provided
the forum for expression of a variety of views on U.S. policy but not
on a sustained basis.
Abortive Efforts in the United Nations Toward Control
On June 14, 1946, the end product of these meetings, and of discus-
sions within the Administration, was enunciated by Baruch at the op-
ening session of the UNAEC. The views of both the military services
and the Congress had been considered, and some of the basic ingredi-
ents of the Acheson-Lilienthal report had been retained ; other impor- .
taut characteristics had originated with Baruch and his deputies.
THE U.S. PROPOSAL
In Baruch's speech to the opening session of the UNAEC, he noted
that his proposal was made as a basis for discussion, although it
eventually came to be regarded as a rather firm statement of the
U.S. position. Baruch proposed that an International Control Au-
thority be established "to which should be entrusted all phases of the
development and use of atomic energy." It would control or own all
atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, and
would control, license, and inspect all others. Its functions would in-
clude fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy, and conducting
research and development in the field, in order to remain at the fore-
front of potential new developments. Once the Authority was estab-
lished, all bomb manufacturing would be halted and existing bombs
destroyed, and the Authority would possess all the information as-
sociated with atomic energy. This proposal marked the first time that
diplomats had sought to establish a worldwide system of control and
use of a scientific discovery.
An important point which was included, and a major contribution
of Baruch, concerned the issue of enforcement of the arrangement for
international control. Because of the serious nature of atomic energy
questions, Baruch expressed the view that any countries which pur-
sued activities that ran counter to or usurped those of the Authority
should be subject to punishments. Specific violations were listed, such
as possession or manufacture of an atomic weapon. Moreover, in order
to ensure that violators would be punished, Baruch proposed that the
27 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
pp. 557-560.
72
veto power in the Security Council would not apply on questions con-
cerning the fulfillment of sanctions.28
In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation submitted
three memoranda which elaborated on the U.S. position.29 These
documents and the speeches of Baruch set forth the details of the U.S.
position on the various issues covered in the discussion below.
THE SOVIET PROPOSAL
The Soviet proposal was presented at the second meeting of the
UNAEC on June 19, 1946, by Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Foreign
Minister and the Soviet Representative on the U.N. Security Council.
Demanding that atomic energy should be used only for peaceful
purposes, he proposed that a first step should be a convention outlaw-
ing the production and use of atomic weapons. Following such an
agreement, he continued, there should be established "a system of su-
pervision and control to see that the conventions and agreements are
observed, and measures concerning sanctions against unlawful use of
atomic energy." 30
At this time, Gromyko introduced two resolutions to implement the
Soviet principles of international control. The first called for an agree-
ment to ban the use and production of atomic bombs and to destroy
existing weapons within three months of the conclusion of the agree-
ment. This resolution also provided that the parties to the proposed
agreement would pass legislation to punish violators of the agreement.
The second resolution proposed that two committees be established : one
to make recommendations on the exchange of scientific information,
and another to examine methods of insuring compliance with the
prohibitions of the agreement, including sanctions. The only direct
response by Gromyko to the U.S. proposal was the expression of
Soviet opposition to elimination of the veto:
Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security
Council, including efforts directed to undermine the require-
ments of unanimity of the members of the Security Council,
upon questions of substance, are incompatible with the in-
terests of the United Nations * * * . Such attempts should be
resisted.31
The veto question was to remain at issue throughout the negotiations.
One source has described the Soviet proposals as inchoate:
Gromyko's proposals of June 19 have, frequently been de-
scribed in the Western press and by the Soviet representatives
t hemselves as the "Soviet plan": but they really constituted no
plan at all. Not, if by a plan, one comprehends a systematic
28 For a complete text of Banich's speech, see "Proposals for an International Atomic
Development Authority." Department of State Bulletin, v. 14, no. 364 (June 23, 1946),
pp. 1057-1062, or State Department, Growth of a Policj/, pp. 138-147.
»The three memoranda were entitled U.S. Memorandum No. 1. Submitted to Sub-
committee No. 1 <>t the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New V>rk. July -'.
1946; D.S. Memorandum No. 'J Dealing with the Functions and Powers of the Proposed
Atomic Development Authority. Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations
Atomic- Energy Commission, New York, July r>, 1046; and D.S. Memorandum No. 3, Deal
Ing With the Relations Between the Atomic Development Authority and the Organs of the
United Nations, Submitted to Subcommittee No. 1 of the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission, New York, July 12, 1946. _,
30 Joseph I,. Nogee, Soviet Policy Toward International control of Atomic Energy.
t N.>tre l lame. Ind. : I'niversit v of Notre Dame Press, l!'t;i |, p. 36.
m Ibid., p. 37.
73
and comprehensive procedure for action. Gromyko's "plan"
was, in fact, the enunciation of three or four basic principles
which guided Soviet policy ( promotion of peaceful develop-
ment of atomic energy, prohibition of atomic weapons, agree-
ment on international control, and the retention of full sov-
ereign freedom of action) plus proposals for the further
organization of the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with
the problems of control and the exchange of scientific informa-
tion. On the exact form of international control, Soviet state-
ments were deliberately vague.
32
DEBATE AND IMPASSE
Early in the negotiations, the structure of the UNAEC was orga-
nized to include four committees : a Scientific and Technical Commit-
tee, a Legal Advisory Committee, Committee Two to examine all the
questions associated with a control plan, and Committee One to coordi-
nate the work of the other three committees. In July 1946, at the second
session of Committee Two, Soviet representative Gromyko delivered
a major speech condemning the U.S. proposals, and declaring that
as they are presented now [the proposals] could not be ac-
cepted by the U.S.S.R., either as a whole or in their separate
parts.33
When further efforts to negotiate seemed fruitless, it was decided to
postpone the deliberations of Committee Two until a report from the
Scientific and Technical Committee had been submitted.
The report of the latter Committee, similar in purpose to that of the
Acheson-Lilienthal groups, was given to Committee Two on October 2,
1946. Committee Two had passed a resolution suggesting that the Sci-
entific and Technical Committee "present a report on the question
whether effective control is possible, together with an indication of
the methods by which * * * effective control can be achieved." 34 The
Scientific and Technical Committee had decided to confine its con-
siderations to the requirements of a control system as dictated solely
by the technical characteristics of atomic energy development, and
disclaimed any responsibility for taking political feasibility into ac-
count. Obviously, the major portion of the information on atomic
energy was supplied by the United States, primarily through the
Smyth report and the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In light of this fact,
the Soviet representative to the Committee interpreted the conclusions
of the Committee as "hypothetical and conditional" because the Soviets
considered the information "limited and incomplete." 35 Despite this
statement, the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee
concluded that "we do not find any basis in the available scientific
facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically
feasible." 3G
33 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
33 State Department. Growth of a Policy, r>. SI.
34 As quoted in First Renort on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of Control. In United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to
the Security Council, 31 December 1946," Official Records. Special Supplement. Report to
the Security Council. (Lake Success, New York : 1946), p. 20.
35 Ibid., n. 50.
36 State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 86.
74
In addition, the Committee reemphasized the scientific principle which
had provided a basic element in the efforts to establish international
control of atomic energy, when it stated :
There is an intimate relation between the activities required
for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of
atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the
former are also needed for the latter.3'
The report defined the various dangerous points in atomic energy
development at which some form of safeguard should be applied, but
made no recommendations for specific methods of safeguards.
Committee Two continued its deliberations and prepared a report
which set forth specific safeguards for various activities, but these
were deemed only the basic elements of a plan and not a complete plan
for control.
The report on safeguards and that of the Scientific and Technical
Committee were included in a report prepared by the full membership
of the TT.X. Atomic Energy Commission, and submitted to the Security
Council on December 31, 1946. The report had been approved by 10
members of the Commission, with the remaining two, the Soviet Union
and Poland, abstaining. Following this expression of majority ap-
proval, Baruch and his. staff resigned on the grounds that the U.S.
representative to the United Nations (at this time, Warren Austin)
should serve as the U.S. spokesman in the Security Council. This first
report of the UNAEC offered various findings and recommendations
based largely on the proposals submitted by the United States. By
March 1!> 17. when its debate on the provisions of the first report failed
of agreement, the Security Council passed a resolution which referred
the discussions back to the UNAEC and requested a second report
from that body. The major sources of disagreement in the negotiations
are discussed below. There was to be little narrowing of these differ-
ences in the subsequent negotiations of the UNAEC.
One source describes the "deadlock" at this time as "particularly
ominous not because of specific Soviet objections to the majority plan,
but because Soviet criticism was made a part of its ideological con-
flict with the West." !s Some of the U.S. policymakers who had engi-
neered the U.S. plan, including both scientists and politicians, became
disillusioned with the negotiations, and even suggested that the United
States withdraw from them. However, consultations with U.S. allies
had discouraged such an idea, and the negotiations continued "'because
world opinion would not let them stop." 39
In September 11)47, the UNAEC submitted the second report to the
Security ( louncil, elaborating on the specific recommendations for con-
trol in the first report. Besides engaging in this exercise, the second
round of the. UNAEC deliberations had considered a list of 12 amend-
ments which the Soviet Union proposed be applied to the findings and
recommendations of the first report. These amendments, which sought
to alter some of the fundamental features of the majority plan, were
not accepted by the Commission. Examples of the questionsot principle
; [bid., p. 36.
Is NoRee, Soviet Policy, p. 88.
80 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 391.
75
raised by the Soviet amendments on which no agreement had been
reached are the question of what was required for strict international
control of atomic energy, whether international control, including the
prohibition of atomic weapons, was to be established by one treaty or
several and in the latter case, the question of priorities, or the question
of the right of the proposed Authority to conduct research in atomic
weapons. As was the case with the first report of the UNAEC, the
second report had been approved by 10 members of the Commission,
but this time only Poland had abstained, while the Soviet Union had
registered opposition.
Because of more pressing matters on its agenda, like the Palestine
question or the India-Pakistan question, the Security Council de-
cided not to consider the second report of the UNAEC. Deliberations
continued in the latter institution through the remainder of 1947 and
the spring of 1948. These discussions prompted the UNAEC third re-
port to conclude that an impasse had been reached, and to request that
UNAEC negotiations be suspended. A resolution for Security Council
approval of all the reports of the UNAEC was vetoed by the Soviet
Union in the summer of 1948 ; in the fall, General Assembly consider-
ation of the question of atomic energy control resulted in a 40-6— 1 ap-
proval of the majority plan, but the value of this non-binding reso-
lution lay in propaganda more than in support for successful collabora-
tion. Further negotiations in the UNAEC, which were continued at the
insistence of the General Assembly, rapidly deteriorated, and by No-
vember 1949, the General Assembly agreed to suspend the work of the
UNAEC.
IV. Issues in the Interplay Between Diplomacy and Nuclear
Technology
Identification of a number of basic issues prominent in the U.S.
policymaking process and in the negotiations will help to clarify the
way in which technological and diplomatic factors interacted during
the formulation and negotiation of the Baruch proposals. These basic
issues will be explored to show this interaction, and also how it affected
the outcome of each issue. Each issue will be examined in this man-
ner, first in the course of the U.S. policymaking process and then in
the international negotiations. Special attention will be given to the
U.S. proposals as finally presented, the Soviet reaction to them, and
the outcome of the negotiations.
Broadly, these issues all dealt with the interlocking concerns of
national power, human safety, secrecy of atomic technology, privacy
of the Soviet Union, and the potential utility of peaceful atomic en-
ergy. Three broad issues emerged : ( 1 ) the form of control, that is,
international ownership and management versus inspection ;
('2) transitional stages for the establishment of international control,
involving transfer of control of information and nuclear production
facilities from the United States to the international authority; and
( 3 ) the question of sanctions and the veto.
Significance of Technological Factors for U.S. Policy
Before these issues are discussed in detail, it might be helpful to
note a number of general factors of technology and diplomacy which
may have influenced U.S. policy and the outcome of the negotiations.
Foremost among the technological considerations was the U.S.
monopoly over atomic weapons. The very nature of scientific inquiry
made it axiomatic that the U.S. monopoly was transitory. Acceptance
of this factor was a major political motivation for U.S. efforts toward
international control. Nevertheless, the question arose as to how the
United States could prevent a premature end to its monopoly and
thereby avoid endangering either its own security or world security
while an international system of control was being established. U.S.
policy on this question would influence the general political atmos-
phere surrounding the effort to establish international control.
Among the possible measures which the United States could use to
protect itself and the world from proliferation of atomic weapons
until an international system could be set up was stringent control
of the dissemination of information which would contribute to devel-
opment of military applications of atomic energy. This idea led to a
persistent popular misconception regarding the "secret" of the atomic
bomb:
Many of the semantic difficulties dated from the first
months of public knowledge of the wartime program. The
"secret" of the atomic bomb was a case in point. After more
than two years of efforts to explain this term accurately, use
of it still induced an almost automatic emotional response.
(76)
77
Polling questions which contained references to both "bomb
secrets" and "international control"' invariably brought
fewer approvals of the control principle, the automatic reac-
tion being to "keep the secrets." 40
At the time of the December 1945 conference which resulted in the
Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other members of Congress
repeatedly sought and obtained assurances from the President that the
United States would not release atomic energy information prior to
the establishment of adequate safeguards. The protective attitude to-
ward the U.S. "secrets" was heightened by the revelation in early
1946 of evidence of espionage in Canada involving the transmission
of atomic energy information to the Soviet Union. These events served
not only to reinforce the public attitude toward nuclear secrecy sur-
rounding the bomb, but also to engender a growing mistrust in the
United States of the Soviet Union.41
In general, the attitude of the United States toward the secret of
the bomb may have had several effects on its policy and on other coun-
tries' conceptions of that policy. Mistrust of the Soviet Union, coupled
with the idea that sole possession of the atomic weapon represented a
"sacred trust" 42 in terms of U.S. responsibility for world security,
may have acted as a motive to withhold as much information as pos-
sible, for as long as possible, until the international control system was
secure. But a marked reluctance on the part of the United States to
part with information or facilities may have encouraged critics of
the U.S. proposals, especially in the Soviet Union, to conclude that
the United States did not intend to relinquish its monopoly and
eventually would exercise "atomic diplomacy."
The notion of devising methods to protect the secret of the bomb
figured importantly in U.S. policy discussions on international control
of atomic energy. However, considerations of this nature ran counter
to a principle which might be deemed applicable to any field of scien-
tific inquiry : that secrecy cannot long delay the independent acquisi-
tion of scientific and technological information. This principle had
special force in the case of atomic energy, in light of the inherent im-
portance of this information to other nations, especially a great power
like the Soviet Union.
A related question which entered U.S. policy deliberations involved
estimates of how long it would take the Soviet Union to develop its
own atomic weapon without access to outside information. Such esti-
mates would indicate how long the United States could expect to
enjoy its preeminence in the field of atomic energy even if its efforts
to maintain secrecy, before establishment of effective international
control, should be entirely successful. Thus, the U.S. assessment of
Soviet technological capabilities was a factor to be reckoned with in
the U.S. diplomatic approach to the international negotiations.
"U.S. Department of State, The International Control of Atomic Energy, Policy at the
Crossroads, Publication 3161 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948),
4R,Pewlett and Anderson- History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
I>. 5(11. The spv cas"8 also had an effW-r on Oip concessional deliberations oi domestic
control of atomic energy and on the U.S. attitude toward international information ex-
change, e.g., wartime agreements with the British. Ibid., p. 480.
4-This phrase was used by President Truman to describe the U.S. role in relation to its
monopoly on atomic weapons. State Department, Growth of a Policy, p 117.
78
Opinions varied within the Administration as to the length of time
necessary for the Soviet Union to develop an atomic weapon. As early
as 1D4T). the question was raised in Administration circles. During a
meeting of Stimson's Interim Committee, a memorandum was cited
which reflected the estimate by Bush and Conant that it would be 3
to 4 years before the Soviets could develop an atomic weapon. General
Groves' estimate is described as follows: ''Taking a very low view of
Russian ability, he considered 20 years a much likelier figure."43
Conant called this figure "highly unsafe."
The Acheson-Lilienthal report noted the speculative nature of esti-
mates of this kind. In order to assess a technological situation accu-
rately, the report contended, it was necessary to have a knowledge of
the progress of foreign development. Such knowledge, of course, was
not then forthcoming. But on balance, the report seemed to minimize
the possibility of an imminent acquisition of atomic weapons by other
countries. The Consultants touched on this question insofar as it re-
lated to how much a rival effort would be accelerated by the release
of U.S. information. Even with the release of purely theoretical in-
formation, according to the Consultants, "a major program, surely
lasting many years, is required for the actual production of atomic
weapons." 44 It might be inferred from this statement that the Con-
sultants' view of rival efforts, without access to theoretical informa-
tion, could hardly have been an imminent cause for alarm to U.S.
policymakers.
One high Administration view, even more explicit regarding esti-
mates of Russia's ability to develop its own bomb, was conveyed to the
U.S. negotiating team. Hancock kept a record of a meeting which he
attended between Byrnes and Baruch, which states :
Mr. Byrnes briefly reviewed his impression that the Rus-
sians don't know much about atomic energy or its use in
bombs. Dr. Conant got no facts regarding it while he was in
Russia and the assumption is that they know nothing.'
While it is difficult to appraise the extent to which these assessments
of Soviet nuclear development influenced U.S. policy, one might infer
from the course and outcome of the negotiations that these considera-
tions had weight. Considering the fact that differing estimates were
made regarding Soviet atomic capabilities, it is possible to note an
example of one problem which can arise when diplomacy is depend-
ent upon science and technology. Policymakers do not always receive"
a technological assessment to which all members of the scientific com-
munity agree. A wide divergence only complicates the diplomat's task.
If. for example, there is no clear consensus that an imminent danger
exists, the diplomat will probably tend to be guided by counsels of
compromise rather than urgency. And perhaps he should be — but it
must also be noted that the counsels of urgency could be right, ami that
in the present instance it was the conservative estimates of General
Groves which turned out to be the furthest from the true situation.
An equally thorny political factor which would enter into the dis-
11 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, p. 3.r>4.
11 state Department, "Acheson Llllentbal Report," p. 51.
** Lleberman, The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, p. 274. Hancock may have been referring
ti. Conant's trip t" Russia with Byrnes, for the meetings which resulted in the Moscow
Declaration. Ibid., pp. iog-107.
79
cussions was the secrecy shrouding Soviet activities. One source de-
scribes this phenomenon as follows :
Western ignorance about the real condition of Russia was
deemed by the regime, quite logically from its point of view,
as one of the greatest assets it had in its conduct of foreign
relations. Access to the U.S.S.R. was never so difficult — i.e.,
virtually impossible — for a foreigner who was not a diplomat
or Communist, travel throughout the country never so limited
as between 1946 and 1954. Not even during the Great Purge
of the 1930's were restrictions so all-encompassing. The fear
which this restrictive behavior suggests cannot have been
simply a concern over revelations about the police-state
aspects of Soviet life. By 1947, only Communists, fellow
travelers, and the most naive of Western liberals denied that
aspect of Soviet reality. Much more dangerous was any revela-
tion of Russian weakness, of the magnitude of the tasks of
industrial reconstruction and rapid demobilization lying
ahead of this still primitive society. A truer picture of Rus-
sia's strength and weaknesses might induce some new and
unwelcome thinking in the State Department and the
Pentagon.46
Just as U.S. secrecy surrounding the bomb presented problems for its
policy and the negotiations, the secretive nature of the Soviet Union
would have a serious effect on the efforts to reach agreement on some
of the fundamental elements of control.
Soviet development of atomic energy had proceeded quite well until
World War II.47 In terms of the quality of research, the Soviet capa-
bility at that point has been estimated to have been on a par with that
of the United States, and the Soviets were catching up in the field of
equipment. As the extent of Soviet involvement in World War II in-
creased, however, they apparently found it necessary to abandon their
efforts. All available manpower and resources were directed to meet
the German attacks, rather than toward the "calculated gamble" of
research for a nuclear weapon, at least until the setback for the Ger-
mans at Stalingrad in 1943. Moreover, as one writer has asserted, "the
Soviet military strategy of enormous masses of ground troops, backed
by artillery and close air support was not conducive to a whole-hearted
search for weapons useful to strategic aircraft." 4S
Nuclear research in the Soviet Union was resumed in 1944, but a
blackout was imposed on information at that time. It has been theorized
that the first Soviet nuclear reactor was in operation by late 1947. This
occurrence was considered a turning point in the Soviet efforts, a point
which was reached less than two years after the opening of the nego-
tiations for international control of atomic energy. It was only a
matter of time before the Soviet research efforts succeeded, as evi-
denced by the explosion of its first nuclear device in 1949.
The contribution of Soviet espionage activities in the United States
to progress in the field of atomic energy is hard to assess. One writer
^Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals. America and Russia Since World War II. (New York:
Viking Press. 1971). pp. 106-107.
47 The following discussion is based on Kenneth Whiting. "Post-War Strategy," in Asher
Lee, ed. The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces. (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 91-95.
«Ibid., p. 92.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-7
80
has attempted to put this question in perspective when he comments on
this possibility as follows :
We still do not know how much the relatively short gap
between the first American and the first Russian explosion
was due to successes in Soviet espionage, and how much it
was due simply to native Russian capability. At the time it
seemed to many of us that espionage must have been far and
away the main reason they were able to accomplish the job so
quickly, especially after the devastation that had been
wreaked on them by World War II. Haying since seen some
excellent Russian technological progress in other fields, we are
no longer quite so sure that this was the case. We should note,
furthermore, that it is always easier to do something a second
time, even if the only thing known from the first time is that
it can be done.49
All things considered, an awareness of the progress of Soviet nuclear
technology may contribute to an understanding in retrospect of the
Soviet perceptions and attitudes during the negotiations of the
UNAEC.
The Form and Purposes of International Control
The first question which arose in connection with the atomic energy
policy formulation in 1947 was whether the general form of control
should depend primarily on a system of international ownership and
management, or on a system which left atomic energy development in
national hands and relied on inspection to assure compliance with an
agreement not to develop atomic energy for military purposes. Few
specifics regarding the substantive aspects of this control issue were
offered in the early international political actions on the subject. The
resolution which established the UNAEC simply called on the pro-
posed Commission to make proposals for "effective safeguards" to in-
sure compliance with the control arrangement. Although it mentioned
inspection as one type of safeguard, it offered no commitment to a
particular method.
PROPOSALS OF THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT
The Hoard of Consultants'1 position against inspection: The con-
cept of inspection was distasteful to the members <>!' the Hoard of Con-
sultants. The Hoard saw it as inherent in the leading alternative to
their own proposals: to leave atomic energy development in the hands
of individual nations while prohibiting its development for military
purposes would require inspection of national activities. Thus, inspec-
tion would be the sole means of verification of the control system, an
arrangement which t he ( lonsilltants opposed.
The Hoard's position, as expressed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report,
was not based solely on technological considerations; it included "the
inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in
enforcing agreements between nations, each free to develop atomic
energy, but only pledged not to use it for bombs." " Nevertheless, the
argument against inspection in the report originated with the techno-
'"Herberl York, Race to oblivion: A Participant's liar of the Arm* Race. (New York:
Si d & Schuster, 1971 >, pp. 34 35.
60 State I)t'i>iirtinent, "Acheson-Lilienthal report", p. 4.
81
logical premise that the processes associated with the development of
atomic energy, whether for military or peaceful purposes, "are in
much of their course interchangeable and interdependent." Because of
this factor, it was considered necessary under a control arrangement to
monitor each stage in the process of developing atomic energy, from
raw materials to finished product, to insure that the materials were
not diverted at some point in the process to weapons development by
an individual nation. Such a comprehensive inspection system would
take a great number of inspectors; moreover, the inspectors would be
called upon to determine intent behind an operation associated with
atomic energy development. The Consultants asserted that "at no
single point can external control of an operation be sufficiently reliable
to be an adequate sole safeguard." 51
Another technological argument against inspection concerned the
need for technical expertise in the staff which monitored atomic energy
activities. To determine the existence of violations, staff members of
an inspectorate would have to be highly trained in the field of atomic
energy development. Moreover, the organization would have to be
involved in research and development activities to keep abreast or
ahead of advanced and changing developments, in a field which is "es-
sentially a living art." Otherwise, would-be violators might try to
exploit breakthroughs if they discovered them first. According to the
Board of Consultants, an inspection system would "inevitably be slow
to take into account changes in the science and technology of the
field." 52
The remainder of the remarks against inspection in the Acheson-
Lilienthal report seem to be derived from the "political, social, and
organizational problems" of a control system, rather than from the
technological requirements. The Consultants asserted that an inspec-
tion system having a generally policelike character, would be deemed
negative and suppressive. This quality would have a number of ill
effects on the control system and its personnel. First, it would be diffi-
cult to attract highly qualified personnel in the field of atomic energy
to an inspection team having this character, and the team itself would
encounter problems in morale. Second, because inspection of facilities
would require a large number of inspectors, the presence of many for-
eigners in participating countries would intrude excessively into na-
tional activities, challenge the good faith of the nations, and provide
a likely source of tension and friction. On this particular point, the
Consultants declared that this arrangement would be "as obnoxious to
Americans as to any others." 53 Finally, the Consultants contended, un-
der a system which entrusted atomic energy development to individual
nations, "suspicion by one nation of the good faith of another and the
fear engendered thereby are themselves strong incentives for the first
to embark on secret illicit operations [and] any system based on out-
lawing the purely military development of atomic energy and relying
solely on inspection for enforcement would at the outset be surrounded
by conditions which would destroy the system." 54 Indeed, a basic
source of the problem associated with inspection, according to the
51 Ibid., p. 6.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 7.
54 Ibid., p. 8.
82
Board, was the national rivalries which would result as countries en-
gaged in atomic energy development :
National rivalries in the development of atomic energy
readily convertible to destructive purposes are the heart of
the difficulty. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may
be carried on by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are
engendered that place so great a pressure upon a system of
international enforcement by police methods that no degree
of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly hope to
cope with them.55
International oionership and operation of dangerous activities:
Awareness of the political problems caused by inescapable national
rivalries provided the main basis for the Consultants' proposals. The
Consultants sought to eliminate these rivalries by internationalizing
certain activities which might become a source of competition among
nations. As was the case with the Consultants' views of inspection, they
looked to both technological and political considerations to support
their ideas for assigning certain activities to an international
Authority.
The practicability of such an international Authority, in their view,
would be derived from certain technological characteristics of atomic
energy development. An inherent technological difficulty of an inspec-
tion system was how to determine the intent behind an activity in
atomic energy development, that is. whether it was designed for peace-
ful or military purposes.
The Consultants asserted that specific categories of activity could be
identified which, if undertaken by an individual nation, clearly would
constitute a violation of the control system: such activities should be
assigned to an international Authority. This arrangment would elim-
inate the need to determine intent behind a national activity in the
atomic energy field. This concept was developed to the extent that the
Board named in broad terms certain '"safe" and "dangerous" activi-
ties. They warned, however, that these categories would have to be
subject to constant reevaluation and revision in light of potential ad-
vances in atomic energy.
One example of how internationalization would function concerned
the raw materials needed for atomic weapons; namely, ores of uranium
and possibly thorium.5" The existing technical knowledge at that time
supported the conclusion that these materials were the only source of
nuclear fuel materials57 which could energize nuclear reactors for use
either to produce fissionable materials for nuclear explosives, or to
generate electricity. The practical problems posed by attempting to
monitor the use of these raw materials were considered "most difficult."
Hut management of actual mining operations by an international
Authority would provide assurance that it could account for all sources
ra Ihid ]> 5
w The role of thorium in atomic energy illustrates the difficulty Imposed by secrecy. The
fact was still "classified" In 1946. that the addition of slow neutrons to thorium converted
it Into U238, which was fissionable. Nevertheless the Acheson-Lillenthal report proposed
thai its presence In a nuclear reactor Bhould be prohibited withoul Baying why.
Uranium ores could provide the raw material for production of the fissionable isotope
uranium-235, and also for the manufacture of plutonlum by the exposure of uranium-238
to neutrons within a nuclear reactor. Uranium 235 and plutonlum could be used for nuclear
weapons.
83
of raw materials. Moreover, if possession of raw materials should be-
come the exclusive prerogative of the international Authority, any at-
tempt on the part of an individual nation to exercise control over raw
materials would represent a clear violation. Mere possession, irrespec-
tive of use or intent, would be illegal. An added advantage owing to
technological factors was that this particular violation would occur
early enough in the development process to allow other nations to take
appropriate action to prevent national production of atomic weapons.
Another advantage created by technological circumstances was that
uranium and thorium occurred under special geological conditions
which reduced the task of controlling the raw materials to "manage-
able proportions," a characteristic of a control system which the Con-
sultants considered essential to effective safeguards. Moreover, the
Consultants concluded that enough knowledge had been acquired to
indicate that this principle regarding raw materials (as well as others)
was not likely to be altered significantly by further scientific
discoveries.58
A similar case could be made for the plutonium-producing atomic
reactor, a design which produces material usable for either atomic
weapons or power. By granting responsibility for building and operat-
ing such reactors solely to an international Authority, an attempt by a
country to usurp this activity would represent an unambiguous viola-
tion. Determination of intent for the use of the product of the re-
actors would not be necessary.
Aside from the technological concepts which were considered to
justify international operation of a number of specified activities, the
report commented on another quality of such an approach which would
make it advantageous to a secure system of safeguards. The activities
which the Consultants contemplated turning over to an international
Authority were also considered those most likely to foster rivalry
among nations. Removing these from national hands would greatly
reduce, if not eliminate competition among nations in atomic energy
development, thereby enhancing the security of nations under the con-
trol system.
Another advantage of internationalization was illustrated by the
proposal to give the Authority the function of development and re-
search in the field of atomic energy. This function would be aided by
the fact that the Authority would conduct the principal processes of
atomic energy development. Both practical and political concepts
played a role in establishing the report's position on this point. In the
opinion of the Board, the control organization would have to stay in
the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy to maintain
awareness of discoveries which could have a potential for violation of
a control agreement. Thus a research and development function for
the international agency would enhance the efficiency of the control or-
ganization in detecting violations. An additional reason for assigning
this function to the international Authority was based partly on the
technological prospect that in the foreseeable future, atomic energy
could be used substantially in a beneficial way. This function, it was
suggested, would attract and hold the skilled, imaginative staff so
vital to the successful operation of a control authority. But the prin-
58 Indeed, one section of the report, "The Adequacy of Present Scientific Knowledge." is
devoted to explaining that there were basic scientific principles which could be expected
to remain unchanged, and would therefore provide a reasonably sound basis for devising
a control system.
84
ciples to support this idea are expressed in terms which hardly could
be considered scientific or technological :
While suppression is not possible where we are dealing
with the quest for knowledge, this thirst to know (that can-
not be ''policed" out of existence) can be used, affirmatively,
in the design and building of an effective system of safe-
guards.
Human history shows that any effort to confine the inquir-
ing human mind * * * is doomed to failure. * * * Like the
jiu jitsu wrestler whose skill consists in making his opponent
disable himself with his own thrusts, the designers of a sys-
tem of safeguards for security should and can utilize for en-
forcement measures that driving force toward knowledge
that is part of man's very nature.59
Retention of "safe" national activities : The Consultants recognized
that a complete monopoly of atomic energy activities by an inter-
national Authority would not be acceptable politically or economically.
Therefore, based on the existing technical knowledge, certain types
of activities were classified as "safe" and Mould be allowed to remain
in national hands. The judgment that such activities could be retained
safely on a national level relied primarily on a technological assump-
tion that "denaturing" of atomic fuel was possible. The Consultants
asserted that fissionable materials could be contaminated in such a
way that they would "not readily lend themselves to the making of
atomic explosives, but they can still be used with no essential loss of
effectiveness for the peaceful applications of atomic energy."60 Re-
versal of the denaturing process, to make the materials suitable for
weapons production, was thought to involve a difficult and easily de-
tectable effort.
Using denatured materials, the Consultants declared, nations could
puisne a number of legitimate activities, such as the operation of re-
search reactors (kept below a certain power level), construction and
operation of reactors to produce radioactive materials, and construc-
tion and operation of reactors to generate electric power. For these
activities to be entrusted to national hands, designs would have to be
devised for reactors which could not be diverted to dangerous use. The
denatured materials and operation of these activities would have to
be licensed or controlled in some way by the international Authority.
In discussing the Authority's licensing functions under which national
activities would operate, the Consultants raised the following
questions :
How shall control be exercised lightly enough to assure the
free play of national and private enterprise without risk to
security? I low shall facilities and materials available for
national and private exploitation 1m> allocated and at what
cosl '. How may safe activities, assigned to national hands, be
withdrawn if new discoveries show them to be dangerous? 61
The entire discussion of national activities in the Acheson-Lilienthal
report would seem to imply that the Consultants envisioned and sup-
ported rather active national programs in atomic energy development.
These activities would be of a sufficient scale and variety to encourage
m Ibid., p. 15.
00 Ibid . p. 2\\.
81 Ibid., p. 35.
85
development and competition among nations and private industry.
Moreover, active national participation in atomic energy development,
they hoped, would "help correct any tendencies that might otherwise
develop toward bureaucratic inbreeding and over-centralization, and
aid in providing healthy, expanding national and private develop-
ments in atomic energy." 62
Although the Board contended that the technological factors associ-
ated with denatured materials lent credence to their expectations for
national activities, they warned that :
Although as the art now stands denatured materials are
unsuitable for bomb manufacture, developments which do
not appear to be in principle impossible might alter the
situation.'"'3
During Administration deliberations before the opening of the
UNAEC, Baruch said denaturing had inspired false hopes, and in his
initial address to the UNAEC he stated that "Denaturing seems
to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.'' G4
Both the first and second reports of the UNAEC granted the
possibility of permitting national activity using denaturing mate-
rials only if the denaturing process proved technologically feasible.
This skepticism of the reliability of denaturing, as well as Soviet op-
position to proposals for international ownership and inspection, ap-
pear to have been responsible for the fact that the proposed reliance
on denaturing did not become a major issue in the negotiations. In
retrospect, the U.S. position on denaturing appears to have been
based upon a technology forecast — the assumption of a principle which
today, 25 years later, has remained undemonstrated in practice. This
fact points up one occasion when forecasts by scientific advisors would
not have met the needs of the diplomats.
Inspection jrrovisions in the report : Despite the number of nega-
tive aspects of inspection, the Board members pointed out that the
need for it could not be eliminated entirely. However, the overall plan
they recommended was aimed at making inspection "so limited and
so simplified that it would be practical and could aid in accomplishing
the purposes of security." 65 The requirements for inspection are dis-
cussed in detail among the functions of the proposed international
Authority.
The discussion of the issue tended to emphasize that inspection could
be beneficial. Because inspectors would also be engaged in research
on atomic energy ,GC their "policing" of national facilities (for example,
those using denatured materials) would offer opportunities to provide
helpful guidance and advice to the operators of those facilities, mak-
ing inspection less objectionable. The only "systematic or large-scale
inspection activities" contemplated for the proposed Authority were
those which would be used to take control over raw materials.67 In
addition, the report recognized that some procedure would have to be
devised for the investigation of suspected clandestine dangerous activ-
82 Ibid., p. 22.
83 Ibid., p. 23.
64 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1061.
65 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 5.
98 The inspectors of tlie International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today do not reflect
this concept of the scientist-inspector. Rather, present-day inspectors are precisely that,
professional men in the complicated and uncertain art of nuclear materials.
87 Contemporary inspection is focused more on processing, fabrication, use. and reproc-
essing of nuclear fuel materials than upon mining and refining.
86
ities, which might involve the International Court of Justice or some
similar body, to determine if enough evidence of clandestine activity
existed to warrant investigation.68
The report stressed that operation of dangerous activities by the
proposed international Authority could eliminate the need for deter-
mination of intent behind national or private facilities, and would
thereby avoid the need for extensive and intrusive inspection. In addi-
tion, the following statement regarding some of the technical diffi-
culties of engaging in clandestine activities seemed to minimize not
only the need for inspection but also, perhaps, the possibility that
evasions might be attempted :
It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of
the industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable
burden; it is true that a calculated attempt at evasion may,
by camouflage or by geographical location, make the specific
detection of an illegal operation very much more difficult.
Hut the total effort needed to carry through from the mine to
the bomb, a surreptitious program of atomic armament on a
scale sufficient to make it a threat or to make it a temptation
to evasion, is so vast, and the number of separate difficult
undertakings so hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort
should be impossible to hide. The fact that it is the existence
of the effort rather than a specific purpose or motive or plan
which constitutes an evasion and an unmistakable danger sig-
nal is to our minds one of the great advantages of the pro-
posals we have outlined.60
REACTIONS AMONG U.S. POLICYMAKERS TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE BOARD
OF CONSULTANTS
When the Board originally presented its plan to Achesoirs commit-
tee, both Conant and Groves voiced apprehension that the need for
inspection had been minimized too much and that the terms which
the Consultants used to characterize it were too negative. Conant con-
sidered it vital that there be freedom of access for inspectors. At one
point McCloy raised the possibility that this plan might be one way
"'to alter Russia's closed society.'' 70 But Acheson discouraged the idea
on the grounds that the basic political issues associated with the diffi-
culties in United States-Soviet relations could not be resolved through
the efforts to deal with the problem of international control of atomic
energy. Although Lilienthal agreed readily to make changes appropri-
ate to the views of Conant and Groves, the report's general tone on the
issue of inspection remained negat ive.
Despite the fact that the Board had retained the idea of some na-
tional activity, significant forces at work in the policymaking proc-
ess opposed extensive internationalization, for technical and other
98 For a discussion of Inspection, sop State Department, "Acheson-Lillenthal Report",
pp. 35 39.
•"Ibid., pp. 36 ':t The Board seems t<> have given little thought to the possible emer
gence <>f an international black market in fissionable materials, an issue that is attracting
considerable attention todaj as the United states and other governments push ahead with
die development "i i>r ler reader technology, which can greatly increase the amount "i
fissionable material available for direct use in weapons manufacture, Today it' a nation or
other institutions can obtain nuclear materials en q black market, it is probable that such
an instrumentality could fabricate small, inefficient, but still enormously destructive
at Iininhs.
7" Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United Stairs Atomic Energy Commxxsion,
p. 548.
87
reasons. The issue of ownership of raw materials is an apt example.
Searls, the mining engineer on Baruch's delegation, did not share the
Consultants' view regarding the manageability of all the sources of
raw materials, and advised Baruch that the arrangement proposed in
the Acheson-Lilienthal report would be difficult. His views were sec-
onded by representatives of mining interests who sought out Baruch
to argue against international ownership. One mining executive told
Baruch "an international administration would upset wages, dissat-
isfy people, and, on account of the different nationals involved, present
tremendous management difficulties." 71
Another argument against international ownership was that it vio-
lated the rights of private enterprise. Hancock, of Baruch's group,
contended that if uranium was the byproduct of mining operations
which contributed significantly to a country's economy, international
ownership would be unacceptable to that country. At one meeting,
when Hancock expressed his preference for more inspection over own-
ership, Acheson pointed out that the Russians would not accept this
arrangement as the predominant safeguard. Hancock disagreed, and
the two men did not resolve the issue.72 An alternative plan called for
operation of nationally owned mines under "reasonable regulations"
of the Authority or "a system of rigorous inspection and accounting
procedures for the separation operations at mining locations through-
out the world." Baruch's team was willing to support this position
against international ownership.73 When Baruch met with the Ache-
son and Lilienthal groups, he announced the delegation's preference
for "some form of licensing of private mining operations" and sug-
gested using the term "dominion" to describe the relationship between
the international Authority and raw materials.74 Apparently, the tech-
nological assertions which were advanced to support the Consultants'
proposals for ownership of raw materials were insufficient for the
United States to overcome traditional political and economic concepts
of sovereignty and private ownership. The varying assertions by the
qualified experts on the manageability of raw materials compounded
the confusion surrounding the problem of atomic energy control. In
retrospect, a more important factor was the discovery of uranium
in the years following the negotiations in places where it was not
anticipated in 1946.
TREND TOWARD CONTROL IN U.S. POLICY
As enunciated at the negotiations, the main thrust of U.S. policy on
the general form of control shifted somewhat from the plan proposed
in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In describing the international Au-
thority, Baruch's speech to the UNAEC offered a variety of specific
methods of control over various phases of atomic energy development.
Among the safeguards he proposed were "various forms of ownership,
dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research, and manage-
ment."70 While Baruch stated that these duties should interfere as
little as possible with the internal affairs of the states involved, every
phase of atomic energy development would be placed under the juris-
71 Ibid., p. 563.
72 Ibid., p. 569.
73 Lieberman. The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 276.
74 Ibid., p. 281.
75 Baruch, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," p. 1060.
88
diction of the international Authority, in one way or another. One
point on which the United States yielded to private and national in-
terests concerned raw materials, which were proposed to be placed
under the international Authority's "dominion"1; specific forms of
control over the natural deposits would depend on the geological, min-
ing, refining, and economic circumstances of the various locations
where they were found. While the second U.S. memorandum stated
that the Authority should have such control as would insure "its com-
plete and absolute ownership of all uranium and thorium produced,''
the proposal involved a control system imposed upon national mining
and concentrating operations, rather than simply transferring these
activities to the international Authority, as the Acheson-Lihenthal
report had proposed.
It will be recalled that the Acheson-Lilienthal report displayed some
enthusiasm for allowing national and private participation in certain
areas of atomic energy development. But when Baruch presented the
U.S. proposals to the UNAEC, the main concern over national ac-
tivities was that they Avould be subject to licensing and inspection by
the Authority. As noted above, he questioned the effectiveness of de-
naturing to prevent illegal diversion of activities in national hands.
Moreover, Baruch stated that national activities should be subordinate
to the international Authority and added that this represented "neither
an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national author-
ities."
In the brief discussion of inspection in Baruch's speech, he men-
tioned the advantages of the overall plan, which stressed international
ownership, thus providing unambiguous evidence of violations and
limiting inspection requirements. He also noted that those activities
licensed by the Authority would be subject to inspection. II is third
point, however, which was to become a focus for Soviet opposition
dining the negotiations, was an insistence on freedom of access. He
said : Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of
the Authority must be assured." 7" Less attention was given to the idea
of linking the developmental function with inspection, as the Acheson-
Lilienthal report had done.77
U.N. STALEMATE OVER CONTROL AND INSPECTION
Soviet reaction to jrroposed interTiationalizaiion: Typical of the
Soviet I'nion's reaction to the notion of international ownership was
Gromyko's comment on the IXAEC's first report; he labelled the
whole concept "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable," and added that
international ownership and managerial control "would lend to inter-
ference by the control organ in the internal affairs and internal life
of States and eventually would lead to arbitrary action by the control
organ in the solution of such problems as fall completely within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State." 78
Soviet reaction to the requirements for inspection set forth by
Baruch was unequivocal, as indicated by a press release which dis-
•" Ibid., i>. 1001.
"The first U.S. memorandum touched on the issue of inspection In a manner similar to
that of Baruch's speech. The second memorandum expanded on the Idea by elaborating the
d( tail- of Inspection, I.e.. adequate provision would have to be made for inspectors in terms
Of communication and transportation, as well as unhindered access to the facilities In
question.
7"Stat>- Department, Polioi/ at the Crossroads, p. 80.
89
cussed a speech by Gromyko to a committee of the UNAEC in July
1946:
Mr. Gromyko said that the proposed inspection is not re-
concilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. "No in-
spection as such can guarantee peace and security." And. he
added, ''This idea of inspection is greatly exaggerated in im-
portance. Tt is a too superficial understanding of the problem
of control." The Soviet Delegate repeated that inspection has
assumed undue importance in the course of the discussions
and said that the only real underlying method of control is
"by the cooperation of the United Nations." 79
The origin for this opposition appears to have been in the precepts
associated with the political principle of national sovereignty. One
U.S. response to this argument was made by Baruch in a speech be-
fore Freedom House in October 1946 :
Every treaty involves some diminution of absolute national
sovereignty, but nations enter into such treaties of their own
free will and to their common advantage. Indeed, freedom to
enter into such voluntary international arrangements is in-
herent in the very concept of national sovereignty.80
Action by the UNAEC: The first report of the UNAEC declared in
its "Findings" that :
Ownership by the international control agency of mines
and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as man-
datory.81
Broad terms of reference were applied to dangerous activities, a cate-
gory which seemed to include all aspects of the production of fission-
able materials:
* * * Effective control of atomic energy depends upon
effective control of the production and use of uranium,
thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mech-
anisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or
clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of
seizure — including one or more of the following types of safe-
guards: accounting, inspection, supervision, management,
and licensing — must be applied through the various stages of
the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are
severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel
and are used.82
Looking back from the early 1970s, when most contemporary chal-
lenges to nuclear power focus on safety and environmental effects, it
is interesting to note that these matters received scant attention by the
United Nations in the 1940s.
The second report of the UNAEC elaborated on the general concept
of ownership by the Agency and how it applied to source material and
the operation of dangerous facilities, and thereby addressed itself to
political problems inherent in such an arrangement. The report's dis-
79 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 83.
80 Ibid., p. 91. He might, however, have added that the ripht of withdrawal is also in
herent in national sovereignty.
81 United Nations Atomic ' Energy Commission, "First Report of the Atomic Energy
Commission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p. 16.
8- Ibid.
90
cussion was premised on the assertion that it was not possible to main-
tain security by allowing nations or individuals to have proprietary
rights over source materials, nuclear fuels, or dangerous facilities. It
recognized the need to protect certain rights of individual nations
and to guard against any abuse of power by the international Agency.
Ownership by the Agency would be "in the sense of a trust exercised
on behalf of signatory States jointly." While broad powers over the
materials and facilities would be granted to the Agency as owner,
many of these, especially those dealing with ''rights of disposition."
would be '"very closely controlled by the terms of the treaty or conven-
tion." Certain arrangements, for example, the location of facilities
within a country or compensation for source materials, would have to
be determined through agreement with individual nations. Other ac-
tivities would be executed by the Agency in accordance with the prin-
ciples established by treaty for governing the Agency's rights and
duties as "trustee."
Similarly, the report proposed that the treaty or convention deter-
mine principles respecting the geographic distribution of production
facilities and stockpiles of materials suitable for weapons use ; these
principles would be such that no particular location would have a
greater share of materials, and thus would avoid the potential for a
military capability or military superiority. It was decided that the
Agency could not be allowed to determine policy on this subject as
decisions in this area affected world security.83 Thus, the UNAEC en-
visioned that decisions on political considerations arising from the
rights, duties, and limitations of international ownership would be
agreed to before assumption by the Authority of the powers entrusted
to it.
In additional sections of the second UNAEC report, these and other
concepts were developed in considerable detail ; specific proposals dealt
with the mining of raw materials and with dangerous activities. Dis-
cussion of "dangerous activities'' offered proposals on the refining of
raw materials; the stockpiling, production, and distribution of nuclear
fuels; and the design, construction, and operation of isotope separa-
tion plants and of nuclear reactors.
These later sections of the report contained several observations with
regard to arrangements with individual nations which the Authority
would have to make, some of which might have to be included in the
treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The need for such
arrangements was recognized, as certain activities of the Authority
might a licet the economy of a nation or might otherwise warrant com
pensation by the Authority. The report also listed the various forms of
inspection and licensing activities and where they would be required.
Although these proposals in the second UNAEC report were based
primarily on technological considerations, they also involved political
factors, as reflected in the prescription that :
Production facilities, facilities utilizing nuclear fuel, and
stockpiles be distributed in such a way as to minimize the
possibility that seizure could provide an aggressor with a
militarv advantage.84
*> United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "The International Control of Atomic
Energy. The Second Report • • ♦ to the Security Council.- Sept. 11. 1047. Reproduced for
the United Nations Mission to the United Nations. U.N. Document S/557, Mimeo L>e«
York United Nations, 1047), pp. 13 17.
"Ibid., p. 3
91
Despite the kind of attention to detail which might have been expected
to ease Soviet fears, the Soviets continued to express adamant opposi-
tion to some of the fundamental features of the plan. This attitude
may have lessened the value of the efforts by the UNAEC to formulate
the finer points of the control system.
The third report of the UNAEC may have been commenting on the
need for the acceptance of the general concept of international owner-
ship, when it stated :
Only if traditional economic and political practices are
adapted to the overriding requirements of international se-
curity, can these proposals be implemented. Traditional con-
cepts of fhe economic exploitation of the resources of nature
for priv • e or national advantage would then be replaced in
this fielu by a new pattern of co-operation in international
relations.85
With regard to inspection, the first report of the UNAEC had stated
that "only'' through an "international system of control and inspec-
tion" can atomic energy be "freed from nationalistic rivalries." 86 It
called for "a strong and comprehensive system of control and inspec-
tion." On the "freedom of access" issue, the UNAEC seemed to put its
recommendations in even more specific terms than Baruch, when the
report stated that the treaty or convention establishing the interna-
tioral Authority should contain provisions —
* * * Affording the duly accredited representatives of the
utornational control agency unimpeded rights of ingress,
3gi ss, and access for the performance of their inspections
and other duties into, from, and within the territory of every
participating nation, unhindered by national or local
authorities.87
Committee Two's report, appended to the first UNAEC report, had
referred to the need for inspection quite frequently in regard to a num-
ber of activities. The group defined inspection as follows :
2. Inspection means close and careful independent scrutiny
of operations to detect possible evasions or violations of pre-
scribed methods of operation. In addition to direct auditing
measures as described above, inspection may include observa-
tion of points of ingress to and egress from an establishment
or installation to ensure that materials and supplies are flow-
ing in the prescribed manner, observation of the activities
within the establishment or installation, and measures in the
form of aerial or ground survey and otherwise to guard
against clandestine activities. To be fully effective, the power
of inspection may require that the operations be carried on in
a specified manner in order to facilitate the inspection. In this
event, inspection verges on supervision.88
The need for inspection was discussed in Committee Two's report,
and during the negotiations, insofar as it related to examination of
"declared" activities, i.e., those facilities operated by the proposed
83 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Official Records. Third year. Special
Supplement. "Third Report to the Security Council. May 17. 194S." (Lake Success, New
York : August 1948) p. 4. (AEC/31/Rev. 1. June 27, 1948.)
86 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. "First Report of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission to the Security Council, 31 December 1946," p 16.
87 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
88 Ibid., p. 44.
92
Authority or by national or private management licensed bv the Au-
thority. Suspected clandestine activities seemed to present" the most
difficulties in the findings and recommendations of the UNAEC and
in the negotiations themselves. Committee Two's report seemed to rec-
ognize that inspection for clandestine activities represented one of
the more troublesome political problems to be dealt with in the ne-
gotiations. Moreover, it reflected a recognition of how certain inherent
technological demands of atomic energy control were in conflict with
traditional political requirements of states:
Like all problems in atomic energy, the detection of clan-
destine operations is greatly simplified by the technical facts
of the field. Nevertheless, general and political considerations
play a larger part in the effectiveness and acceptability of any
system for the detection of clandestine operations than in most
other parts of the problem. They will need most careful con-
sideration when the functions, powers, and organization of
the agency are defined. It will be here that the conflicts be-
tween the requirements of the international control agency on
the one hand and considerations of national sovereignty and
present practice on the other will have to be resolved.89
The second report of the UNAEC attempted to deal with the politi-
cal problems associated with inspection in a section entitled "Rights
of and Limitations on the International Agency in Relation to In-
spections, Surveys, and Explorations." It offered 21 specific proposals
on such subjects as procedural details of inspections, ground or aerial
surveys, and the like. Six of these were devoted to proposals dealing
with investigation of clandestine activities.90 Many of these procedural
proposals were made with the understanding that they should be in-
corporated in the treaty or convention establishing the Authority. The
following concluding statement may serve as a general comment on
the character of the inspection envisioned by the UNAEC in its sec-
ond report:
In summary, the proposals contained in this chapter pro-
vide very extensive powers of inspection and search which
enable the agency to visit any accessible place and provide
appropriate procedures applicable in certain specified circum-
stances. It has to be recognized that, in addition to these pro-
posed procedural requirements and limitations, the good sense.
as well as the budget, of the agency will themselves be limita-
tions on the exercise of powers given to the agency and that,
by virtue of the prospective functions of the agency which
have been proposed in previous chapters, the amount or inspec-
tion required and t he attendant interferences will be much less
than would be necessary under a control system which sought
to depend on inspection alone.1'1
With regard to declared facilities, the Soviets woidd agree only to
"periodic inspections." or to inspections "carried out at definite inter-
» Ibid., p. 56.
■ The main categories of these proposals were the following: (1) requirement of war
rants or special consenl ; cj i granting of special consent : (3) resorl to domestic or inter
national court, body, or official; (i> domestic •■,,urts. bodies, or officials required to issue
warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause; (5) International court, body, or
official required to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause: and (6)
scope of warrants. Complete details of these proposals <;m be found in United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, "The International Control of Atomic Energy, The Second
Report to the Security Council", pp. 54—55.
« Ibid., p. 50.
93
vals," but opposed permanent stationing of inspectors in countries.
Soviet proposals on this subject, though more detailed than others,
were considered by the majority of the Commission as failing to pro-
vide
an adequate basis for the development * * * of specific
proposals for an effective system of international control of
atomic energy.92
The U.S. interpretation of the Soviet proposals on inspection was that
it was "concerned chiefly with bookkeeping and reports."93 As far as
investigation of clandestine activities was concerned, the Commission
reported that in the "minority" (Soviet) position, "inspection as to
clandestine or unreported facilities is virtually ignored." 94 As was the
case with international ownership, the extent of agreement on details
achieved by a considerable number of UNAEC members was nullified
by Soviet opposition to the basic principles behind the proposals on
inspection.
In commenting on the impasse in the negotiations, the third report
of the UNA EC seemed to focus on how the inspection issue, and the
agreed technological requirements of control, challenged national at-
titudes toward security, secrecy, and sovereignty. It said :
* * * Secrecy in the field of atomic energy is not compat-
ible with lasting international security. Cooperative develop-
ment and complete dissemination of information alone prom-
ise to remove fears and suspicion that nations are conducting
secret activities * * *.
The majority of the Commission is fully aware of the im-
pact of its plan on traditional prerogatives of national sov-
ereignty. But in the face of the realities of the problem it sees
no alternative to the voluntary sharing by nations of their
sovereignty in this field to the extent required by its proposals.
It finds no other solution which will meet the facts, prevent
national rivalries in this most dangerous field, and fulfill the
Commission's terms of reference.95
Moreover, the third report placed the issue in a larger perspective
when it expressed, if perhaps too f acilely, the hope that :
The new pattern of international co-operation and the new
standards of openness in the dealings of one country with an-
other that are indispensable in the field of atomic energy
might, in practice, pave the way for international co-operation
in broader fields, for the control of other weapons of mass de-
struction, and even for the elimination of war itself as an
instrument of national policy.96
The Issue of Stages of Transition to International Control
A second major problem for U.S. policy and for the negotiations in-
volved the manner in which an international control Authority would
assume its responsibilities, or the stages by which there would be a
82 Proposals and Recommendations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission,
Sec. 2, "Report and Recommendations of the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission, adopted May 17, 194S." pp. 77-78, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post-
war Negotiations, p. 66.
93 State Department, Polici) at the Crossroads, p. 137.
91 U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047, p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Postwar
Xeriotiations, p. 66.
95 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, "Third Report to the Security Council,"
pp. 4-5.
98 Ibid., p. 5.
94
transition from the existing U.S. control of atomic energy to a system
of international control. The issue of these transitional stages involved
partly the practical steps by which the international Authority would
arrive at its position of complete control over atomic energy, but it
also concerned the underlying assumption that this transition would
have to proceed in such a way that the control system would be made
reliable before it could assume responsibility for the information and
facilities associated with the dangerous uses of atomic energy.
Without jeopardizing its own military security or that of the other
nations of the world, thereby fulfilling its responsibility as keeper of
the "sacred trust'' over atomic energy, the United States had to deter-
mine its policy regarding the sequence and timing of the transfer of
information and facilities to an international Authority. For other
countries, the issue of the transitional stages raised questions regard-
ing whether and when the United States would relinquish its monopoly
over atomic energy7 and thus give up what appeared to be a command-
ing military advantage. Thus, U.S. policy had to be framed to satisfy
multiple and conflicting purposes. Important related questions for
policymakers of the United States and other countries were, when
would the United States stop its production of atomic bombs, and
what would become of its stockpiles ?
THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR PROCEEDING BY STAGES
The concept of stages for the release of information and transfer of
facilities had its foundations in early U.S. policy on international con-
trol of atomic energy and in those international agreements which com-
mitted the United States to seek such control. Initial Administration
pronouncements regarding atomic energy included assurances that
the "secret" of weapons manufacture would not be released in the ab-
sence of international control. In his October 1945 message to Congress,
which concentrated primarily on national control. President Truman,
in speaking on the problem of international control, pledged that
international discussions would "not be concerned with disclosures re-
lating to the manufacturing processes leading to the production of
the atomic bomb itself," and that they would "constitute an effort to
work out arrangements covering the terms under which international
collaboration and exchange of information might safely proceed."
Although the President did not specifically mention transitional stages,
his comments indicate an effort to avoid any implication that the im-
pending discussions might lead to dissemination of information on
atomic energy, before control of its destructive uses had been achieved.
As later developed in U.S. policy, this goal became one of the primary
purposes for devising transitional stages.
The Three Nation Agreed I >eclaration of November 1945 offered an
"exchange of fundamental scientific information * * * for peaceful
ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate," bul added that much
of the information on practical applications of atomic energy would
become available "just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards
"Harry s Truman, "Special Message to the Conpn>ss on Atomic Energy, October 3,
I'M.". / ublic Papers of th( President of tin United States, 1945 (Washington, D.C. : u.b.
Gove'rnmenl Printing Office, 1961 >, i>. 366.
95
against its use for destructive purposes can be devised." 98 Moreover,
the statement recommended that the proposed U.N. Commission pro-
ceed "by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which
will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage
is undertaken." " The same phrase was incorporated in the Moscow
Declaration and in the resolution which established the UNAEC. At
the Moscow Conference, the provision that the work of the Commission
should proceed by stages had been strongly supported by the United
States; Russian agreement was obtained primarily in exchange for
Western agreement to Soviet insistence on the close relationship of the
Commission with the U.N. Security Council.100
The idea that the. proposed Commission should proceed by stages
may have made it appear to the United States that its participation
in the proposed organization would involve the release of information
on atomic weapons either for the purposes of negotiation or to set up
the system of international control. Thus, even before taking part in
the negotiations on the substantive issues of control the United States
felt it necessary to seek assurance that atomic weapons information
would be protected in the absence of international control, and this
concern was carried over into the negotiations themselves, as it applied
to the transition from U.S. to international control.
INSISTENCE BY ACHESON COMMITTEE ON STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH
Origins of the discussion: The idea of transitional stages in the
Aeheson-Lilienthal report originated in the attitude among the mem-
bers of Acheson's committee that the security of the United States
had to be protected before and during the transition to effective inter-
national control. Some committee members expressed concern lest in-
formation and facilities associated with manufacturing the atomic
bomb be released by the United States before a reliable system of in-
ternational control had been established. The Board of Consultants
did not set out initially to devise such stages. They viewed their basic
task as to conceive a "workable system of international control," and
tended to disregard devising the steps to achieve it. It was only at
the insistence of the Acheson committee that the Board resigned itself
to modifying its report to include a general discussion of stages. The
finished form of the Aeheson-Lilienthal report, however, avoided
going into considerable detail, on the grounds that specific schedules
would have to be negotiated in the UNAEC, and that decisions on the.
timing of the release of information and facilities by the United States
should be left to the highest policymakers in the Government.
Although the political basis for the concept of stages had been es-
tablished in the policy approved by the President, the Board of Con-
sultants apparently preferred to omit explicit discussion of this sub-
ject, even though Conant had earlier mentioned to the Board the need
for transitional stages.101 In the Board's original report to Acheson's
committee, the Consultants did not deal with the issue of transitional
98 state Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 25.
m Ibid.
100 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 216.
101 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
p. 534.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-8
96
stages beyond the assertion that a necessary first step would be a raw
materials survey. This consideration was primarily an operational
requisite of the international Authority. When the plan was submitted
to the committee, Conant, Bush, and Groves were the principal ex-
ponents of the political and military arguments for determining the
transitional stages for the release of information and transfer of
material.
Bush based his position on the recognition that rapid demobiliza-
tion of U.S. military manpower had resulted in a U.S. dependence on
the atomic bomb as its primary source of military power, while the
Soviet Union had retained its large armies. If the international con-
trol system should be established in one step, and the United States
relinquished its monopoly, Bush argued, the Soviets would be left in a
superior military position.
Acheson's comments on the stages centered on two considerations.
First, while he granted that the plan should go into effect as quickly
as possible, he appeared to envision the transitional period as one
which would reveal whether other nations would adhere to a system
of international control. Acheson's remarks have been described as fol-
lows : "As soon as the organization had completed the first transitional
phase and everyone was 'playing pool,' it would turn to the next. If
the first phase revealed bad faith, further progress was out of the
question." 102 Acheson's second point was that the United States should
be prepared for crises with the Soviet Union and that a variety of
issues, whether connected with the plan or not, could sabotage the
whole effort. Therefore, U.S. preeminence in the field of atomic energy
should not be forfeited immediately, in the event that steps to set up
the international Authority failed.
Moreover, support for the idea of stages was based on the commit-
tee's general view of the complete plan for international control. Both
Acheson and Conant described the plan primarily as a "warning de-
vice" whereby the United States and other nations of the world would
become aware when a country embarked on its own program to de-
velop nuclear weapons, and could take preventive or punitive action.
Given this attitude toward the fully operational control system, it is
understandable that the committee should have sought to retain for
the United States the highest degree of military preparedness in the
event of a breakdown as the system was being established, while at the
same time preventing other nations from developing their own nuclear
weapons.
Committee members differed as to the extent to which a detailed
schedule of transition could be specified. Bush suggested that the
stages would have to be defined clearly enough to insure acceptability
of the plan, perhaps on the grounds that such definition would serve
to strengthen the confidence of other nations in U.S. intentions to re-
linquish its monopoly. lie recognized, however, that the fine details
could not be determined at that point, a task which rightly belonged
to the American negotiator. This position was supported by Acheson.
Throughout the deliberations between the Board and the committee,
General Groves supported the idea of setting forth the most explicit
stages possible, to show "where the American people would come out
«» Ibid., p. 548.
97
if someone suddenly doublecrossed them." 103 It was finally agreed
that the Board would add a section to its report to deal with stages,
but only in a "speculative way."' The purpose of the new section was
"to give the report the ring of reasonableness." 104
During the discussions with the committee, Lilienthal had ques-
tioned the group's competence to set down the transitional stages. In
a meeting following the presentation of their first report to the com-
mittee, the Board members were apprehensive about the idea, appar-
ently because of its political implications. One source has described the
meeting as.follows :
All had serious misgivings about adding a section on stages.
It was not that they had any illusions about Russia. They
recognized that the shift to international control must come
in orderly steps. But they considered it bad tactics to write
in an implied distrust of other nations. Their report assumed
the good faith of Russia. It permitted the concept of stages to
evolve during the negotiations. It avoided giving the plan a
made-in- America stamp that would prejudice others against
it. Yet what could the consultants do ? If they refused to write
the fourth section, someone else would. Perhaps they ought to
stick with the task and see it done well. Distinctly unhappy,
fearing they were blighting the spirit of the work, they de-
cided to undertake the revision.105
Final version — some technological considerations : In keeping with
the concern expressed by Acheson's committee, the main thrust of the
discussion in the Acheson-Lilienthal report on transition to interna-
tional control was the effect which the transition process would have
on U.S. facilities and information, and thus on the status of U.S.
military security. The report stated that two different kinds of sched-
ules needed to be considered. One would include "indispensable re-
quirements for the adoption and the success of the plan itself" and
these steps were "fixed by the plan itself." 106 The second kind of sched-
ules consisted of a number of options which were considered "compat-
ible with the operability of the plan and affecting primarily its accept-
ability to the several nations." 107 The task of choosing from these op-
tions involved the acceptance of the parties concerned. Therefore, it
should be left to the international negotiations. In dealing with these
two kinds of schedules, the report divided the nature of the releases
by the United States into two categories: material and information..
The discussion of the release of fissionable materials cited the two
kinds of schedules mentioned above. In discussing those material ac-
quisitions by the Authority which were viewed as "fixed by the plan it-
self," the report treated only the initial operations of the Authority.
The first step, regarded as "an essential prerequisite for all further
progress," was for the Authority to obtain "cognizance and control
over the raw materials situation." Various other steps were listed re-
garding initial operations of the Authority, but none would affect
U.S. weapons production facilities. The report left the determination
103 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 257.
lf'4 Hewlett and Anderson. History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
p. 549.
m Ibid., p. 547.
106 State Department, "Acheson-Lilienthal report," p. 45.
10T Ibid.
98
of the schedules for the transfer of these facilities for later negotiation.
The same treatment was given to disclosures of information. Nego-
tiators would need some kinds of information to gain an adequate
understanding of atomic energy, and thus contribute to effective nego-
tiation of control. In making a case for these disclosures, the report
cited an earlier study of classified information, prepared by a group
in the Manhattan project, which delineated various groups of infor-
mation which could be released or which had to be retained. The
Acheson-Lilienthal report noted that this earlier report had been able
to identify certain categories of information which could be released in
the absence of international control without jeopardizing national se-
curity. In appealing for the release of certain kinds of information,
the Acheson-Lilienthal report pointed out that all of this information
fell into releasable categories.108
The Acheson-Lilienthal report suggested that the timing and se-
quence of the release of more sensitive information would depend on
the negotiated stages whereby the international Authority would as-
sume its operations. Some of this information would be required to
enable the international Authority to undertake its initial operations.
Another portion, particularly that on atomic weapons, would not have
to be released until such time as the Authority was allowed to pursue
research in this field, presumably during some later stage of transition.
The report did emphasize that when the Authority was prepared to
take over an operation, the United States and other countries would
be obliged to release to the Authority all information, practical and
theoretical, pertinent to that activity. The report also added that in
order to take over some activities, the Authority would have to carry
on planning in advance, and that for these purposes, information
might have to be released prior to actual operations by the Authority.
In discussing the need to negotiate many of the schedules for the as-
sumption of control by the international Authority, the consultants
commented on the demands this practical requirement for informa-
tion release placed on U.S. policy :
The extent to which special precautions need to be taken to
preserve present American advantages must be importantly
influenced by the character of the negotiation and by the
earnestness which is manifested by the several nations in an
attempt to solve the common problems of international con-
trol. These questions lie in the domain of highest national
policy in international relations.109
The release of both fissionable material and atomic information was
discussed in the report in relation to U.S. security; in both areas, the
report declared that the position of the United States would continue
»°*The Acheson-Lilienthal report described the product of the Declassification Committee
as follows: "It recommended against declassification at the present time oi a very con-
sidernble body Of technical, technological, industrial, and ordnance information, that is
information bearing directly on the manufacture of weapons and the design and operation
of production plants. Bit* it recommended the. prompt declassification of a large Dortyot
.' ..^ S_ -. ' j -n J.--T.-I i i—e „t:„„ «* ,,..,, ,.,-H I. >iil nntllro find W (IP n III) lea 111 1 IV.
furtherlngTffoSn lo^I-tera muT.rnaT^cirrit^in the absence of International measures.
Ibid., pp. 53 54.
we Ibid., p. 49.
99
to be a favorable one during the stages of transition. As far as facil-
ities were concerned during the transition, all operating facilities
would be located in the United States; and if a breakdown in the con-
trol system occurred, this country would have the advantage. Sim-
ilar assurances were given with regard to the release of information.
As noted above, information necessary for release during the nego-
tiations met- the security requirements set down in the earlier study by
the Manhattan District Group. Moreover, the report explained, the
items of information it advocated were "of a theoretical and descrip-
tive nature and have in large part to do with the constructive applica-
tions of atomic energy [and] involve almost nothing of know-how." 110
The report contended that a major source of U.S. superiority in atomic
energy rested in the actual experience of working with the facilities.
Thus, the Acheson-Lilienthal report relied in part on certain tech-
nological considerations to meet some of the political demands associ-
ated with the transfer of U.S. information or facilities. (One example
is the assertion that selective release of technical information would
not jeopardize U.S. security.) At the same time, however, the Consult-
ants pointed out that many political decisions would have to be made
in order to determine U.S. policy on the arrangements for the transi-
tion to international control. These decisions would be governed partly
by the general trend of the negotiations, but would have to define the
circumstances under which the United States was willing to relin-
quish those atomic energy facilities associated with its destructive ap-
plications and which were then viewed as temporarily the exclusive
property of the United States. It is interesting to note that on this
latter point, the letter of transmittal of the report to Secretary Byrnes,
written by Acheson, discusses the stages at length, and calls for fur-
ther study and decisions to support U.S. policy on transitional stages.
Indeed, the letter even comments on the question of U.S. production of
bombs, but does not take a position :
The development of detailed proposals for such scheduling
will require further study and much technical competence and
staff. It will be guided, of course, by basic decisions of high
policy. One of these decisions will be for wThat period of time
the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs.
The plan does not require that the United States shall dis-
continue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the
plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency.
At some stage in the development of the plan this is required.
But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be con-
strued as meaning that this should or should not be done at
the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever
made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affect-
ing our security, and must be made by our Government under
its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of
the world situation.111
INCONCLUSIVE TREATMENT OF THE TRANSITION ISSUE BY UNAEC
The U.S. policy on stages, as enunciated in Baruch's speech and in
the memoranda which elaborated the U.S. position, did not develop
u°Ibid., p. 52.
v* Ibid., p. vi.
100
the concept beyond the level of detail contained in the Acheson-
Lilienthal report. Indeed, very little was said regarding: the relation-
ship between the need for stages and U.S. security. In his remarks
to the opening session of the UNAEC, Baruch mentioned stages only
in regard to what would seem to be a procedural matter. He merely
asserted that full control of atomic energy would ''have to come into
effect in successive stages," and that the transition should be set
forth in the charter creating the Authority. Baruch recalled the
language of the resolution creating the UNAEC as the basis for this
provision.
Baruch did mention the U.S. role during the transitional stages,
with regard to the release of both information and facilities, in terms
which obviously offered few. if any, immediate concessions on the
part of the United States. As far as information was concerned.
Baruch outlined basically the procedure recommended in the Aeheson-
Lilienthal report, stating that only the information necessary to an
understanding of atomic energy in the negotiations would be revealed
by the United States until a successful conclusion was reached. Further
disclosures would depend "in the interests of all. upon the effective
ratification of the treaty," and would be carried out when the inter-
national Authority Avas prepared to assume certain functions. In his
comments on U.S. facilities, he said that, "The United States was
prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control
of activities in this field to the Authority." 112
The first U.S. memorandum expanded somewhat on Baruch's state-
ment that the charter establishing the international Authority would
specify the sequence and timing of the transition from the existing
conditions to international control. Besides citing this requirement,
the memo stated that the charter also should specify "the time when
and the conditions under which the national and private possession,
manufacture, and use of atomic weapons shall be outlawed."113
Nevertheless, U.S. policy on the specific question of the timing for the
disposal of existing weapons, a major question dining the negoti-
ations, was not mentioned. The second U.S. memorandum treated the
question of transit ional stages in a similar manner and did not provide
any additional elaboration of the U.S. position, particularly concern-
ing its own contributions during the transitional process.
Soviet policy on the question of stages was concerned primarily
with the timing of the destruction of existing atomic weapons. It called
for the establishment of international control following an agreement
on the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons. This sequence
was never accepted by the majority during the negotiations:
While it is generally agreed that atomic weapons must be
eliminated from national armaments, the majority have con-
cluded that such elimination should come at that stage in the
development of the international control system which would
clearly signify to the world that the safeguards then in op-
eration provided security for all participating states.114
Indeed, the Soviet Union itself recognized that there could be no guar-
antee that a second agreement establishing a control system would be
u* State Department, drouth of a Policy, p. 146.
'"Thirl p 14!)
u* U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report 1047. p. 103, as quoted in Bechhoefer, Post-
war Negotiations, \>. I
101
concluded following conclusion of an agreement to prohibit and de-
stroy atomic weapons.115 Apparently, Soviet skepticism regarding the
sincerity of U.S. pledges to destroy its bombs after the institution of
international control contributed to the persistence of the Soviets in
standing by their own proposals. Probably they saw advantage also in
delay. It seems a strong probability, moreover, that the progress of
their own development of atomic energy may have reinforced the de-
termination of the Soviets to maintain their position. (The Soviet
negotiators may not have been aware of that progress, but those from
whom they received their policy directives presumably were fully
informed.)
In regard to negotiation of the transitional stages, the issue was
probably reduced to the question of when the United States would
relinquish its monopoly over atomic energy, or more specificially, its
bombs and the facilities for producing them. The Soviets asked what
assurance there was that destruction actually would be carried out.
During the negotiations, U.S. policy on this particular question was
not defined beyond the pledge that destruction of existing stockpiles
would take place when effective safeguards had been established. Ef-
forts by the UNAEC to settle this question in more precise terms were
unable to reach an* agreement satisfactory to the Soviets.
The question of U.S. cessation of bomb production in relation to in-
ternational control had been raised during the deliberations which
resulted in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Despite Acheson's assertion
in the letter of transmittal that the report had not taken a position
on the timing for a halt of U.S. weapons manufacture, the treatment
of the issue in the report has been interpreted as follows :
* * * the report took no definite position, implying there-
fore, that atomic weapons would continue to be built. Bomb-
making would have to stop sometime, but that was a ques-
tion for the President to determine consistent with consti-
tutional processes and in the light of the world situation.116
In a speech before Freedom House in October 1946, Baruch pledged
the intention of the United States to destroy its bombs "if the world
would join in a pact to insure the world's security from atomic war-
fare." His comments on destroying U.S. weapons prior to establish-
ment of the system posed the question :
Why should America alone be asked to make sacrifices by
way of unilateral disarmament in the cause of good will? If
equality of sacrifice be needed then each should participate.117
Truman himself had written to Baruch the previous July :
We should not under any circumstances throw away our
gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against
us.1
In discussing the negotiations, Bechhoefer describes this question as
"perhaps the most fundamental divergence between the Soviet posi-
tion and that of the West." To Soviet questions on when bombs would
be eliminated, the U.S. response was that the majority had concluded
115 Ibid. . p. 71.
ua Laeberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 258.
117 State Department, Groirth of a Policy, p. 90.
118Hnrrv S. Truman. Memoirs, vol. 2. Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, N.Y. :
Doubleday, 1956), p. 11.
102
that weapons should be eliminated "at that stage in the development of
the international control system which would clearly signify to the
world that the safeguards then in operation provided security for all
participating States." 119
Bechhoefer cites one discussion during the second year of the negoti-
ations which illustrates the "indecisive nature" of the negotiations on
the question of stages. The Soviet Union had proposed an amendment
to the first report which simply called for destruction of manufactured
and unfinished weapons. The first UNAEC report had proposed dis-
posal of bombs, an expression which meant the elimination of the bomb
mechanism and the peaceful use of the nuclear fuel from the dis-
mantled weapons. The Soviet amendment had omitted any provision
for use of the nuclear fuel, which posed the real danger following de-
struction of the bomb mechanism, although they agreed that the fuel
should not be destroyed. During discussion of the amendment, the
U.S. representative raised the point that the real issue was not destruc-
tion of the weapons but control of the nuclear fuel from dismantled
weapons. In response, the Soviet representative insisted that the
issue of control could not be discussed apart from destruction of weap-
ons. Attempts to settle this question in the form of a resolution were
fruitless, when the group could not even agree on a definition of the
term "'destruction." References to the term could not be separated from
the issue of stages, which comprised the basic source of disagreement
between the positions expressed by the United States and the Soviet
Union.120
In the face of this impasse, a section on the majority plan for control
in the third report of the UNAEC included the following statement
regarding stages, which had been retained verbatim from the recom-
mendations in the first report :
The treaty should embrace the entire programme for put-
ting the international system of control into effect and should
provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional proc-
ess over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and
agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establish-
ment of international control of atomic energy. In order that
the transition may be accomplished as rapidly as possible,
and with safety and equity to all, the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission should supervise the transitional proc-
ess, as prescribed in the treaty, and should be empowered to
determine when a particular stage or stages have been com-
pleted and subsequent ones are to commence.1'-'1
The final report recognized that more details would be desirable, but
stated that it would serve no useful purpose to attempt to elaborate on
this and other questions "until agreement on the basic principles of
control has been reached." 122
Thus, it would appear that efforts to determine the sequence and
t imingof the assumption of control by the international Authority may
have originated in the negotiations simply as a question of tin1 pro-
1W I* S Participation in the U.N., report 1947, p. 10.1 as quoted in Beehhoofer, Postwar
\ egotiations, p. 74,
<-*' For ;i il.'iailod discussion of this particular point, see ibid., i>i». 72-74.
121 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission^ "Third Report to the Security Council",
p. 17 is
122 Ibid., p. 3.
103
cedural steps necessary for setting up the control system. However, the
negotiations soon became preoccupied with the political implications
of stages, which were important to the security interests of both
the United States and the Soviet Union ; that is, the question of when
the United States would no longer be the sole power in possession of
atomic weapons.
The Issue of Enforcement : Sanctions and the Veto
The third important issue in the effort to establish international
control of atomic energy was that of imposition of sanctions on viola-
tors. The question of whether violators of international control should
be punished grew out of Baruch's advocacy of the idea. He succeeded
in having it adopted as part of the U.S. proposal. During the negotia-
tions, the question of the procedural arrangements to deal with sanc-
tions— specifically, whether the veto power in the U.N. Security Coun-
cil could be exercised over decisions on them — represented a major
obstacle to agreement.
DETERMINING U.S. POLICY ON SANCTIONS
Conant had cautioned the Board of Consultants at the outset that
the issue of sanctions was a matter for the Security Council to con-
sider ; and during later discussions, one member of the Board pointed
out that it would have been presumptuous for a group of technical
consultants to comment or make recommendations on such a political
subject. During its deliberations, the Board foresaw war as the prob-
able outcome in case of a violation, but needless to say it did not enter
into the subject of the organizational mechanism that would be em-
ployed to initiate, conduct, and coordinate the war. This was a political
problem, in the opinion of the Board, and there was no discussion of it
in the Acheson-Lilienthal report.
Baruch's idea of establishing sanctions to enforce the control system
was discussed at the time the U.S. proposal was being developed. At a
meeting between Baruch's group and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups,
opposition by the latter to the idea of sanctions was unanimous, ap-
parently on the grounds that they did not consider the concept work-
able under existing political circumstances. In turn, the members of
Baruch's delegation to the UNAEC viewed the Acheson-Lilienthal
plan as offering merely a warning device and less than a secure system
to guarantee control of the destructive uses of atomic energy. Although
Lilienthal granted that the plan was only a warning device, he,
Acheson, and other members of their groups argued that absolute
security was unattainable,123 Nonetheless, Baruch felt strongly that the
plan did not provide an adequate measure of security and continued to
press Secretary Byrnes for a policy which included penalties. Baruch's
position on penalties has been described as follows :
It was important to * * * show the necessity of enforcing
the engagements of the nations. Baruch considered penalties
the sine qua non. He was quite aware this might bring the
123 Later, Baruch called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment on the plan for atomic
energy control. Both General Dwisrht Eisenhower and Admiral Chester Nimitz voiced doubts
on the effectiveness and acceptability of sanctions, while General Carl Spaatz supported the
idea. Although Baruch sought the advice of the military, their views did not enter into the
discussions which determined policy. Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 575— 576.
104
United States ""athwart of the veto power." for war, the ulti-
mate penalty, might be necessary. * * * Penalties means im-
mediate punishment and elimination of any veto of it. * * *
As for the warning elements in the plan, the American people
should know how little it amounted to.124
Eventually, Baruch obtained approval from President Truman of
both the idea of sanctions and the provision that the veto power of the
Security Council would not apply to the decision to administer them.
Two days before the opening of the UNAEC, Baruch briefed the Sen-
ate Special Committee on Atomic Energy on the U.S. proposals, and
the members appeared to welcome the plan approved by the
President.1-"'
U.S. POLICY ON THE VETO : ITS RELATION TO ENFORCEMENT
Because U.S. policy on the veto over sanctions was a principal target
of Soviet opposition, and a major hindrance in the negotiations, a
discussion of this question might be useful to an understanding of the
principal issues of this study. It should be noted that the principle
of unanimity — that is, the veto power — among the permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council on security matters had been a contro-
versial issue during negotiation of the U.N. Charter. Strong U.S. sup-
port for the veto power has been explained as follows :
* * * The Western powers * * * realized that the veto privi-
lege placed a premium on inaction at precisely the most criti-
cal point of great-power disagreement. Long and fruitless ef-
forts were therefore made by American experts * * * to de-
vise some method of decisionmaking on security issues that
would allow the Council to override the negative vote of at
least one permanent member. All such formulae, however,
collapsed before the dominating political fact that the ad-
ministration was not prepared to allow American armed
forces to be ordered into some unknown future military action
without U.S. consent. Even had Executive officials felt less
strongly on the question, they would never have assumed that
Congress could be persuaded to relinquish so much authority
to an untried international organization.1-"
Thus, the policy of the United States on the veto, as it applied to
the question of enforcement of atomic energy control, represented a
significant departure from its earlier policy on the veto within the
general framework of the United Nations. Although the question of
sanctions and its relationship with the veto power was primarily a
political matter, a number of technological factors associated with
atomic energy control may have influenced the United States in its
policy decisions on these subjects.
This change in US. policy was probably attributable to the nature
of atomic weapons and the destructive force which they represented to
policymakers, a perception epitomized in Baruch's opening address to
the [TNAEC:
Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its poten-
tialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet
121 Ibid., pp. .-,7.", 574.
'=■'• [bid., pp. 565 574
120 Emphasis added, itnth B. Russell, The United Nations <m<l United States Security
Policy. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 1968), i>. 51.
105
terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The
terror created by weapons has never stopped men from em-
ploying them. For each new weapon a defense has been pro-
duced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate
defense does not exist. * * * The search of science for the
absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country.127
In light of the fact that the atomic bomb inspired such awe, it is
not difficult to understand how an important U.S. political stance could
experience such a drastic modification in the form of the proposal
that the veto power should not be exercised over sanctions for viola-
tions of atomic energy control.128
Another technological consideration which may have had a bearing
on U.S. policy toward the veto question concerned the "warning de-
vice" aspect of the plan in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Policy dis-
cussions revealed that the Board had not envisioned any international
stockpile of bombs. Thus, if a nation decided to embark on an atomic
weapons development program by seizing production facilities of the
international Authority, the sequence of technological processes of
producing atomic weapons would take considerable time. The Board
estimated that it would be approximately 1 year before enough atomic
weapons could be produced to constitute a significant threat. During
the drafting of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, one member of the
group envisioned the following situation in the event of a violation of
the international control system :
Supposing denatured material had been allocated to a plant
which is located in Ruritania, and the Ruritanian Pooh-Bah
decides to wTelsK on the Atomic Development Authority by
removing the denaturants. The •Authority's representatives,
made up of people of many nationalities, try to check on the
plant, on the watch for just such a move. So the Pooh-Bah
sends soldiers to get the ADA people out of the way and seize
the factory. Assuming that the Pooh-Bah has the scientists
working for him, it will still take him in the neighborhood of
a year to turn out a bomb. While he's at it, the member coun-
tries of the Authority, having received no satisfactory answer
to what's become of their inspectors, go to war with Ruritania
* * * the war would have to be along conventional lines.
Naturally, the atomic plant would be the first target for the
attacking planes.129
Presumably, the Board considered that the warning device aspect
of the plan satisfied the technological requirements of security. How-
ever, this conception was not shared by all of those involved in U.S.
policy deliberations. One source states that Baruch's position on this
question was that the Board's plan provided "no more of a warning
than S3 months to a year,' " although the origin of his estimate is not
clear. Moreover, Baruch added that technological developments could
shorten even that amount of time.130 These estimates may account for
127 State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 138-139.
12R Nonetheless, it should be recalled that this was not the first occasion when this line
of thinking on the destructive potential of atomic energy affected policy, for it had played
an important role in inflnpncinc nations, including the United States, to take the initial
steps ; for example, the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, et cetera, toward seeking agree-
ment on international control of atomic energy.
1=0 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 247. n~m~.i<,oin*,
130 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
p. 573.
106
the sense of urgency with which Baruch treated the veto question in
his opening speech to the UNAEC :
* * * There must be no veto to protect those who violate
their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy
for destructive purposes.
The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to
die. The time between violation and preventive action or
punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as
to the course to be followed.131
It is unlikely, however, that these factors alone can account for
Baruch's adamant position on penalties and the veto question. Early
in the policy deliberations following Baruch's appointment, the elder
statesman had raised the possibility to Secretary Byrnes and others
that the negotiations of the UNAEC might provide a forum for the
attainment of world disarmament, encompassing all weapons. One
writer labelled Baruclrs notion as "an expression of his idealism and
expansive self-image." 132 although his position was supported by Eber-
stadt and Hancock. When Hancock learned that the Secretary of State
was not enthusiastic about Baruch's idea, one source describes his reac-
tion : "As Hanock sized up the situation, Byrnes was trying to simplify
the job by limiting it to atomic energy." 133 The exchange on the subject
between Baruch and Byrnes has been described as follows:
* * * Byrnes would have none of this vision. It would be
"a serious mistake," he said, to attempt to cover these other
weapons as part of Baruch's present assignment. Baruch was
equally strong in response : "The problem of atomic energy is
a problem of the hearts of men — no plan so far proposed gives
any guarantee of assurance." Only total disarmament offered
such a guarantee. Byrnes was unmoved.134
News of Baruch's proposal for total disarmament prompted one
member of the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy to admon-
ish him to "stick to his knitting." l35 Thus, since Baruch's idea of a com-
prehensive disarmament proposal had been thwarted, it is understand-
able, perhaps, that if his efforts had to be confined to atomic energy,
he might seek a control system which would be as secure as possible.
by providing "immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who
violate the agreements that are reached by the nations."130
In addition. Baruch's insistence on removal of the veto as a vital
component of the proposed system of punishments may have l>cen
prompted by the -rowing U.S. attitude of mistrust of the Soviet
Union. The belief was strong that violations most likely would origi-
nate with the Soviet Union or one of its allies. Moreover, the Soviet
Union's performance during the first months of the United Nations,
which was characterized by frequent use of the veto in the Security
Council, fortified the impression that Moscow would have recourse
to the veto to avoid the consequences of its violations.137
*» State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp. 142-143.
"3 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 277.
Hewlett and Anderson, History of the Atomic Energy Commission, p. 569.
■ Lieberman, The Scorpion mni the Tarantula, p. 290.
Hewlett and Anderson, History o) the Atomic Energy Commission, p. o7G.
i« State Department, Growth of a Policy, p. 138.
«i During ii..- meetings of the iNAI'c itself, a resolution was Introduced In tbe General
Assembly, calling for an investigation of Soviet abuse of the veto. Bechhoefer, Postwar
Negotiations, p. 57.
107
Thus, by proposing sanctions to achieve "an international law with
teeth in it," Baruch may have compensated for losing the personal op-
portunity to propose and negotiate a comprehensive disarmament plan.
He may also have sought to satisfy the requirements of a control system
which he believed the emerging political relationships of the atomic age
demanded.
POLITICAL UNACCEPTABILITY OF VETO-FREE CONTROL IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS
At issue during the negotiations, sanctions and the veto became in-
volved with the political arguments associated with the general issue
of the veto power in the United Nations. In order to understand how
this issue contributed to the failure of the negotiations, it might be
helpful to examine briefly the course of the issue and U.S. policy during
the international discussions of international control of atomic energy.
During the negotiations, the third U.S. memorandum provided a
vehicle to answer the various legal questions arising from the rela-
tionship between the proposed international Authority and the United
Nations, and an important part of this issue was sanctions. The memo-
randum listed those activities which if pursued by an individual na-
tion would constitute a serious threat to the peace. These included
virtually every possible breach of the control arrangement.138
The memorandum proposed that the Security Council would deter-
mine the response to these violations. In defending the provision to
exclude these matters from the veto, the U.S. position was that it did
not impair the principle of unanimity in the United Nations, because
nations would enter into this particular arrangement freely. It also
emphasized that the proposal to exclude the veto applied only to the
question of atomic energy. An additional point raised by the memo-
randum was that the question of sanctions could not be discussed
without considering the provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
which recognized the "inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations." Besides noting that an attack with atomic weapons would
justify a response under Article 51, the memorandum suggested that
a broader definition of "armed attack" might be included in the treaty
for the Authority, to include certain preliminary steps to such action.
Baruch was unyielding on the veto question during the negotiations,
and his perseverance was matched by the adamant opposition of the
Soviet Union. One example of the Soviet position on this question is
in a speech by Gromyko in July 1946 :
We believe that it would be wrong, and perhaps fatal, to
undermine, in practice to abandon, the principle of unanimity
i3s inegal possession or use of an atomic bomb ; illegal possession, or separation, of
atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb ; seizure of any plant or other property
belonging to, or licensed by, the Authority ; willful interference with the activities of the
Authority ; creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the
absence of, a license granted by the Authority. The U.S. proposal also granted that admin-
istrative decisions would be made and carried out only by the international Authority, and
that the Authority could make decisions on other matters, which were not serious threats
to the peace. The" latter could be enforced by the Security Council as procedural matters,
a process which did not involve the veto. State Department, Growth of a Policy, pp.
161-163.
108
of the permanent members of the Security Council * * * We
cannot accept any proposal which would undermine in any
degree the principle of unanimity of the permanent members
of the Security Council on all questions relating to the main-
tenance of peace and security.139
Bechhoefer notes that Baruch attempted "to soften the impact of
his position" by recalling that the proposal to eliminate the veto would
apply only to the control of atomic energy. He also points out that in
terms of the legality of the provision, it would not affect the veto
power as established by the U.N. Charter. But, in Bechhoefer's view,
because the proposal "ran counter to the basic concept of the continued
unity of the great powers as embodied in the Charter," it indicated to
the Soviet Union "a U.S. decision to attack the underlying basis of
postwar settlements." 14°
Baruch was so firmly convinced of the correctness of his stance
on the veto that he may have missed an opportunity to bargain with
the Soviets on the issue, or at least to place them in a position where
they would be called upon to reveal further details of their proposals.
Bechhoefer cites an instance in 1947, when the Soviet Union proposed
an amendment that the Authority "should carry out their control and
inspection functions, acting on the basis of their own rules, which
should provide for the adoption of decisions, in appropriate cases,
by the majority vote".141 The Soviet Union was willing to grant the
majority vote of the Authority "in appropriate cases," a term which
could have been explored. Nonetheless, discussion of this amendment
would have "shifted the question from the problem of a veto to the
issue of the authority of the control commission, which was politically
far less sensitive." However, Baruch would accept nothing less than
his original proposal.142
While U.S. policy on the veto had its foundations in both techno-
logical and political factors, it would appear that the underlying po-
litical relations of the great powers in the United Nations provided a
major source of the difficulty in the negotiations. Indeed. Bechhoefer
concludes that Baruch's position on the veto gave the Soviets the op-
portunity to oppose the U.S. proposals "'for the wrong reason." The
basis for this assertion is that disagreement over the veto involved basic
political differences between the two countries rather than the substan-
tive, technical aspects of control.143
Recap'/tiihiflon of the Three Issues of Atomic Control
Thus, the United States brought before the United Nations three
issues making up a program of international control of atomic energy.
The first involved the control institution itself. This called for a
scheme of international ownership and regulation, with considerable
intimate interaction with national programs of atomic energy develop-
ment. Possibly the newly-formed United Nations would have been un-
equal to the large task of managing such a program. But the tech-
"■ [bid. p. B2.
'hhoefer, Postwai Negotiations, pp. .~>7 58.
1,1 State Department, Policy >ii the Crossroads, p. ~f>.
"■' Emphasis added. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 59.
'" [bid., pp. 59 '''<>
109
nical orientation of the design of the proposed institution left un-
answered many political questions, and after long debate in the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the scheme was tabled.
The issue of the transition from U.S. monopoly to international con-
trol met the same fate. Lacking agreement on the what, it was hard to
design the hoir of a plan. After much deliberation, the UNAEC came
reluctantly to this conclusion.
The question of what should be done to preserve world security in
the event of a violation of an international atomic control agreement
likewise went unresolved. This question went to the heart of the issue
of collective security versus national sovereignty. But even though it
came at a time when only one nation possessed atomic weapons cap-
ability, the quest for agreement went unsatisfied.
V. Some Distinctive Features of the Negotiations
It appears as though the negotiations came to nothing because the
control plans advanced by the Soviet Union and the United States
were each based upon their perceptions of a desirable world order
and the defense of their respective national interests. In the cir-
cumstances of that period, these views and the plans based on them
were not reconcilable. The reasoning and perceptions underlying Soviet
policy decisions at that juncture are not known with certainty 25 years
later, and clearly were less well perceived at that time. The fact that
many of the following observations relate mainly to U.S. policy is not
intended to be solely a comment on this country's approach to atomic
energy control. That such observations are useful arises from the fact
that basically it was the U.S. plan which was accepted by the majority
in the international negotiations. Therefore, an important part of an
inquiry into the outcome of the negotiations lies in the origins of U.S.
policy and inputs of U.S. scientists and diplomats.144
Excessive U.S. Reliance on Technical Control Plan
One characteristic of the efforts to achieve control of atomic energy
which may have contributed to their failure was the tendency on the
part of U.S. policymakers and of the majority of the negotiators in
the UNAEC to accept the constraints developed out of technological
considerations as the basis for their proposals for a control arrange-
ment. The foundations for the concrete proposals by the United States
were the technological studies of the Board of Consultants, and when
the first signs of impasse appeared in the UNA EC, in 1946, the negotia-
tors chose to await a report from the Scientific and Technical Commit-
tee before proceeding with the negotiations. However, each scientific
group, Lilienthal's and the UNAEC committee, divorced itself from
any responsibility for considering the political factors involved in a
control arrangement. And the diplomats and politicians, in addressing
themselves to the basic political problems which were preventing agree-
ment, chose to seek a firm basis for their proposals in what were con-
sidered to be the undeniable technological facts of the situation.
When it was evident that there was little hope for agreement, the
basic assertion from the UNAEC was that a minority had failed to
recognize the compelling technical factors needed to shape1 an ade-
quate control system.145 But there appears to have been a larger failure
of the i \ can only be .'i matter for speculation
(110)
Ill
of the participants on both sides to appreciate that even as powerful
a scientific and technological event as the discovery and decisive mili-
tary use of atomic energy could not of itself prompt so radical a re-
ordering of diplomacy as to reconcile the overwhelming political
stakes at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Spe-
cifically, this was a failure to reconcile (a) the basic technological
fact that any effective international control system would have to cope
with the difficulty of separating peaceful from military activities, and
(b) the fundamental diplomatic reality that any such system would
have to accommodate both the Soviet Union's traditional fear of for-
eign intrusion and the U.S. fear of becoming an inferior military
power. In retrospect, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the con-
cessions necessary on all sides to establish a workable arrangement
for international nuclear control were beyond the scope of traditional
international behavior. A profound change in concepts of sovereignty
and security would have been required to insure the success of the
negotiations. Possibly this principle remains as unappreciated today as
it was at the time the Baruch plan was being considered.
LACK OF U.S. ATTENTION TO SOVIET REQUIREMENTS
Based upon U.S. perceptions of Soviet motives and of Soviet capa-
bility for nuclear development, acceptability of the U.S. plan for
atomic energy control was secondary to requirements for an effective
control system. As early as the U.S. preparations for the Truman-
Attlee-King meetings, before the Soviet Union had had an oppor-
tunity to participate in any forum on the atomic energy question, the
intent of U.S. policy was to devise a workable system of control with-
out special regard for acceptability of the plan to any other parties.14*
Similarly, throughout the deliberations between Achesoivs committee
and Lilienthal's group, very little was said regarding the possibility
of or the requirements for Soviet acceptance of the plan, although
there was some recognition of the prevalent political facts of life,
largely mutual suspicion, which would characterize United States-
Soviet relations during the early postwar period. But an awareness
of these factors did not prompt active consideration of whether the
Soviet Union would accept the plan. Rather, it became the goal of
U.S. policy to devise the necessary arrangements to prevent violation
of a control system, and eventually, with Baruclvs policy on punish-
ments and the veto, a guaranteed course of action in the event of viola-
tion. To the United States, the most likely target of its policy toward
thwarting or punishing violators was the Soviet Union.
The suspicious and negative attitude in the "West toward the
Soviet penchant for secrecy was undoubtedly reinforced by the ex-
pansionist actions of the Soviet Union in the East European countries
following the war. Yet Soviet expansionism has been explained as
an effort to buffer that country from foreign incursions, a traditional
fear which had been exacerbated by the devastating Soviet experience
148 Indeed, Secretary Byrnes approached the negotiations for international control of
atomic energy with a negative attitude, which was carried over into a policy paper which
Bush prepared for the meeting. In characterizing a conversation with Ryrnes on the issue.
Bush commented to Conant that "we were discussing carefully ways and means toward an
effective accord [i.e.. one which was without risk to the United States] rather than
merely struggling with the question of whether any accord is possible." Bush to Conant.
Xov. 8, 1945, in the Bush Papers, as quoted in Liebernian, The Scorpion and the Taran-
tula, p. 167.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-9
112
during World War II.147 The question of how this particular ex-
planation of Soviet actions at that time might have justified Soviet
foreign policy in general is a political problem beyond the scope of this
study. Still, it may be worth noting that this observation, as a pos-
sible explanation of Soviet expansionism, has been offered to account
for Soviet rejection of certain elements of the Baruch plan.148 In the
Soviet view, these proposed arrangements would have made the Soviet
Union vulnerable by admitting foreig] rs to the Soviet Union in posi-
tions of authority. Apart from the ideological trauma of this foreign
penetration, their presence might enable potential enemies of the
Soviets to detect sources of strength to attack and evidences of weak-
ness to exploit. On the other hand, if the United States had recog-
nized Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence, the same
argument continues, this gesture may have represented enough of a
concession by the West to contribute to obtaining a Soviet concession :
modification of its stand on the presence of foreign inspectors. To
some extent, a certain amount of outside inspection probably would
have been necessary for effective control, and obviously a change in
the Soviet position was essential to reaching agreement.149
SOVIET CALCULATION' OF U.S. POSITION
The Soviet Union's calculation of the motives of the United States
probably encountered uncertainty with regard to the place which
atomic weapons held in the overall defense posture of the United
States. While the Soviets had retained their large forces of manpower
following the war, the United States had undergone rapid demobili-
zation of its armies. The extent of U.S. dependence on the atomic bomb,
and thus any demonstration of its willingness to relinquish it. were
governed by basic U.S. security considerations. In turn, the fact that
the atomic weapon had become such an integral part of the U.S. de-
fense posture only complicated its own efforts to devise an equitable
policy on a system of international control without jeopardizing U.S.
or world security. Indeed, Bechhoefer points out that "By January
1947 * * * it had been ascertained that * * * United States de-
mobilization had reached the stage where Soviet acceptance | of the
U.S. plan] would leave the United States naked." Bechhoefer be-
lieves this might account for l.S. failure to explain t ransitional stages
in detail, including the stage for elimination of the bomb, although
he does not explicitly question the sincerity of U.S. motives.1™
The principle behind the declarations by the United States that it
would hold atomic energy in a "sacred trust" in the absence of inter-
national control raises an additional point which might explain Soviet
skepticism toward the U.S. plan. This point concerns the moral force
which US. officials attached to their pronouncements bearing on the
U.S. position in the negotiations. It would seem that merely by stat-
ing its aims and responsibilities in atomic energy, these officials may
have expected other count lies to accept the U.S. pledges without ques-
tion. For example, during a policy discussion of stages, Acheson's re-
147 Lieberman. The Scorpion and tin- Tarantula, j> 402.
"s [bid., p. 404.
"" iMii , p mi Lieberman'a Interpretation Is, however, o hypothesis which it is impos-
Bible id prove or disprove nl tin- present time.
uo Bechhoefer, Postwar Vegotiationa, p. 11.
113
marks are described in one source as follows: "When the United
States presented its plan, it would have to explain the process of tran-
sition. Then the nations would establish an international authority.
* * * The United States would not give everything away the day it
agreed to institute the plan ; rather, it would promise to do so." 151 Cer-
tain actions — e.g., the atomic test at Bikini in July 1946, less than one
month following the opening of the UNAEC, or the U.S. failure in the
UNAEC negotiations to define the specific control conditions which
would determine when it would relinquish its atomic weapons —
might well have cast doubt on those pledges, particularly in the eyes
of the Soviet Union.
Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union acted in the
negotiations primarily to meet their individual needs of security, based
on their own particular perceptions of the existing threat. Some of
these perceptions may have been less than accurate. Nevertheless, as
a result, a basic element in each country's policy toward atomic energy
control, which could not be ignored or superseded by technological
requirements, was to avoid an arrangement which would have sub-
jected one party to the suspected goal of domination by the other.
For the most part, there is little evidence that a substantial effort was
made to combine or reach a compromise between those technological
and diplomatic elements which were necessary to reach agreement on
international control. By and large, representatives from each field
retained their parochial interests, especially in light of the attitudes
of representatives of one field toward the other, and approached the
problem of atomic energy control accordingly. In short, once the diplo-
mats had grasped the import of the possibility of a facile solution
offered by the technical experts, they began to mistrust it. For their
part, the technical experts had probably underestimated the political
difficulties in implementing the solution. And finally, the tasks of
both groups were made difficult by the many previous commitments
to allies and other countries and to the American people.
One Attempt at Technical-Diplomatic Coordination
One example of an attempt to combine technological and political
factors of atomic energy control may be evident in the proposal of the
groups led by Acheson and Lilienthal to assign a research and develop-
ment function to the international Authority. Recognizing the nega-
tive human response to police methods of inspection, they hoped that
the purposes of security could be served in two ways through research
in atomic energy. First, because some national activity would be re-
tained in this area, the potential for national rivalries would be chan-
neled into constructive purposes. Second, this function of the interna-
tional Authority would keep the supranational body technically ad-
vanced in terms of detecting activities which were illegal under the
151 Hewlett and Anderson, History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,
p. 548.
114
terms of the agreement. The research carried on by the international
Authority would serve as a beneficial source of consultation for the na-
tional efforts; periodic inspections would not be solely investigative,
in the sense of arousing suspicions, which would only threaten the
entire system of control. Rather, as envisioned by the Board, inspec-
tions would provide an opportunity for individual nations to receive
guidance in their efforts through the knowledge of the inspectors, and
inspections would be less intrusive because of the generally beneficial
expertise developed in the inspectors by the Authority. Thus, the pur-
poses of security would be served through methods which met the
needs of the technology and the less tangible human factors inherent
in international control. However, obstacles to agreement were so
weighty in relation to the total effort to agree on a system of interna-
tional control that this element of the U.S. plan exercised no positive
influence on the outcome of the negotiations.
Underlying Misconceptions in U.S. Policy
A number of misconceptions and miscalculations during the U.S.
policymaking process on matters pertaining to both the technology
and the politics of atomic energy control may have influenced the out-
come of the negotiations. U.S. policy in the negotiations may possibly
have been conditioned by an attitude that possession of the bomb pro-
vided great leverage for the United States to press for acceptance of
its proposals.
This attitude rested on a number of technological assumptions,
which eventually proved incorrect. First, U.S. estimates regarding the
Soviet Union's ability to develop its own atomic weapons ranged any-
where from 5 to 25 years, whereas the first Soviet atomic explosion
occurred in IUV.), just 3 years following the opening of the UNAEC.
This development changed the entire character of the atomic energy
control problem. Although negotiations on the Baruch plan continued
until the early 1950's. Soviet possession of atomic weapons — some
sources reason — necessitated a different approach to arms control, and
perhaps even made the Baruch proposals obsolete.
The length of time during which the United St#es could expect
to maintain its supremacy in the field of atomic energy posed a dilemma
for U.S. policy. On the one hand, there was the assumption, based on
historically valid technological considerations, that the loss of the U.S.
monopoly was inevitable. This recognition contributed greatly to the
U.S. commitment to seek international control of atomic energy. On
the other hand, erroneous technological intelligence estimates which
favored the U.S. position appear to have prompted a further — and as
it proved, unwarranted — U.S. assumption that it could attain interna-
tional control on its own terms, and that it could afford to insist on
certain points in its proposals. This attitude was interpreted as "atomic
diplomacy" by critics of U.S. proposals, and was justified by propo-
nents of U.S. policy as fulfillment of the U.S. responsibility for the
"sacred trust" over atomic energy.
An additional technological misconception which may have played
at least a minor role in the outcome of the negotiations concerned the
extent to which peaceful uses of atomic energy would be made readily
available to benefit a large number of countries. Much of the scientific
and technological information which would have contributed sub-
115
stantially to development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy could
not be released in the absence of international controls, as such peace-
ful development was so closely connected with the information neces-
sary for development of an atomic weapon. Thus, the hope of sharing;
the knowledge for beneficial uses of atomic energy became an incentive
for the Lilienthal Board to devise an effective control system. Such
hopes apparently influenced both U.S. policymakers and the other
negotiators in the UNAEC to believe that the control plan offered
something more than a rein on the destructive forces of atomic energy.
Although present-day development of atomic energy for peaceful
uses — a quarter-century later — is advancing at a substantial pace, the
predictions of 1945 regarding the imminent development of peaceful
uses seem overly optimistic. Notwithstanding the optimism, however,
security factors so overshadowed all other issues in the negotiations
that the drive by individual countries for active international coopera-
tion in peaceful development failed to develop real momentum at that
time.
These technological factors tended to limit the ontions of the non-
nuclear countries participating in the negotiations. Essentially, for
any such country there were only two options : development of its own
atomic bomb, at considerable industrial effort and economic cost, or
controlled access to the technology through acceptance of a plan for in-
ternational control, defined by the only country which possessed the
ultimate weapon. To supporters of the U.S. proposals, perhaps suffici-
ent confidence existed between them and the United States that its
pledges and its control plan seemed reasonable. Moreover, many coun-
tries, recovering from their massive war efforts, lacked the reserves of
resources to develop their own atomic weapons. The promise of the
potential benefits of atomic energy for national purposes, however
limited, which the control plan offered may have provided additional
incentive for approval of the U.S. proposals.
It is doubtful that the Soviets experienced a similar reaction. In
commenting on the plan proposed by the Board of Consultants, one
source speculates on the Soviet reaction as follows :
* * * The members of the Lilienthal Board were con-
vinced that adoption of their plan by the Soviet Union would
cause no less than another revolution in Russian society — a
revolution which was to be accomplished apparently in re-
turn for Russian involvement in atomic development. This
could not have seemed a very desirable quid pro quo to the
Russians, who knew that they were capable of building
atomic weapons themselves in three or four years.152
A political miscalculation by the United States affecting the negotia-
tions can be identified in light of U.S. experience in its relations with
the Soviet Union. One source has expressed the possible Soviet percep-
tion of the Baruch plan as follows: "The clear advantage offered the
U.S.S.R. was relief from an 'out of the blue' American atomic air
attack, but at a price of forgoing any early moves toward nuclear
equality." 153 An almost axiomatic reflex of the Soviet approach to
arms control negotiation has been the notion that the Soviet Union
will not negotiate from an inferior military position. One explanation
152 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, p. 409.
163 George H. Quester. Nuclear Diplomacy: the First 25 Tears (New York : Dunellen Co.,
1970), p. 20.
116
for the delay in the opening of recent negotiations on strategic arms
limitation has been Soviet reluctance to bargain until it had attained
"parity" with the United States in strategic weapons.154
A fuller appreciation of this Soviet attitude during the UNAEC
negotiations might have broadened the perspective of U.S. policy.
Moreover, if U.S. policymakers had been aware of the fact that the
Soviet Union had been working assiduously on its own atomic weapons
during the negotiations, a different approach might have been used.
Two cabinet members, Secretary Stimson, and the Secretary of Com-
merce, Henry Wallace, suggested that the Soviet Union be treated in a
more open manner on atomic energy questions. Stimson, who left the
Administration in September 1945, suggested including the Soviets in
atomic energy development as soon as possible after the war. Such a
move, he believed, would avert Soviet suspicions regarding U.S. inten-
tions and would mark a first step toward the necessary internationali-
zation of atomic energy, without giving rise to an arms race. During
the UNAEC negotiations, Wallace publicly encouraged more active
cooperation with the Soviet Union, to the point where his remarks be-
came a source of embarrassment to the Administration; to Baruch the
vigorous expression of the Wallace position was undermining the U.S.
position at the UNAEC. As a result, Truman asked Wallace to leave
his cabinet. Obviously, the suggestions of both Stimson and Wallace
fell on deaf ears of those in power, who felt it necessary to adopt a
defensive position toward the Soviet Union.155
One source declares that a major weakness of the U.S. policy on
atomic energy was its diplomatic timing. Details of U.S. policy on in-
ternational control remained unclear for a few months after the first
atomic weapon was used. And the approach to the Soviet Union at
the Moscow conference was made only after consultations with the
British and the Canadians, a move which one source sees as an indica-
tion to the Soviets of a conspiracy against them.156
Another issue in the negotiations which may have represented a po-
litical miscalculation by the United States concerned its policy on
eliminating the veto over sanctions. Bechhoefer concludes that U.S.
insistence on this provision gave the Soviets the wrong reason for
opposing the U.S. control plan, since it presented an issue which was
unrelated to the substantive problems of control.157 In light of the way
U.S. policy on the veto developed just two years after the opening of
the UNAEC, the political impact of Baruch's attitude toward the veto
in atomic energy matters does not seem to have been noticed by other
policymakers at the time of the UNAEC meetings. Indeed, U.S. policy
toward the veto soon developed in such a way as to be inconsistent with
the position which Baruch was striving to maintain. The Vandenberg
resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate in July 1948,158 recommended
,M For example. Dr. Mnrshnll Shulman. Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia
University, recently testified to a Senate committee that "Perhaps one reason for the delay
in the Soviet response was the desire to wait until deployments then planned had made
their appearance, so thai negotiations could lie conducted on the hasis of equality." U.S.
Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, Inter-
national Law and Organization. Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget.
Hearings, June and July, 1971, 92d Cong., first scss. (Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office. l!»71 1. n 246.
163 For detailed accounts of the positions taken by Stimson and Wallace, see Lleberman,
The Scorpion and the Tarantula, pp. 138-155 and pp. 334-358, respectively.
>'■" Ibid., p. in:,
inT Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations, pp. 59-60.
«»For a complete texl o1 tin Vandenberg resolution, see U.S. Congress. Senate. Sub-
committee on the t " n i t <<t Nations Charter. Review <>f tin United Nations Charter, t Col-
lection of Documents. 83d Cong., Second scss., January 7, 1954. (Washington. U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 140-141.
117
that the United States supports "voluntary agreement to remove the
veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international
disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members."
(These were areas most hindered by Soviet use of the veto in the Se-
curity Council.) However, consideration of the resolution may have
reinforced the U.S. position of maintaining its veto power over mat-
ters of enforcement, particularly those involving the use of armed
force. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report stated :
Some advocates of Charter revision contend that the veto
should be stripped from decisions involving enforcement ac-
tion and the use of armed forces by the Security Council. It
should be pointed out, however, that such a proposal would
be vigorously opposed by all the great powers, who remain
unwilling to permit their troops to be thrown into action
without their consent, and by many other members of the
United Nations as well. Moreover, it is significant that it is not
enforcement action in a single instance which has been blocked
by the veto.159
Through this resolution, the Senate helped to clarify U.S. policy on
enforcement in the United Nations, but these principles represented
a divergence from Baruch's position on atomic energy questions.
The Vandenberg resolution also paved the way for the United States
to take an active part in engineering collective defense arrangements
such as NATO, under the terms of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The
fact that the United States sought this kind of vehicle to ensure its
security and that of its allies marked a recognition by the United
States of a need for alternatives to the Security Council in this regard.
As expressed in the UNAEC negotiations, the U.S. position on the
security arrangements of atomic energy control placed a great deal of
emphasis on the Security Council as the' principal organ to deal with
questions of this nature. However, this position toward the machinery
for security matters seemed to undergo a transition, as indicated by
subsequent U.S. participation in collective -defense arrangements. The
development of collective security arrangements may or may not rep-
resent a possible alternative which was neglected in the effort to set up
machinery for security under atomic energy control. But it may in-
dicate a general trend which was casting the Security Council in a dif-
ferent role from that which seemed to govern the atomic energy
proposals. And as involvement of the Security Council demanded,
resolution of the question of how the veto would be used, the emphasis
on that body may have contributed to the failure of the negotiations.
Given the existing political conditions at the time, it would be diffi-
cult in retrospect to determine whether a change of one or several fac-
tors or developments might have altered the results of the negotiations.
The complexity of the relationships among science, technology, and
diplomacy is abundantly illustrated through an examination of these
first efforts to control atomic energy. It is clear, from the perspective
of this study, that elements of both the diplomatic and technological
aspects of atomic energy contributed to the failure of the initial inter-
national efforts to control it.
159 Ibid., p. 135.
VI. Concluding Observations
The discovery of nuclear fission and its subsequent military appli-
cation by the United States altered the balance of power among the
major nations of the world and gave to the United States a few brief
years of exclusive possession of a military weapon of truly revolution-
ary potency. During this transitional period and until the present era
of nuclear stalemate, American diplomacy was able to function from
a position of great military strength with little need to make conces-
sions.
One of the first impacts of the discovery upon American diplomacy
was the task accepted by U.S. diplomats of doing what they could to
bring the nations of the world into sufficient agreement to establish
the international control of nuclear energy. Examination of their un-
successful attempt to do so suggests several observations about the im-
pact of science and technology upon American diplomacy and inter-
national relations.
In this examination, it is necessary to be aware of a distinction be-
tween two questions associated with international control of atomic
energy and the issue of the interplay among science, technology, and
diplomacy. First one can examine the events surrounding the Baruch
plan as they exemplify the impact on diplomacy of an unprecedented
technological achievement, the atom bomb. The second consideration
arises from the fact that there were certain technological principles of
atomic energy which determined the necessary technological character-
istics of the control system. One might call this area the "technology
of control.'* Thus, the second question to consider is the interaction
between the technology of control and the conduct of the diplomatic
negotiations to establish a control system. A recognition of this distinc-
tion in terms of the scope of this study is important to an understand-
ing of the following discussion.
I in pact of New Technologies on I nt, motional Relations
In light of the way the discoveries associated with atomic energy gal-
vanized U.S. diplomacy and stimulated an extended and global diplo-
matic effort, this case suggests that the creation and application of
new technologies arising from scientific discoveries may so change re-
lations among nations that a system of international control of that
technology becomes desirable to one or more parties. Nuclear en-
ergy is neither the first nor the last example of a technological innova-
tion suggesting the desirability of international machinery and proce-
dures for controlling it. Hut it is probably the most dramatic example
to date.""
On the other hand, the fact that the diplomatic effort arose out of
the discovery of fission, a radical development in itself, did not change
the basic function of diplomacy or the behavior of diplomats. The U.S.
""Other examples would include aviation, warships, supertankers, ami communications
satellites.
( us)
119
experience suggests the venerable aphorism : "Plus ca change, plus
c'est la meme chose." The idealism of science and its traditions for in-
ternational cooperation were not strong enough to overcome interna-
tional political differences. Not even an awareness of the awesome de-
structive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient incentive to
nations to agree on a secure form of control over atomic energy. In the
face of a new weapon which drastically altered traditional concepts of
war, intense rivalries among different national interests prevented a
movement toward common ground on international control of atomic
energy.
While exclusive possession of a new technology stemming from a
scientific discovery may give a nation an advantage in international
affairs, that advantage is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear
energy, the principal disadvantaged country was able to duplicate the
discovery of fission and to create a rudimentary initial technology
sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device while the negotia-
tions were still in progress. Yet during this time U.S. negotiators ap-
parently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a
comfortably long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus, another
lesson from this study is that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once
the application of a new technology has been forcefully demonstrated
before the world as in the case of the atomic bombs, to prevent other
nations from acquiring or recreating this technology.
In approaching the problem which the new atomic energy technology
imposed on U.S. diplomacy, there was recognition of the need to com-
bine elements of both areas to achieve a solution to the problem. While
this principle was easily accepted by diplomats and scientists alike,
members of each profession were not successful in putting the principle
into practice. To a considerable extent, the differences between men
like Lilienthal and Baruch were founded on a certain lack of apprecia-
tion on each side for the manner in which the members of the other
side approached the problem of the international control of atomic
energy. Perhaps this case indicates that for science and diplomacy to
work together efficiently, the members of each field must express their
respective points of view fully and in terms which can be understood
and applied by members of the other field. At the same time, there
must be a special receptivity by members of each field and a special
willingness to accommodate to the outlook of the other, in order to
attain the ultimate goal.
Not only were mistakes made in the course of the interaction of
science and diplomacy, but there were also a number of miscalcula-
tions by the experts in their respective fields, as described in the previ-
ous section. Whether or to what extent these particular elements,
contributed to the failure of the negotiations would be difficult to deter-
mine. Total accuracy on the part of either scientists or diplomats may
be too much to expect, but certainly in areas basic to the solution of
critical problems, a high degree of accuracy would seem to be a reason-
able and necessary goal.
The Diplomatic Task : Combining Effectiveness and Acceptability
The second major portion of this conclusion deals with the tech-
nology of control and the diplomatic efforts to cope with it. This ques-
tion breaks down further into two features of a control system in which
science, technology, and diplomacy became involved: effectiveness and
120
acceptability. The first concerns those characteristics required of an
effective system, that is, one which merely fulfilled the function of con-
trol. For the most part, these could be found primarily in the area of
science and technology of atomic energy, although certain political
factors were thought to be essential to a workable plan. The second has
to do with the acceptability of the plan, those technological and polit-
ical characteristics of the plan which would lead to agreement among
nations. In turn, those aspects of the plan which promoted its capacity
for effectiveness or acceptability interacted in ways which may have
contributed to the failure of the negotiations.
During negotiation of the Baruch plan, one can detect two absolute
factors which were peculiar to the efforts to attain an effective system
of international control over atomic energy: a technological reality
and a political reality created by the discovery and use of atomic
energy. In turn, both of these realities created substantial problems
for the negotiations, and thus for the acceptability of the plan.
The predominant political characteristic of atomic energy was the
fact that the keeper of the military use of the atom represented an
absolute power for a finite period of time. Thus, the control system had
to be effective in such a way as to exercise adequate control over this
tremendous military force. The primary problem this presented for
the United States was the fact that international control affected the
very heart of its military security. To the Soviet Union, the political
impact of the United States as sole owner of the bomb strengthened the
impression of a very real threat to Soviet military security. More
assurance of an end to that threat would have been necessary in ex-
change for Soviet renunciation of its own efforts to develop a bomb
and accept international control.
The technological reality of atomic energy which was important to
the negotiations was the fact that the processes associated with the
peaceful and military uses of atomic energy were approximately the
same. And it appeared from the outset that the security of a control
system would have to be maintained through inspections of an exceed-
ingly intrusive character. The Soviet Union was faced with this pe-
culiar attribute of the technology of atomic energy which weighed
heavily on the choices of a control system and which seriously chal-
lenged the closely guarded society of that country. To the United
States, a major consideration influenced by this technological fact of
life was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in
order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control system.
Perhaps also, to some indeterminate degree, this penetration of Soviet
society was regarded in the United States as an intrinsically desirable
goal, apart from considerations of atomic control.
Thus, during the negotiations to devise a control system, both the
United States and the Soviet I'liion were faced with certain political
and technological absolutes which were directly opposite to certain
fundamental features of their respective countries. These features
were integral to meeting what each country considered the require-
ments for maintenance of its national security. The negotiations ne-
glected to reconcile these requirements with these dominating techno-
logical and political factors of atomic energy in order to attain
adequate and acceptable international control.
121
On the whole, the technology of atomic energy seems to have deter-
mined the parameters of the proposals and therefore set the tone of the
negotiations. When obstacles arose in the policymaking process and in
the negotiations, the consensus was that there had been a failure to
recognize the technological factors which supported the proposal for
the international control system. Yet little effort was made by the
diplomats to come to terms with some of the political problems which
contributed significantly to the impasse. At the same time, scientists
who were in a position to influence policymakers in the United States
and in the UNA EC refused to accept any responsibility for comment-
ing on the political feasibility of control or the political elements of a
possible control system.
Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and negotiators
alike was that the technological necessities of effective control would
force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the drive to devise
effectiveness in the control system seems to have ignored, if not to have
defied, the need for special diplomatic efforts to achieve acceptability.
The area of acceptability received little if any consideration in U.S.
policy discussions. The basis for the U.S. approach may be found in
several considerations: a moralistic attitude which characterized the
U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance generated by the notion of U.S.
leverage, or prejudice toward Soviet science and technology which led
to overly hopeful estimates of the life expectancy of the U.S. monopoly
over atomic weapons.
It is clear that while science and technology alone could devise a
control system which would be efficient in its task, and diplomacy
could provide the fundamentals for an acceptable system to protect
national security, only a combination of the elements from science,
technology, and diplomacy could be expected to devise a workable
system for control which would be acceptable to the leading nations
of the world.
Underlying many of the conclusions on acceptability is an assump-
tion that all parties entered the UNAEC negotiations in good faith,
and were prepared to bargain diligently for a goal which represented
the promise of assured security for all. It would be virtually impossible,
of course, to determine accurately what were in fact the motives of
each country as it entered the negotiations. But it is reasonably certain
that the tone of the initial proposals could have helped shape the sub-
sequent behavior of the countries in the negotiations. As it was, the
initial proposals may have lessened the force of the drive which was
necessary to sustain the bargaining process successfully.
In light of the fact that the Soviets were not far from developing
their own atomic weapon, one might infer alternatively that the So-
viets entered the negotiations simply for propaganda value and were
not genuinely interested in achieving a system of international con-
trol of atomic energy. Whether or not this was the case, not everything
possible was done by the West to create an atmosphere of trust or a
spirit of compromise which would seem to be basic ingredients to
meaningful negotiation. This fact could cast doubts on the intentions
of the West. On the whole, one cannot discount entirely the possibility
of some measure of reluctance on the part of both the United States
and the Soviet Union to accept the idea of international control of
atomic energy, a sentiment which would inevitably have influenced
their behavior in the negotiations.
122
U.S. Attitudes in the Conduct of the Negotiations
Diplomats were clearly the focus of action, with scientists in an
advisory capacity. No radically new participation of scientists was
observed in these international negotiations.
The interplay between science and technology and diplomacy was
not so continuous or extensive as to require direct participation by
scientists in the negotiations. Rather, the advice and analysis from
science advisers served mainly to set the stage for the diplomats and
their negotiations.
At a time when scientists enjoyed the peak of postwar public esteem
for their contribution to the victory in World War II, their normal
role in the Baruch plan negotiations did not extend beyond technical
advice. Apparently, the scientific approach with its emphasis upon
objective, experimentally demonstrable fact did not provide a useful
paradigm for the international negotiators.
The characteristics of the proposed control plan, as enunciated by
the scientists of the Lilienthal Board and those of the UNAEC Scien-
tific and Technical Committee, suggest that the authors were thinking
in terms of an ideal situation. Many of the features of this plan, while
considered necessary to an effective control system, presented notions
which were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. A possible al-
ternative in the U.S. policymaking process might have been to deter-
mine the basic technological and political requirements for an effective
control system which each side would accept, and then to try to estab-
lish some common ground between the two positions. With this process
as a starting point for the negotiations, perhaps the discussions could
have proceeded to elaborate on the control system in such a way as to
explore a variety of proposals and arrive at the proper combination
of technological and political characteristics which would provide both
an effective system, and one reasonably acceptable to all concerned. A
willingness to proceed on this basis might at least, in the Baruch plan
negotiations, have emphasized good faith and signalled an understand-
ing that each side had its special political problems to resolve.
Chapter 4 — Commercial Nuclear Power In
Europe: The Interaction of American
Diplomacy With a New Technology
CONTENTS
Page
I. Reasons, Purpose, and Scope 131
Some Reasons for the Study 131
Scope and Limitations of the Study 131
Sources of Information 133
II. Some Facts About Nuclear Power 134
Fission and Fusion: Two Sources of Nuclear Energy 134
Breeding or the Conversion of Useless Atoms Into Useful
Nuclear Fuel 134
Natural and Enriched Uranium as Nuclear Fuel 134
Plutonium: A Manmade Nuclear Fuel 135
Commercial Nuclear Power 136
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 137
Fusion Power: An Expectation Yet To Be Fulfilled 138
Safeguards : Ways To Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diver-
sion of Fissionable Materials 139
Some Limitations of Safeguards 140
III. From Hiroshima to Atoms for Peace: Postwar Trends in Regional
Multinational Cooperation in Europe 141
An Initial Prohibition of International Cooperation 141
Initial Pessimism Toward Nuclear Power 142
Changing Technology and Diplomacy 143
Interest in International Collaboration 143
The Evolving Scene: 1945-1953 144
The Postwar Struggle 144
The Marshall Plan 145
The Truman Doctrine 145
Unification in Europe 146
The European Coal and Steel Community 146
The European Economic Community 146
Common Organs of the European Communities 147
The Commission of the European Communities 147
The Council of Ministers 147
The European Parliament 147
The Economic and Social Committee 147
The Court of Justice 148
Financing the Communities 148
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 148
U.S. Attitude Toward European Unity 148
IV. Atoms for Peace: A Presidential Initiative 150
Origins of Atoms for Peace 150
President Eisenhower's U.N. Address : 150
Implications for Nuclear Power in Europe 152
Legislation for Atoms for Peace 152
The Eisenhower Proposal to Congress 153
The Congressional Response 153
International Cooperation and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954_ 154
Some Questions From the Scientific Community 156
Accomplishments of Atoms for Peace 156
V. Bilateral Agreements for U.S. Technical Assistance to Commercial
Nuclear Energy in Europe 158
Legislation for Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy 158
AEC Organization: The Division of International Programs — 160
The First Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation 161
Pressures To Promote Nuclear Power Abroad 161
(125)
126
V. Bilateral Agreements, etc. — Continued Pase
Providing Working Experience With Nuclear Energy 164
The Research Reactor Program 164
Some Doubts and Insights 164
Fuel for Research Reactors 165
The Power Reactor Program 165
The Bilateral Agreement Situation in 1971 167
Additional Measures To Stimulate Foreign Interest in Nuclear
Power 168
Allocation of Nuclear Fuel Materials 168
Establishing Prices for Nuclear Fuel Materials 169
Financial Assistance for Foreign Nuclear Powerplants 170
Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Disposal 171
Authority for the U.S. Nuclear Industry To Provide Nu-
clear Products and Assistance 172
A Reluctance To Export Technology 172
Safeguarding Nuclear Materials Supplied Through Bilateral
Agreements 173
Conclusions and Current Issues 174
VI. Creating an International Organization: The International Atomic
Energy Agency 176
The IAEA: A Brief Description 176
Changing Goals and Situations 177
The Fruits of Negotiation 178
The Role of Scientists in the Negotiations 179
Some Insights From Congressional Review 179
Limitations Upon the U.S. Commitment 181
Warnings of Consequences of Failure To Ratify 182
The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of
1957 182
Bilateral Agreements and the IAEA 183
A Bilateral Agreement With the IAEA and Three Policy
Questions 184
U.S. Participation in the IAEA 185
Initial U.S. Support 185
Trends in U.S. Support 186
A Hardheaded Approach to IAEA Functions 187
A Stronger Role for the IAEA: The Smyth Report of 1962 188
A State Department Commentary 189
An AEC Reaction 190
A Pessimistic Postscript
The Decline of the Supply Function 191
International Standards for Nuclear Safety 192
International Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 194
Congressional Interest in IAEA Safeguards 195
Bilateral Versus IAEA Safeguards 197
Evolution of IAEA Safeguards: A Brief Chronology 198
Conclusions and Current Issues 201
VII. Creating a Regional Nuclear Organization: The European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom) 203
Origins of Euratom 203
Advice for the Decisionmakers 204
A Target for Euratom 204
U.S. Support for European Nuclear Integration 205
Soviet Opposition to Euratom 206
Three Policy Issues of Euratom 207
Whether Euratom Should Manufacture Enriched Uranium. 207
Whether To Include Military Activities in Euratom 208
Whether Euratom Should Have a Monopoly of Nuclear
Materials 208
A Treaty for Euratom 208
127
Page
VII. Creating a Regional Nuclear Organization — Continued
Establishing the Infrastructure for European Nuclear Power... 209
Financing and Operating Commercial Nuclear Power-
plants 210
Creating a Nuclear Common Market 210
Joint Enterprises: An Innovation in International Organi-
zation 210
Early Changes in Euratom Objectives 211
Research for Nuclear Power 211
Funding of Euratom Research 212
In-House Research and Development for Euratom 212
Dissension, Crisis, and Delay in Euratom's Programs 213
The First 5- Year Plan (1958-1962) 214
The Second 5- Year Plan (1963-1967) 214
Failure To Adopt a Third 5- Year Plan 215
Plutonium for Fast Breeder Research 216
The Supply and Control of Nuclear Materials 216
Supranational Ownership of Nuclear Fuel Materials 217
Supplying Nuclear Materials 217
Euratom Manufacture of Enriched Uranium 217
Some Difficulties of the Supply Agency 218
Safeguarding Nuclear Fuel Materials 218
Euratom Safeguards and U.S. Policy 220
Euratom and Nuclear Safety 220
Euratom and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power. . 221
Duplication and Dilution of Effort 221
Proposals for New Research Functions for Euratom 222
The McKinney Report Recommendations of 1959 222
Views of the EEC 223
Conclusions and Current Issues 223
VIII. Joint United States-Euratom Research and Development 226
U.S. Interest in Euratom Demonstration of Nuclear Power 227
Initiation of the Joint Programs 228
The United States-Euratom Agreement of 1958 229
The Joint Boards: An Organizational Innovation 230
A Note on the Environment of the Negotiations 230
The Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958 231
A Bilateral Agreement With Euratom 232
The Joint Power Program 233
The First Invitation To Participate 233
The Second Round of Invitations 235
Financing the Demonstration Plants 235
The Fuel Guarantee Authority 235
The Joint Research Program 236
The First 5- Year Plan (1959-1964) 236
The Second 5- Year Plan (1965-1969) 237
Conclusions and Current Issues 237
IX. The Nuclear Energy Agency: Another Regional Approach to
International Organization for Nuclear Energy 239
Origins of the Nuclear Energy Agency 239
NEA Functions 239
Some NEA Innovations in Organization of International
Projects 240
The Halden Project in Norway 240
The Dragon Project in the United Kingdom 241
The Eurochemic Project in Belgium 242
Building the Infrastructure for Nuclear Power 242
NEA and Safeguards for Nuclear Materials 243
U.S. Participation in NEA Activities 243
Conclusions and Current Issues 244
X. U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power 246
The Enriched Uranium Business 246
Requirements for Enriched Uranium and Enrichment Services. 247
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1
128
X. U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power — Continued Page
U.S. Supply Policy 248
Advantages to the United States 248
Disadvantages to the United States 249
Evolution of U.S. Supply Policy 249
Special Conditions for Euratom 250
Toll Enrichment 251
Financing Nuclear Fuel Inventories 252
The Deferred Payment Plan 252
Pricing Uranium Enrichment Service 253
European Opposition to U.S. Enrichment Monopoly 253
The U.S.S.R. as an Alternative Source of Supply 254
Supply Policy Alternatives 255
Maintaining the Competitive Position of the United States in
the World Enrichment Market 255
Enrichment Requirements 256
The Prospects for Expanding U.S. Enrichment Capacity. _ 257
Sharing the U.S. Monopoly 258
Some Views of the Joint Committee 261
The Gas Centrifuge: A Technical Perturbation for U.S. Policy?. 261
The Centrifuge and Proliferation 262
Breaking the Secrecy Barrier 263
The French Drive for a European Diffusion Plant 263
Conclusions and Current Issues 264
XI. The Nonproliferation Treat y and Safeguards 266
New Urgency for Safeguards 266
The Four Functions of the Nonproliferation Treaty 267
U.S. Ratification and Support of the Treaty.. 268
U.S. Support for Safeguards 269
Safeguards Provisions of the Treaty 270
Elements of the IAEA Safeguards System 271
Negotiation of IAEA Safeguards Agreements: The IAEA
Safeguards Committee 272
Some Facets of the Negotiations 272
Protection of Commercial Interests 273
Inspections and Their Scheduling 273
"Strategic Points" 274
Enforcement of Safeguards 274
U.S. Support of the Safeguards Committee 275
The Soviet View 275
Criticisms of IAEA Safeguards 275
Some Congressional Doubts 276
Costs of Safeguards 277
Financing Safeguards Under the Treaty 278
A Joint Committee Reservation 279
Physical Security of Nuclear Materials 279
Nonproliferation and Euratom 280
Euratom Concern 281
A Recent Development 282
Conclusions and Current Issues 282
XII. Some Issues Recapitulated 285
Nuclear Power for U.S. Foreign Policy 286
Sustaining U.S. Technological Leadership in the 1970s 286
Reducing European Dependence Upon Imported Energy. 286
Controlling the Possibilities for Proliferation 287
Demonstrating the Practicability of Inspection for Arms
Control 287
Improving the U.S. Position in World Trade 287
A Potential Limitation Upon Nuclear Power for Foreign
Policy 288
129
Page
XII. Some Issues Recapitulated — Continued
Foreign Policy for Nuclear Power 288
Maintaining the Competitive Position of the U.S. Nuclear
Industry in the World Market 288
Further Development and Demonstration of U.S. Nuclear
Technology Abroad 288
Expediting the Solution of Environmental Effects of
Nuclear Power 289
Establishment of International Standards for Nuclear
Power 289
Protecting the U.S. Position in Uranium Enrichment 289
Glossary 290
TABLES
I. Status of Agreements for Cooperation as of April 1, 1958 163
II. International Agreements in 1970 168
III. U.S. Contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Calendar Years 1960-73 187
IV. Appropriations for Euratom Research and Training Programs From
1958 to 1971 213
V. AEC Contracts for Toll Enrichment With Foreign Customers,
November 1970 252
VI. Total Manpower and Cost Estimates for IAEA Safeguards 278
VII. Summary of Nuclear Facilities in Non weapons States 278
FIGURES
I. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 138
i
t
i
*
4
>H VjV
Garigliano Nuclear Power Plant (SENN), Scauri, Italy. This 160,000 KW.
station began commercial operation in November 1964.
CHAPTER 4— COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER IN EU-
ROPE: THE INTERACTION OF AMERICAN DIPLO-
MACY WITH A NEW TECHNOLOGY
I. Reasons, Purpose, and Scope
The interaction between American diplomacy and the new tech-
nology of unclear power during the past three decades illustrates how
the development of nuclear power has been a resource for U.S. diplo-
macy and. conversely, how diplomacy has helped the domestic devel-
opment of nuclear power in the United States. The purpose of this re-
port is to describe this interaction and to identify issues that may need
attention during- the 1970s.
Some Reasons for the Study
One of the most dramatic scientific discoveries of our time is that
of atomic energy. During the brief span of 30 years from the first
demonstration of a nuclear chain reaction in 1942 to date, a whole new
technology has been developed, demonstrated, and brought into practi-
cal use in such widely divergent applications as enormously destruc-
tive military weapons, naval propulsion, generation of commercial
electricity, and, most recently, the possible civil use of nuclear ex-
plosives in engineering, mining, ancl recovery of natural gas. There
exist today 38 working nuclear power stations in Europe in comparison
with 28 operable nuclear power stations in the United States.1
The applications of this new science and technology by public and
private bodies have inevitably interacted with American diplomacy.
On the one hand, American preeminence in military and civil use
of nuclear power has provided certain advantages ancl leverages for
U.S. diplomatic action. On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy deci-
sions have been made to further the progress of domestic use of nu-
clear power in the United States. These decisions have led to the
creation of not only one but three international organizations and
to the establishment of a complex network of bilateral agreements
for technical assistance by the United States to its allies and friends
to promote use of nuclear energy.
As the United States and the industrial nations of the world stand
on the threshold of an anticipated massive deployment of civil nuclear
power during the coming years, further issues for diplomacy merit
attention before the pace of events so accelerates that there will be no
time for unhurried decisions.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
The immediate impact of nuclear energy upon American diplomacy
following World War II is to be found in the fruitless efforts of the
United States and the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
to bring about the international control of this new science and tech-
nology. Although the UXAEC was to continue in existence until Janu-
ary 1952, it had for all practical purposes ceased to function in 1949
1 These nuclear power stations are distributed among the nations of Europe as follows:
Federal Republic of Germany .">, France S, Italy 3, Netherlands 1, Spain 2, Sweden 2,
Switzerland 3. and the United Kincdom 14
Note : This chapter was prepared in 1972 by Warren H. Donnelly.
(131),
132
and with its demise died the hope that atomic energy could be put
under international ownership and control. An analysis of this inter-
action of atomic energy and American diplomacy is to be found in
a companion study of the Congressional Research Service : Tht Baruch
Phi n : U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age.2
The subsequent interaction between U.S. diplomacy and nuclear
power is the subject of the present study. Since the first use of nuclear
weapons terminated the war with Japan in 1945, U.S. diplomacy and
nuclear energy have been closely and continually intertwined. The re-
lationships have changed over the years from the early postwar period
when the United States possessed the great military advantage of the
atom bomb to back its foreign policy and diplomacy to the situation
today when the possession of enormously destructive nuclear arma-
ments by the superpowers of the world has brought a period of nu-
clear stalemate. While large-scale armed conflict between major nations
has not occurred since 1945, the many smaller wars and conflicts have
prevented the postwar years from being an era of peace.
The starting point for this examination of American diplomacy and
commercial nuclear power for Europe is President Eisenhower's
Atoms for Peace Plan of 1953. This initiative, together with the sub-
sequent rewriting of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, opened the way
to accelerated development of commercial nuclear power in the United
States, and to greater technical assistance to, and cooperation with,
other countries and with international organizations in nuclear power.
Against this background, the bilateral technical assistance arrange-
ments of the United States are described and also the U.S. relations
with the three international organizations set up to foster use of nu-
clear power in the free world: the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Euratom, and the Nuclear Energy Agency. Next follows in-
formation on U.S. policy and programs for supplying nuclear fuel to
Europe. The next-to-last section deals with the Xonprolifcration
Treaty, and the safeguards which it would impose on civil use of
nuclear fuel materials in Europe. The study concludes with a reca-
pitulation of the issues and a look to the future.
Commercial nuclear power in Europe presents an instructive case of
major interaction between technology and foreign policy for two rea-
sons. First, the strengthening of Europe during and since the era of
the cold war has been a keystone of U.S. foreign policy; Second.
Europe is the only area other than North America where commercial
development of nuclear power has attained any prominence. Further-
more, during the late L950's the economics oi the European energy
market were more attractive for the early demonstration and appli
cation of commercial nuclear power than were those of the United
States with its then abundant and cheap energy supplies of coal, oil,
and natural gas.
No attention is given in this report to commercial nuclear power
in the developing nations of the world because the technology for
nuclear power has not evolved in this direction. Nuclear power tech-
nology so far has been characterized by high capital costs, rcquire-
* Lenelce N. Wu. The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Xuclcar Age, A report
prepared fur the Subcommittee mi National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of
tiir House Committee mi Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972), 67 p.
133
ments for a sophisticated infrastructure of supporting technical and
industrial products and services, a need for highly trained personnel,
and dependence upon the United States for nuclear fuel supplies. The
combination of these factors has made nuclear power less attractive
to developing countries than had been hoped for by early proponents
of nuclear power. Thus the commercial use of nuclear power is con-
centrated largely in the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, and
the Soviet Union. During the period covered by this study, Europe
has been a principal theater of interaction between American diplo-
macy and nuclear technology — both civil and military. For this reason,
and for the sake of manageability, this examination is limited to
commercial or civil use of nuclear power in Western Europe.
This analysis is not intended to be a definitive account of the domes-
tic nuclear power program of the United States, nor of the nuclear
programs of the several international organizations that were created
to further the peaceful use of this new technology. Rather it is intended
to illustrate typical interactions between a rapidly evolving, science-
based technology and diplomacy, and to suggest some issues for Amer-
ican diplomacy that may be anticipated as the evolution of nuclear
power continues.
Sources of Information
The principal sources of information used in this study include the
hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the annual reports
of the Atomic Energy Commission, and hearings before the foreign
relations committees of the House and the Senate. Additionally it
draws upon publications of the U.S. nuclear industry, notably Nuclear
Industry, which is the monthly magazine of the Atomic Industrial
Forum, and Nucleonics Week, a commercial weekly newsletter; also
used were Nuclear Science and Engineering, which is a commercial
British journal, and the monthly bulletins of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and Euratom. Several books on nuclear energy which
have been useful for this analysis include those of Nieburg, Polach,
Kramish,. Scheinman, and Willrich.3 The report does not attempt an
exhaustive examination of all of the literature, but rather seeks to
select materials that illustrate interaction of U.S. foreign policy and
domestic policy with commercial nuclear power in Europe.
■
3 Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. : Public
Affairs Press, 1964), 255 pp.
Jaroslave G. Polach, Euratom: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications
(Dobbs Ferry, New York : Oceana Publications. Inc., 1964), 232 pp.
Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row.
Publishers. 1963). 276 pp.
Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic
(Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press. 1965), 259 pp.
Mason Willrich, ed.. Civil Xuclear Power and International Security (New York:
Praeger Publishers. 1971). 124 pp.
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control (Charlottesville,
Va. : The Mlchie Company, 1969), 341 pp.
II. Some Facts About Nuclear Power
The discovery that useful energy could be obtained from uranium
atoms initially attracted more academic than commercial interest, and
the first Government interest in its use was for naval propulsion rather
than commercial application.4 This discovery, together with earlier
speculations that the enormous energy of the sun also originated in a
different nuclear reaction, laid the foundation for the peaceful, com-
mercial use of nuclear power, and for employment of this new tech-
nology as an element of U.S. foreign policy.
Fission and Fusion : Two Sources of Nuclear Energy
The two basic processes for the release of nuclear energy are fission
and fusion. Fission is a demonstrated and practical, although poten-
tially dangerous, source of energy. Fusion remains to be demonstrated
as a controlled source of useful energy, although its proponents expect
that this capacity will be achieved before the end of this century.5
Fission refers to the splitting apart, or fissioning, of atoms of ura-
nium and plutonium accompanied by the release of energy and the pro-
duction of intensely radioactive wastes. For present nuclear tech-
nology, the nuclear fuel in general use is atoms of uranium of atomic
weight 235, or the U-235 isotope. In nature, for each 1,000 atoms of
uranium, 7 are U-235 and the other 993 are the uranium isotope of
weight 238 (U-238) which is not directly useful for nuclear fuel.
Breeding, or the Conversion of Useless Atoms into Useful Nuelear
Fuel
In the fission process in a working nuclear power reactor, some atoms
of U-238 or thorium can be transformed into useful nuclear fuel,
namely, atoms of plutonium and U-233 respectively. If more of these
'"fertile" materials are transformed into nuelear fuel than are consumed
by the reactor, the process is known as "breeding. " Through breeding
it is possible, in principle, to use all of the U-23S and thorium in nature
as a nuclear fuel. As a practical matter, it is estimated that successful
demonstration of breeder technology would multiply the energy re-
coverable from uranium resources at least fifty-fold, would virtually
make nuclear power independent of the costs of mining uranium ores,
and would add the nuclear energy of world thorium deposits to world
energy reserves.
Natural and Enriched Uranium as Nucleai Fuel
In some types of nuclear power reactors, the uranium obtained from
nature can be used as a fuel. This was tin1 approach favored by the
I nited Kingdom and France during the l!>50's and well into the L960'&
'The lirst U.S. Government Interest was at the Naval Research Laboratory of the
Department of the Navy where research was proposed to explore the potential use of
nuclear energy fur naval propulsion,
8 Details about tli«' scientific anil technological aspects of nuclear power are available in
such sources as Samuel Glasstone's two definitive imoks : Sourcebook on Atomic Energy
(New York: I) Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967); and .\miinr Reactor Engineering
(New York : I >. Van Nostrand Company, inc., 1963)
(134)
135
The natural uranium reactors offered the advantage that a country
possessing uranium deposits could have nuclear power without having
to build its own enrichment facilities or obtain enrichment from
abroad. On the other hand, for technical reasons, this type of reactor
is larger and more expensive than reactors of other types. To get the
same power out of smaller, less expensive reactors it is necessary to
process the uranium fuel to increase the relative proportion of U-235
atoms from the 0.7 percent in nature to perhaps 3 percent. This de-
sired "enrichment" can be obtained by several processes. The process
in general use is the gaseous diffusion process in which a gaseous form
of uranium — uranium hexaHuoride — is diffused through a porous
ceramic barrier. Each time the gas passes through such a barrier, there
is a slight separation of the lighter U-235 atoms from the heavier
U-238 atoms. Many hundreds of diffusion stages, even a thousand or
more for a large plant, are needed to manufacture material sufficiently
enriched in U-235 for use in weapons. Another enrichment process
that has strong proponents today is the gas centrifuge process. Here
the uranium hexaHuoride is whirled rapidly about with the heavier
atoms being forced outward by centrifugal force. As with gaseous dif-
fusion, a series or cascade of centrifuges is required, for the separa-
tion at each stage is slight. Of the two processes, the gaseous diffusion
process requires a large industrial facility and a large supply of elec-
tricity. In principle, centrifugal separation, if it is demonstrated to be
economically feasible, should permit building of smaller plants at less
capital investment and with less demand for electricity.
Because enriched uranium has been available in the United States
from the three plants that were built to make materials for weapons
and for naval propulsion, and because of advantages of enriched
uranium as fuel, it was natural for the infant nuclear industry to
apply its military experience with enriched uranium to commercial
nuclear power plants. As a result, the principal path of evolution for
U.S. nuclear power technology has been the use of slightly enriched
fuels. Now, at the outset of the 1970's, this technology has become
dominant for much of commercial nuclear power in the United States,
in the Soviet bloc nations, and in Europe. Even in the United Kingdom
and France it appeal's that many future nuclear power plants are
likely to use enriched fuels.
Plutonium : a Manmade Nuclear Fuel
Nuclear power reactors fueled with natural or slightly enriched
uranium also produce plutonium as a byproduct.6 While some of the
plutonium atoms are fissioned, enough remain in the used fuel when it
is removed from a reactor to make recovery of this byproduct nuclear
fuel economically feasible. The recovered plutonium can be used for
weapons or as fuel for other nuclear reactors. This dual utility of plu-
tonium is troublesome for world peace : As nuclear power grows, so
will the stocks of plutonium, which some observers fear may increase
the risk of theft or undetected diversion of this material to clandestine
manufacture of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the operation of a nu-
clear reactor for power produces a mixture of plutonium isotopes,
plutonium-239 and plutonium-240. The longer uranium fuel is ex-
0 U-238 atoms capture neutrons emitted by the fissioning U-235 atoms and are trans-
formed into plutonium.
136
posed to the fission reaction, the higher the proportion of plutonium-
240 (Pu-240). The more Pu-240 is present, the less usetul the ma-
terial is for weapons because it makes the behavior of the material less
controllable. On the other hand, limiting the exposure of uranium
fuel in a power reactor limits the amount of plutonium-240 and makes
the recovered material more suitable for weapons.
When nuclear power reactors are operated to produce the cheapest
electricity, the plutonium they produce as a by-product is not suitable
for very efficient nuclear weapons because of the Pu-240 present.
"Weapon grade" plutonium should contain no more than 10 percent
of these non-fissionable isotopes and preferably less.7
One way in which nuclear power reactors could be used to produce
weapons grade plutonium would be to limit the time the fuel spends
in the reactor to a few weeks, which is about a tenth of the normal
exposure time for economic nuclear power. However, even though con-
taminated with up to 30 percent of plutonium-240, the by-product
plutonium normally produced in present nuclear power reactors would
still be usable as the explosive material for primitive but still effective
nuclear weapons.8
When the breeder reactors favored by the United States are commer-
cially deployed during the 1980's, they will produce more plutonium
than the nuclear fuel they consume. Use of this technology will allow
many more nations to become self-sufficient in the production of nu-
clear fuel. Any nation with sufficient deposits of natural uranium can
then achieve a nuclear fuel cycle independent of other nations provided
it has enough enriched uranium or plutonium to start the cycle. From
the point of view of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, it
should be noted that the preferable fuel for fast-breeders will be the
same as that for efficient nuclear weapons, namely, plutonium con-
taining little of the isotope plutonium-240. The problem of preventing
the diversion of fissionable material seems likely to become more dif-
ficult as fast-breeder reactors come into widespread commercial use.9
Commercial Nuclear Power
The large-scale generation of electricity from steam-electric power
plants requires access to an industrial base that can supply the furnaces,
boilers, turbines, generators, switchgear, and other electrical apparatus.
Additionally, it requires access to transportation facilities to move
huge amounts of fossil fuels — coal, oil, and natural gas. To introduce
commercial nuclear power requires access to industries that can design,
manufacture, install, and service the components of nuclear power
reactors, fabricate and reprocess uranium fuels, and indefinitely store
the residual radioactive wastes. Of these industrial capabilities, prob-
ably the most unusual are those for enriching uranium and for reproc-
essing used nuclear fuels. The other facilities are not greatly different
from those to be found in an industrialized country.
The enrichment plants that have been built to date by the United
States and the Soviet Union are verv large industrial installations
i Stockho'm International Pence Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarma-
ment: 8IPR1 Yearbook t:>: l (New fork: Humanities Press, 1972), p. 366.
- Loc, -it.
0 ll.i.l . p. 290.
137
representing capital investment thought to be beyond the resources of
most countries. The United Kingdom and France have small enrich-
ment plants which were built to make highly enriched uranium-235
for weapons, but these are not large enough to supply fuel for
commercial nuclear power. Enrichment plants now in operation use a
process known as ''gaseous diffusion" and sometimes are referred to as
gaseous diffusion plants. Recently there has been revived European
interest in the gas centrifuge, and work is in progress to demonstrate
the feasibility of this process as an alternative to gaseous diffusion for
the manufacture of enriched uranium.
Fuel reprocessing plants are unusual industrial facilities. They must
be designed, built, and operated to process intensely radioactive mate-
rials. Because the required equipment, processes, and personnel are not
readily available from other industries, the construction and operation
of a fuel reprocessing plant is costly and does not offer possibilities of
conversion to other uses if the markets for fuel reprocessing should not
meet expectations. On the other hand, the scale of financial and indus-
trial effort should be within the capability of most industrial countries.
An undesired and troublesome waste from fuel reprocessing is the
radioactive materials produced when uranium or plutonium atoms are
fissioned. The radioactivity of these wastes decreases slowly, and the
wastes remain dangerous for centuries. While proponents of nuclear
power assert that these wastes can be made inert and be safely stored
for many years, some critics fear their ultimate release to the environ-
ment with disastrous results. After some 25 years of research and
development for nuclear power, the United States has yet to demon-
strate on a working scale the technology for the indefinite storage of
these wastes.
At present, only a few industrialized countries now have the indus-
trial capabilities to supply all the special materials, products, and
services for commercial nuclear power. But many countries are plan-
ning to build their own fuel fabricating and fuel reprocessing plants
to service their nuclear power plants. The International Atomic En-
ergy Agency expects that by the late 1970 's several additional countries
will possess the industrial base necessary for nuclear power. At pres-
ent these countries are limited to Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and the Soviet
Union. But of these only the United States and the Soviet Union have
a large-scale capability to produce enriched uranium for nuclear fuel.
The Japanese are exploring with the United States and France the
possibilities of some form of joint international enrichment project,
while the French also have been seeking partners to build an inter-
national enrichment facility in Europe.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
From the preceding notes on vital aspects of nuclear energy, it is
apparent that the construction and operation of nuclear power plants,
in contrast to conventional hydro or steam electric power plants that
burn oil, coal, or natural gas, is only one step in a long and complex
sequence of technological activities that are necessary for the genera-
138
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
URANIUM MINES
1 MILLS
CONVERSION
TO UF6
RECOVERED
URANIUM
ENRICHING
CONVERSION
TO FUEL
REP10CESSIN6
WASTE STORAGE -
BY-PROMCTS
J
Figure 1
tion of nuclear power. The entire sequence is called the nuclear fuel
cycle and is illustrated in Figure I. In summary, the major parts of
the nuclear fuel cycle are as follows :
(1) Mining and milling of uranium ;
(2) Refining of uranium and conversion to uranium hexafluo-
ride;
(3) Enrichment of uranium ;
(4) Conversion of enriched uranium into fuel material ;
(5) Fabrication of fuel elements for the nuclear power re-
actors ;
(6) Use of the fuel elements in working nuclear power plants;
(7) Reprocessing of spent fuel to recover useful nuclear fuel
materials; and
(8) Perpetual storage of intensely radioactive waste's from the
fission process.
Fusion Power: an Expectation Yet to be Fulfilled
In the fusion process, atoms of light elements, primarily hydrogen,
are fused together with a resultant release of energy. The uncon-
trolled fusion process is the basis for the hydrogen bomb which has
so revolutionized foreign relations and national security in the 20th
century. If a controlled fusion process could be achieved and demon-
strated to be technologically and economically feasible for generation
of elect licit v. the world would have a literally inexhaustible supply of
energy. It is for this reason that the United States, the Soviet Union,
and many other countries are engaged in fusion, or "controlled ther-
monuclear," research.
As ;in environmental benefit, fusion would not produce the enormous
amounts of radioactive wastes characteristic of lission, and could offer
139
the prospect of more efficient conversion of energy into electricity ; a
fusion powerplant would discharge less waste heat to the environ-
ment than its fission counterpart, thus easing problems of thermal
pollution.
At least three major technical obstacles stand in the way of a demon-
stration of a workable controlled fusion reaction. Optimists expect
these can be overcome within the next few decades. On the other hand,
until a demonstration is actually achieved, national energy policies
cannot assume that fusion will in fact be available to supply energy
needs of the 21st century.
Safeguards : Ways to Assure Discovery of Unauthorized Diversion of
Fissionable Materials
The nuclear age brought a new meaning to the word "safeguards"
in international relations. Safeguards are measures to guard against
the diversion of nuclear fuel material from uses permitted by law or
international agreement and to give timely indication of possible diver-
sion or assurance that diversion has not occurred.10 Safeguards are a
means of detecting but not preventing diversion.
Diversion of plutonium produced in nuclear power plants is con-
sidered to be the chief danger to national security from commercial
nuclear power. A fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy is to dis-
courage nations which now lack nuclear weapons from building fa-
cilities to produce nuclear materials to make weapons. The expected
installation of nuclear power plants in many of these countries will
make available large amounts of plutonium with an attendant risk
of diversion. The Internationa] Atomic Energy Agency estimates that
by 1980 the daily accretion to the world's stock of nuclear fuel mate-
rials will be sufficient to manufacture 10 nuclear weapons a day.11
Some observers expect that from 300,000 to 450,000 kilograms of
plutonium will be accumulated by 1980 in civil nuclear power pro-
grams throughout the world.12 As for slightly enriched uranium, while
it cannot be used directly in weapons, it could be further processed to
increase its enrichment to weapons grade.
Fortunately for international security, the plutonium produced in
commercial operation of nuclear power plants is not ideal for use in
weapons. Nonetheless, it would be possible in principle to operate
some nuclear power plants to produce plutonium better suited for
weapons materials. "With present nuclear technology, this action would
require the plants involved to be shut down frequently, which would
be a conspicuous signal of suspicious behavior.
All safeguards systems depend upon two elements: (1) the main-
tenance and review of records showing the receipt, production, con-
sumption, transfer, and storage of nuclear materials: and (2) the
undertaking of on-site inspections to determine the validity of these
records. Physical inspection is necessary- to verify the amount of safe-
guarded materials actually on hand. An inspector must have access
to the materials to take measurements and, in some cases, take samples
for analvsis.
10 The Department of State used this definition in : U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Hearings, Xonprolifcratinn Treat;/. 90th Cong. 2d Sess., 196S, p. 50.
11 International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards, (circa 1968) p. 7.
12 Mason Willrich. "The Nature of the Problem," in Mason Willrieh. ed., Civil Nuclear
Power and International Security (New York : Praeger Publishers, 19T1), p. 3.
140
Some Lim itations of Safeguards
Control of nuclear materials, both because of their monetary value
and for their utility to make nuclear weapons, would seem to require a
combination of accounting and physical controls and protection. This
double control is not now in practice. Safeguards systems do not
extend to physical protection against theft or diversion, but are
designed only to detect such theft or diversion. The hope for safe-
guards is that their detection capability will deter a would-be diverter
by his risk of early detection and unmasking in the world community.
This limitation of safeguards has important consequences. It means
that assuring the physical security of nuclear materials is a separate
responsibility of the possessing nation.
A second limitation of safeguards is technical and statistical. Ex-
perience indicates that large users and producers of nuclear materials
can never know precisely how much materials they have ; there can be
no assurance of the detection of every slight diversion. Unavoidable
process losses and statistical errors in sampling and measurement set
limits on accuracy. These limitations do not mean that safeguards
cannot achieve a high level of effectiveness. They do mean that some
margin of error is inescapable which might mask some small diver-
sions. The diversion of substantial amounts of plutonium or highly en-
riched uranium-235 would probably be detected, but there remains the
nagging possibility that enough materials might be diverted without
detection to make a few nuclear weapons. The possession of a few illicit
weapons by a smaller nation, or possibly a non-national organization
which might obtain the nuclear materials on a nuclear black market, is
a real disadvantage of nuclear power to be weighed when considering
the balance of cost and benefit from a policy of promoting its world
use. Moreover, the higher the rate at which atomic fuel is used, re-
processed, and increased by breeding, the larger will be the margin
of uncertainty attributable to statistical error and the greater the
chance of undetected diversion.
III. From Hiroshima to Atoms for Peace: Postwar Trends in
Regional Multinational Cooperation in Europe
Nuclear power is capable of both military and peaceful applica-
tions. While the first research aimed at application of nuclear power
was for ship propulsion, the first actual application was a bomb. It
was the latter use that colored the impact of the atom upon U.S.
diplomacy for the later 1940's and well into the 1950's.
The first postwar impact of nuclear power upon American
diplomacy was evident in the unsuccessful struggle of diplomats to
achieve international control of atomic energy through the United
Nations and the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. As the effort failed,
the diplomats had to grapple with the implications of possession of
atomic bombs by the Soviet Union. And even as diplomacy was learn-
ing to accommodate to the military implications of atomic energy,
scientists and engineers were adding a new factor as their research
and development led to the expectation of early commercial use of
nuclear power. By the early 1950's this optimism began to affect the
foreign policy of the United States, as its diplomats and scientists
undertook initiatives that ultimately led to the creation of two regional,
multinational organizations to coordinate peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, a military alliance for its military use, a worldwide interna-
tional atomic energy organization, a network of bilateral agreements
by the United States with other countries for technical assistance
with nuclear energy, and a treaty to prevent proliferation of new
national capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons. These develop-
ments evidence the impact of the discovery of fission upon American
diplomacy.
In addressing the interaction between American diplomacy and
programs to foster commercial nuclear power in Europe, this study
gives limited attention to the role of the United Kingdom. While the
British were a principal partner of the United States in the wartime
development of the atomic bomb, this special relationship was dis-
solved by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There-
after the United Kingdom's government moved vigorously to estab-
lish a civil nuclear power program both to supply energy for domestic
use and in hopes of increasing future export trade. This they did
independently of the United States and also of the nations that were
later to form the European Common Market. The British tradition
of separation from and independence of Europe has persisted until
recently. Clearly the separation efforts of the British caused diplo-
matic interactions between the governments of the United Kingdom
and the United States. However, an analysis of these interactions is
not within the scope of this study.
An Initial Prohibition of International Cooperation
To maintain nuclear secrecy, Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946,13 terminated nuclear collaboration with the wartime allies
13 Public Law 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.
(141)
142
of the United States. The Act stipulated that until Congress should
declare by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international
safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes
had been established, there could be no exchange of information with
other nations for the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes.
Xo such joint resolution has ever been introduced.
As the cold war intensified, the United States began to favor the
sharing of some nuclear information to strengthen its NATO allies.
To this end, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was amended in 1951 14
to authorize the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under cer-
tain conditions to enter into arrangements with allies of the United
States to give them certain nuclear information.15
In congressional debate on this amendment many Members indi-
cated their belief that such nuclear cooperation should be entered into
only for reasons so compelling as to overbalance the preference for
secrecy of the original legislation. Clearly, the 1951 amendment was
intended to strengthen military alliances rather than to foster commer-
cial use of nuclear energy in Europe.
The restrictions of the 194G atomic energy legislation upon U.S.
technical cooperation with other nations are notable for attitudes they
represent. During the war years, close collaboration of scientists and
engineers of the allies had produced the atom bomb within the short
span of six years from the initial observation of fission in uranium.
Once atomic energy had entered the arena of international relations
the attitude changed from cooperation to secrecy. One early task of
U.S. diplomacy was to reconcile the nuclear interests of U.S. allies
with this legislative constraint upon international cooperation and
communication of information for nuclear energy.
Initial Pessim ism To travel Nuclear Power
Early postwar preoccupation with military use of nuclear energy
and initial pessimism as to the commercial utility of nuclear power
concentrated the impact of atomic energy upon American diplomacy.
With the rapid expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, particularly
after perfection of the hydrogen bomb, U.S. diplomats for many years
operated from a unique position of strength that offset the rapid post-
war reduction of the Nation's armed forces.
That commercial nuclear power would soon be feasible seemed un-
likely in the late 1940's. A leading theoretician of nuclear power, Dr.
Walter Zinn, in draft ing the firsl program for nuclear power in 1947.
called attention to the shortage of nuclear fuel. Existing stocks of
uranium ores were judged scarcely large enough to sustain produc-
tion of a modes! number of weapons, but inadequate to supply fuel
for future nuclear power plants. Zinn concluded that the only hope
for nuclear power lay in successful perfection of the breeder. Trans-
" Public Law 82 235, 05 Stat. 692.
u The Act amended Section 10. (a) (3) it required unanimous action by the five ('mn-
ioners on such an agreement and provided further that certain Information about
weapons nut be communicated ; thai no such arrangement be entered into with any
nation "threatening the sccuritj of the United States"; thai the data involved ". . . shall
he limited ami circumscribed i" the maximum degree consistent with the common defense
ami Miu ri t y . . ." ; thai the Presidenl gel written recommendations of the National
Security Council ami incorporate these in a determination that the arrangement would
". . . substantial]} promote ami would not endanger tin' common defense ami security of
the United States . . ami that before tin' arrangement was consummated, the Joint
Committi i' "a Atomic Energj should be Informed ami thirtj days pass.
143
luting the breeder concept into practice appeared to be extremely
difficult and in 1947 the chances for successful breeding were said to
be marginal at best.10
The General Advisory Committee17 shared Zinn's pessimism. On
November 23, 11)47, the committee expressed doubt that it would be
possible under the most favorable circumstances for any considerable
portion of the power supply of the world to be replaced by nuclear
fuel within 20 years.18
Subsequent history confirmed their observation. Even by the early
1970s, nuclear power accounts for only a small percentage of electrical
power generation in the United States and of the world. However, by
the 1990s it is expected to supply half of the electricity needs of the
United States and a quarter of U.S. total energy needs.
Changing Technology mid Diplomacy
During the late 1940's and early 1950's diplomats struggled toward
international control of atomic energy. Efforts of the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission resulted in diplomatic frustration. Mean-
while, scientists and engineers were progressing toward commercial
nuclear power, and the initial pessimism about commercial nuclear
power shifted to optimism, an optimism that was soon to affect Amer-
ican diplomacy. For example, in June 1952 a Canadian leader in
nuclear energy, J. Lome Gray of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.,
said : 19
We are convinced, even with our present incomplete knowledge of this tech-
nology, that fission of natural uranium will produce energy that can and will
compete economically with coal or oil. We are thinking at this stage of quite large
control power stations.
A few months later, AEC Commissioner Eugene M. Zuckert
wrote : 20
Study of the development of atomic energy from 1942 leads me to feel that the
strides the engineers and scientists are making are so great that "power only"
reactors may be nearer than we dare hope for, even though we are still in the
early phases of research and development.
By December 1952, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had
concluded that atomic power for industrial purposes was technically
feasible, and that the only problem was its cost.21
Interest in International Collaboration
If this optimism was to be justified, prototype nuclear power plants
had to be designed, built, and put into operation to provide engineering
and operating experience for the nuclear industries and the electric
utilities. The AEC wished to get on with this demonstration, but
its nuclear power program became caught up in the controversy of
public versus private generation of electricity. One pragmatic solution
was to build demonstration plants overseas. Arranging such demon-
16 Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan. Atomic Shield, 1947/1952 (University Park,
Pa. : The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1969). p. 29.
17 The General Advisory Committee to the USAEC was created by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 and for almost a decade had a powerful influence within the Commission.
18 Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit.. p. 116.
19 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on .Atomic Energy. Atomic Poirer anil Private Enter-
prise, 82nd Cong.. 2d Hess.. December 1952 (Joint Committee print), p. 3.
20 Loc. cit. Reference to "power only'' reactors is important, for previously many
observers hwl argued that at best nuclear power could be economically competitive only as a
byproduct from manufacture of plutonium for bombs.
=l Loc. cit.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 11
144
strations became the task of the diplomats. The AEC supported the
idea of building demonstration plants abroad. In 1952, AEC Com-
missioner T. Keith Glennan forecast an increasing demand abroad
for nuclear power: "This demand naturally will arise first where
present costs of electrical energy are high and this suggests that such
a program may have an important place in a future Point Four pro-
gram," J2 Europe was a likely location because it needed electricity and
costs of European electricity were higher than in the United States.
thus setting an easier economic goal for the designers and engineers.
AEC Commissioner Henry D. Smyth endorsed the idea that the
nuclear power stations might be built abroad with U.S. financial help
through Point Four funds. He too pointed out that since power pro-
duction in the United States was much cheaper than in other countries,
the economic incentive for nuclear power would be greater abroad.
By the early 1950's nuclear power had begun to attract the interest of
the makers and executors of foreign policy. Still it remained of limited
import as the governments and diplomatic services of the United
States and its allies struggled to assure the survival of a free Western
Europe. The experience then with a massive outpouring of U.S. fi-
nancial and technical aid through multinational organizations was to
point the way for later multinational ventures in nuclear power.
The Evolving Scene: 191^5-1953
Eight years elapsed between the end of fighting in Europe and
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan of 195)1 The events and
trends of these years generated pressures upon the United States to
take new diplomatic initiatives. One initiative was the President's plan
to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the world by
means which included construction and operation of demonstration
nuclear power plants in Europe.
These 8 years saw the initial recovery of Europe, the start of
the cold war. the onset of economic stagnation in Europe, the mount-
ing of the Marshall plan and the related establishment of the Or-
ganisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), creation
of the .North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Korean
"War. U.S. pronouncement of the doctrine of massive retaliation, and
the formation of two multinational European organizations for eco-
nomic cooperation.23
I UK POSTWAR STRUGGLE
Fighting ended in Europe on May 5, L945. The enormous devasta-
tion on the continent and in the British Isles made survival and
restoral ion of commerce and industry the imperatives of the day. Yet
despite this devastation, the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe estimated that Western Europe had by 1946 regained its
prewar levels of industrial production. Unfortunately, the extremely
harsh winter of 1946 17 impeded this initial recovery, which came to
a halt altofrtherin L947.
-Ihi.l . p. 25
M While an examination <>r r.s Soviet relations In Europe lies outside the scop.' of this
paper, there were i" be interactions between these power blocs with respeel ii> nuclear
power, for background on the general relations, the reader may wish to consult Thomas
\Volfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1915 t970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
L970).
145
With the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the elimination of
the Nazi threat, the Soviet Union gave priority to its historical strug-
gle with the capitalist world, the leading member of which was the
United States. By 1047. Eastern Europe was under full Soviet domi-
nation : the Soviet Union's subsequent refusal to accept Marshall plan
aid for herself and her satellites decisively ended the wartime alliance
and there began the period known as the cold war. The subsequent
struggle short of war pervaded all sectors of society in both the United
States and the Soviet Union, including the scientific and technical
communities, as the two opponents attempted to prove the superiority
of their respective systems.
The Soviet threat to Western Europe, together with the threat of
economic breakdown and resulting political instability, led to Presi-
dent Truman's initiatives of the Marshall plan and the Truman
doctrine. These moves were deemed necessary because conditions in
Western Europe presented a power vacuum between the United States
and the Soviet Union. The United States feared that Soviet forces
would enter Western Europe, especially through Germany, where they
already had a foothold. Consequently, U.S. diplomatic objectives
were aimed at strengthening Western Europe politically and eco-
nomically until this power vacuum could be filled.
THE MARSHALL PLAN
The concepts of the Marshall plan were announced by Secretary
of State George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. The basic principle of
American foreign policy was to foster closer collaboration among
European nations. Further help from the United States therefore
should be given only after these nations had agreed together upon
their basic needs and had organized to make effective use of aid from
the United States. Such aid was in the U.S. national interest, said
Secretary Marshall, because the modern system of industrial division
of labor in Europe was in danger of breaking down with a consequent
demoralizing effect on the world, the generation of disturbances, and
undesirable consequences for the U.S. economy.
The Marshal] plan continued in operation until 1951. In addition
to the financial support it provided, the plan also stimulated European
nations to organize for economic development through the Organisa-
tion for European Economic Co-operation. By the end of this remark-
able venture in international aid. the industrial outputs of the United
Kingdom. West Germany. France, and other nations of Western
Europe had increased substantially over the levels of 1947, ranging
from an increase of 35 percent for the United Kingdom to 334 per-
cent for West Germany.
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
On November 17. 1947, President Truman announced to a joint ses-
sion of Congress that he would propose a long-range European re-
covery program to support the freedom-loving countries of West-
ern Europe in their endeavors to remain free. A few weeks later in
his foreign aid message of December 19. 1947. the President proposed
major U.S. aid to Europe, coupling this with the Marshal plan con-
146
cept of European joint action and also to the national interests of the
United States.
Unification in Europe
Alter the crisis of initial survival had passed, the remaining
problems facing the governments of Western Europe were three-
fold :
(1) To develop an effective system of collective security;
(2) To sustain economic stability ; and
( :; ) To foster further industrial development,
U.S. foreign policy toward European recovery received another,
largely unanticipated, technological shock in 1949 when the Soviet
Union detonated its first atomic explosive. Four years later the
U.S.S.R. tested its first hydrogen bomb.24 As the Soviet Union began
to acquire a nuclear arsenal, the nations of Western Europe, saw rea-
son to seek unity in their future dealings with the Soviet bloc. A uni-
fied or federated Western Europe also might hope to emerge as an
independent global power, capable of exercising substantia] influ-
ence in world affairs independently of the United States or the Soviet
Union. The European approach to unity featured the creation of three
international communities: a coal and steel community, a common
market, and a nuclear power community.
The European Coal mid Steel Com in mi ity
A major step toward the goal of European unity was taken when
West Germany, France. Italy, and the Benelux countries ( Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) ratified the Treaty of Paris on
July 25, L952, and brought the European Coal and Steel Community
( EUSC) into force as an independent multinational organization. The
treaty required that the six members remove all tariff and other bar-
riers to the free movement of coal, iron ore, and steel within two years,
and abolish all discrimination against imports from other members.
Max Beloff of the Brookings Institution sees the importance of this
multinational organization in the impetus it gave to Western Euro-
pean cooperation and integration in political and defense matters.25
Tin- Euro/" mi Economic Community
Within a few years the example of the Coal and Steel Community
led to the formation of two additional communities: a European com-
mon market . and an atomic energx community.
The starting point for these ventures was a conference of the for-
eign ministers of the ECSC nations at Messina in June 1955, shortly
before the opening of the United Nation's first international confer-
ence on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Two years later the Treaty
of Rome was signed, on March 25, L957, establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC), commonly known as the Common
Market. The treaty came into force on January 1. l!>f>8.
The aims of the Common Market are to promote a harmonious
development of economic activity and cooperation among its members
through gradual elimination of financial and physical restrictions on
the free movement of goods, capital, and workers among member
countries: the harmonization of economic policies; and the consolida
« December R, 1953
!»M:i\ Beloff, 77" United States <m<! th< Unity of Europe (Washington, D.C. : The
Brook i n gs Institution. 1963), p. »'■ 1
147
tion of a single external tariff. By the close of 1961, internal tariffs
among members had been reduced by 40 percent on industrial goods
and by 30 percent on farm products. Quotas on industrial goods had
been abolished, and the EEC was working toward a common external
tariff intended to be 20 percent below the average of The national
tariffs. Complete internal free trade was to be established on July 1,
1907. Quotas on trade were removed and national tariffs toward non-
member countries were aligned toward the common external tariff,
effective July 1968.
The second community originating at the Messina conference was
the European Atomic Community (Euratom). This multinational
supranational organization of six nations to foster use of nuclear
energy is treated in detail in sections VII and VIII.
COMMON ORGANS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
The parallel membership and organization of the Coal and Steel
Community, the Economic Community, and Euratom led to an agree-
ment in 1965 to combine them under a single system of executive,
legislative, and judicial bodies. This agreement took effect on July 1,
l'.MlT. and the three communities now share in common a Commission
of Member States, a Council of Ministers, a European Parliament,
an Economic and Social Committee, and a Court of Justice.
The Commission of the European Communities: The Commission
consists of nine members : two each from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, and Italy, and one each from the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg. It implements, administers, and enforces the Treaties
of Paris and Rome. The Commission works on the principle of col-
legiate responsibility for respective sectors. Energy is identified as
one such sector, which in 1970 was the responsibility of the member
from the Federal Republic of Germany.26
The Council of Ministers: A Council of Ministers represents the
interests of member states, with one representative from each member.
Usually the representative is the minister concerned with the subject
before the Council, but the foreign affairs ministers participate in
the most important sessions. The work of the Council is prepared by
a Committee of Permanent Representatives of the member states.
The European Parliament : The legislative arm of the common or-
ganization is the European Parliament, which supervises the execu-
tive organs of the communities and debates their annual reports. It
has the power by vote of censure of a two-thirds majority to dismiss
the executives of the communities. The Parliament maintains 12 stand-
ing committees to follow the work of the three communities. One of
these committees deals with energy, research, and atomic affairs. While
the Commission need not defer to the Parliament, in practice it tries
to shape its proposals to attain approval by a majority.27
The Economic and Social Committee: An Economic and Social Com-
mittee of 101 members represents employers, trade unions, and the gen-
eral interest. Its function is advisory.
:G The 13 sectors which have been identified are: external relations, external trade, eco-
nomic and financial affairs, industry, internal market and regional policy, competition,
budget and information, agriculture, energy, social affairs, transport, research and tech-
nology, and development aid.
» The U.S. Department of State Fact Book of the Countries of the World (New York:
Crown Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 785.
148
TIk Court of Just i,-e: A supreme court of seven judges sits in
Luxembourg with power to decide whether acts of the communities,
member governments, and private organizations are compatible with
the treaties. The Court can annul acts of the Commission and the
( Jouncil of Ministers. Its decisions are directly binding upon all parties
and are not subject to appeal. The seven justices are appointed for
terms of six years by the member governments. Through 1968 some
56< i cases had been brought before the Court.
Financing the communities: The communities are financed by na-
tional contributions, much as was the federal government of the United
States during the era of the Continental Congress. From Janu. ry 1,
1975. the communities are scheduled to have their own independent
financial resources derived from : (1) variable levies on farm imports:
(2) customs duties: and (3) proceeds of up to 1 percent of a value
added tax.
The general budget of the communities in 1969 came to about $2.7
million and was financed by the member governments in the following
proportions: France, West Germany and Italy, 28 percent each: Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, 7.1) percent each: and Luxembourg 0.2
percent.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Dt velojmu nt
Interest in European cooperation extended beyond the communities
of the six nat ions and led to establishment of a European multinational
organization that quickly developed a parallel interest in nuclear
energy. On December 14. 1960, the Organisation for European Eco-
nomic Co-operation, which had been set up in 1948 to coordinate efforts
to restore Europe's economy under the Marshall plan, was reorganized
into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). England, which was not a member of the Common Market,
was a member of OECD. One fundamental purpose of OECD was
"to achieve the highest sustainable growth and employment and a
rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining
financial stability and thus to contribute to the development of the
world economy." This objective was to be accomplished in part by
efforts to reduce or abolish obstacles in exchange of goods and services
and by the maintenance and liberalization of capital movement between
countries. A new major goal was coordination of economic aid to less
developed count ries.
The OECD in the mid-1950's became interested in nuclear energy
and established a Nuclear Energy A.gency. OECD interests extend to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science policy research cooperation,
scientific and technical personnel, indust rial matters, and energy prob-
lems. The OECD is headed by a council composed of representatives
of t he member count lies.
/ .S.Attitudt Toward European Unity
Every I'.S. administration of the postwar period has supported
European unity and has looked to the institutions of the European
communities as the most promising way of achieving that unitv. An
early example of the I'.S. attitude appears in President Truman's
pledge in L948 that the consolidated effort of the free countries of
Europe to protect themselves would be matched by the I'.S. determi-
nation to help them do so. Support by Congress for European unity
149
was also evident in Senate Resolution 239, sponsored by Senator Van-
denberg, adopted by a vote of 64 to 4 on June 11, 1948. The resolution
urged t be President to pursue ". . . progressive development of regional
and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self
defense." It called for "association of the United States, by constitu-
tional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements
as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and
as affects its national security." 28
The Congress further endorsed unification and integration in Europe
through the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952. In the former,
Congress specified as an objective of U.S. foreign policy the economic
unification and political integration of Europe.29 During 1951, the
Department of State apparently decided that the political unification
should be more actively encouraged, and at a meeting between Mem-
bers of Congress and the Council of Europe the U.S. representatives
pressed hard in that direction. The Mutual Security Act of 1952
included a forthright statement of support for European unity : 30
The Congress welcomes the recent progress in political federation, military
integration and economic unification in Europe and reaffirms its belief in the
necessity of further vigorous efforts towards these ends as a means of building
strength, establishing security, and preserving peace in the North Atlantic area.
In order to provide further encouragement to such efforts, the Congress believes
it essential that this act should be so administered as to support concrete meas-
ures for political federation, military integration and economic unification in
Europe.
Through the late 1940's and into the early 1950's the principal
impact of nuclear science and technology upon American diplomacy
was the temporary military advantage it gave to the United States in
relation to the European Community. Although the United Kingdom
and France had some knowledge of nuclear weapons they lacked the
industrial base to make them. Possession of nuclear weapons initially
enabled American diplomats to extend to allies of the United States
an umbrella of protection against attack.
But the exclusive military advantage was short-lived as scientists
and engineers of the Soviet Union developed their own nuclear
weapons. By the mid-1950's the realization that the Soviet Union
would acquire large nuclear weapons plus the optimism of U.S.
scientists and engineers as they surveyed the initial results of the first
few years of work to produce commercially useful nuclear power,
had set the scene for a major new diplomatic initiative: President
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace plan of 1953.
A new scientific and technological achievement was soon to divert
interest from nuclear energy. With the Soviet Union's successful
launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, the attention of the world
became directed toward outer space. Facing technological rivalry with
the Soviet Union, the United States, while still giving some attention
to nuclear power, began its efforts (which are still continuing) to get
Europe to cooperate in space programs.
28 Congressional Record, vol. 04. June 11, 194S p. 7791
29 The Mutual Security Act of 1951, P.I,. 82-165. 65 Stat. 373.
30 The Mutual Security Act of 1952, P.L. 82-400, 66 Stat 141.
IV. Atoms for Peace: A Presidential Initiative
"Atoms for Peace" is the name of a presidential exercise of diplo-
matic powers to foster foreign use of the science and technology of
nuclear energy. It signaled the start of U.S. diplomatic efforts to cre-
ate an international atomic energy agency; American encouragement
to two European regional, multinational agencies for nuclear energy:
establishment of a network of bilateral agreements between the United
States and individual nations for technical assistance in nuclear en-
ergy: and a treaty to establish international safeguards over nuclear
fuel materials. These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of
nuclear energy abroad, ranging from applications of radioisotopes
for research and for diagnosis and treatment in medicine to the demon-
stration of nuclear power for the generation of electricity. I underlying
the publicized, idealistic purpose of sharing U.S. nuclear science and
technology were pragmatic, practical considerations of advantages to
the United States. In this way. the idealism of American nuclear
scientists and engineers was coupled effectively to the support of U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
Three basic goals of I'.S. policy and interest in Europe have re-
mained constant since the end of World War II: integration of the
nations of Western Europe, the defense of I '.S. security, and the quest
for East-West detente. ' Atoms for Peace was to have implications
for all three goals.
Origins of Atoms for Peoxn
Atoms for Peace grew out of a frustrating era for United States
diplomacy. The Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb in 1949,
an unexpectedly early date. Military forces of North Korea had in-
vaded South Korea in 1950. The attempts in Europe to establish a
European Defense Community had failed and international dis
armament negotiations were deadlocked. One U.S. response was a
policy that threatened "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons
against Communist aggression. Another was the President's Atoms for
Peace proposals as an alternative to the arms race.
president Eisenhower's ct.n. address
By 1953, President Eisenhower was persuaded thai the world was
courting disaster in the continuing armaments race and that something
had to be done to put n brake on its momentum. lie sought "any kind
of an idea thai could bring the world to look at the atomic problem
in a broad and intelligent way and -till escape the impasse to action
created by Russian intransigence. . . ." :rj After discussion with Prime
*' l ;on1 recent discussion of U.S. interests find objectives In Western Europe from
the standpoint of n diplomat, see the speech of I»;i\i<l B. Bolen, First Secretary of the
American Ei In Bonn, in the Congressional Record, September 20, 1971, pp. S14589
14592
'Dwiffht l> Elsenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953 1956 (Garden City, N.Y. : Double
day, 1963 I, p. 252
(150)
151
Minister Churchill at the Bermuda conferences of 1953, and receiving
British encouragement, President Eisenhower offered his Atoms for
Peace proposal in an address to the General Assembly of the United
Nations, December 8, 1953. 33
Speaking first of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, the
President emphasized two atomic realities of the day : (1) knowledge
of atomic power which some nations then possessed would eventually
be shared by others; and (2) even a vast superiority in numbers of
nuclear weapons would not prevent the damage and toll of human
lives that could be inflicted by surprise aggression. Even against the
most powerful defense, he said, an aggressor having enough atomic
bombs for a surprise attack could probably inflict hideous damage on
chosen targets. What, then, should be done? The consequences of in-
action were too forbidding to accept. He said : 3i
To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two
atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a
trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of
civilization destroyed — the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind
handed down to us from generation to generation — and the condemnation of man-
kind to begin all over again the age old struggle upward from savagery toward
decency, and right, and justice.
The President proposed to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power
as a way to reverse the trend of atomic military buildup. Nuclear ma-
terials committed to peaceful purposes would not be available for
weapons. To this end, he proposed that the nuclear nations of the
world, primarily the United States and U.S.S.K., contribute fissionable
materials to an international pool that would be administered by an
International Atomic Energy Agency. This pool would provide fuel
for abundant electrical energy to the power-starved areas of the world.
The initial contributions to the pool would be small. However, the pro-
posal had the great virtue, said the President, that it could be under-
taken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any
attempt to set up a system of worldwide inspection and control. Elabo-
rating on his proposal, the President said : 35
The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding,
storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The
ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such
a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise
seizure.
The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to
devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the
peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to supply atomic
energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A
special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-
starved areas of the world.
The President specifically invited participation of the Soviet Union
and committed himself to seek the legislation necessary for the United
States to carry out its part of the proposals.
Within the United Nations, the response to the Atoms for Peace
proposal was instantaneous and favorable. The speech was scored as
a victory for the United States in international affairs by undercut-
m "Address bv the President before the United Nations General Assembly," Congressional
Record, vol. 100. January 7, 1954, pp. 61-63.
34 Ibid., p. 62.
35 Loc. cit.
152
ting a persuasive Communist propaganda offensive that represented
the United States as motivated by "atomic imperialism'" and aimed
at monopolizing the benefits of nuclear technology through its policy
of atomic secrecy. James J. Wadsworth, later to become U.S. am-
bassador to the conference that was to create the international agency,
wrote that the United States had gained a diplomatic advantage over
the Soviet Union by making the first overture to the world commu-
nity for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.36
Implications for Nuclear Power in Europe
From the point of view of Western Europe, the main implications
of the Atoms for Peace message were threefold :
(1) In principle it would be possible to obtain from the United
States enriched uranium and scarce materials such as heavy water,
for development of nuclear power, subject to agreements for ex-
change of technical information and control of the materials
supplied ;
(2) The United Nations would be entrusted with supply and
safeguards functions via the proposed international agency :
(3) A great amount of scientific and technical information and
data on nuclear energy would be released to the world.
This latter was significant for until then much of the technology
for nuclear power was kept secret in the United States.
The first tangible result of the message was an international confer-
ence on atomic energy sponsored by the United Nations in Geneva in
1955. In retrospect, the conference was a unique event. None of the
three subsequent U.N. conferences released at one time so much scien-
tific and technical information in such an exhilarating atmosphere. But
the United States, which was the principal participant in the confer-
ence, tended to oversell atomic energy, which many, if not all, countries
looked to as a symbol of modernity and greatness. The year 1955
marked the launching of all-out nuclear programs in many countries,
with attendant overestimating of promised benefits and underestimat-
ing of the technical and economic problems of nuclear power.37
Legislation for Atoms for Peace
A complete redrafting of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 legislation
quickly followed President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposals
to clear the way for private development of civil nuclear power in the
United State- and to open opportunities for nuclear cooperation with
other nations and with international bodies. The modifications em-
bodied in the 1954 legislation,88 while permitting expanded interna-
tional cooperation, also included provisions to insure that this coopera-
t ion would promote, not compromise, national security.
m James .1 Wadsworth. "Atoms for Peace " hi J, Stoessinger and A. Westin, eds., Power
and Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Inc., 1964), p. 35.
This aspeel of "over ell" is emphasized by Jules Queron, former general director of
research ; i ml development for Euratom, In liis essay. "Atomic Energy In Continental
Western Europe," in Richard L. Lewis and Jane Wilson, eds.. Mamooonin Pins Twenty-
Yeara (New York : The Viking Press, t.iti I p. 146
••Public Law 83 703, 68 Stat. 919, approved August 30, 1!»r>4. The vote In the House was
231 for. 154 against, 'i present, and 4.". not voting; in the Senate it was r.7 for, 28 against,
nnd 11 not vrot inc.
153
THE EISENHOWER PROPOSAL TO CONGRESS
Scarcely two months after his Atoms for Peace message, President
Eisenhower on February 17, 1954 proposed revision of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946.39 He called for expanded international cooperation
in atomic energy, but was silent as to the proposed international atomic
energy agency. The changes he recommended were to :
Widen cooperation with U.S. allies in certain atomic energy
matters ;
Improve procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic
energy information ; and
Encourage broadened participation in the development of peace-
time uses of atomic energy in the United States.40
These recommendations, the President observed, were separate from
his proposal to seek a new basis for international cooperation in atomic
energy as outlined in his Atoms for Peace address. Consideration of
additional legislation which might be needed for that proposal should
await, he said, the outcome of discussions with other nations.41 But no
subsequent message ever came.
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in May and June 1954 held
extensive hearings on the proposed revisions of the Atomic Energy
Act. Administration witnesses supported international cooperation for
its benefits to the United States. AEC Commissioner Smyth testified
that the requested amendments would contribute substantially to world
peace, strengthen the national defense and the defense and economy of
the free world, and assure the continued leadership of the United
States in atomic energy.42 Commissioner Thomas Murray further de-
veloped the case :
Industrially underdeveloped countries, whose future economic growth is being
hampered by inadequate or high-cost fuels and electric energy, might benefit
significantly if the technical and financial problems can be overcome. For the
industrially advanced nations, encountering difficulty in continuing to secure
adequate supplies of cheap fuel and electric energy in the face of diminished
reserves and mounting costs for local or imported fuel, nuclear-power develop-
ment may prove to be a key element in future industrial growth.43
39 Atomic Energy Art of 1946 — Message from the President. (H. Doc. No. 32S) Con-
gressional Record, Vol. 100. February 17, 1954, pp. 1921-1924.
40 Elaborating tbe reasons for international cooperation, the President spoke of the
need for authority to provide certain information and also nuclear materials to foreign
countries :
In the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy, additional amendments are
required for effective United States cooperation with friendly nations. Such coopera-
tion requires the exchange of certain "restricted data" on the industrial applications
of atomic energy and also the release of fissionable materials in amounts adequate
for industrial and research use. I therefore recommend that the Atomic Energy Act
be amended to authorize such cooperation. Such amendments should prescribe that
before the conclusion of any arrangement for the transfer of fissionable material to
a foreign nation, assurances must be provided against its use by the recipient nation
for military purposes. Ibid., p. 1922.
41 Loc. cit.
42 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energv, Hearings, 8. SS2S and H.R. 8862, to
Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 191,6, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, part II, p. 562.
43 Ibid., p. 574. This point was made by EEC Commissioner Murray, an industrialist.
154
Secretary of State Dulles, after underscoring Soviet military nuclear
progress, concluded that the strict secrecy requirements of the 1946
Act no longer represented the wisest international policy for the United
States. He identified three circumstances that had combined to create
the need to relax the original limits on international cooperation:
(1) the developing Soviet nuclear program, (2) U.S. dependence on
foreign uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons, and (3) legitimate
hopes for nuclear power abroad. Arguing the benefits to U.S. self-in-
terest,44 Secretary Dulles supported the legislation, in part, so that the
United States could stay ahead of the Soviet Union in providing
knowledge of peaceful applications of atomic energy.45
Replying to a question as to international implications of failure
to enact the proposed amendments. Secretary Dulles claimed that it
would be quite disastrous for the United States.46
Some members of the Joint Committee expressed concern lest the
proposed amendments be regarded as an international "giveaway" of
U.S. secrets, technology, and materials. These fears were countered
by Representative TV. Sterling Cole, then chairman of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy. He minimized the significance of the pro-
posed relaxation of controls over exchange of scientific information
with other countries. He observed that in comparison with the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, the new proposals made only one addition to
information that could already be exchanged. This was dissemination
of information on industrial and other applications of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes. This, he said, was no giveaway.
So when you hear talk that this bill proposes to give vital information away
to the peoples of the world, to foreigners, to enemies as well as friends, just tell
those people who talk that way to look at the record. The bill does no such
thing. It scarcely enlarges the field of the exchange of information beyond what
is presently authorized by law. . . ."
Interna fi oh ill Coopcrat'ton and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The overhauling of the Nation's basic atomic energy legislation in
l!>r>4 greatly expanded the scope of possible international relations
to encourage commercial use of nuclear energy abroad. In doing
so it placed new demands upon U.S. diplomacy. For this reason it
is pertinent to identify provisions of the new law that affected move-
ment of scientific information, technology, and materials of nuclear
energy from the United States to other nations.
41 For example, be sa id :
In extending abroad, under proper security safeguards, the evolving technology of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, we shall tighten the lion, is thai tie our- friends
abroad to us, we Bhall assure materials resources that we need, and we shall maintain
world leadership In atomic energy — leadership which today is such a large clement of
our national prestige. Ibid., p. 685.
*» He said :
Other countries an- making progress In atomic-power technology. There Is n crowing
tendency for certain raw materials supplying nations which are not industrially well
advanced, to turn to such other countries for nuclear power information because they
have l n disappointed by our Inability to give them significant help. It is clear to me
that if this trend continues, ihe interests of the United states will be seriously and det-
rimentally affected There is no need lure to emphasize how Important It Is for us in
■tay ahead of the U.S.S.R. In providing knowledge of how to put atomic energy to
peaceful uses. ibid., p. <;85.
M lie said :
I would lie sorry if (lie international aspect of this hill failed . . . because I do want
to emphasize with the greatest earnestness of which I am capable that I believe it
would be quite a disastrous thing fi.r the United States If these foreign policy aspects
of the hill were 1 1 ■ . i adopted.
It would gravely Interfere in my opinion with our ability to get indispensable
quantities of source material which we have to get from foreign markets and which I
do not think we can continue to get except on a basis of exchange of Information,
piTlng of information, which is more liberal than that which Is permitted by the present
I. or. eil.
♦7 Congressional Records vol lno, July 23, 1954, p. 11656.
155
The Congress declared that development, use, and control of atomic
energy should be so directed as to "promote world peace, improve the
general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free
competition in private enterprise." To attain this goal, the Act speci-
fied a program to :
. . . promote the common defense and security and to make available to co-
operating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely
as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security
will permit.
In support of this program, the Act authorized the AEC to cooperate
with any nation by distributing nuclear fuel and source materials, and
certain artificial radioisotopes.48 International nuclear cooperation
would be effected through bilateral agreements for cooperation with
individual nations or with a regional defense organization. These
agreements departed from conventional practice. Instead of being
treaties, they were agreements negotiated by the AEC which were
simpler to negotiate and did not require the advice and consent of the
Senate for their ratification. This arrangement was judged appropriate
because of the many foreign nations that were expected to wish to
benefit from U.S. nuclear science and technology.
Congress did place some limitations upon the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission and the State Department in negotiating such agreements.
Section 123 of the Act required that each such agreement include:
(1) The terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the
cooperation;
(2) A guaranty by the cooperating party that security safe-
guards and standards agreed upon would be maintained ;
(3) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to
be transferred pursuant to an agreement would not be used for
atomic weapons, or for research or development for weapons, or
for any other military purposes ; and
(4) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material
and any restricted data to be transferred would not be transferred
to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperat-
ing party except as specified in the agreement.
Section 123 further required the President to approve each agree-
ment for cooperation and to make a written determination that the
proposed agreement would promote rather than constitute an unrea-
sonable risk of the common defense and security. Finally, Congress
preserved for itself the option to intervene by requiring that a pro-
posed agreement for cooperation together with the Presidential ap-
proval and determination must lie before the Joint Committee for 30
days while Congress is in session.
The expanded legislative charter for AEC to foster use of nuclear
power abroad prohibited transfer of information on design and fabri-
cation of atomic weapons and limited the exchange of restricted data
for peaceful uses to six categories.40
Since 1954. this framework of legislative policy, program, and au-
thorization has been the basis for U.S. cooperation with European
<q Section 54 authorized forelcn distribution of special nuclear materials ; section 64 distri-
bution of source materials ; and section 82 distribution of byproduct materials.
19 The six categories included in Section 144(a) of the Act are (1) Refining, purification,
and subsequent treatment, of source material: (2) Reactor development: (3) Production of
special nuclear material: (4) Health and safety; (5) Industrial and other applications of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes; and (6) Research and development relating to the
foregoing.
156
nations — singly and in organizations — to foster commercial applica-
tion of nuclear power. It furnished the point of departure for the
diplomats who worked to create the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Euratom, the European Nuclear Energy Agency, the network
of bilateral and multilateral agreements subsequently negotiated by
the United States, and the Nonprolife ration Treaty. Before 1954,
the diplomats had to deal mainly with the military impacts of the dis-
covery of nuclear energy. Thereafter, their responsibilities were ex-
panded to include the negotiations and other diplomatic activities
intended to secure for the United States the greatest advantages from
cooperating Avith and encouraging the development of commercial
nuclear energy in Europe, and elsewhere.
Some Questions from the Scientific Community
Some scientists saw the Atoms for Peace plan as raising serious ques-
tions. One such scientist was physicist Ralph Lapp, who had served in
tin' wartime bomb project. In 1956 he posed five questions about inter-
national promotion of the use of nuclear power which two decades
later remain largely unanswered. He wrote : 50
President Eisenhower's atomic plan raises some very serious questions along
the following lines :
(1) Is nuclear power technically capahle of aiding foreign nations?
(2) Can adequate safeguards be devised to keep account of nuclear fuel and
prevent nn atomic power plant from becoming a bomb producer?
(3) Is the United States prepared to implement its plan by sharing technical
know-how with other nations?
(4) Will tie demand of power plants for nuclear fuel be great enough in the
near future to siphon off bomb material from military uses?
(5) "What is the danger that we will accelerate the nuclear arms race (the
fourth-power problem) by aiding other nations in nuclear technology?
Accomplishments of Atoms for Peace
The initial objectives of Atoms for Peace were to help contribute
to a more stable and peaceful world by sharing with other nations the
benefits of nuclear science and technology, to improve U.S. relations
with other nations through such sharing, and to minimize pressures for
independent and potentially hazardous nuclear programs by cooperat-
ing in peaceful uses under conditions 'which would discourage diversion
of atomic materials and equipment to military purposes.
In recent hearings before the House Subcommittee on International
Cooperation in Science and Space of the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission observed that
these objectives continue to bo valid. With the passage of years, addi-
tional objective-, have taken on increased importance. For example.
the Atoms for Peace program has enabled the United States to take
part in the rapidly expanding world market for nuclear noods and
service. The program is also "providing an invaluable mechanism for
a worldwide approach to health, safetv, and environmental problems
which transcend national boundaries." r''
60 R.'ili>Ji B, Lapp, Atoms and People (Now York: Harper k Brothers, Publishers, 1950),
p. 182.
Statement of Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, TT.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, Rubcommltl i International Cooperation in Science and Space, Hearings, A
General Review of International Cooperation m Science ami space, 02d Cong., 1st Sess.,
1971, p, ::::::
157
Atoms for Peace has been unique as a form of international coopera-
tion. While cooperation across national boundaries has occurred in
many scientific fields, international cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy came about as the result of deliberate decisions and spe-
cific actions of governments, rather than of scientific communities, to
share the benefits of an important new science and technology.
The basic concept of Atoms for Peace was to draw on two major
U.S. assets: (1) the knowledge of peaceful applications of nuclear
energy; and (2) the industrial capacity of the United States to pro-
duce in large quantities, and at reasonable cost, the essential materials
of the nuclear age, especially enriched uranium.
The costs to the United States of undertaking Atoms for Peace were
to be minimal, inasmuch as the technology to be made available was
under development for domestic use, while the plants and equipment al-
read}* existed to supply the essential materials. Most of the capital in-
vestment in special factories, laboratories, and test sites had already
been made; thus, the U.S. contribution of nuclear resources to Atoms
for Peace was limited largehT to costs of materials and labor.
In retrospect over 15 years, Atoms for Peace has involved only mod-
est financial aid by the United States. U.S. cooperation has been flexi-
ble, designed to meet the needs and capabilities of countries at various
stages of technological and economic development. With the develop-
ing countries, Atoms for Peace cooperation has tended to center on non-
power uses of nuclear energy, particularly use of radioisotopes in medi-
cine and agriculture. With the advanced countries, particularly in
Europe, nuclear power has been the dominant theme of cooperation.52
Not everyone has been sanguine about Atoms for Peace. W. Sterling
Cole, after his experience as the first Director-General of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, was pessimistic. In the early 1960's he
judged that the Atoms for Peace program no longer existed; that the
United States gave only lip service.to the concepts of Atoms for Peace;
that it was not a distinct entity ; and that it had become submerged in
foreign aid along with other types of U.S. foreign assistance. He hoped
that the President would revive and rejuvenate Atoms for Peace by
setting it apart as a special type of assistance.53 Whether Atoms for
Peace has fared as poorly as this is a subjective question. As Cole has
said, no separate agency was ever given the clearcut responsibility for
carrying out the Atoms for Peace program. The AEC may have in-
herited the responsibility, but it did not receive a specific legislative
charter to take a strong promotional position.
62 II. id., p. 334.
M Testimony of W. Sterling Cole. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Fnertrv,
Hearing*, United States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Aaencu S7th
Cong , 2.1. Sess., 1962, p. :;:;.
V. Bii-ateral Agreements for U.S. Technical Assistance to
Commercial Nuclear Energy in Europe
Realization of the ambitious goals for Atoms for Peace by other
nations, particularly in Europe, required U.S. technical assistance in
nuclear energy. Two well established methods for pursuing this policy
were available. The United States could provide technical assistance
directly to individual countries or it could also support and work
through regional or international organizations. Each method had its
advantages. Direct assistance was quicker, credit for successes would go
to the donor nation, and there were the prospects of influence or lover-
age for the donor in dealing with the recipients. International bodies,
on the other hand, had a traditional function of setting standards
and providing a neutral ground for exchange of information and coop-
eration between nations of divergent policies and interests. In the case
of atomic energy, both methods were employed. The United States
through the Atomic Energy Commission has entered into many coun-
try-to-country agreements — more commonly known as bilateral agree-
ments. It also has cooperated with the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom) and with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
to open American nuclear technology to Europe, and is a principal
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which also has
technical assistance functions.
This section examines direct technical assistance from the United
States through the mechanism of bilateral agreements with individual
countries. It relies heavily upon two reports of the Atomic Energy
Commission which were submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy in 1960 during that committee's review of the international
atomic policies and programs of the United States.54
Legislation for Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy
At the time of the Atoms for Peace message, the authority of the
Government to provide technical assistance to foreign nations to
encourage their use of nuclear power was severely limited. While the
Atomic Energy Act of 194C> 55 provided for a program to share with
other countries, on a reciprocal basis, information concerning the prac-
t ical indusl rial applications of atomic energy, this could not be imple-
mented before ". . . effective and enforceable safeguards against its use
for destructive purposes [could] be devised." 56 With the failure of the
U.S. proposal for the international control of atomic energy, this con-
dition was never fulfilled and the restriction ended the notable col-
423 I'M.
P L. 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 7.r,r, 7:..
id . section I. (b)(2).
(158)
159
laboration of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Bel-
gium which had characterized the wartime atom bomb project. The
only cooperation remaining after 1946 was in exploration for and pro-
curement of uranium ores needed for the continuing nuclear weapons
program of the United States. The restrictions on technical assistance
were relaxed slightly in 1951 by an amendment to the Act 57 which
authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to exchange certain infor-
mation with other countries about the "refining, purification and sub-
sequent treatment of source materials, reactor development, production
of fissionable material, and research and development related to the
foregoing." Canada was a primary beneficiary of this amendment. The
Canadians had continued to transmit information on nuclear energy to
the United States despite U.S. restrictions upon information in
exchange. After this amendment, the United States was able to provide
information to friendly nations that were beginning to show an interest
in civil nuclear energy. Notable among these countries was Belgium,
which still controlled large uranium deposits in the Belgian Congo.
In this amendment, the Congress laid down four principles for U.S.
technical assistance in nuclear energy, principles that were to be in-
fluential when the Atomic Energy Act was rewritten in 1954. These
were :
(1) A prohibition against communications of weapons design
and fabrication data ;
(2) A requirement for adequate security standards in countries
receiving classified information ;
(3) A determination by the President that the arrangements
would promote and would not endanger the common defense and
security; and
(4) A requirement that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
be informed of the arrangement 30 days prior to its consum-
mation.
The specification of these principles indicates ways the United
States can control its technical assistance to and cooperation with
other countries, ways which would not be possible were such assist-
ance to be channeled exclusively through an international organization.
The last principle also is of interest for it asserts congressional interest
in arrangements for furnishing technical assistance to nuclear indus-
tries abroad. During the early years of the technical assistance pro-
gram, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy closely examined the
individual agreements and their administration. The Joint Commit-,
tee on Atomic Energy held hearings on international agreements in
1964, 1965, and 1966.
Congress gave fresh recognition to international cooperation in
nuclear energy when it revised the Atomic Energy Act in 1954.5S One
of six statutory programs and objectives specified in the Act was a
"program of international cooperation to promote the common de-
fense and security and to make available to cooperating nations the
benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy as widely as expand-
ing technology and considerations of the common defense and secu-
rity will permit." 59
57 Public Law 82-235, 65 Stat. 692.
68 Public Law 83-703. 68 Stat. 919.
68 Sec. 3e. of P.L. 83-703.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 12
160
Additionally, the 1954 revision defined limits and procedures for
technical cooperation with other nations and provided for certain
forms of cooperation to be conducted under executive agreements, or
"Agreements for Cooperation," commonly known as '"bilateral agree-
ments." Under the revised act, the United States could encourage
foreign use of atomic energy and nuclear power through various in-
centives, which included :
1. Supplying nuclear fuel materials for research and power
reactors ;
2. Providing assistance in the design and construction of these
reactors ;
3. Exchange of certain scientific and technical information after
mutually agreeable controls for sensitive materials and secret in-
formation had been agreed upon.
The. Congress specified detailed conditions and limitations on nego-
tiation of the agreements. Section 123 of the Act states that no co-
operation with any national or regional defense organization shall be
undertaken until :
a. the Commission, has submitted to the President the proposed agreement for
cooperation, together with its recommendation thereon, which proposed agree-
ment shall include (1) the terms, conditions, durations, nature, and scope of
the cooperation: (2) a guaranty by the cooperating party that security safe-
guards and standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be main-
tained ; (3) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material to be trans-
ferred pursuant to such agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, or for
research on or development, of atomic weapons, or for any other military pur-
poses: and (4) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any
Restricted Data to lie transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation
will not be transferred to an unauthorized person or beyond the jurisdiction
of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for cooperation:
b. The President has approved and authorized the execution of the proposed
agreement for cooperation, and has made a determination in writing that the
performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security : and
c. The proposed agreement for cooj>eration. together with the approval and
the determination of the President, has been submitted to the Joint Committee
and a period of thirty days has elapsed while Congress is in session (in com-
puting such thirty days, there shall he excluded the days on which either House
is not in session because of an adjournment of more than .". days) .
The. Act further specified that the communication of Restricted
Data.00 the export of facilities to produce of use nuclear fuel materials,
and the distribution of nuclear fuel materials to another country could
occur only pursuant to an Agreement for Cooperation. U.S. citizens
and companies were prohibited from directly ot- indirectly engaging
in the production of any nuclear fuel materials outside of the United
States, except under an Agreement for Cooperation or an AEC au-
thorization. Tn this way. the Act out control of cooperation between
the domestic nuclear industry and private industries of other coun-
tries firmly into the hands of ( he A EC.
AEC Organization: the Division of International Programs
In response lo the new positive outlook for international technologi-
cal collaboration authorized by the Atomic Enersrv Act of 1054, the
AEC established a Division of [international Affairs in November
••Tlif term "Restricted Data" Is defined to menu "nil dnta concerning (1) design, mnnu-
f.-K-ii"-,. ,,r utilization of ntomle weapons : ('Ji the production of special nuclear material
or i •"■ i the use of special nuclear material In the production of energy, bul shall not include
data declassified or removed from 1 1 n- Restrict**'! Data category. . . ."
161
1955. Its function was to develop and direct a program of international
cooperation for peaceful applications of atomic energy. The division's
responsibilities included coordination of AEC activities relating to
various types of agreements for international cooperation; assistance
with negotiations for an International Atomic Energy Agency; and
liaison with the State Department, including direct participation with
the State Department in preparing proposals to be presented to the
United Nations.61 In a subsequent AEC reorganization, the division
was renamed the Division of International Programs.
The First Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation
The AEC moved quickly to use its new authority by opening nego-
tiations with 27 countries for bilateral agreements. By the end of 1955,
agreements with 22 countries had been comj^leted.
The first agreements negotiated were those with the three wartime
nuclear collaborators of the United States. Each agreement reflected
the special and close relationship that had developed between the
United States on one hand and the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Belgium on the other. The differences among these agreements also re-
flected the stages of development of the nuclear science and technology
of the countries involved.
PRESSURES TO PROMOTE XTJCLEAR POWER ABROAD
The mid-1950s witnessed increased pressure to promote demonstra-
tion of U.S. nuclear power technology abroad. One example of this
pressure was a report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy, which was appointed by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy in 1955 62 63 and was chaired by newspaper pub-
lisher Robert M. McKinney. It urged vigorous measures to encourage
the use of atomic energy abroad. The measures included convening a
series of regional conferences with bilateral partners of the United
States to establish realistic goals for nuclear power; U.S. supplying of
nuclear fuels and technological assistance for installation of at least
1000 megawatts of nuclear power capacity outside the United States
by I96064; furnishing financial assistance through normal govern-
mental and private channels; and applying of safeguards to such
powerplants.65
The anticipated returns from encouraging foreign nuclear power
were seen as substantial for U.S. world leadership and also for the
domestic nuclear industry. According to the McKinney panel : 66
61 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs,
July-December 1955 ( Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 85.
w U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report of the Panel on the Impact
of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, S4th Cong., 2d Sess., January 1956. (Joint Com-
mittee print i . 155 p.
84 One of the four principal instructions to the Panel was to "consider also the effects
of the application of atomic energy upon economies and industries abroad." The Joint
Committee instructed the panel to take into account the interlocking effects that such
development and application abroad might have on the United States economy and
industries. Ibid., p. v.
81 More specifically, the Panel recommended that the United States, In issuing invita-
tions to such conferences, "announce that it Is prepared to furnish nnclear fuels, provide
necessary technological assistance and permit contracts for the installation of at least
1 million kilowatts of atomic generating capacity outside the United States as soon as
possible — we hope by 1960. The attention of the world should be called to the fact that
such a program would parallel and possibly exceed the capacity installed during the same
period at home." Ibid., p. 8.
65 Loc. cit.
66 Ibid., p. 95.
162
... In the uncommitted areas of the world, American leadership in making
atomic power available could be a strong influence in guiding these areas toward
a course of freedom. In this sense, atomic power acquires great importance in
international relations. This consideration should strongly influence our national
policy as to the rate at which the development of atomic power suitable for such
purposes is pressed. There is urgency for the development in the United States
of atomic powerplants suited to the needs of the other nations of the free-
world. . .
This urgency which exists for foreign atomic power has domestic benefits
as well. The growth of an atomic power program will probably not become signifi-
cant before 1965. A gap may occur for the power equipment manufacturing
industry between present domestic interest in atomic power reactors and actual
sales in substantial volume. If the equipment manufacturers . . . are to be
expected to carry forward research and development directed toward making
atomic power competitive in the United States, the foreign market for power
reactors with its high near term growth potential may offer a solution to bridg-
ing this gap. The potential demand may represent a $30 billion market.
But this sense of urgency was not strong enough to warrant U.S.
incentives to the European electricity industry that went beyond those
offered by the AEC to the domestic nuclear power industry. The
McKinney Panel avoided proposals to supply nuclear fuel without
charge, or to pay repurchase prices for byproduct plutonium from
European power plants higher than those paid to domestic nuclear
power producers. Also, no special financial arrangements were pro-
posed. Instead, the panel preferred the normal channels of U.S. foreign
financial assistance. "Any other course will complicate to the point
of un workability what should be a straightforward comprehensive
policy covering international activities of the United States." r,r
In reference to the domestic concerns that byproduct plutonium
from nuclear power might lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons,
the McKinney Panel opted for a two-pronged approach to safeguards.
It called for inspection rights under the bilateral agreements plus
reprocessing of the used European fuel in the United States.88
By April 1, 1958, the AEC had in effect 30 agreements for coopera-
tion in nuclear research and 11 for nuclear power with 39 countries.
Four more research agreements and three power agreements with an
additional four countries were signed and being ratified.09 Table I lists
these agreements.
•"Ibid., p. 06.
«T1ic panel said: "We believe the United States should pet on with making atomic
power available now to these nations. We believe that this can and should be done on
an Interim basis with bilateral agreements permitting appropriate Inspection, providing
for earmarking Of plutonium and uranium 233 thus recovered exclusively for further
peaceful uses. Other control mechanisms for a broader nature can be devised and agreed
upon later." Ibid., p. 96.
"•U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Development, Grotrth
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong.. '2d Sees., 1958, p. 79.
163
TABLE I— STATUS OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION AS OF APRIL 1, 1958
Cumulative
number of
countries Country
Scope of exchange
Effective date
1 Argentina
2 Australia
3 Austria
4 Belgium...
5 Brazil
6 Canada
7 Chile
8 China, Republic of
9 Colombia -
10 Cuba
11 Denmark
12 Dominican Republic
13 Ecuador
14 France
15 Germany, Federal Republic of.
Germany: City of West Berlin.
16 Greece.
17 Guatemala
18 Israel
19 Italy....
20 Japan
21 Korea, Republic of
22 Lebanon
23 Netherlands
24 New Zealand
25 Nicaragua
26 Norway
27 Pakistan
28 Peru
29 Philippines
30 Portugal
31 South Africa
32 Spain
33 Sweden..
34 Switzerland...
Switzerland
35 Thailand
36 Turkey
37 United Kingdom
38 Uruguay..
39 Venezuela
Research
Research and
Research
Research and
Research
Research and
Research
do
power,
power,
power.
.do.
.do.
.do.
do
do
Research and
do
power.
Research.
do...
do...
.do.
.do.
.do.
.do
do...
Research and
Research
.do
power.
Research and
Research
do
power.
do
do
Research and
do
power.
Research
do.
Power
Research
do
Research and
Research
do
power.
July
29.
May
28
July
13.
July
21,
Aug.
3
July
21
Aug.
8
July
18
July
19
Oct.
10
July
25
Dec.
21
Feb.
6
Nov.
20
Aug.
7
Aug.
1
Aug.
4
Apr.
22
July
12
July
2H
Dec.
2/
Feb.
3
July
18
Aug.
8
Aug.
29
Mar.
/'
June
10
Aug.
11
Jan.
2b
July
27
July
21.
Aug.
22.
Keb.
12,
Jan.
18.
July
18.
Jan.
29.
Mar.
13.
June
10,
July
21,
Jan.
13
July
21
,1955
,1957
,1956
,1955
,1955
,1955
,1955
,1955
1955
,1957
,1955
,1956
,1958
,1956
,1957
,1957
,1955
.1957
,1955
,1955
,1955
,1956
,1955
,1957
,1956
,1958
,1957
.1955
,1956
,1955
.1955
,1957
,1958
,1956
,1955
,1957
,1956
,1955
,1955
,1956
,1955
SIGNED AND IN RATIFICATION PROCESS AS OF APR. 1, 1958
Brazil.. Power
40 Costa Rica... ._ Research
41 Iran _ ._ do
42 Iraq do
43 Ireland do
Italy Research and power.
Peru do
July 21,1957
May 18,1956
Mar. 5,1957
June 7,1957
Mar. 16,1956
July 3, 1957
July 19,1957
Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, hearings, "Development, Growth and State of the Atomic
Energy Industry," 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958, p. 79.
164
Providing Working Experience with Nuclear Energy
For the United States to share the benefits of nuclear energy with
other countries, particularly those of Europe, required a growing cadre
of trained scientists and engineers in those countries. One way to ex-
pose these technologists to U.S. nuclear technology was for them to be
trained at and work in the laboratories of the AEC. Arrangements
to this end were included in the bilateral agreements for cooperation.
Another way was to encourage the installation and use of nuclear re-
actors abroad which would provide still more experience for local
scientists and engineers. Arrangements to this end were negotiated
by the AEC and the Department of State with many countries. Some
agreements provided for help in obtaining research reactors, others
extended to demonstration nuclear power plants. The latter were to be
of particular importance for fostering commercial nuclear energy in
Europe.
THE RESEARCH REACTOR PROGRAM
U.S. efforts to get research reactors into the hands of scientists and
engineers abroad began November 5, 1054. At that time Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge announced to the U.N. General Assembly that the
United States was prepared to negotiate bilateral agreements with
other nations. These agreements would commit the United States to
supply technical assistance and nuclear fuel materials for the construc-
tion and operation of research reactors. By the end of 1955, the AEC
reported that agreements for the exchange of information on design,
const ruction, and operation of research reactor- included the couut ries
Japan, Lebanon, Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal,
the Republic of China, Spain. Switzerland. Turkey, and Venezuela/0
On June 11. 1955, President Eisenhower at Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity outlined new programs to enlarge the scope of U.S. assistance
to other nations in development of research and power reactor projects
under agreements with other nations or through the International
Atomic Energy Agency. For research reactors the President proposed
that the United States* would contribute half the cost and furnish the
nuclear fuel needed. lie said : 71
We propose to offer research reactors to the people of free nations who can
use them effectively for die acquisition of the skills and understanding essential
to peaceful atomic progress. The United states, in the spirit of partnership that
moves as. will contrihute half the cost. We will also furnish the acquiring na-
tion the unclear material needed to fuel the reactor.
To keep the commitment within bounds, the arrangements for fi-
nancing set a limit of $350,000 upon the U.S. contribution, which was
to he paid in dollars to the cooperating nation after it had completed
the project and certified the completion. By the end of 1!K>7. six re-
search reactors of US. manufacture were in operation abroad and 10
others were under construction or on order. The total US. commitment
at thai time was $2.4 million for the research reactor projects.
Some doubts and insights: Several years later, in 1964, the Joint
( Jommittee \ oiced some reserval ions as to the accomplishments of the
7" r s. Atomic Energv Commission, Major ictirities in the Itomic Energy Programs,
.lulu December 1955 (Washington, D.C. : U.'S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 85.
71 r.S atomic Energy Commission, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy
Commission (Washington, D.C. : r.s. Government Printing Office, 1055), p. 13.
165
research reactor program. By then a total of 26 grants had been made
to 12 countries which had established atomic energy programs. While
the initial purpose of this program had been to provide scientists with
working experience with nuclear reactors, some nations sought posses-
sion of a research reactor as a symbol of national prestige although
they lacked the trained scientists to operate them. The AEC was
faced with a touchy international issue. Rather than offend some na-
tions by refusing them research reactors, the AEC often installed them
in countries that could not use them effectively.72
Today there is little mention of these research reactors. For the in-
dustrial countries, they have served their initial purpose and have
been bypassed by more modern reactors for experimentation and the
training of nuclear scientists and engineers: for the developing coun-
tries the reactors, while perhaps a mark of prestige, did not appre-
ciably accelerate the use of atomic energy. In retrospect, the research
reactor program raises the question of how far a highly industrialized,
technological nation should go in providing sophisticated equipment
to countries lacking the personnel or the industrial base to use it effec-
tively. There is also the question of the extent to which scientific and
technical manpower assigned to these research reactors in the develop-
ing nations could have been more profitably assigned to other work of
greater short term benefits.
Fuel for research reactors : Initially the United States limited its
offer to supply nuclear fuel for research and test reactors to material
of 20 percent enrichment or less, which could not be readily used for
clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1956, the desire of
the industrial nations for improved research and test reactors had
caused the United States to announce a major revision in policy which
permitted the export of uranium enriched up to 90 percent for use in
special testing reactors. This raised the safeguards issue. The United
States required the recipient nations to accept comprehensive controls
and safeguards.
Two years later, in 1958, this policy was liberalized when the
AEC announced that highly enriched fuel could be supplied for
research as well as test reactors. The following year, in 1959, the
AEC announced its intention to lease such materials to foreign
countries either through the International Agency or through bilat-
eral agreements.
THE POWER REACTOR PROGRAM
If the United States wished to demonstrate the use of U.S. nuclear
power technology in Europe, it had to attract the interest of European
utilities. The "power agreements" were the means to this end. In his
June 11, 1955 announcement, President Eisenhower said : 73
72 The USAEC commented on this as follows :
During the recent hearings on our agreements for cooperation, we discussed the matter
of follow-up on the research reactor grants which had been made to developing countries.
Information on these grant reactors is received from a variety of sources such as reports
by our AEC scientific representatives, reports by IAEA technical teams and consultants,
and reports by United States scientists. From these reports we are able to obtain an
idea of the extent to which these reactors arc being utilized. In general, we have con-
cluded that these reactors are making a contribution to the scientific program of the
country but they are also capable of being used to a greater degree. Cf. U.S. Congress,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agreements for Cooperation,
88th Cong., 1st Sess.. 1964, p. 127.
73 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Eighteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic
Energy Commission, January-June 1955, op. cit., p. 13.
166
Within prudent security considerations, we propose to make available to the
peoples of such friendly nations as are prepared to invest their own funds in
power reactors, access to and training in the technological processes of construc-
tion and operation for peaceful purposes.
By the end of 1955, several countries had initiated negotiations in
response to this invitation. Early in 1956, negotiations were concluded
with the governments of Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
for the iirst bilateral agreements for power reactor projects. The agree-
ments provided for the transfer of Restricted Data 74 and special nu-
clear materials. They also provided for sale of nuclear fuel materials
to each country, with the United States retaining an option to the plu-
tonium produced and the right to approve the transfer of such pluto-
nium to any other nation or to an international organization if the
United States decided not to exercise its option. Additionally, subject
to limitations of available space, facilities, and personnel, the United
States and its bilateral partners agreed to open their specialized nu-
clear research facilities to each other.
The first bilateral agreement for nuclear power development also
opened the way for direct relations between representatives of the U.S.
nuclear industry and private individuals and organizations in the
cooperating nations, thus removing the AEC as a direct participant in
commercial dealings. Other provisions of the bilateral arrangements
provided for: 75
(1) Patent arrangements covering inventions or discoveries
resulting from the exchange of Restricted Data;
(2) Security and safeguards arrangements to protect classified
information and equipment and nuclear materials;
(3) Future consultation about transfer of rights or responsibil-
ities of the agreement, particularly those relating to safeguards
to the International Atomic Energy as might be mutually agreed
upon, and
(4) Disclaiming of any warranty by the communicating Party
on the accuracy and completeness of information, material, equip-
ment or devices transferred under the agreement and of its suit-
ability for any particular use or application.
74 At that time exchange of Restricted Data was significant, for much of nuclear power
technology was still classified ami unavailable In open literature. The Restricted Data to
lie exchanged Included: (1) general Information on research reactors, experimental and
demonstration power reactors; (2) technical Information as mighl lie agreed upon for
specific research ami demonstration power reactors; and (3) the exchange of classified
information on reactor materials, specifications, physics and engineering, and also of
environmental safety information. Restricted Data of military Significance were not to be
exch.i aged.
" It should he noted that this disclaimer was also used by the UISAEC for information,
materials, devices, services, etc., that It supplied to the domestic nuclear Industry and
so was not unique to the bilateral agreements.
167
The term of each of the first bilateral agreements was 10 years.
By l(.>r>7. advancing technology of nuclear power led several Euro-
pean countries to the initiation of negotiations with the United States
for the transfer of large quantities of nuclear fuel for specific power
projects. Such arrangements were requested by the governments of
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Union of
South Africa. Subsequent bilateral agreements with the European
nations were considered as interim measures pending the establish-
ment of the Euratom Supply Agency.
A decade later, nuclear power was so far advanced in Europe that
availability of nuclear fuel to cover long-term requirements for nu-
clear power programs became a subject for negotiation. New bilateral
power agreements were negotiated which committed the United States
to supply nuclear fuel over a term of 30 years to Switzerland and
Sweden, and for 10 years to the United Kingdom. These agreements
also reflected an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act in 1064 76
which permitted private ownership of nuclear fuel materials, opening
the way for wholly commercial transactions between companies in the
U.S. nuclear industry and customers abroad in countries having bi-
lateral agreements with the United States. These new agreements also
specified that the IAEA would promptly be requested to assume re-
sponsibility for applying safeguards to the material transferred under
agreements. In addition, the agreements committed the United States
to supply nuclear fuel materials to these governments, or to enrich
uranium supplied by them. 7?
The Bilateral Agreement Situation in 1971
At the end of 1971, the AEC had in effect 34 Agreements for Coop-
eration in Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States
and other nations or groups of nations. These agreements covered co-
operation and technical assistance in the development of peaceful uses
of atomic energy, and provided for the supply of nuclear materials,
the exchange of scientific and technical information, and for the safe-
guarding of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials. Table II listing these
agreements as of 1970 is the latest list published by the AEC.
■« Public Law 88-489, 78 Stat. 602.
77 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs,
January-December 1966 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967),
p. 263.
168
TABLE II— INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN 1970
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
Effective Termination
Scope date date
Country:
Argentina Research and power ___ July 25,1969 July 24,1999
Australia ...do... May 28,1957 May 27,1997
Austria... do Jan. 24,1970 Jan. 23,2000
Brazil Research... Nov. 9,1966 Aug. 2,1975
Canada . Research and power July 21,1955 July 13,1980
China, Republic of Research ...July 18,1955 July 17,1974
Colombia do Mar. 29,1963 Mar. 28,1977
Denmark do. July 25,1955 July 24,1973
Finland Research and power July 7,1970 July 6,2000
Greece Research Aug. 4,1955 Aug. 3,1974
India Power Oct. 25,1963 Oct. 24,1993
Indonesia Research... Sept. 21,1960 Sept. 20, 1980
Iran ..do Apr. 27,1959 Apr. 26,1979
Ireland do July 9,1958 July 8,1978
Israel do July 12,1955 Apr. 11,1975
Italy . Research and power Apr. 15,1958 Apr. 14,1978
Japan do July 10,1968 July 9,1998
Korea. Research Feb. 3,1956 Feb. 2,1976
Norway Research and power... June 8,1967 June 7,1997
Philippines ....do.. July 19,1968 July 18,1998
Portugal. Research .July 19,1969 July 18,1979
South Africa. Research and power Aug. 22,1957 Aug. 21,1977
Spain do Feb. 12,1958 Feb. 11.1988
Sweden do... _ Sept. 15,1966 Sept. 14, 1996
Switzerland do Aug. 8,1966 Aug. 7,1996
Thailand Research Mar. 13,1956 Mar. 12,1975
Turkey do June 10,1965 June 9,1971
United Kingdom..- ....do July 21,1955 July 20.1976
United Kingdom.. Power July 15,1966 July 14,1976
Venezuela.. Research and power .• Feb. 9,1960 Feb. 8.1980
Vietnam Research July 1,1959 June 30.1974
Special arrangement:
United States-U.S.S.R... Memorandum on cooperation on the peace- Feb. 10,1970 Oec. 31,1971
ful uses of atomic energy.
United States-Romania do Jan. 1,1969 Dec. 31,1970
AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Organization:
European Atomic Energy Community Joint nuclear power program Feb. 18,1959 Dec. 31,1985
(Euratom).
Euratom Additional agreement to joint nuclear July 25,1960 Dec. 31,1995
power program.
International Atomic Energy Agency Supply of materials, etc Aug. 7,1959 Aug. 6,1979
(IAEA).
Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1970, Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, appendix 6.
Additional N< asures to Stimulate Foreign Inti n st in. Nuch ar Pan-, r
The bilateral power agreements provided incentives to European,
and other governments to push ahead with use of nuclear power. I*. S.
measures to foster this interest through these agreements included
allocations of fuel materials, firm pricing policies, financial aid for
purchase of nuclear fuel, authority for the U.S. nuclear industry to
deal with its foreign counterparts, and declassification of nuclear
power teclmology. These are briefly discussed below.
ALLOCATION OF NUCLEAR II EL MATERIALS
On February 22, L956, at the recommendation of the 4EC and with
the Departments of State nnd Defense concurring, President Eisen-
hower announced that the Government would make available 40.000
kilograms of uranium-235 t-> assist industrial power development and
research within the United States and abroad. Of this material, 20,000
169
kilograms were allocated for foreign bilateral partners of the United
States. The President also committed the AEC to recommend alloca-
tion of additional supplies as further projects undertaken by the
domestic nuclear industry and by other nations might require.78 AEC
Chairman Strauss described this action as the most important step
toward peaceful use of atomic energy since revision of the Atomic
Energy Act in 1954. Concurrently, he noted that the action affirmed
the United States intention to make fuel available for the expected
working lifetime of bilateral power reactor projects.79
A year later, in July 1957, the President approved an additional
allocation of uranium-235 for domestic and foreign use, bringing the
total to 100,000 kilograms. Of this, 50,000 kilograms were allocated for
foreign use. Based on then current prices, the nuclear fuel allocated
for foreign use was worth about $850 million. The AEC has been care-
ful to emphasize that the supplying of this nuclear material was not a
gift and that payment would be required.
ESTABLISHING PRICES FOR NUCLEAR FUEL MATERIALS
If the commercial nuclear power industry in Europe was to use U.S.
nuclear fuel and U.S. nuclear power technology, the European users
had to know what they would have to pay for enriched uranium. The
first U.S. announcement of prices came at the opening of the first
international conference on atomic energy in Geneva on August 8,
1955. There the AEC announced a price for enriched uranium and
also prices for natural uranium and for heavy water.80
The Geneva announcement, however, was indefinite on many details.
To minimize these uncertainties, the President announced on Novem-
ber 18, 1956, detailed terms and conditions for U.S. supply of nuclear
fuel materials. In a subsequent amplification of the President's
announcement, AEC Chairman Strauss said that this measure to
accelerate foreign use of nuclear power under Atoms for Peace
included : 81
(1) Establishment of a schedule of charges for uranium-235
which were to be the same as those for the domestic nuclear
industry.
(2) Adoption of a policy of assurances to bilateral partners of
the United States that the Commission was prepared to furnish
uranium-235 in quantities based on estimated fuel requirements
for specific nuclear power plants for periods longer than 10 years.
(3) Establishment of prices that the Commission would pay
for plutonium and uranium 233 produced in foreign nuclear power
reactors which used United States fuel. The United States would
use nuclear materials so acquired only for peaceful purposes.
78 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twentieth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy
Commission (Washington, D.C : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. ix.
78 Loc. clt.
80 The price set for uranium enriched up to 20 percent was placed at $25 per grnm of
uranium-235 contained ; natural uranium metal was priced at' $40 a kilogram ; and heavy
water at $28 a pound. Cf. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic
Energy Programs, J uly-Decemher 1955 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1056). p. 80.
Heavy water at the time was a key material for one kind of nuclear power re.ictor
which offered improved prospects for using natural uranium for fuel. This technology
Is currently being developed and used by the Canadian nuclear power Industry.
81 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Radiation Safety and Major Activities in Atomic
Energy Programs, July-December 1956 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1057), p. 339.
170
(4) Reaffirmation of the earlier Commission decision to pur-
chase all plutonium and uranium 233 produced in foreign nuclear
power plants from fuel supplied by the United States through
June 30, 1963, subject to availability of appropriations.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR FOREIGN NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS
In extending special incentives to encourage foreign use of nuclear
power, the U.S. Government faced a dilemma. On the one hand it was
well established that the AEC should treat domestic and foreign users
of nuclear power alike. On the other, special incentives were seen nec-
essary to induce foreign utilities and governments to risk investment
in demonstration nuclear power plants. For example, it would have
been advantageous to lease nuclear fuel to foreign users, which would
have offered the incentive of a lessened capital outlay. However, at that
time the domestic nuclear industry was evolving rapidly toward self-
sufficiency and the AEC required it to buy enriched uranium outright
rather than lease it. Likewise, while the AEC would fund research
and development for domestic nuclear power demonstrations, it would
not share in the requisite capital investment.
The dilemma was resolved in October 1956 by providing special
assistance to foreign nuclear power projects through a different chan-
nel which was not available to the domestic nuclear industry. The AEC
and the Export-Import Bank agreed upon joint action to help finance
the construction of nuclear power plants in nations having bilateral
agreements with the United States. This arrangement was judged nec-
essary because of the still undemonstrated economics of nuclear power
and the known higher capital investment required for nuclear power
plants in comparison with conventional fossil fueled power plants. The
Bank announced its willingness to consider applications for loans to
cover the capital costs of nuclear power plants for privately owned, but
not state owned, utilities abroad. The announcement indicated that the
terms for such loans would be similar to those for the financing of con-
ventional power plants for which equipment and technical services
were obtained from the United States. The Bank indicated that it
would require the following for a nuclear power project:82
(1) A comprehensive engineering survev :
(2) A technical report by the United States Atomic Energy
Commission;
(3) An arrangement for supply of the nuclear fuel for the
term of the loan:
(I) Evidence of overall financial and economic soundness:
(5) Evidence of availability of funds to defray the costs which
must be met with local currency : and
(6) Assurance as to the ability of the country to service the
dollar debt involved.
The Bank made clear that funds so loaned could be used only to buy
equipment, materials, and technical services from the U.S. nuclear
industry.
-is Atomic Energy Commission. Radiation Safety and Major Activities in the
Atomic Pneryy Programs, July-December J956, op. cit., p. 15.
171
FUEL REPROCESSING AND WASTE DISPOSAL
Commercial use of nuclear energy requires many auxiliary technical
services and products. One such service, the reprocessing of used nu-
clear fuels, received special attention during efforts of the United
States to stimulate commercial nuclear power in Europe. Since a key
U.S. incentive was the offer to repurchase plutonium or residual ura-
nium-235 from European power reactors, there naturally arose the
question of who would reprocess these fuel materials. The question
was made somewhat more complex by the domestic policy of the
United States, which sought to establish a self-sufficient nuclear in-
dustry. During the 1950s one missing link in the U.S. nuclear industry
was a capability to reprocess used fuels and to store the intensely radio-
active wastes separated from the used nuclear fuels.
Domestic policy was announced by the AEC on February 18, 1957,
when it committed itself to contract with domestic reactor operators to
reprocess their fuel through June 30, 1967. However, as the AEC at
that time lacked statutory authority to extend this offer to foreign re-
actor operators, there remained a gap in the technical services needed
to promote nuclear power in Europe. In 1957 the Commission pro-
posed to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the Atomic
Energy Act be amended to authorize the Commission to enter into con-
tracts to reprocess nuclear fuels from foreign power reactors, provided
that comparable services were available to the domestic nuclear in-
dustry. The Joint Committee, in favorably reporting this legislation,
amended it to require that the term of such reprocessing contracts be
limited to the term of the bilateral agreement in effect, or to compa-
rable periods offered to the domestic nuclear power plants. In recom-
mending this action, the Joint Committee underscored the principle
that while the United States could offer technical aid and assistance
through the Commission, it could not offer special terms and conditions
unavailable to the domestic nuclear industry.83
The new authority was not used until after nearly 5 years, when
the first return shipment of used nuclear fuel arrived from Sweden
and was sent to the AEC's Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The
costs of processing and shipping were paid by Sweden, which in turn
received credit for the plutonium and residual uranium-235 recovered
from the fuel.84 The intensely radioactive wastes left over from the re-
covery were stored at the Idaho plant with similar wastes from do-
mestic fuel.
Later, when commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants began to
be built, the AEC negotiated bilateral agreements wherein it had the
option to decide whether the reprocessing would be done in its facilities
or in those of the domestic nuclear industry. In this way the AEC
hoped to expand the market for the U.S. fuel reprocessors.
While much was made of the arrangements for fuel reprocessing
during the late 1950's, the unexpectedly slow growth of nuclear power
in Europe and the high cost of shipping the intensely radioactive,
used nuclear fuels combined to limit their return flow to the United
83 The new authority was given to the Commission in Public Law 85-681, 72 Stat. 632.
H U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1963 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 236.
172
States. These factors, in turn, have limited the market of the U.S.
nuclear fuel reprocessors and also have kept in Europe the radioactive
wastes associated with the used fuels.
AUTHORITY FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR
PRODUCTS AND ASSISTANCE
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, private firms of the infant
U.S. nuclear industry could not deal directly with potential customers
in Europe but had to work through the AEC. This cumbersome proc-
ess was not suited to the promotional attitude of the U.S. industry.
Soon after revision of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, the AEC an-
nounced a general authorization to American firms and individuals
to engage in any unclassified atomic energy activity with friendly
countries without having to obtain prior AEC approval. This au-
thorization greatly simplified cooperation between the domestic nu-
clear industry and its potential customers. Specific AEC authoriza-
tion was still required, however, before an American firm could do
anything which directly or indirectly constituted production of any
special nuclear material in countries of the Soviet bloc.85 This re-
straint, in effect, precluded export of technical assistance, products,
or power plants to the Soviet Union.
A RELUCTANCE TO EXPORT TECHNOLOGY
The essence of Atoms for Peace was a commitment to share the
benefits of atomic energy, including atomic power, with friendly na-
tions. This purpose occasionally has come into conflict with the prin-
ciple that certain U.S. nuclear technologies should not be exported be-
cause of potential- threats to national security or to world peace.
Obviously there is no disagreement over control of weapons technology,
or that for peaceful nuclear explosives. But borderline cases do arise.
One example is to be found in the export of unclassified technology
and apparatus for the reprocessing of used nuclear fuels. Countries
interested in large scale use of nuclear power inevitably must reprocess
their own fuel or arrange for this service elsewhere. However, if they
build their own reprocessing facilities there arises the possibility of
unknown or illicit diversion of recovered nuclear materials to weap-
ons use, or into a black market for stolen nuclear materials. This issue
came to a head in L966 when foreign interests inquired of a U.S. com-
pany about fuel reprocessing technology. The company provided some
information. When the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy learned
of t he inquiry, it was critical of t he transact ion. ( Jommittee ( Ihairman
Chet Ilolilield wrote to the AEC to urge that no non-nuclear nation
should he assisted in obtaining information and technical know-how
on reprocessing technology unless that nation first agreed to place under
IAKA safeguards any fuel reprocessing facility that it might build.8'
Responding to i he cril icism, A E( ' < Ihairman Seaborg agreed on the
importance of bringing reprocessing facilities abroad under IAEA
safeguards. He informed the Joint Committee thai the AEC was un-
i S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, .July-
Dec mbt r 1 95 5, "p. '-if .. p 93.
'' V s. Congress, .Toinl Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agreements
for Cooperation — l'jcc, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 187.
173
dertaking a study to determine how technical assistance by private
U.S. firms could be controlled to assure that safeguards would be ap-
plied to the facility involved. However, such information was unclas-
sified and AEC regulations for years had permitted its export to coun-
tries outside of the Soviet bloc. He suggested that the AEC might find
some specialized technical items needed for fuel reprocessing plants
which by regulation could be supplied by the U.S. nuclear industry
only if there was agreement that safeguards would be applied.87
The most recent manifestation of this conflict in purposes came in
July 1972 when the AEC published new regulations that forbade U.S.
companies to do business abroad in three fields of nuclear power-re-
lated technology unless AEC approved.88 The new rules prohibited
"directly or indirectly" engaging in overseas production of heavy
water, chemical reprocessing of used fuels, or enrichment of uranium.
Xo reasons for choosing these three nuclear technologies were given
in the announcement.
Safeguarding Nuclear Materials Supplied Through Bilateral Agree-
ments
U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power inevitably involved the
supplying of nuclear fuel materials to foreign countries. Since the
technical assistance program began well before the IAEA came into
being, there was the question of how the United States would assure
itself, and the world, that materials it supplied would be adequately
safeguarded against diversion. The question was answered by includ-
ing provisions for U.S.-conducted safeguards in the bilateral agree-
ments and also a provision calling for consultation with the United
States on transferring safeguards of U.S. materials to an international
agency when it was formed. U.S. policy for control over U.S. sup-
plied nuclear materials was established by the AEC in consultation
with the Department of State. The policy provided that : S9
(1) The United States would give assistance and advice to the
recipient country in establishing a national system of control
over materials and equipment, including adequate materials ac-
countability and physical control measures ;
(2) The system would be subject to audit, appraisal, and verifi-
cation by United States personnel ;
(3) The specific measures applied in auditing and verifying the
system would depend upon the type and complexity of the facili-
ties involved and the type and quality of the material involved;
and
(4) AEC staff would provide assistance and guidance to co-
operating countries.
To indicate the range of U.S. safeguards activities for its bilateral
agreements, the AEC reported that in 1969 it had made 52 inspections
of facilities in five countries. These inspections included the first in-
spection of the unloading of fuel from a reactor, witnessing the first
seals to be applied to a power reactor, and inspection of a reactor fol-
lowing a radiation incident.90
"Ibirt., p. 187.
*8 Federal Register, vol. 37. July 26, 1972. pp. 14870-1.
"■' T'.s. Atomic Energy Commission. Major Actiritics in the Atomic Energi) Programs,
J a nn a rp -December 1959 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing OHice, I960),
p. 110.
90 U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1969 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 60.
174
In retrospect, negotiation and administration of the safeguards pro-
visions of the U.S. nuclear bilateral agreements has proven to be a
unique and extraordinary achievement in international relations. The
technological promise of nuclear power, reinforced bv incentives and
pressures of foreign policy, gave the United States the unusual right
to send its own inspectors into foreign jurisdiction to inspect and
verify the use and holding of U.S. supplied nuclear materials. That
no major confrontation has arisen from the administration of the
safeguard provisions of the bilateral agreements gives reason for some
optimism in the future of international relations. For, despite the
arguments and analyses of those who consider sovereign rights un-
alterable, there can be pragmatic yieldings and accommodations when
this is sufficiently in a nation's interest,
The safeguards provisions of the U.S. bilateral agreements were
notable also in that they prepared the way for giving the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency practical experience in administration
of safeguards. While details are given in later sections of this chapter,
it is worth noting here that this IAEA experience was certainly an
important factor in the subsequent negotiations of the Xonp ml itera-
tion Treaty with its provisions for international safeguards to be
applied by the IAEA.
Conclusion and Current Issues
One of the first assignments resulting from the effects of the dis-
covery of nuclear fission for American diplomacy was to negotiate and
administer a web of bilateral agreements for U.S. technical assistance
to foreign nations. Though of lesser status than treaties or executive
agreements, they nonetheless obtained for the United States unusual
rights not available through the more traditional and presumably
more potent and durable instruments of international relations.
The bilateral agreements were created to provide special technical
assistance to foster civil use of nuclear energy abroad. These research
and power agreements demonstrated an effectiveness for supplying
information, materials, equipment, services, training, and advisers to
nations that were interested in nuclear power. The power agreements
also were notable in the rights they obtained for the United States for
control and safeguarding of nuclear fuel materials and certain equip-
ment. In the participating nations, inspectors of the United States had
access to the places where U.S. nuclear materials were being used to in-
spect them and to verify their quantities. In addition, because of fore-
thought of U.S. policy and the work of the diplomats and negotiators,
the. bilateral agreements had provisions which ultimately were to en-
able the International Atomic Energy Agency to gain useful experi-
ence with working safeguards.
The success of the U.S. bilateral agreements, however, worked
against one major goal of Atoms for Peace. Because the agreements
provided many advantages to the other countries, and because this web
of agreements obtained for the United States influence and leverage
that it otherwise might not have had, there has been a reluctance to
shift the channel for U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power in
Europe and elsewhere, from country-to-country agreements to the
International Atomic. Energy Agency. From a' global viewpoint, it
might be seen that the United States and other world leaders in nuclear
power are in competition with the International Agency when they
175
deal directly with other countries in supplying technical assistance.
There is an implied balancing of advantages to goals of individual
nations versus the anticipated advantages of a strengthened Interna-
tional Agency.
Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States and
world peace to see the Xonproliferation Treaty operate at full effec-
tiveness, it may now be time for the United States to reexamine the
present roles of bilateral agreements and of the International Agency
as the means for furnishing future technical assistance and incentives
for nuclear power. Channeling more U.S. aid through the IAEA could
be expected to strengthen the agency. However, to deemphasize the
present network of bilateral agreements with individual nations and
with multinational bodies such as Euratom would lose for the United
States the benefits associated with direct dealings.
The United States supplying of technical assistance in nuclear
energy through direct agreements between the United States and other
nations, and groups of nations, has been successful and might well
provide a model for measures to accelerate research and development
for fusion and other new sources of energy.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-13
VI. Creating an International Nuclear Organization: The
International Atomic Energy Agency
The discovery and application of nuclear energy led to the creation
of several international and regional organizations. The one associated
with Atoms for Peace is the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). This section of the study has to do with the diplomatic
efforts that culminated in creation of the new International Agency,
and in the evolution of U.S. support for its activities.
IAEA was the offspring of a Wilsonian idealism reflected in Presi-
dent Eisenhower's proposal. That the subsequent evolution of the
Agency in the real world of Bismarckian relationships falls short of
these ideals should not mask the fact that of all the participating
nations, the United States has cared the most and worked the hardest
to create this new Agency, and that the burden of this effort has been
carried on by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department
of State.
The International Agency is open to virtually all the nations of the
world, including the People's Republic of China.91 Tt has been shaped
by political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
as well sis their working relationship within the Agency. These rela-
tions at times reflected some of the adversary tensions of the cold war.
and fit other times some of a partnership friendliness of "have"
nations in relations with the "have-not" members of the Agency.
Still evolving are the relations of the IAEA with the Nuclear Energy
Agency of OECD and with Euratom. The ultimate fate of these three
bodies and their roles vis-a-vis commercial nuclear power in Europe
remain to be determined. Certainly the foreign policy decisions and
actions of the United States, whether passive or active, will influence
their- futures and thereby the future of nuclear power in Europe.
The f . I /-.'- 1 / a Brief Description
The Intel-national Atomic Energy Agency was established July 20,
l!>r>7. to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is an inter-
national organization within the family of the United Nations, report-
ing annually to the United Nations General Assembly and. in appro-
priate cases, to the Security Council and to the Economic and Social
Council. It has concluded relationship agreements with five other
specialized agencies of the United Nations. By September 1!>7-_\ the
number of member states in IAEA totalled 103; they included all of
the Common Market nations and other nations of industrial conse-
consequence.
-el out in the Statute, the principal organs of the Agency are a
( reneral ( inference, t he Board of ( rovernors, and a Secretariat headed
w Countries not members of tlio IAEA are North Korea, North Vietnam, .-ind tlm People's
Republic of Germany, which are nol recojrnized by the United States. A^ for Chinn. in
.T un<- 1972 the Board of Governors of the IAEA recognized mainland China as the definitive
government, thus displacing Taiwan. Mainland China has yet to apply for recognition.
i L76)
177
by a Director General. The General Conference includes representa-
tives of all member states. The Board of Governors consists of 25 mem-
bers designated by the outgoing board or elected by the General
Conference.92
Regular expenses of the Agency are met out of assessed contributions
of member states. The revised regular budget for 1972 rose to
$16,561,000. There are also voluntary contributions from members to
finance IAEA technical assistance. In 1972 these pledges totalled
$3,375,000. The United States furnishes about 36 percent of the
voluntary f imds.
Changing Goals and Situations
President Eisenhower's plan to reduce the international threat of
nuclear weapons would divert nuclear explosive materials to an inter-
national pool of materials to be used for peaceful purposes, and would
create an international agency to maintain custody of that pool and
to enforce a credible system of safeguards. This dramatic and innova-
tive concept of nuclear disarmament did not long survive. One observer,
Harold L. Nieberg, says the Atoms for Peace initiative quickly became
transformed into a means of enlisting the support of the U.S.S.R.
to dissuade other nations from manufacturing their own nuclear
materials while imposing upon them (but not upon the two principals)
a system of international inspection and control over nuclear power.93
During the 3% years of diplomatic and legislative effort that went
into creating IAEA, commercial interest in nuclear power declined as
nations realized it was not a quick and easy way to supply energy to
Europe, and the hope of diverting substantial quantities of nuclear
materials from military to peaceful uses evaporated. Nonetheless in
1957 AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss told the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations that had the President not proposed the Inter-
national Agency, we "should be at pains now to invent it." The follow-
ing excerpt of his testimony summarized the changes which had so
diminished the prospects for the IAEA. He said : 94
What has changed in 3x/2 years is that there has been indefinable improve-
ment in outlook, a revival of hope for a future in which an atomic cataclysm
need not be inevitable. That change began with the announcement of the plans
for this Agency. It is built upon the expectation that the Agency will come into
being. The still-birth of the Agency can plunge the world back into darkness.
There is another change that has come about in the same period. In 19.".°,
uranium was still a rare commodity. A few nations controlled practically all
there was of it, so far as we then knew. Discoveries of large new deposits have
demonstrated that uranium is far more plentiful and more widely distributed
than we ever imagined.
This availability of fissionable material and the extraordinary progress i'i
engineering for power development has brought other nations besides the
United Kingdom, Soviet Russia and ourselves into the atomic power situation
and will continue to do so.
As a result of this, I would submit that, had the President never proposed the
International Agency, we should be at pains now to invent it. Let me be spe-
cific. With time the operation of atomic reactors all over the world is inevitable.
It can no more be prevented than one could restrict or prohibit the use of fire.
82 In 1972 an amendment was proposed to the charter to increase the number on the
Board of Governors to 33. The amendment was awaiting ratification at the time of
writing.
93 Harold I,. Xifherjr. Nuclear Seereeu and Foreign Pollen (Washington, D.C : The Public
Affairs Press, 1964). p. 19.
61 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Enercry, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 84.
178
The Fruits of Negotiation
After more than 3 years of intense U.S. diplomatic effort, an inter-
national statute was produced which the President approved on
July 27, 1957. This effort witnessed the unequal interplay between the
idealism and the pragmatic imperatives of international relations. The
outcome was an international agency that reflected only modestly the
ambitious and idealistic goals expressed by some groups of scientists
for Atoms for Peace. In December 1953 President Eisenhower had
proposed an international body with the following four major pur-
poses : 95
First — encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime
uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had ail the mate-
rials needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate ;
Second — begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's
atomic stockpiles ;
Third — allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the
great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in
human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war ;
Fourth — open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiate at least
a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private
and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear,
and is to make positive progress toward peace.
In 1957 the negotiations produced an International Statute which
specified a limited goal for the IAEA. Article II specified that :
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic
energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure,
so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its
supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military
purpose.
As "military purpose7' is nowhere defined in the Statute, t ho mission
of the International Agency is general enough to accomplish as little
or as much as the member nations might desire.
Arnold Kramish, an observer of the peaceful atom in foreign policy,
notes that the U.S. negotiators had decided early in the negotiations
to postpone the idea of a workable pool of nuclear materials. De-
emphasis of this arms-control function of the Agency also deempha-
sized the initial safeguards function. Instead, negotiators began to
talk of a "clearing-house" function, meaning that in some unspecified
way materials for future bilateral agreements would somehow be
channeled through the International Agency, but not be controlled by
it. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge gave an economic reason for this
change in role. Interviewed at the United Nations on Noveml>er 6,
1954. he said: "Since the resources of the Agency obviously will be
limited, it seems more useful to us to use the resources available to
the Agency for additional programs than for expensive custodial
arrangements."96 At the same time, he said that the United States
would proceed independently with its bilateral agreements with other
countries, rather than channel them through the new Agency.
Despite the limited goals finally established for the, International
Agency, the official U.S. assessment of the negotiations was optimistic.
Secretary Dulles assured the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
that the I 'nited States had achieved its diplomatic objective of obtain-
"Dwlpht D. EiRenhower, The Atom for Progress and Pence. Department of State Publi-
cation No. 5103 (Washington. DC. : T'.S Government Printing Office, 1954).
99 The New York Times, November 6, 1054, p. 6.
179
ing the adoption of the U.S.-originated draft statute without substan-
tial alteration and with the widest possible international support.
Despite the widely differing political attitudes and stages of economic
development of the negotiating nations and the need to reconcile their
divergent interests, U.S. negotiators had "kept intact every element of
the President's proposals without sacrifice of substance or principle." 97
U.S. Ambassador James Wadsworth, who had headed the U.S. nego-
tiations, concurred in Secretary Dulles' assessment. Speaking of the
statute produced by the U.S. negotiators, he said : 98
. . . Functionally, it will make possible an Agency with broad authority to
assist in research and development in the peaceful uses field ; possess and dis-
tribute nuclear materials ; carry out the pooling of such materials at. the request
of member states as proposed by the President: establish and operate its own
facilities: organize and apply a system of minimum safeguards on request to
bilateral or multinational arrangements or the atomic energy activities of a mem-
ber state ; conduct its financial management on a flexible but business-like basis
in the interest of the entire membership ; establish an appropriate relationship
with the United Nations and other international organizations; and take into
consideration recognized standards of international conduct in connection with
the admission of new members.
THE ROLE OF SCIENTISTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
Although the International Agency evolved out of the discovery of
fission by scientists, the scientific community had relatively little part
in the negotiations. Individual atomic scientists were members of dele-
gations to the negotiations and advised the diplomats. Lacking, how-
ever, were substantial organized attempts by the scientific community
to shape the functions and activities of the Agency. The European
nuclear scientist. Professor Gunnar Banders, complained in I960."
Scientists do not generally know what an enormous effort lies behind the cre-
ation of a full-fledged international agency. They also do not know what an
irresistible momentum lies in international organizations. It may be difficult to
create one, but it is practically impossible to terminate one in peacetime. It is
therefore only a question of the degree of usefulness of these indestructible giants
which can be influenced. And here is a point of criticism of ourselves, the scien-
tists and technologists of the world — we have not as a group realized the potential
power of the instrument created, and have failed to follow up with action our
decade of speaking and writing about the duty of scientists.
With few exceptions, we have not even tried to influence the selection of rep-
resentatives of our countries for important positions in the Agency organs. No
organized attempt by scientists has been made to make the Agency promote the
ideas or the programs about which we have talked and written. Scientists who
have gone there have usually done so without any knowledge of the real purpose
of the Agency. Most scientists do not know whether the Agency needs top-notch
scientific specialists or scientific organizers and administrators. The last question
would probably be answered 50-50, one way or the other, even by the present
Board of Governors.
Some Insights From Congressional Review
President Eisenhower sent the International Statute for the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency to Congress on March 21, 1957. The
Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on June 18, 1957. The
arguments and reasons advanced in support of the International Stat-
97 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
op. eit, p. 4.
9RIbid., p. 46.
"° Gunnar Randers "The Scientist's View," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April, 1960),
p. 164.
180
ute gave further insight into what was expected of the IAEA and
what benefits were expected by interests of the United States. The
Statute was the subject of hearings before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations with the invited participation of the Senate Mem-
bers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Wadsworth and Chairman Strauss
of the AEC carried the burden of advocacy and defense. Their
testimony gives many insights into the diplomatic initiatives of the
United States, and into U.S. policy for commercial nuclear power in
Europe, as illustrated in the following sampling.
In terms of foreign policy advantages to the United States Chairman
Strauss and Secretary Dulles outlined reasons for congressional ap-
proval of the International Statute. Approval would : 10°
(1) Accelerate nuclear progress: The Agency would provide a
forum for the exchange of discovery and invention among all
nations.
(2) Provide safeguards: Provide an effective system of safe-
guards to insure the development of atomic energy with security.
(3) Enhance nuclear health and safety: Protect, through in-
ternational codes, the health and safety of those increasing num-
bers of persons who would work with or live near nuclear estab-
lishments.
(4) Improve manpower utilization: Establish a pool of man-
power resources which otherwise could be a limiting factor for
the peaceful use of the atom.
(5) Strengthen control of nuclear weapons: Demonstrate the
feasibility of international controls and safeguards which could
have a constructive impact upon negotiations for the regulation
and reduction of armaments.
(6) Reduce pressure for proliferation : By opening the develop-
ment of nuclear power to international scrutiny, the Agency could
reduce internal pressure within nations to develop their own nu-
clear weapons because of suspicion of the nuclear activities of
their neighbors.
(7) Improve the climate of international r< 1 at ions: Initiate co-
operation with the Soviet Union which could have a favorable
impact upon the climate of international relations. "The splitting
of the atom might conceivably lead to a unifying of the now di-
vided world." 1(il
™ Ibid., pp. 4-5
181
In his summation of these advantages Secretary Dulles described
the potential of the proposed Agency :
. . . for economic development of large areas of the world ; for cooperation with
other nations, including the Soviet Union, in ways which will reduce interna-
tional tension and promote the practice of peaceful and constructive collabora-
tion ; for encouraging peaceful use of the atom and averting the spread of nu-
clear military potential to additional countries ; and for giving the nations ex-
perience with a system of international safeguards which could build confidence
and further the prospects of disarmament.102
LIMITATIONS UPON" THE U.S. COMMITMENT
Assurances were also offered that U.S. commitment of support was
small. Secretary Dulles emphasized that the Agency would not be a
"giveaway organization" for U.S. nuclear fuel materials. Countries
receiving materials from the Agency would have to pay for them.
Moreover, there was no U.S. commitment in the Statute to supply
nuclear materials. The supply of materials, services, or equipment was
a voluntary matter, and the Agency had no authority to require a
member to supply anything. Also, the United States would pay no
more than its share of the administrative expenses of the Agency.
Neither would the IAEA become a giveaway organization for U.S.
atomic secrets. It would distribute only that information on nuclear
energy which was free of security restrictions. Finally, any nuclear
fuel materials distributed would be unsuitable for weapons.
As a gesture of U.S. support for the International Statute, Chairman
Strauss at the closing session of the United Nations conference on the
final draft Statute delivered a message from President Eisenhower
announcing that the United States would make available (but not
give) to the International Agency 5,000 kilograms of uranium-235,
an amount sufficient to fuel three to five nuclear power plants for their
working lifetime. Furthermore, the United States offered to match
additional allocations of nuclear materials to the Agency by all other
member nations.103
The offers received close congressional scrutiny to make sure they
did not constitute a subsidy to commercial nuclear power in Europe.
Senator Hickenlooper questioned Secretary Dulles pointedly, inquir-
ing where the recipient countries would get the money to pay for
this fuel material. Mr. Dulles speculated that recipients might find
the money in the foreign exchange they would otherwise have to
spend to import fuel. In any event, there was nothing in the Inter-
national Statute which directly or indirectly committed the United
States to finance the costs of the uranium. The recipient countries
would have to pay.104 Chairman Strauss was even more emphatic : 105
The United States has not offered to make a gift of those materials to the
Agency. The President's statement explicitly speaks of "terms" to be agreed
upon. Articles 9, II, and 13 of the Agency statute likewise provide specifically
for reimbursement. In any event, the advice and authorization of Congress would,
of course, be sought before any gift were made to the Agency, or to any nation or
group of nations, should such a gift appear advisable at some future date.
182 Ibid., p. 6.
103 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Radiation Safety and Major Activities in the Atomic
Energy Programs, July-December 1956, op. cit., p. 12.
104 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, op. cit.. ». 49.
Agency, op. cit.. p. 49.
105 Ibid., p. 92.
182
WARNINGS OF CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO RATIFY
Secretary Dulles advised Congress that failure to ratify the Inter-
national Statute would be disastrous. The injury to the prestige and
influence of the United States in the world would be of ''incalculable
proportions." 106
Failure to adopt the Statute would pass the atomic initiative to the
Soviet Union or, more likely, destroy the project. He said : 107
This is essentially a made-in-America project. It is one which has caught the
imagination of the peoples of the world, and for us to he the nation that
rejected it would have very fateful consequences indeed.
Whether or not the project would survive that I douht. The only nation that
could make it survive would be the Soviet Union which is the only other nation
which has sufficient quantities of this material to make it a viable project.
The Soviet Union, recognizing that this was a project which greatly enhanced
the prestige of the United States, sought for about 2 years to block it and
thwart it. They finally saw it was going ahead anyway, and then apparently
adopting the old political slogan "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em," they have
now become very active in trying to join up and to try to give a certain leadership
of its own to the movement.
I think however, if we did not. ratify the treaty, the whole effort would
collapse and the responsibility for that collapse would of course be clearly
pinned on to us, and it would involve a blow to our prestige and influence in
the world of almost incalculable proportions.
The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957
The resolution giving the advice and consent of the Senate to the
ratification of the International Atomic Energy Agency was adopted
by the Senate on June 18, 1957. On June 19, a bill to provide for the
participation of the United States in the activities of the Agency was
introduced. Hearings began on July 2 by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, which were held to complement hearings of the
Foreign Relations Committee when it acted on the resolution recom-
mending that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification
of the statute.
The participation Act, Public Law 85-177 (71 Stat. 453) is similar
to the participation Act providing for representation of the United
States at the United Nations and also at other specialized interna-
tional agencies. The Act permits the President to name the repre-
sentatives and deputy representatives of the United States to the
IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference, and to the
other organs of the Agency. The representatives and deputy repre-
sentatives are appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The represental ives are to vote and act in accordance with the instruc-
tions of the President. The Act also authorizes the payments of the
United States share of the annual budget of the Agency and included
provisions to encourage Federal employees to go with the Agency.108
To be sure that the nuclear materials distributed to the Agency are
not a ''giveaway.'1 they are required to be paid for at no less than the
charges established for domestic use. While the President's offer of
5,( K)0 kilograms of \ 235, together with matched amounts of materials
that might be made available to the Agency by other members, was
w»Ibid., pp. 14 15.
'"■ Ibid., p. i t
""• Federal employees serving with tlio IAEA .ire given 3-year prntootlon on Civil
Service retirement, life Insurance, and reinstatement r i^u < s in tnelr positions.
183
authorized by the Act, these materials must be distributed to the
Agency under agreements for cooperation. These provisions pre-
vented the AEC from furnishing nuclear materials wholesale to IAEA
which might then act as ia broker and finance its fuel supply function
by charging a brokerage fee while still keeping the price paid by
the recipient no more than would have been charged for direct purchase
from the United States. There was one exception. The AEC could
assist and encourage research on peaceful uses of nuclear energy or
medical therapy by distributing without charge during any year
material valued at not more than $10,000 in the case of one nation,
or $50,000 for any group of nations. Foreign distribution of nuclear
materials exceeding the 5,000 kilograms ottered by President Eisen-
hower would require congressional approval.
The Act required the President to report annually to Congress on
the International Agency and U.S. participation ; the Department of
State and the AEC were directed to keep the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations cur-
rently informed.109 To prevent unacceptable changes in the Interna-
tional Statute, the Act required that in the event of an amendment
which the Senate disapproved by a formal vote, all authority for
U.S. participation would terminate.
Bilateral Agreements and the IAEA
When Congress authorized U.S. participation in the International
Agency, the AEC had had almost three years of experience with
negotiating and administering bilateral agreements to foster the civil
use of nuclear energy. Considering that the International Agency, in
its watered-down version, was to serve in part as a clearing house,
would the United States shift its emphasis from the bilateral agree-
ments and deal with other countries through the Agency ? This the
United States chose not to do.
When Congress approved U.S. participation in the IAEA, the
United States already had bilateral agreements with some 40 coun-
tries. Most of these were for nuclear research with a few for nuclear
power.110 Secretary Dulles and the State Department were inclined
toward channeling U.S. aid through the International Agency. Sec-
retary Dulles advanced three reasons for this:
(1) Although the bilateral agreements included adequate pro-
visions for safeguards, unless there was an international agree-
ment on common standards, future competition among supplying
nations for the nuclear fuel market would almost certainly erode
the safeguards of the bilateral agreements;
(2) Nations with bilateral agreements with the United States
for development of nuclear power would not indefinitely accede
to U.S. inspection of the nuclear powerplants. "They will accept
international supervision indefinitely, but they will not, I think,
indefinitely accept mere inspection by another nation." 11X and.
109 This annual reporting requirement was terminated In 1965 by Public Law S9-34S.
79 Stat. 1310.
110 At that time, negotiation with 4S nations had produced 44 agreements for cooperation
with 42 nations. Of these, 34 were in force — 29 for research and 5 for power. The remaining
10 agreements were awaiting completion. Fifteen of the participating nations were Euro-
pean, with all of the Common Market nations represented.
111 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, op. cit., p. 66.
184
(3) The United States lacked adequate technical personnel to
meet all potential needs for inspection. It would be preferable to
avoid this drain by sharing the task with others.
While the State Department testimony indicated that the United
States would probably continue to use bilateral agreements, it sug-
gested also that bilateral agreements should not be made a more attrac-
tive source of these materials than the International Agency. The
United States had a moral obligation to be a good member of the
Agency and to try not to undermine it.112
Chairman Stra'uss clearly favored use of bilateral agreements. The
United States, he testified, should not abandon these direct agreements
with other countries when the Agency came into existence, or at any
time in the foreseeable future. He anticipated that the Agency would
stress activities in which many nations had a direct interest and in
which the greatest progress could be made by a multinational ap-
proach. At the same time, the United States through bilateral agree-
ments would be able to extend to individual countries nuclear coopera-
tion which . . . conforms more precisely to our traditional and spe-
cial relationship with those particular countries." 113 He did acknowl-
edge possibilities of some resistance to bilateral agreements. Some
countries, he said, had not responded to U.S. overtures to enter into
bilateral agreements with them. However, these nations had shown
their willingness to accept from an international agency limitations
on their sovereignty unacceptable from the United States.114
A Bilateral Agreement With the IAEA and Three Policy Question*
As authorized by the IAEA Participation Act, the AEC began to
negotiate a bilateral agreement with the International Agency. The
negotiations took almost 2 years. An agreement for cooperation was
finally signed at Vienna on May 11, 1959, and entered into force on
August 7, 1959.
During the negotiations IAEA became aware that it had no major
role in the development of nuclear power. Its first Director General.
W. Sterling Cole, who had resigned from his post as Chairman of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to take this post, strove to carve
out roles for the Agency as a channel for atomic energy aid. and as a
proponent of international safety codes and standards and interna-
tional controls for nuclear fuel materials. When the United States did
not respond to his vision of a strong International Agency, he became
a strong critic of U.S. policy toward the Agency.
One example of Mr. Cole's ideas serves to illustrate the gap between
expectations and performance for IAEA. On March 9, 1959, before a
conference of the American Association for the United Nations, Direc-
tor General Cole asked three questions of policy which indicated both
his vision of what the Agency should Ik>, and the shortfall from his
hopes. He asked : 115
Shall tlif atomic energy contribution of the technologically advanced and ma-
terially endowed nations to other countries in the world be given and applied
through truly International channels; or shall we continue to channel such aid
"- Ibid., p. 165.
»» Ibid., p. 86.
"* Ibid., i». 116.
118 Quoted l>y Senator Clinton Anderson, Jn U.S. Oonpross, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Cooperation Between th<- united states and the Inter-
national Mnmic Energy Agency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 8-10.
185
through networks of bilateral agreements for selective nation-to-nation exchange
without benefit of the balance wheel of international considerations?
Shall the peacetime production and utilization of nuclear materials around
the world be carried out under international codes and standards for health and
safety, or shall we permit the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy under vary-
ing, perhaps conflicting, and certainly confusing, and only partially effective, na-
tionally imposed standards for health and safety?
Shall the nations seek in unison to establish and maintain uniform, prac-
tical rules to prevent the diversion for military purposes of nuclear materials
supplied for peaceful use, or shall we dangerously and foolishly let any and all
supplying countries of such nuclear materials make their own rules and apply
them as they deem desirable under unpredictable conditions of international
competition?
In 1959 Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee put these ques-
tions to the AEC during hearings on the bilateral agreement with the
IAEA, but received inconclusive answers. State Department witnesses
addressed only the issue of bilateral agreements, and defended their
continued use because other countries asked for them.116
In 1972, with commercial nuclear power in Europe and elsewhere
apparently ready for substantial growth, Director General Cole's sec-
ond and third questions assume greater relevance.
U.S. Participation in the IAEA
As with other international organizations in the years following
"World War II, the United States has been the largest single contribu-
tor to the funding of the International Agency, regularly financing
about one-third of its administrative costs, and much higher percent-
ages of voluntary operational funding. It remains to be seen whether
the present scale of IAEA operations will be adequate for the future
when its international safeguards responsibilities under the Nonpro-
life ration Treaty become fully operational. There already have been
some signs of concern that the United States will be expected to finance
much of this increase in costs in the future, as it has many U.N. field
activities.
INITIAL U.S. SUPPORT
At the first IAEA General Conference in 1957 AEC Chairman
Strauss announced that the AEC was preparing a program of detailed
assistance and cooperation which might include offering to IAEA a
research reactor, an isotopes laboratory, and a comprehensive technical
library. In addition to formal restatement of President Eisenhower's
offer of 5,000 kilograms of uranium-235, Chairman Strauss announced
that the AEC would match offers of 20 kilograms of U-235 made by
the United Kingdom, 50 kilograms made by the Soviet Union, and
100,000 kilograms of normal uranium oxide concentrate made by
Portugal. Subsequently, at the first meeting of the IAEA Board of
Governors in January 1958, the United States summarized its prof-
fered support as follows :
(1) Cost-free services for limited periods of 20 to 30 expert con-
sultants for use in the Agency's surveys of programs in member
countries.
116 A State Department spokesman commented :
When we get requests from countries to enter into bilateral agreements, we acknowledge
those requests and we attempt to accommodate them. We cannot very well spurn the
Approaches of other countries when they come to us seeking bilateral agreements. So that,
whereas we continue to enter into them when we are requested, I think it is fair to say
that it is not our policy to push, so to speak, bilateral agreements at the present time.
On the contrary, we attempt wherever possible to direct other countries to and through
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ibid., p. 9.
186
(2) Grants matching contributions of other member nations
up to $125,000 for an IAEA fellowship fund ;
(3) Approximately 120 fellowships, at an estimated cost of
$840,000, over the following two years, for education and training
in nuclear science in the United States ;
(4) Two mobile radioisotope training laboratories ;
( 5 ) A research reactor ;
(6) An isotopes laboratory.117
TRENDS IN U.S. SUPPORT
For the 10 calendar years 1960 through 1970, the United States
contributed $28 million, or about one-third of the IAEA's adminis-
trative budget, and $10.5 million, or about one-half of its voluntary,
special programs budget. Details of U.S. funding appear in Table III.
By way of comparison, the U.S. shares in the costs of United Na-
tions operations through assessed payments, which amount to 31.5
percent of the total, and voluntary contributions, which vary from
10 to 55 percent of the total of individual programs and agencies.
Assessed payments are authorized and appropriated to the Department
of State and voluntary contributions are authorized by' the Foreign
Assistance Act and are separately appropriated.
At the time of writing, the matter of determining what is a "fair
share" of U.S. costs in international organizations is a matter of
congressional debate, both as to assessed dues and to contributions.
The Senate Appropriations Committee, for example, recently ex-
pressed its views that U.S. share of such costs should amount to 20
to :>0 percent of the total. A sense of the Senate amendment to the
Foreign Aid and Assistance Act for FY 1072 called for the total U.S.
contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including
in kind contributions, not to exceed 31.5 percent of the total, world-
wide contribution. The Senate Appropriations Committee in 1072
expressed a hope, that other countries would increase their contribu-
tions to international organizations coupled with a more realistic
effort on their part to provide for their multilateral and their in-
dividual defense.118
The Senate Appropriations Committee while calling for redis-
tribution of support for international agencies among member states,
with a smaller U.S. share, recognized the advantages of multi-
lateral assistance programs. It mentioned the following, saying: 119
As justified to the committee multilateral assistance programs have a number
of advantages :
They promote a wider sharing of the burden of development assistance :
They reduce the political friction that can arise from reliance on bilateral
contacts in the most sensitive affairs of nations, such as population and family
planning, the production of and traffic in dangerous drugs, and surveys of min-
erals with strategic implications ;
They enhance the effectiveness of the world development effort by providing
for the pooling of knowledge and expertise for solving development problems :
They can operate in areas of political tension such as the Middle East, where
Individual nations are often unable to function, even in providing essential
humanitarian assistance.
117 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Research from Power from Fusion and Other
Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Program*, January— June 1958, op. cit., p. 25.
•"U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related
Programs Appropriations Pill, 19T3, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972, Sen. Rept. 92 1231. p. 42.
119 Loc. cit.
Amount
Percent
Amount
Percent
$1,900
32.51
$500
50.00
1,942
32.43
631
50.00
1,775
32.27
690
50.00
2,157
32.02
1,192
50.00
2,238
31.93
1,179
50.00
2.338
31.84
990
45.00
2,519
31.91
903
40.00
2.813
31.87
984
37.50
3.294
31.86
1,000
35.00
3, 374
31.57
1,000
32.50
3,673
31.50
1,400
40.00
4,104
31.45
1,521
36.00
4.882
31.7
1,550
35.00
5,421
31.8
1,750
35.00
187
TABLE lll.-U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CALENDAR YEARS
1960-73
[In thousands of dollars]
Regular budget (assessed) Special programs (voluntary)
Year
I960....
1961
1952
1963..
1964
1965
1966.... :
1967
1968 _
196S
1970
1971...
1972 (estimate) _ _.
1973 (proposed). _
SOURCES
1960-70 information from statement of Samuel de Palma, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs. In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, "Economy and Efficiency of U.S. Participation in
International Organizations," 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, pp. 15-17.
1971-73 information on regular budgrtfrnro In'erns'ional Atomic Energy Agency, "The Agency's Programme for 1973-78
end Budget for 1973," IAEA document GC(XVI)/485, 1972, pp. 13, 15, 203.
Energy Agency, "Scale of Members' Contributions for 1973," 1972, IAEA report GC(XVI) 486, p. 4.
1971-73 Information on voluntary contributions from U.S. Congress Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
"Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1973," 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, Senate report
92— 12 jl , p. 43, and also personal inquiry of the Department of State.
NOTE: Because the Ag3ncy uses a revolving fund, the budget figures shown are not always the same as
those in other IAEA or other U.S. documents.
A HARDHEADED APPROACH TO IAEA FUNCTIONS
The Joint Committee's 1959 inquiry into the agreement between
the AEC and the International Agency gave the AEC an opportunity
to enlarge upon its explanation of the concept of what the IAEA
should be doing. Commissioner Harold S. Vance of the AEC, after
arguing against a nuclear-materials supply role or a role in demon-
stration of nuclear power for the IAEA, asserted there were many
other tilings for it to do.120
. . . There are problems that do not respect national boundaries in the field of
health, safety, safeguards, waste disposal and so forth. I believe that if the
Agency will address itself to those problems and do it a little more vigorously
and forget this business of trying to be a broker for fuel, that in the long run
they will be a lot more productive than they would otherwise.
He proposed four unique services for IAEA : 121
(1) Resolution of problems of health and safety which tran-
scend national borders;
(2) Creation of international security safeguards and controls
over worldwide usage of fissionable materials ;
(3) Expansion of East-West cooperation in peaceful uses of
atomic energy; and
(4) Pooling of resources to meet the technical assistance needs
of underdeveloped countries.
la U.S., Congress, Jo:nt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing, Agreement for Coopera-
tion Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 86th Cong.,
121 Ibid., p. 28.
188
As for the first of these services, Commissioner Vance reported
there was already widespread recognition of the IAEA health and
safety role. What he said in 1959 has a contemporary sound : 122
Concerning the general problem of safe usage, all countries with atomic energy
programs have a mutual concern in minimizing accidental or inadvertent con-
tamination of property and personal injury through adequate health and safety
standards. International transport of radioactive materials, waste disposal at
sea, and safe operation of reactors sited near national boundaries are examples
of problems predominantly international in nature that can best be resolved
through a single technically competent world organization. The Agency provides
both a forum and the implementing mechanism for fulfilling the common inter-
ests of all nations.
As for the second opportunity for services, Commissioner Vance
saw a strong safeguards function for the IAEA as consonant with U.S.
foreign policy objectives. In his view, the recognition in U.S. bilateral
agreements of the ultimate desirability of transfer of safeguards re-
sponsibilities to the IAEA was evidence of U.S. support for this func-
tion. He did not elaborate on the third and fourth points.
A Stronger Role for the IAEA: The Smyth Report of 19G2
Whether IAEA should be given some real international operating
functions was a question before the State Department, the AEC, and
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1962. The State Department
in 1961 had called for a competent general review of the Agency in
terms of U.S. foreign policy, technology, administration, and finance.
To this end the State Department, in agreement with the AEC,
established an Advisory Committee chaired by Dr. Henry D. Smyth of
Princeton University.123 His committee reported in 1962.124
The Advisory Committee concluded that peaceful uses of atomic
energy ought to play an important role in future foreign policy and
that active support of IAEA would further this policy. Development
of nuclear power was the key issue in determining the usefulness of
IAEA. Because nuclear power was becoming economically attractive
in many parts of the world, it would be advantageous for the United
States to encourage the Agency to participate in this development. Five
of the Smyth Committee's six recommendations were pertinent to U.S.
foreign policy : 125
(1) The United States [should] reaffirm and constructively
support its policy for furthering the utilization of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes throughout the world.
(2) The International Atomic Energy Agency [should] be rec-
ognized as the most effective means by which the United States
can carry out that policy. To that end, activities now being con-
ducted under existing bilateral agreements should be transferred
to Agency auspices wherever practical.
"» Ibid., p. 28.
123 Dr. Smyth was the author of the notable wartime "Smyth Report" on the Manhattan
Project. A lending nuclear scientist, he was in 1902 the U.S. representative to the IAEA.
134 Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic
Energy Agency. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, United
States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962,
pp. 37-62.
128 In the opinion of the Committee, these functions should be to :
a. Provide the best attainable assurance against diversion of material and equip-
ment to military purposes.
b. Establish uniform health and safety standards.
c. Provide technical assistance.
(1. Reconcile liability and indemnification practices.
e. Conduct international research projects.
f . Promulgate International waste management standards.
189
(3) The United States [should] take the lead in securing inter-
national agreement that the Agency be recognized as the instru-
ment most appropriate for carrying out certain important func-
tions in the field of atomic energy.
(4) A detailed study [should] be made within the United States
Government of the steps to be taken to further the foreign policy
objectives in the field of atomic power. We believe that such a
study will show that an effective program need not be costly.
(5) The United States Government [should] continue to sup-
port actively the programs of the Agency in the fields listed above
by providing financial assistance, by supplying experts for special
assignment, and by encouraging competent technical men to serve
upon the Agency staff.
The Smyth Committee extended its study to include two primary
questions affecting atomic energy and foreign policy : 126
( 1 ) Did atomic energy occupy a unique position in science and
technology at that time ? and,
(2) Did the past and present achievements of the United States
in atomic energy give this country a unique opportunity and obli-
gation to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy ?
The Committee's answer to each question was yes.
As for the future of nuclear power and the IAEA, Professor Smyth
posed three questions of policy for the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy :
( 1 ) Did the United States wish to support the development of
nuclear power around the world ?
(2) How important were safeguards ?
(3) Was the United States really going to use IAEA, or would
it continue to work largely through bilateral or regional groups ?
A STATE DEPARTMENT COMMENTARY
In comment before the Joint Committee on the Smyth report, Mr.
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Or-
ganization Affairs, foresaw that expansion of nuclear power was
likely to be important to foreign policy planning from two points of
view: safeguards, and assistance to developing countries. Of this
he said : 127
First, we are concerned that adequate safeguards be maintained to guard
against military applications of a proliferating nuclear technology. Second, the
prospect of increasing use of nuclear energy for power as well as research makes
it important to help the newly developing nations to develop the new technical
people who can handle the new technology.
But he discouraged the idea that the IAEA should be a channel
for financial aid for nuclear power or that the United States should
increase its proportional support of the Agency.128 He anticipated
some undefined third-party role of the Agency in relation to U.S.
bilateral agreements.
12a U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, United States Policy
Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. cit., pp. 2, 3.
127 Ibid., p. 14.
128 Elaborating on this point, he said : "We do not, however, believe that the IAEA or
any of the other technical agencies of the United Nations complex should be used as
channels for major inputs of financial aid. The IAEA is not a bank. We continue to believe
that the international, regional, and national financing institutions are better equipped
for this purpose," Ibid., p. 14.
190
As for the State Department's ideas about the future of the Agency,
it preferred that IAEA concentrate on technical service functions : 129
We most explicitly agree that the Agency is the most appropriate instrument
for establishing uniform health and safety standards, for working out uniform
rules for liability and indemnification for atomic accidents; for developing and
publishing international standards for waste management; and for conducting
research and calling scientific conferences on problems which require interna-
tional planning and coordination.
Queried about Dr. Smyth's three policy questions, Mr. Cleveland in
reply raised questions of his own. He said : 130
. . . Sure, the United States wants to support the development of nuclear power
around the world. But do we want to build into our aid program a preference
for nuclear power as opposed to other forms of power in power development?
This is a more complex and difficult and interesting question that really has to
be looked at in terms of the economic program country by country.
How important does the United States consider safeguards? Very. This is in-
deed the most important single aspect as we look into the future of the Inter-
national Agency's program. This is more than any one thing the raison d'etre of
an international agency.
la the United States really going to use the Agency? Yes, we are going to use
the Agency. But whether we will use it in a particular case, given all the con-
ditions in that case, can only be determined when you look at the case. That
is a complicated answer to some simple looking questions, but Dr. Smyth knows
how complicated his questions are.
Cleveland's own questions went unanswered at the hearings and re-
main largely unanswered today. This difference between Professor
Smyth who wished to channel U.S. nuclear technical assistance though
the IAEA and the Department of State which saw a continuing utility
in bilateral as well as international channels illustrates the difference
in approach of an announced advocate of an international agency and
measures to strengthen it in contrast with the pragmatic approach of
U.S. diplomacy which views both bilateral and international arrange-
ments as useful for U.S. purposes. This same pattern of bilateral and
multilateral arrangements for technical assistance and cooperation has
appeared in the space program. There too the United States uses bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements. Able to use either approach, U.S.
diplomacy is not tied to the success or failure of one method or the
other, but can choose the combination that best fits its interests.
AN AEC REACTION"
Commissioner Leland J. Haworth welcomed the Smyth Commit-
tee's reaffirmation of a policy of strong support for the International
Agency, for use of atomic energy as an element of U.S. foreign policy,
and for support of the Agency as a means to advance U.S. policy.131
He agreed that one way to develop the competence of the
Agency was to transfer to it as many as possible of the AEC activities
then being carried out through bilateral agreements. But the AEC
was not ready to commit itself to this idea. As to safeguards, the Com-
mission endorsed the need for a continued effort to obtain a uniform,
worldwide, effective system, ideally to be administered by the IAEA.
But the Agency's system could apply only to materials received
through the Agency or to those voluntarily placed under its system.
"•Ibid., p. 1".
«*>Ibld., pp. 1S-19.
131 Ibid., p. 19.
191
Thus IAEA safeguards could not be global in scope. Nevertheless, the
Agency's system provided a means to bring a few nuclear facilities
under safeguards and could set a desirable example of a workable in-
ternational safeguards system for the future. "For these reasons",
j>aid Commissioner Haworth, "the AEC judged the Agency's safe-
guards function to be the most important of its activities." 132
As for the supply function, the AEC demurred. While any of the
bilateral partners of the United States could at any time utilize the
Agency, and it was AEC policy to encourage them to do so, Commis-
sioner Haworth gave assurance that many countries trusted and pre-
ferred the bilateral code : 133
. . . Important as it may be to the Agency for it to serve as a supplier of ma-
terials (a question on which there have been different opinions) it is even more
important that Agency safeguards become generally applied. It is, therefore, of
great significance, in the interests of strengthening the safeguards function of
the Agency, that greater emphasis be given to the voluntary application of IAEA
safeguards to bilateral transactions.
The idea that the IAEA should become involved in financing nuclear
power also was minimized by the AEC. There were other financial in-
stitutions. Moreover, a financial role for the IAEA could lead to an
unbalancing of its functions. It would not, in Ha worth's opinion, bene-
fit either the Agency or the United States for this country to use the
Agency as a broker to finance construction of a nuclear power plant at
an expenditure level several times as large as the Agency's entire
budget.134
A PESSIMISTIC POSTSCRIPT
The year following the Smyth Committee report, one observer cau-
tioned that IAEA remained weak and lacking in direction. As seen
by Arnold Kramish, the Agency was not the idealistic mechanism en-
visioned by the President in 1953 to diminish the potential destruc-
tive power of the world's nuclear stockpiles, nor had it provided a new
channel for peaceful international discussion. If the Agency's
members wished to develop it for that purpose, they would have to
strengthen its support.135
Likewise in 1966, Sterling Cole was to comment that the IAEA was
still being avoided or circumvented, and that "not a single nuclear
power plant capable of producing by-product weapon material has
come under the Agency control . . ., except for psychological ges-
tures or demonstrations.136
The Decline of the Supply Function
If the International Agency was to have a viable supply function,
the appropriate time to establish it was in 1959 when the AEC received
legislative authority to cooperate with the Agency. But this brokerage
function that was so important for the plans and hopes of Director
General Cole was discounted and minimized by the AEC. Appear-
ing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1959, Commis-
sioner Vance of the AEC ruled out the possibility that the United
States supplying nuclear materials to the International Agency on
132 Ibid., p. 20.
133 Ibid., p. 20.
134 Ibid., p. 21.
133 Kramish. op. cit.. p. 77.
"'Sterling Cole. "Needed: A Rebirth of the IAEA," Nuclear News, vol. 9 (September
1966) , p. 19.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 14
192
special terms which would enable it to be a competitive supplier in the
world market. As he analyzed the situation, unless other governments
volunteered to become suppliers, countries wishing to obtain uranium-
235 had two options. They could deal directly with the United States,
or go to the International Agency. He anticipated they would prefer
the former, which he too preferred as in the best interests of the United
States. He said : 137
... if they deal with us under an individual bilateral agreement, we have
some control over where this material goes and for what purpose it is used, and
we do not have that if it is channeled through the International Agency. There-
fore. I think the present arrangement is a good one from our standpoint.
He opposed Director General Cole's proposition that the United
States supply nuclear materials to it at a discount of 3 to 5 percent : 13S
... I believe that this possible function of the International Agency which
Mr. Cole laid great stress on in his speech in March has been greatly overem-
phasized in his mind and in the minds of a lot of other people. I do not believe that
it is one of the principal functions of the International Agency to act as a broker
between the countries who make U-235 or enriched uranium and the countries
who require it.
That same year AEC Commissioner John Floberg told the third ses-
sion of the IAEA General Conference that the United States saw for
the Agency a continuing and important role as a supplier of source and
special nuclear materials.139 Asked why, in view of the AEC's attitude,
a bilateral agreement with the International Agency was necessary at
all, Commissioner Vance said it would provide the machinery for sup-
plying nuclear fuel, even though the amount to be delivered might be
nominal. "We have gone this far, we should go on to the point where
nobody can accuse us of pulling back the offer that was made."' 140
So although Atoms for Peace proposed a strong supply function for
the International Atomic Energy Agency, within a few years this
function had atrophied. U.S. policy prevented the Agency from
obtaining nuclear materials from the United States at a wholesale or
discount price for resale to other members. Whether the Agency
would in fact have been strengthened by a more favorable policy is
now academic, for other supply channels are now well established and
it is unlikely that they would be abandoned now in favor of the
International Agency.
International Standards for Nuclear Safety
One little-developed function of IAEA which could have affected
commercial nuclear power in Europe was the setting of international
safety standards for nuclear power. Commissioner Vance and others
had called attention to this function and the Department of Stale
and AEC had both emphasized the importance they assigned to it.
During hearings on the International Statute, Secretary Dulles justi-
137 V K. Concress, Joint Committee on Atomic Enortr.v. Hearings, Agreement for Co-
operatinn Between the United States and the International Atornie Energy Agency, op.
clt., p -••
"R IMd., p. 21.
"" r s Atomic Knprpy Commission, Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs,
January— December jf>5.9,op. clt., p. 104.
'"t'S. Congress, Join! Committee on Atomic Kncrpy, Hearings, Agreement for Co-
operation Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. clt.,
p. 25.
193
fied ratification by the United States because of what the International
Agency could do to control the dangers of nuclear power. He said: 141
. . . people are becoming more aware of some of the dangers inherent in this
progress. When power is produced by nuclear energy . . . such production also
creates waste products which could imperil health and safety. Today, the need
is even more imperative for protection against the inevitable byproducts of the
atomic age.
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is designed to fill
this need. . . .
Chairman Strauss was quite frank about the hazards. He testified
that : 142
A byproduct of reactors is radioactive waste. This byproduct will probably
some day be valuable, but presently and for the foreseeable future, it presents
a huge disposal problem. Solution of the problem is necessary for public health
and safety.
If these wastes are indiscriminately dumped at sea, they could spread around
the world. If they are indiscriminately buried in the earth they may migrate along
the plunging contours of subterranean strata with no regard whatever for the
political boundaries that men and nations have scratched on the earth's surface.
The only way we can safeguard our own health and safety is by securing
world health and safety. And that can only be achieved by a uniform international
agreement on standards of health and safety applicable to atomic energy.
The United States was ready to support the concept of voluntary
international safety standards. However, it was unready to accept
the application of such standards by an international agency to its
own nuclear activities. In 1959 while discussing IAEA Director
General Cole's ideas about the IAEA, a State Department witness,
Chad wick Johnson, Office of Special Assistant for Disarmament and
Atomic Energy, declined to take a position on this question, as indi-
cated in the following colloquy : 143
Mr. Johnson. I, of course believe it is a generally good thing for the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency to establish rigid standards of health and
safety for possible adoption by other countries with which the agency works.
Senator Anderson. For adoption by other countries. Why not for adoption by
the principal country that started it, the United States? . . .
Mr. Johnson. Being a member of the Department of State, I believe that I
cannotfully answer your question on this matter of health and safety.
The IAEA itself has not been able to move very far to establish
international standards for safety in design, construction and oper-
ation of nuclear power plants. It did convene a Panel on Safe Opera-
tion of Critical Assemblies and Research Reactors which prepared
an international safety manual and subsequently assisted in setting
up safety procedures for a few small research reactors. But the IAEA-
went no further despite the fact that the nuclear power technology
is potentially dangerous, and effects of accidents with nuclear power
plants could cross national boundaries and affect other countries.
Shortly after the issuance of the Smyth report, Arnold Kramish
suggested that adoption and enforcement by members of the IAEA
of international safety standards promulgated and monitored by that
141 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the
Jo'nt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, op. eit., p. 3.
142Jbid.,p. 84.
143 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera-
tion Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, op. clt.,
p. 10.
194
body could also contribute to international control of nuclear mate-
rials. Safety procedures for such hazardous materials and other safety
concerns are intimately related to the measures for an effective inter-
national safeguards system.144
Despite these statements attesting to the importance of a nuclear
safety function for the IAEA, there remains a confusing proliferation
and apparent overlap of radiation safety guides and standards. In
Europe, there are standards issued by the IAEA and standards pro-
mulgated by Euratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, rather than transfer
the functions of that U.N. committee to IAEA. Meanwhile, the role
of the International Agency in setting standards for construction and
operation of nuclear power plants is now dormant. If commercial nu-
clear power expands in Europe, as optimists are beginning to antic-
pate, the issue of international standards for safety and to control
environmental effects can be expected to revive. If and when it does,
U.S. diplomats are likely to be faced with the question to what extent
and in what way should such standards apply to domestic nuclear
power plants? Should the United States voluntarily agree to apply
such standards to the domestic industry? Should the United States
voluntarily permit inspection of design, construction, and operation
of commercial nuclear power plants? What would be the effect on
the Intel-national Agency were the United States to refuse to acknowl-
edge the applicability of these standards? Then too, what might
such a conflict do to the competitive position of the U.S. nuclear
industry in the world market ?
In ternational Safeguards for Nuclear Materials
Of all the negotiating issues faced by the diplomats and their
scientific advisors in drafting the IAEA statute, the most intrac-
table was the safeguarding of nuclear material?. U.S. negotiators were
caught between (a) the demand for credible inspection and control
of nuclear materials to reduce the chances of proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and (b) the reluctance of the non-nuclear nations to sur-
render any sovereign rights to permit inspection. In these negotiations,
the Soviet Union chose to emphasize the issue of sovereign rights and
to oppose international inspection. The final compromise reached at the
United Nations Conference Avas to restrict safeguards to IAEA proj-
ects or to those projects voluntarily placed under IAEA safeguards.
Thus hopes were dashed for a worldwide safeguards system that
would apply to all nuclear materials and facilities in peaceful
applications.
On paper, the Statute specifies an impressive array of power and
responsibility for the Agency in enforcing safeguards for its projects,
or projects assigned to it by member states. The International Statute
requires that such arrangements include provisions for IAEA
examination of design of nuclear equipment, including power
reactors: that IAEA health and safety measures be observed: that
records be maintained for nuclear materials produced or used; and
*** Kramish, op. clt., pp. r>n-CO.
195
that the Agency can send inspectors into the member states to check
nuclear materials that it supplies.145
CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN IAEA SAFEGUARDS
The questions of what safeguards would entail, why they were
needed, and how they would work were of continuing interest to both
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy. Safeguards offered two sets of benefits : a means
to make disarmament more palatable, and a means to improve world
security in an area of nuclear energy.
In sending the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
to the Senate, President Eisenhower reassured Congress that the safe-
guards would be adequate and that the security of the United States
would not be endangered by nuclear materials made available to or
through the IAEA. Said the President: 146
To achieve the confidence essential to cooperation among members of the
International Atomic Agency, great care has been exercised to insure that fis-
sionable material will be safeguarded to prevent its diversion to any military
purpose. A comprehensive safeguard system is provided by the statute. This
will apply to all aspects of the Agency's activity involving nuclear materials.
A key part of this system is a plan for thorough international inspection. The
United States will provide fissionable materials for Agency projects only as
the safeguard system is put into effect. I am satisfied that the security of the
United States will not be endangered by materials made available to or through
this Agency.
In the hearings which followed, Chairman Strauss described the
International Agency as prospectively providing a practical, working
model of an inspection system for disarmament. He said : 147
The Agency will not, of course, achieve atomic disarmament, nor was it con-
ceived to attempt that. However, it can promote United States objectives in
115 Article XII specifies that the Agency shall have the following rights and responsi-
bilities for safeguarding its own proierts or those of member states :
1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities including nuclear
reactors and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring that it will not further
any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety standards,
and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this
art'c'e ;
2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by the
Agency ;
3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in
ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced
in the nroi'e^t or arrangement :
4. To call for and receive progress reports :
r>. To approve the means to he used for the chemical processing of irradiated mate-
rials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diver-
sion . . . and will comply with anplicable health and safety standards. . . . :
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated
by the Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have
access at all times to all places and data and to any person ... as necessary to
account for source and fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to
determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in further-
ance of any military purpose . . . with the health and safety measures referred to in
. . . tbis article, and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between
tbe Agency and the State or States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency
shall be accompanied by representatives of the authorities of the State concerned, if
that State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or
otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions ;
7. In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to
take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate
assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or
a member. . . .
na •"The State of the International Atomic Energy Agencv." Message from the President
of tbe United States. S5th Cong.. 1st sess., March 21, 1957 (Senate Executive I), p. 2.
147 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Senate Members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, op. cit, p. 87.
196
the field of disarmament by creating a practical working model of an inspection
system, and a climate of international opinion in support of our objectives. This
we may hope, will facilitate establishment of the broader controls needed for
a successful disarmament agreement.
Sterling Cole, then chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, strongly supported the safeguards function of the IAEA for
its implications for disarmament. In a statement to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee he cited its potential for "outstanding accom-
plishment." He said : 148
This will be a period of learning about all of the problems— technical, legal,
psychological — of international inspection and control. The Agency was suggested
at a time when neither the United States nor Russia were able to agree on an
inspection and control plan for themselves for disarmament purposes. The
Agency's operations can produce that technology and that confidence in inter-
national control which will lead to complete international control of atomic
energy at an appropriate time later on. Since the Soviet Union has been the
country principally opposed to international inspection of atomic arms, perhaps
it will learn that international inspection will not be as unpalatable as
anticipated.
The State Department underscored the importance of international
safeguards. In reply to a question as to why the desired safeguards
could not be had equally well through bilateral agreements, Secretary
Dulles replied : 149
. . . while in theory you could have the same degree of inspection under bi-
laterals as you have under the International Agency, ... in fact there would be
competition between the countries — there is already evidence of that now — as to
who would want to sell this material. One result would be dropping these
standards of inspection, so that in fact we would not be able to maintain our
own standards as the era of plenty arrives in this field.
Secondly .... there is objection to continuing inspection just by one nation
as against an international system.
Thirdly . . . , we do not have the manpower to do it adequately as the need
increases.
Strauss foresaw that within a few years other nations would be
offering nuclear materials on the world market and that without the
International Agency the United States could not then be sure that
these other nations would impose equally stringent safeguards. Accord-
ing to Strauss, the Agency could establish standards for safeguards
more effectively than any system of agreements between individual
countries. Such standards had to be set up at the outset of the growth
of a world nuclear power industry. It would be too late to attempt it
"after the contaminants have been broadcast." 150
AEC Commissioner Thomas Murray saw IAEA as the only means
of avoiding international nuclear anarchy. He said : 151
In no field does the need for international order exist more imperatively than
in the field of nuclear energy. In the concept of order I include a whole set
of notions — regulation, control, supervision, commonly accepted standards of
health and safety, and above all the institution of free and orderly procedures of
cooperation among nations. You have heard statements about the danger of
our gradually drifting into a state of atomic anarchy. This is a good phrase in
which to describe the state in which we already find ourselves. Surely this is
true in the field of nuclear weapons. Each of the nations engaged in their
development and production is acting as a law unto itself.
14SIMd.. p. 171.
uu Ibid., p. 69.
' ' [bid., p. 87.
161 Ibid., p. 175.
197
There are no common norms or standards binding on all ; there are no common
agreements accepted by all. The result is international lawlessness or anarchy
which shows itself chiefly in the ungoverned — and for the moment seemingly
ungovernable — race for nuclear armaments.
This international situation is not simply the road to anarchy. It is itself anar-
chy. Unless and until this anarchy is resolved into some decent measure of order,
neither America nor the world at large could enjoy even that basic security that
consisted in the assurance of continued national existence.
BILATERAL VS. IAEA SAFEGUARDS
Since U.S. bilateral agreements provide for U.S. safeguards, it
might be asked what difference does it make whether U.S. nuclear
materials are safeguarded under the bilateral agreements or through
the International Agency. This question was probed by the Joint
Committee in 1964. Dr. Henry Smyth, speaking both as the U.S. repre-
sentative to the IAEA and as an adviser to the State Department and
the AEC, outlined three major advantages of international safe-
guards : credibility, uniformity, and expense. He said : 152
First of all, we believe that international safeguards may be viewed as more
credible than bilateral safeguards. That is, if the U.S. Government, or any
other government, for that matter, is conducting safeguards inspections in the
nuclear installations of a very close ally, some question might arise in the minds
of people at large as to the thoroughness and efficacy of such inspections. If,
on the other hand, those same inspections are conducted by an international
inspectorate in which a variety of countries is represented, no one in the world
can doubt their thoroughness and objectivity.
Second, we believe that it is important that the safeguards applied to various
countries be uniform. If 10, 11, or more countries set up their own individual
inspection systems, it may well turn out that one country has a vigorous
system and that another country has a lenient one. If transferred materials and
equipment, whatever their source, are subjected to the same inspection under an
international organization, there will be complete uniformity - of safeguards
standards.
Third, we believe it is far more expensive for many different countries to
establish inspection systems than if one international secretariat representing
the governments both of the supplying countries and the receiving countries
undertakes this whole job.
The AEC itself outlined five reasons favoring replacement of bi-
lateral safeguards, with those of the IAEA. It testified that : 153
1. The most effective safeguards, the United States believes, are those carried
out by an international organization. While bilateral safeguards provide adequate
assurances to the supplier against diversion of materials supplied by them,
only internationally applied safeguards are capable of giving equivalent as-
surances to the world at large that nuclear material supplied by one country
to another is not being diverted to military uses.
2. Application of safeguards by an international organization develops the
experience and competence in an international staff which can serve as an im-
portant precedent for international inspection in connection with any future
disarmament agreement.
3. International safeguards would be uniformly applicable and, therefore,
would minimize tendencies toward discriminatory treatment which might reduce
arrangements to the level which the least strict bilateral arrangements required.
4. Relying upon the IAEA to carry out the safeguards function enhances the
prestige and increases the responsibilities of the IAEA and thereby makes it a
more effective instrument in all of its fields of endeavor.
5. Many supplying countries will probably find it difficult if not impossible to
undertake bilateral safeguards on nuclear materials which they supply. Effective
102 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agree-
ments tor Cooperation, S8th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1965, p. 141.
153 Ibid., p. 140.
198
safeguards on these exports can be realized only if an international organization
has developed a capability for applying safeguards and recipient nations are pre-
pared to accept them.
EVOLUTION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS : A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY
U.S. support of IAEA safeguards has been and is a curious mixture
of innovation, generosity, and unusual voluntary actions, offset by a
reluctance to commit the United States to reliance upon IAEA safe-
guards and an unreadiness to obtain for the International Agency the
financial and technical support it will need to carry out its expanded
safeguards responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty. The
evolving nature of U.S. participation is illuminated in the following
chronology of developments in IAEA safeguards.
Toward the end of 1957, the AEC was working on ways to help
the IAEA carry out its safeguards functions. In addition to assuring
that U.S. supplied nuclear materials would be used only for peaceful
purposes, administration of the safeguards was expected to accumu-
late technical and administrative experience that would be useful for
future IAEA operations.154
In 1959, Director General Cole attempted to expedite IAEA action
for a safeguards system. He pleaded with the Board of Governors
to do so. The nuclear nations represented should demonstrate for the
"have-not" nations that inspection and other safeguards were not an
unreasonable invasion of national sovereignty. But the Soviet repre-
sentatives were not cooperative. They challenged IAEA safeguards
as unacceptable intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign
states— a position U.S.S.R. representatives had taken during negotia-
tion of the International Statute— and argued that IAEA safeguards
would establish the domination of the strong over the weak states.
Apparently U.S. representatives and their supporters were able to
counter the Soviet position, for during 1959 the Board provisionally
approved principles for drafting a safeguards system. These principles
were never published.
In May 1960, the Director General sent a draft of a proposed safe-
guards agreement to 70 governments. It provided for inspection by
IAEA inspectors of facilities using nuclear materials obtained
through the Agency, IAEA approval of reactor designs, and Agency
supervision of records of reactor operations. In September, this draft
was debated and adopted at the fourth General Conference. In 19G0
the AEC took a first step toward providing the IAEA with practical
working experience with safeguards. At the Agency's General Con-
ference^ it and several of its bilateral partners announced their will-
ingness to transfer to the Agency the administration of safeguards
for U.S. -supplied materials. In that year the United States volun-
teered to place four nuclear reactors under Agency safeguards.155
Full IAEA safeguards, principles, and procedures would apply,
including inspection and verification of records and accounts.156
1M
Decern
The.
V S Atomic Encrev Commission. Proprcss in Peaceful Tines of Atomic Encroy.July-
mhe'r 1957 (Washington. DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office lOr.S), p. 196.
The four reactors Included two research reactors at the AECVFropkhaven National
Laboratory, an experimental power reactor at the AEC's Argonne National Laboratory.
and a small de ostration power plant In an electric utility at Plqua, Ohio.
•"""T'S Atomic Enerpv Commission. Annual Heport to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1960 (Washington, DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1961). p. 205.
199
In 1961 the International Agency adopted guidelines for a safe-
guards system. The AEC in turn adopted these principles and pro-
cedures to be applied under its bilateral agreements, and the countries
involved indicated their willingness to consult with the United States
about future transfer of safeguards for U.S. -supplied materials to the
IAEA.157 During 1962 the IAEA and AEC completed negotiations
for application of Agency safeguards to the four reactors, and two trial
inspections were carried out by IAEA inspectors at these reactors.158
In 1963 the AEC and a bilateral partner completed an agreement
to transfer to the IAEA the function of safeguarding U.S. -supplied
material. While most of the nuclear power bilateral agreements of the
United States were with European countries, the first such agreement
was executed with Japan. Entering into force on November 1, 1963,
this trilateral agreement of the United States, Japan, and the Inter-
national Agency provided for the Agency to safeguard any nuclear
material, equipment, and facilities supplied to Japan by the United
States. It also specified that Agency safeguards would apply to any
fissionable material produced in the Japanese facilities upon its
return to the United States for reprocessing unless the U.S. substi-
tuted an equivalent quantity of like material in Japan.159 This pro-
vision was doubly innovative: it recognized the idea that IAEA
safeguards should follow the return flow of safeguarded material from
a recipient country to the country where it was processed or used;
and it provided a way for the supplying nations to break the chain
of safeguards simply by substituting a like amount of material at
the recipient country. By this device, a supplier country like the United
States, or the U.S.S.R. or the United Kingdom could avoid IAEA
inspection of nuclear material sent by a third party.
The IAEA Board of Governors in 1963 provisionally approved a
system of safeguards for small power reactors and the Seventh General
Conference that year adopted a. U.S. -proposed resolution endorsing
the Board's action. AEC Chairman Seaborg recommended to the
Conference that the Agency consider extending safeguards to facilities
for fabricating and for reprocessing nuclear fuel ; also that the Agency
compile and publish an international registry of ocean disposal sites
for radioactive wastes and undertake the development of international
or regional wastes burial grounds.160
In 1964 IAEA safeguards were expanded to include power reactors
of any size. At this time, many members of the Agency called for
clarification and simplification by revising the whole safeguards sys-
tem. A start was made in that year.
In 1965 the IAEA Board of Governors provisionally approved a
clarification and simplification of the Agency's safeguards system.
The General Conference that year adopted a U.S.-proposed resolu-
tion to approve this revision and the Board of Governors effectuated
the revised system on September 28, 1965.161 The State Department
157 U.S. Atomic Unersrv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1961 (Washington, DC. : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1002), p. 2::3.
^U.S. Atomic Enerjrv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1962 (Washington, D.C. : TT.S. Governmpnt Printing Office, 196^), p. 296.
1C8U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1963 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 2:!4.
160 Ibid., p. 233.
161 U.S. Atomic Energv Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1965 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 254.
200
supported the revision before the Joint Committee, describing it as
intelligible, comprehensive, and likely to provide a mechanism for
effective safeguards on peaceful nuclear programs around the world.162
Also in 1965 the United States expanded its original four reactors
offer by voluntarily putting under IAEA safeguards the 175 megawatt
Yankee nuclear power plant at Rowe, Massachusetts. This action
provided IAEA inspectors with practical experience with a larger,
regularly operating, nuclear power plant and was expected to confirm
the U.S. position that safeguards would not interfere with efficient
operations of nuclear facilities. During 1965 IAEA inspectors made
10 inspections of the reactors under voluntary safeguards.163
By the end of 1965 two other supplying countries also were using
trilateral agreements that involved the IAEA. One was among the
IAEA, Canada, and Japan; and others were among the IAEA,
the United Kingdom and Japan, and Denmark, respectively.
In 1966 President Johnson pledged full U.S. support for the
Agency's safeguards system, which he characterized as one of the
principal instruments for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
In a message to the 10th General Conference, he said : 164
. . . the Agency has a crucial responsibility to see that the vast beneficial
uses of nuclear energy are not diverted for military purposes. I cannot say
often enough that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the
most important tasks of our times. We look on the Agency's safeguards system
as one of the principal instruments for accomplishing this task. The U.S. Govern-
ment fully supports the Agency system and we will do all in our power to support
the continued growth and technical effectiveness of the system.
To show its support, the United States voluntarily permitted appli-
cation of safeguards to a commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing facil-
ity. That April, at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva,
the United States offered, in cooperation with the company con-
cerned,165 to make the fuel reprocessing plant available to the IAEA
to develop and test safeguards techniques and to gain experience and
training for its inspectors. During 1966, IAEA inspectors made 10
inspections of the Yankee plant, including 4 unannounced visits to test
provisions of IAEA inspection procedures for access at all times to
power reactors.
In 1967 the United States suggested at the 11th General Conference
of the IAEA that the Agency's systems extend to fuel fabrication
plants.166 Far more important, on December 2, 1967, President John-
son announced that when safeguards were applied under a nonpro-
liferation treaty for nuclear weapons, the United States would volun-
tarily permit the International Agency to apply its safeguards to all
nuclear activities in this country, excluding only those with direct
national security significance.167
In 1968 IAEA safeguards were extended to cover facilities for cer-
tain chemical processing of nuclear fuel materials and for fabrication
103 Statement of Charles W. Thomas. Office of International Scientific Affairs, Donart-
iii.nt df State. In D.S. Congress, lolnt Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International
Agreements for Cooperation, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 14.
>*'< U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1965, op. clt., p. 2.r>7.
184 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs,
.latuinry-December 1966 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967),
p. 201.
ln"' Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., of West Valley, New York.
1MU.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to the Congress on the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1967 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 210.
ia,7Ibld., p. 216.
201
of these materials into fuel elements for nuclear power plants. Also
in 1968, the Treaty for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was
opened for signature. Under Article III of the Treaty, IAEA would
be called upon to provide assurance that nuclear energy programs in
non-nuclear-weapons states adhering to the Treaty were not diverted
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. To support IAEA safeguards, the AEC provided the services
of technical experts, shared results of its research and development,
and provided safeguards training opportunities for the Agency's
staff.168
On March 5, 1970, the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into
force. In keeping with Article III which required each non-weapons
state to accept safeguards by agreement with the International Agency,
representatives of the United States and 47 other IAEA member
states, including the nuclear power states of Europe, met twice
during 1970 to consider the character of such safeguards agreements,
the procedures to be included, and the methods of financing the
safeguards.
The "Four Reactor Agreement" of the United States expired on
July 31, 1970. To continue its cooperation with the IAEA in develop-
ing effective safeguards, the United States arranged for IAEA
personnel to take part in safeguards exercises at certain U.S. facilities.
This was intended as an interim arrangement until such time as
President Johnson's offer of 1967 to submit all U.S. peaceful nuclear
activities to IAEA safeguards was implemented.169
In December 1970, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in its
annual report noted that members and staff of the Committee had
visited the International Agency to discuss safeguard inspection pro-
cedures. The Joint Committee reported that it was mindful of the
importance of safeguards, ". . . but is looking very cautiously at the
growing safeguards program and what could develop into a need for
increased funding to support the numbers of personnel which may be
suggested as necessary to run the IAEA safeguards program." 17°
However, the Joint Committee's report for 1971 had little to say
about safeguards.
Conclusions and Current Issues
Had the International Atomic Energy Agency evolved in the di-
rection indicated by President Eisenhower's idealistic Atoms for
Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence upon develop-
ment of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a channel for
technical assistance and nuclear materials. However, the tensions of
the cold war effectively precluded such a role. While the United
States was the most generous contributor to the IAEA, it chose not
to promote the Agency as a distributor of nuclear materials or the
custodian of a pool of such materials. Nor did the United States
support an international regulatory or standard-setting function for
the IAEA for design and operation of nuclear power plants. On the
1WU.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1968 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969>, p. 204.
199 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1970 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1973, p. 129.
170 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. "Activity and Accomplishments
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy During the Second Session of the 91st Congress,"
Congressional Record, vol. lltf, December 31, 1970, p. 44324.
202
other hand, the Agency provided an arena wherein U.S. and Soviet
representatives could meet in an atmosphere where political differ-
ences were less pronounced than for other cold war circumstances.
From the beginning of the IAEA, the United States and the U.S.S.R.
as the two principal "have" nations in the world's nuclear com-
munity were pushed together in their participation in the Agency's
activities by the pressures of the other largely "have-not" nations.
These circumstances engendered some mutual interest and the result-
ing experience demonstrated the possibilities for cooperation between
the two governments in diplomatic, legal, and technical matters relat-
ing to nuclear energy. While such cooperation has become common in
1972.171 it was most unusual during the formative years of the IAEA.
The IAEA provided a sheltered field wherein member states belong-
ing to widely differing world power blocs could cautiously experiment
with new relations. On the other hand, the variety of viewpoints and
national desires represented among the members of the Agency on
occasion led to strained relations within the IAEA's governing bodies
and has tended to limit the Agency to a lowest common denominator
of inoffensive activities.
The IAEA has been a useful test-bed to demonstrate a limited form
of international inspection, a demonstration that can be important
for U.S. interests if international limitations upon armaments are
agreed upon. The IAEA, with strong U.S. backing, has demonstrated
on a small scale how international safeguards for nuclenr materials
can work. Perhaps more important, it has done so without generating
any insoluble problem of national sovereignty. Whether the United
States and other nations will now be willing to provide the financial
and technical support required by the Agency to expand its safeguards
functions enough to adequately implement the Nonproliferation
Treaty remains to be seen.
Several specific questions relating to the IAEA are likely to con-
front U.S. diplomats and policymakers in the future. These questions
can be expected to bear upon :
(1) Establishing and enforcing international standards and
guides for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear
power plants, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, and perpetual
radioactive waste storage facilities ;
(2) Establishing and enforcing international regulations for
the shipment of highly radioactive materials ;
(3) Assessment of environmental effects of nuclear facilities
located so near to national boundaries that such effects could
be expected to extend across national borders ;
(4) Supplying nuclear fuel materials;
(5) Providing for the perpetual storage of radioactive wastes
from nuclear power ;
(0) Safeguarding of nuclear fuel materials for commercial
nuclear power;
(7) Possible future relations with the regional nuclear energy
agencies of the Soviet bloc nations.
171 The United States and the U.S.S.R. slimed an agreement on scientific find technological
cooperation on May 24. 1072, that poos hoyond the usual eTehantre of Ideas and opens the
way to scientific Joint research undertakings and cooperative projects. It estahlished for
the first time a U.S. -Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Cf.
Claire R. Geler. The U.B.-Boviet Aqrrcmcvt in Science anrl Technology (Washington, P.P. :
The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 10, 1972, report No.
72-179 SP.
VII. Creating A Regional Nuclear Organization : The European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
Of the international organizations arising out of the discovery of
nuclear fission, the most ambitious, but perhaps the most disappoint-
ing, has been the multinational, regional organization known as
Euratom. Established in 1958, the purpose of the European Atomic
Energy Community was to create conditions necessary for the speedy
establishment and growth of nuclear power within the European Eco-
nomic Community, whose members then included Belgium, France,
the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands. The goal of Euratom was also expected to further the eco-
nomic integration of Europe, which was a long standing objective of
U.S. diplomacy. The support and collaboration of the United States
with Euratom has been directly instrumental in demonstrating U.S.
nuclear power technology in Europe, and, for a while, provided U.S.
diplomacy with special leverage in relations with Euratom.
This section outlines the origins of Euratom, its functions and
activities, and the disappointments of its research and development
program. The nature and scale of U.S. support are mentioned and
show that U.S. participation in Euratom has been greater than U.S.
participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency or the
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. The joint U.S.-Euratom re-
search and reactor programs are described in section VIII.
Origins of Euratom,
The impetus for European economic and military integration that
followed World War II,172 and problems with oil supplies were con-
tributing factors to the idea of a European atomic energy community.
There was the three-year suspension of Iranian oil production fol-
lowing nationalization in 1951 and the closing of the Suez Canal in
1956-57.173 The initial impetus for Euratom appeared in the mid 1950's
when statesmen took note of the expectations of nuclear scientists
and engineers that economically competitive nuclear power was close
at hand. In June 1955 the foreign ministers of the six members of
the European Coal and Steel Community met at Messina, Italy and
decided that commercial nuclear power could provide a desired
additional spur for European integration. The ministers had in mind
a vertical integration of a new European nuclear industry which prom-
ised quick returns to the participating nations, with negligible in-
terference with established commercial interests. WTith the European
172 Cf . section III.
173 Oil supply interruptions were to occur again with the closing of the Suez Canal in
1967. the Libyan embargo and the Tapline rupture and cutoff in 1970. The interruptions
of the 1950's took place at a time when the United States was a relatively modest oil
importer and still possessed sufficient excess producing capacity to contribute a portion
of the oil to make up the interrupted supply of other major Western oil consuming
countries. However, of recent years the United States has become a substantial importer
of oil and it appears unlikely that the United States could come to the rescue for future
interruptions of European oil supplies.
(203)
204
nuclear industry in its infancy, vested interests were few and still
fluid.
The exciting early purpose of -Euratom was to create a European
nuclear technology and a European nuclear power industry, which, it
was hoped, would be able to compete with the nuclear industries of
the United Kingdom and the United States.174
ADVICE FOR THE DECISIONMAKERS
The foreign ministers decided at Messina to seek the advice of the
technological community. In November 1956 they commissioned three
prominent Europeans to report on the early production of nuclear
power within the six member countries. The three were Louis Armand
of France, Franz Etzel of West Germany, and Francesco Giordani of
Italy.175 Dubbed "the three wise men" in the public press, these three
were well versed in science, technology, administration, and diplomacy,
but their advice and interests focused more upon politics and economics
than upon science.176
A TARGET FOR EURATOM
The product of "the three wise men" was a report, A Target for
Euratom,171 delivered May 4, 1957, after the treaties for atomic inte-
gration had been signed. The substance of the proposals, however, was
well known beforehand, for in January 1957, the authors had ex-
pounded their ideas in a public conference.
A Target for Euratom combined the factors of energy and economic
policy into a compelling argument for European atomic integration.
With the Suez crisis still fresh in mind, they observed that a future
stoppage of oil could be an economic calamity for Europe, and that ex-
cessive dependence upon an oil supply from an unstable region might
lead to serious political trouble throughout the world. Estimating
that future energy requirements of the economic community would
increase by 83 percent between 1955 and 1975, they advised that the
economic growth of the six countries was in danger of being seriously
hampered by lack of another source of energy. They warned that
without such a new source imports of fuel would rise to intolerable
amounts, doubling in the next decade and tripling within two decades.
The authors recommended that the Common Market nations install
15,000 megawatts of nuclear power by 1967. For perspective, at that
"* For more detailed insight into the orlpins of Euratom, Cf. Rene Foche, Europe and
Technology: A Political View (Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1970), p. 23.
178 Louis Armand was then director general of the French State Railways and president
of the Industrial Equipment Commission of the French Commissariat a l'Energle Atomique
(CEA). By profession he was an engineer and an administrator. Franz Etzel was a senior
vice president of the Coal Community. A lawyer and an economist, he was also leader of the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany. Francesco Giordani was president of the Italian
National Rfs^arch Council. A professor, nuclear scientist and chemist, he was a leading
European authority on nuclear science.
w Professor Warren B. Walsh of the international relations program of the Maxwell
School, University of Syracuse, underscored this point In his observation that :
". . . the principal architects of Euratom were specialists In politics and economics,
especially tne former, rather than scientists .... The genesis of Euratom owed
more to the Impact of politics and public affairs than the other way around."
Cf. Warren B. Walsh, Science and International Publio Affairs (New York : Maxwell
School of Syracuse University, 1967), p. 79.
177 A Target for Euratom. Reprinted in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, pp. 38-64.
205
time a powerplant of 250 electrical megawatts output was considered
large, so the goal was equivalent to 60 new such powerplants.178
The authors asserted that the Common Market nations could not
achieve this goal without pooling their resources and obtaining help
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The target
was admittedly ambitious ; of the six members of the Community, at
that time only France had any practical experience with nuclear power.
In summation, the authors presented an optimistic picture of the bene-
fits obtainable from nuclear integration. They wrote : 179
. . . Euratom will create new opportunities. It will pool the scientific as well
as the industrial resources of our six countries and their varied skills. A common
market for nuclear equipment to be set up within a year will promote industrial
specialization. Further, Euratom will represent our nations as a single unit
vis-a-vis other states, and will be far better placed to obtain full cooperation from
them than our countries separately.
The authors highlighted reasons for American support and partici-
pation. For example, the U.S. nuclear industry could expect benefits
from experience with nuclear power plants built in Europe. Their
report stated : 180
... No amount of research can be a substitute for the practical knowledge to
be gained by large-scale industrial application of atomic power. Europe could
make this experience available to the United States. Our talks in Washington
convinced us that, on the healthy basis of a two-way traffic, a close partnership
as equals can be built up between the United States and Euratom and their
respective industries.
What forms could this cooperation take ? The advisors had definite
ideas, which they expressed as follows : m
. . . The United States would make available the necessary fissionable mate-
rials and the technical knowledge to set our industries going. Once Euratom is
established, a task force composed of some of America's most able men would be
at our disposal to continue studying with European experts the many technical
problems posed by our programme. America would provide training facilities for
our scientists and technicians. Joint projects, for instance to improve and adapt
reactors, can be envisaged between American and European industries, as well as
between the American and European Atomic Energy Commissions.
U.S. Support for European Nuclear Integration
The joint communique issued from the White House at the end of a
visit by the three-man Euratom Committee to the United States indi-
cated strong U.S. support. It said : 182
The U.S. Government welcomes the initiative taken in the Committee's proposal
for a bold and imaginative application of nuclear energy. . . . The United States
anticipates active association in the achievement of the Committee's objective,
and foresees a fruitful two-way exchange of experience and technical develop-
ment, opening a new area for mutually beneficial action on both the governmental
and the industrial level and reinforcing solidarity within Europe and across the
Atlantic.
But U.S. support for Euratom was not unqualified. Secretary
Dulles made it clear that the United States wished Euratom to con-
centrate exclusively on development of nuclear power and not aspire
178 That this target was overly ambitions Is evident In the situation of 1967. In that
year the six Euratom nations had between them 16 nuclear power reactors with a total
electrical generating capacity of 2.094 megawatts.
179 A Tarqet for Euratom, op. cit., p. 47.
18° Ibid., p. 50.
181 Loc. cit.
183 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36 (February 25. 1957), p. 307.
206
to such greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com-
munity or the fostering of greater political unity among its member
states. While some European proponents of Euratom looked to it to
restore the influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington
view was the opposite. The communique at the end of the "wise men's"
visit said that the parties agreed that Euratom should be solely the
stimulus to realize the objectives for nuclear power.183
In its assessment of U.S. policy for international development of
nuclear energy, the American Assembly reflected the optimism of the
times. It saw many benefits for the United States from encouraging the
use of this new power technology in Europe : 1S4
A major effort on the part of American industry and government would provide
the American atomic power program with vitality and purpose and accelerate the
development of power at home. While it can be expected that highly industrialized
countries such as those in Europe will ultimately establish their own facilities for
building their atomic power plants, Euratom can provide American industry with
experience as well as a market for its products and technology. Such an effort
would assist the aims of American foreign policy in developing the economic
strength of, and American ties with, the Western European community, and . . .
would provide experience in the operation of large-scale reactors of great and
immediate benefit to our own development program.
Soviet Opposition to Euratom
International rivalries quickly raised diplomatic difficulties for
Euratom. The Soviet Union declared both Euratom and the Economic
Community to be instruments of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization and labeled Euratom a scheme to rearm Germany with atomic
weapons. The Soviet Union sent warning notes to each of the six
Common Market nations, urging them to accept instead the Soviet
plan for Pan-European economic and atomic integration. While this
warning was abortive, the Soviet Union was more successful in block-
ing later Euratom efforts to establish a close relationship with the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency.
An example of the Soviet Union's position is a statement of the
U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry issued March 16, 1957. After agreeing that
economic cooperation in Europe would help to restore disrupted trade
and scientific and technical connections, the Soviet Union opposed both
the Euratom and the Common Market as in contradiction to those
aims and likely to increase the rift in Europe : 185
However, the plans for creating Euratom and the Common Market are in
manifest contradiction with these aims. The first thins that strikes the eye
is that all those taking part in Euratom and the Common Market are members
of the military NATO grouping. It is obvious that the activities of Euratom and
the Common Market will be subjugated to NATO aims, the aggressive character
of whieh Is widely known.
Under the circumstances, the creation of Euratom and the Common Market
would inevitably lead to a further widening of the rift in Europe, to an
aggravation of tensions in Europe, which would complicate the establishment
of economic and political cooperation on a European basis and give rise to fresh
difficuties in the solution of the problem of European security.
Ma For further discussion of this point, Cf. Klaus E. Knorr. "American Forelcn Policy
and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy." Atoms for rower, United States Policy in
Atomic Bnergy Development (New York : The American Assembly, Columbia University,
1957), pp. 100 12fl nnd In particular pp. 123-127.
1S* Atoms for Power, op. clt, p. 157. _ _ . _
"■U.S. < onfrress, Joint Committee on Atomic Enerpy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom.
Agreements, op. clt., p. 28.
207
Three Policy Issues of Euratom
Three issues in the final international negotiations for Euratom
further illustrate the problems that may arise out of a national decision
to foster application of a new technology for the benefit of American
diplomacy. While the U.S. role is not clearly visible in the working
out of these issues, it seems plausible that much encouragement and
influence flowed eastward across the Atlantic.
The three major issues central to establishment of Euratom were :
(1) Whether Euratom should manufacture enriched uranium;
(2) Whether member states should be precluded from military
use of atomic energy ; and
(3) Whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear
materials. These questions shared a common root ; to what extent
was Euratom to be an instrument to achieve economic inde-
pendence and political and military independence for Europe ? 1S6
WHETHER EURATOM SHOULD MANUFACTURE ENRICHED URANIUM
Until January 1957, European proponents of Euratom had pre-
sumed that the new organization would give top priority to building
facilities to enrich uranium. It seemed clear that such a facility would
be needed to reduce the dependence of Euratom states upon nuclear fuel
imported from the United States. But this expectation was dashed
early in 1957 when the Germans proposed that the plan be studied
further. Although the French pressed for immediate construction
the forces of delay prevailed.
The issue impinged directly upon U. S. interests for at that time
the United States did not favor foreign production of enriched
uranium. The thought of an enriched uranium facility upon the Con-
tinent near Soviet-occupied territories and the possibilities that nuclear
materials might be illicitly diverted from such a plant moved the
United States to assure the Euratom nations of a supply of nuclear
fuel. Louis Armand let it be known that while he still favored the
ultimate construction of an enrichment plant in Europe, he rejected
it as an immediate objective for Euratom.187
The publication of A Target for Euratom defused the issue. Noting
that until recently the construction of a plant had seemed the only
way to obtain enriched uranium, the authors noted a changed condi-
tion : "But there is now no doubt that our countries can obtain en-
riched uranium from the United States in the necessary quantities, and
at low published prices." 188 They estimated that enriched uranium
produced in Europe would probably cost two to three times as much.
Furthermore, they anticipated the early reuse of plutonium produced
as a byproduct from other nuclear plants, the use of natural uranium as
a fuel, and the prompt development of the breeder reactor would
reduce European needs for enriched uranium. In the face of this
advice, the proposal to immediately build an enrichment plant dropped
i8e Tije discussion that follows draws heavily upon an analysis of Euratom published
in 1964 by Jeroslav G. Polach, a diplomat and later an economist with Resources for
the Future. Inc., who was interested in energy and Euratom. Cf. Jeroslav G. Polach,
Euratom, Its Background, Tssues, and Economic Implications (Dobbs Ferry, New York :
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964), pp. 61-66.
187 Cf. Le Monde. February 20. 1957 : also, Polach, op. cit, p. 62.
188 A Target for Euratom, op. cit., p. 56.
96-525 O - T7 - vol. 1-15
208
from sight, not to reappear for more than a decade. So the United
States retained its enrichment monopoly.
WHETHER TO INCLUDE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EURATOM
Central to Atoms for Peace was the thought of dissuading nations
from making atomic weapons. This concept was evident in proposals
during negotiation of the Euratom treaty that the signatories be
barred from military use of nuclear energy. This proposed restriction
generated strong opposition in France, which at that time was the
only one of the six Euratom states with the ability to make weapons.
In July 1956 during debate of the proposed European nuclear com-
munity in the French National Assembly, the Gaullists, Radicals,
Independents, and some members of the Catholic Party solidly op-
posed any limitation to France's right to produce and use atomic
weapons. When it became clear to Prime Minister Guy Mollet that
there was no chance for Euratom if he persisted in his advocacy of
limiting European use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, he
yielded to legislative pressure. Before the Assembly would approve
French participation in preparing the treaties, he had to assure it that
his Government would satisfy itself that France's participation in
Euratom would restrict neither her national atomic program nor her
right to produce and use atomic weapons for national security.189 Thus
the idea that Euratom could serve to prevent nuclear armament in
Europe was stillborn.
WHETHER EURATOM SHOULD HAVE A MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
A key issue of the international negotiations that culminated in
Euratom was whether this multinational, regional organization should
have title to all nuclear fuels within the members states, or whether
member states could individually own these materials. The negotiators
had before them the example of the United States which in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 took title to all nuclear materials in the
Nation and forbade their private ownership. The French representa-
tives argued that a Euratom monopoly was imperative to ensure non-
discriminatory access of the members to nuclear supplies. For them
the principles of monopoly and of equal access were fundamental
to European atomic integration. The German representatives opposed
such a monopoly as incompatible with the German free-market econ-
omy. To settle the issue, French Prime Minister Mollet called a con-
ference of the six nations in February 1957. The final communique
from this Paris meeting announced that ownership of fissionable
materials would be vested in Euratom, except for those held for
military purposes.100
A Treaty for Euratom
The treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
was si gned in Rome on March 25, 1957.
Its stated aim was to contribute to the raising of the standard of
living in member states and to development of commercial exchanges
1SBPolach. op. clt.,p. 64.
190 For a discussion of this meeting, cf. Polach, op. clt., p. 66.
209
with other countries by creation of conditions for the speedy estab-
lisliment and growth of nuclear industries.191
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome specifies eight functions of Euratom.
These are to :
(1) Develop research and ensure dissemination of technical
knowledge.
(2) Establish, and ensure the application of uniform safety
standards.
(3) Facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encourag-
ing business enterprise, and the construction of the basic facilities
required for the developing of nuclear energy within the Com-
munity.
(4) Ensure a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear
fuels to all users in the Community.
(5) Guarantee, by appropriate measures of control, that nuclear
materials are not diverted for purposes other than those for which
they are intended.
(6) Exercise the property rights conferred upon it in respect
to special fissionable materials.
(7) Ensure extensive markets and access to the best technical
means by the creation of a common market for specialized mate-
rials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for nuclear
investment, and by freedom of employment for specialists within
the Community.
(8) Establish with other countries and with international orga-
nizations any contacts likely to promote progress in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
As finally approved, Euratom's functions did not include control of
military uses of nuclear energy, thus yielding to the wishes of the
French.
The initial members of Euratom were Belgium, France, the Federal
German Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Later
the United Kingdom applied for entry but was excluded by the posi-
tion in 1963 of General de Gaulle. Now that the United Kingdom is
to become a member of the Common Market, presumably membership
in Euratom will soon follow.
Establishing the Infrastructure for European Nuclear Power
Much of Euratom's functions had to do with establishing the in-
dustrial and regulatory infrastructure for commercial use of nuclear
energy in Europe. Its research and development programs supple-
mented those of France, Italy, and West Germany. It created a nuclear
common market within the European Economic Community. It helped
lay the regulatory groundwork of standards to regulate the radiologi-
cal effects of nuclear power plants. However, its functions stopped
short of financing the construction of operating nuclear power plants.
wi jn comparison with the other two European communities, Euratom has the most
limited aim. The European Economic Community has the widest, its objective being to
promote harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, increased stability, accelerated raising of the living standards, and closer rela-
tions among the member states. Compared with that, the aims of the Coal and Steel
Community are more restrietively associated with its contribution to economic expansion,
development of employment and raising of living standards.
210
FINANCING AND OPERATING COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
The economic uncertainties of nuclear power in the 1950s and its high
capital costs in comparison with conventional fossil-fuel power plants
caused supporters of Euratom to urge that it become directly involved
in financing and management of commercial nuclear power plants. The
concept that Euratom might become the European equivalent of a
Tennessee Valley Authority, however, did not survive in the Treaty
of Rome. The Treaty limited Euratom's scope to facilitating invest-
ment and ensuring the construction of basic facilities for nuclear
power. Euratom is authorized to collect and analyze investment in-
formation for its members. But it has no authority over the decisions
of the national electricity industries and their investors. This limita-
tion made it politically acceptable for the United States to work with
Euratom. For the United States Government to have offered technical
assistance and other support to a foreign body dedicated to state
generation of electricity probably would have raised opposition because
of the predominance of private enterprise in the U.S. electric power
industry. Thus, Euratom's role evolved in the direction of a broker
rather than a prime mover in the commercial use of nuclear energy in
Europe.
CREATING A NUCLEAR COMMON MARKET
Commercial nuclear energy in Europe needed an internal market
large enough to justify the requisite investment of economic, human,
and physical capital. Proponents of Euratom expected it to create a
nuclear common market which would permit a more economic alloca-
tion of resources, and the use of the most modern techniques of special-
ization and mass production. The resulting increase in productivity
of capital and labor was expected to contribute to higher living stand-
ards, to general economic growth, and to facilitation of social changes
in Europe.
The Treaty of Rome laid the basis for such a market. It provided for
the unhindered commerce of certain goods and the free movement
of labor, capital, and services for nuclear energy. Items to move with-
out tariffs, taxes or quantitative restrictions included nuclear ores,
fissionable materials, radioactive isotopes, and goods peculiar to the
nuclear industry. Likewise, free movement of labor seeking employ-
ment in the European nuclear industry was to be assured to properly
qualified nationals of the six Common Market nations.
JOINT ENTERPRISES I AN INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The drafters of Euratom hoped to create a nuclear industrv which
could compete against those of the United Kingdom and the* United
States in world markets. To avoid the limitations of fragmentation
among many, relatively small industrial concerns, the Treaty of Rome
provided for joint enterprises to carry out "undertakings of outstand-
ing importance to the development* of the nuclear industry in the
Community ""'Joint Enterprise status confers special advantages
including recognition as a legal personality, and exemptions from cer-
tain taxes, duties, and charges. In return, a Joint Enterprise is re-
»• Article 45.
211
quired to provide Euratom with information on the construction and
operation of its facilities. All non-patented information communicated
to Euratom might be disseminated by it. Joint Enterprise status might
be conferred under varying terms, but could be annulled when eco-
nomic conditions permit. To date, four of the early nuclear power
plant ventures in Europe have been designated as Joint Enterprises.
These include three nuclear powerplants in "West 'Germany and one
joint Franco-Belgian project.
Early Changes in Euratom Objectives
What an international organization does and what it becomes de-
pends in part upon its foundation in international law, and upon the
perception of its functions. Euratom soon began to give less priority
to the immediate building of nuclear power plants than to its research
and service function. Euratom's first three annual reports reveal this
trend clearly and suggest that in many ways the work of diplomats
had only just begun when the treaty was completed. The first annual
report emphasized an urgent need for nuclear power in the Com-
munity and its optimistic outlook for the economic competitiveness
of this new energy source. Other fields of nuclear activity received
lesser priority. Euratom's role as a middleman, a broker, was em-
phasized : 193
The Commission is entrusted by the Euratom Treaty with the task of creating
conditions necessary for the establishment and growth of nuclear industries. It
stimulates initiative and encourages cooperation, follows the progress being made
in various fields, guides investment and endeavors in every sphere and at all
levels to achieve its aim of building up the independent nuclear industry.
On the other hand, the Commission sought to avoid "systematic in-
tervention," and "any semblance of authoritarianism" or of "isolation-
ist paths."
Euratom's second annual report, for 1959, marked a shift away from
immediate application of nuclear power toward priority for nuclear
research. While Euratom's nuclear power program continued, its sense
of urgency and immediacy was gone. Top priority was assigned to es-
tablishment of a Euratom university — a concept that won no support.
In its third annual report, for 1960, the change in Euratom's goals
was marked by a transition from short to long term goals. By then
Euratom was asserting that a condition for its success, and for that of
the whole European integration, was to overcome traditional attitudes
of governments, civil servants, and organizations. The Commission
assigned the highest priority to ". . . marshalling all the resources at
its command to foster a European spirit." 194 This goal and the closely
related proposal for a Euratom university, became a recurring theme
in atomic integration debates.
Research for Nuclear Power
A principal function of Euratom was to coordinate nuclear research
among the six nations. To this end, the Treaty directed Euratom to
invite member states, persons, or enterprises to inform it of their nu-
183 European Atomic Energy Community. First General Report on the Activities of the
Community, 1958 (Brussels-Luxembourg, 1959). p. 55.
1B* European Atomic Energy Communitv. Third General Report on the Activities of the
Communities, 1969 (Brussels-Luxembourg, February 1970), pp. 7-14.
212
clear research. Euratom would advise on each program to avoid un-
necessary duplication and guide research of member states toward
subjects receiving insufficient attention. However, the Treaty forbade
Euratom to publish any such programs without consent.
The Treaty provided Euratom four means of influencing the nuclear
research of its member states and their nuclear establishments.
Euratom could :
(1) Furnish financial assistance for research ;
(2) Supply nuclear source materials and enriched uranium or
plutonium at its disposal ;
(3) Place facilities, equipment, or expert assistance at the dis-
posal of member states, persons, or enterprises, either against pay-
ment or free of charge ; and
(4) Initiate joint financing by member states, persons, or enter-
prises concerned.
These features of the treaty were intended to give Euratom some in-
fluence over research in the national establishments of the member
states. But Euratom was not authorized to direct the nuclear research
establishments of its members or their nuclear industries. It could, of
course, direct the research and development done with its funds in its
own establishments or in other organizations. Equipped with these
powers, Euratom in principle could have greatly influenced the Euro-
pean nuclear industry. But because of dissension among its members,
these powers were not to be fully exercised.
FUNDING OF EURATOM RESEARCH
Euratom is financed by two budgets : one for operations, the other
for research and investment. Member states contribute to each. The
prevailing pattern has been for France, Germany, and Italy each to
fund 28 percent of the operating budget, Belgium and Holland 7.9
Sercent each, and Luxembourg 0.2 percent. As for the research and
evelopment budget, the pattern has been for France and West Ger-
many to finance 30 percent each, Italy 23 percent, Belgium 9.9 per-
cent, the Netherlands 6.9 percent, and Luxembourg 0.2 percent.
Funds for Euratom research for the period 1958 through 1971
totaled $823.4 million. Table IV shows the breakdown of this budget
according to component programs.195
IN-HOUSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR EURATOM
Euratom's facilities perform long-term, basic research remote from
large scale commercial application of nuclear power by industrial
concerns. Euratom also furnishes technological services, scientific and
technical information, testing, and standardization of measurements.
The Treaty provided Euratom with its own in-house research facil-
ities. It specified establishment of a Joint Research Center,196 which
196 "Spondins by Euratom," Nuclear News, vol. 14 (April, 1971), p. 43.
"• Article 8 laid down three conditions for the Joint Research Center :
(1) The Center shall ensure the implementation of the research programs and of
any other tasks entrusted to it by Euratom.
(2) The Center shall also ensure the establishment of uniform nuclear terminology
and a standard system of measurements.
(3) The Center could be composed of separate establishments for geographical or
operational reasons.
213
TABLE IV.-APPROPRIATIONS FOR EURATOM RESEARCH AND TRAINING PROGRAMS FROM 1958 TO 1971
[In millions of units of account (US$)1
1958-68' 1969 1970 1971 Totals
Technological research connected with reactor de-
velopment:
Fast reactors 97.3 1.4 1.5 1.8 102.0
High-temperature gas reactors 50.5 3.2 3.2 3.7 60.6
Heavy-water reactors 176.2 9.4 9.9 11.4 206! 9
Proven-type reactors 66.2 ' 66 2
Othertypes 16.3 '."" 16 3
Technological problems ) 97 n ( 1.6 1.7 2.6) .„',,
Nuclear materials J u.v \ 2. 3 2.6 3.0) 40- l
Reactor physics _) ln R ( .6 .6 .7) ,. -
Direct conversion.. ] \ .6 .7 .8 J 14"6
Irradiated fuel recycling 6.9 6.9
Waste processing 3.0 _ """ 3! 0
Plutonium and transplutonium elements 41.3 4.0 4.5 5.1" 54.9
Total technological research 495.3 23.1 24.7 28.5 571.6
Public service:
Nuclear measurements and standards 22.7 2.9 3.2 3.8 32.6
Data processing and computer center 15.8 3.3 3.9 4.3 27 3
High-flux irradiations 40.1 3.8 4.2 4.7 52^8
Biology and health protection 20.5 3.-5 3.8 4.1 31.9
Radioisotope applications 4.9 .1 —(2) —(J) 5^0
Training 3.9 .5 .5 .6 5.5
Dissemination of information 12.2 1.7 — Q) —(a) 13.9
Total, public service
Oriented basic research :
Fusion and plasma physics
Condensed state physics
Total, oriented basic research
120.1
15.8
15.6
17.5
169.0
45.4
6.1
2.0
6. 4
2.3
6.6
3.4
64 5
10.6
18.3
56.0
8.1
8.7
10.0
82.8
Grand total 671.4 47.0 49.0 56.0 823.4
' Two 5-year programs.
J As from 1970 the appropriations for the radioisotope applications program and the dissemination of information
program are not included in the research budget.
Source: Nuclear News, vol. 14 (April 1971), p. 43.
•was brought into instant existence by transfer of laboratories from
four of the member states.197
Dissension, Crisis, and Delay in Euratom's Programs
Early hopes that Euratom would become the prime mover for a
coherent, integrated European approach to development of nuclear
power technology were dashed by dissension, crisis, and delay. Eura-
tom's research and development has been threatened with disruption
and in the eyes of some observers has been weak and fragmented. The
rivalry between Euratom and national nuclear technology programs
appeared at an early stage and has since afflicted Euratom's program.
Member states seem to have acted on the principle that a national
nuclear development effort must necessarily precede or accompany
197 The Ispra center. — The first and largest of the Euratom research centers Is that at
Ispra, Italy. Begun as an Italian nuclear research establishment in 1959, it was transferred
to Euratom in March 1961 under a 99 year arrangement. Much of Euratom's nuclear tech-
nology work has been done here. Ispra also contains a scientific data processing center that
performs computer calculations for the European community.
The Petten center. — The Petten Nuclear Research Establishment is located adjacent to
Holland's Reactor Centrum Nederland at Petten, on the North Sea some 36 miles north of
Amsterdam. Work at Petten focuses on nuclear measurements. Ai large materials-testing
reactor that was built by the Dutch Government was transferred to Euratom in 1962.
The Gecl center. — A Central Office for Nuclear Measurements for Euratom Is located
close to the Belgian National Nuclear Research Center at Mol, north of Brussels and near
the Dutch border.
The Karlsruhe center. — A European Institute for Transuranic Elements is located adja-
cent to West Germany's Karlsruhe Nuclear Center. It is concerned primarily with research
on plutonium.
214
multinational technological cooperation in Europe. They were unwill-
ing to subordinate national development in a community-wide effort.
Rene Foche, an international civil servant, describes this principle as
false because it implies that every European state has an equal right
to develop every form of advanced technology within its own borders,
which is the antithesis of the concept of regional specialization charac-
teristic of a true common market.198
The experience of Euratom illustrates a diplomatic reality. The po-
litical cohesion of members in an international technological under-
taking is a prerequisite for success, not a desirable byproduct from it.
The troubles of Euratom's research and development programs show
also that the cohesive force of internationalism in science was not
strong enough to withstand the divisive forces of national commercial
interests.
A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an organ-
ization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that seek to create
and apply new technologies. The Treaty of Rome recognized this
principle by providing for five-year research programs. The first
five-year plan (1958-1962), concentrated upon organizing Euratom's
research, particularly at its Joint Research Center. The second five-year
plan (1963-1967) was soon wracked by dissension and budget troubles.
The third five-year plan (1968-1972) was not authorized and Eura-
tom's research is now funded annually.
THE FIRST 5-YEAR PLAN (1958-1962)
Research programs for the first 5-year plan were specified in
detail in an annex to the treaty. It was devoted mainly to equipping
the establishments of the Joint Research Center and to organizing
contract, research. For the first 5-year plan $215 million was al-
located. This amount proved to be more than enough because of a
slow start and there was a surplus in 1962 to carry forward. "While the
$215 million spent for the first 5-year plan was a considerable
sum, it corresponded approximately to the amount spent on nuclear
research in one year by the United Kingdom.
Even the first 5-year plan suffered from dissent arising out of
divergent national approaches to nuclear power technology. The
French argued that Euratom research should focus upon reactors
using natural uranium as a fuel, thus reducing European dependence
upon imported enriched fuels, while the Italians preferred research
on uses of enriched fuels.
THE SECOND 5-YEAR PLAN (1903-1967)
The second 5-year plan started off ambitiously, with the Euratom
Council unanimously approving a budget of almost $450 million. In
1965 an additional $5.6 million was allocated. But the plan soon was
in difliculty. As interests of the member states continued to diverge,
they jockeyed for the advantage of having Euratom develop the
particular nuclear power technology they favored. Inflation also
became a strain and increased the costs of research, particularly at
1 Foche, op. cit., p. 24.
215
Ispra in Italy where about one-third of Euratonrs own research was
concentrated.
The French continued to criticize Euratom's research. They opposed
research on the enriched fuel technology favored in the United States,
arguing that there was little future for expansion of the European
nuclear industry if its power plants would have to depend upon the
United States for fuel. As an alternative, France offered to put infor-
mation and experience of its own nuclear power technology at the
disposal of the Community. This was the first time such as offer had
been made, and some observers questioned whether it was seriously
meant.199
The issue of which reactor technology to choose became so con-
troversial that it went to the Euratom Council for decision when
Euratom requested a $38 million increase in funding to carry out the
plan. The French and Belgians lined up in favor of a few projects that
would concentrate on natural uranium reactors, breeder reactors, and
fusion. Other members agreed that this concentration would be help-
ful, but not at the expense of a major revision of the ongoing Euratom
research. In a final compromise, the Council allocated an additional
$5.6 million for the five-year plan. Research for "proven-type" reactors,
a term which meant the U.S. -type reactors, was cut 20 percent.
FAILURE TO ADOPT A THIRD 5 -YEAR PLAN
Although Euratom's third 5-year plan for research was scheduled
to start in 1968, by September 1967 the dissension had become so great
that Euratom abandoned hope for agreement. Instead, Fritz Hellwig,
the Common Market commissioner responsible for Euratom research,
proposed a one year "transitional program," which was adopted as a
stopgap measure, but funded at half the 1967 level. As Euratom en-
tered 1968 it faced this severe cut in research funds, aimed particularly
at contract research, as well as isolation from the mainstream of nu-
clear development in Europe. The national nuclear industries did not
want Euratom working on technology that was ripe for commercial
application. That year saw repeated debates about Euratom in the
EEC Council, as representatives of the major members questioned the
practicability of a true nuclear energy community. More specifically,
they asked what kind of research Euratom should sponsor to win
support of member states. Could Euratom be an effective future force
for building an integrated European nuclear energy industry? No
clear answers emerged and the decision on the future of Euratom re-
search was tabled.200
The delay and dissension led Commissioner Hellwig to warn Eura-
tom that its members either had to work out a joint, long-range pro-
gram of research or forfeit all hope of getting into the nuclear power
race. He warned too that prolongation of the Euratom budget crisis
would jeopardize plans for a Common Market research policy.201
The crisis went to the European Parliament. By unanimous resolu-
tion it observed that the European nuclear community needed common
1OT Michael Palmer, John Lambert and others. A Handbook of European Organizations
(New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 19GS). p. 305.
200 Nuclear Industry, vol. 15 (January, 196S), p. 20.
201 Nucleonics Week, vol. 9 (October 24, 196S) , p. 8.
216
policies for research and technological progress ; that it did not have
them ; and that this lack would condemn Western Europe to a per-
manent economic and political inferiority vis-a-vis the rest of the
world. In a parallel policy paper, the EEC Commission warned that
if member states could not find a way to advance together, they would
give up the hope of making a good showing in the race for the nuclear.
market.202
Through 1970 the future of Euratom's research remained uncertain.
A restructuring which could have been affected by a simple majority
vote in the EEC Council was nullified when the French objected.203
The situation was no better in 1971 when initially the European Par-
liament refused to approve Euratom's draft research and investment
budget because it was likely to prolong stagnation and absence of
decision.204
PLUTONIUM FOR FAST BREEDER RESEARCH
Another example of Euratom's difficulties in carrying out a multi-
national program of nuclear research was triggered by a domestic
decision of the United States. Euratom's early research emphasized
the breeder reactor, and was concentrated in France and West Ger-
many. For the experimental work to go forward, plutonium was
needed. Euratom had planned to borrow this material from the United
States and so had budgeted only for use-charges. When, in 1967, the
United States decided as a matter of policy to sell rather than loan
the plutonium to Euratom, the price was set at $8 million. This cost
caused a financial crisis in Euratom, which asked France to provide
40 percent of the U.S. sales price. France refused, saying that it was
up to Euratom to supply the material. Euratom capitulated and ulti-
mately took the funds from other parts of its budget. Italy then
complained that France was monopolizing the most commercially
promising work while the other partners shared only in the costs.205
The Supply and Control of Nuclear Materials
Two institutional prerequisites of nuclear power — supply and con-
trol of nuclear fuel materials — were the basis for granting suprana-
tional authority to Euratom. The Treaty of Rome specified Euratom's
ownership of nuclear fuel materials used for peaceful purposes, and
vested in Euratom supranational rights of inspection for safeguards.
The supply function has not grown as originally expected. The safe-
guards function, in contrast, has been performed effectively and has
demonstrated the practicability of international inspection. It remains
to be seen what will happen to Euratom's safeguards function with the
advent of the Nonproliferation Treaty and its emphasis on the safe-
guards function of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
203 "Call to Preserve Euratom," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 14 (January,
1 y oH ) , p. 8.
,J^"F'"r;ltom I)lHP"te Drags On," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 15 (December
1970) . p. 064.
sot "Euratom Budget Blow," Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 16 (Januarv/
February, 1971), p. 8.
at For a more detailed discussion of this event, see Daniel Greenberg. "Euratom : Atomic
Agency Foundering Amidst Squabbles of Its Partners," Science, vol. 163 (February 7, 1969),
217
SUPRANATIONAL OWNERSHIP OF NUCLEAR FUEL MATERIALS
The Treaty of Rome gave Euratom exclusive right of ownership to
enriched uranium and plutonium within the Community, except for
materials for military purposes, and also gave Euratom a first option
to buy ores and unprocessed nuclear fuel materials. Euratom's exclu-
sive ownership extends to all nuclear fuel materials whether produced
in the Community or imported into it, except for weapons materials.206
Under the Treaty, Euratom has authority to: (1) exercise security
control over the use of nuclear fuel materials; (2) direct the appropri-
ate storage of such materials; and (3) forbid their export whenever
contrary to Community interests.
SUPPLYING NUCLEAR MATERIALS
If nuclear power was to become a commercial reality in Europe and
to attain the goals in A Target for Euratom, there had to be reliable
arrangements for supply of nuclear fuel materials. To this end the
Treaty authorized creation of an autonomous Euratom Supply Agency
under the control and direction of the Euratom Commission.207 Estab-
lished on June 1, 1960, the Supply Agency's primary function is to as-
sure equal access to nuclear fuel for all users within the Community.
The Agency is headed by a director general appointed by Euratom.
With an initial capital investment of $2.4 million, the Agency operates
on commercial principles as a public utility. It has a right of option to
buy all ores and manufactured fuel materials produced in the Com-
munity and an exclusive right to contract for the supply of nuclear fuel
materials, whether originating in the Community or imported. Prices
for its products are expected to reflect normal supply and demand,
although the Commission can propose price fixing with EEC approval.
Discriminatory pricing is forbidden within the Community. The
Agency also maintains records and accounts of nuclear fuel materials
used or transferred within the Community.
The potentially powerful supply functions of the agency have not
been fully exercised. Contributing factors include the glut of uranium
upon the world market of the 1960's, France's independent manufac-
ture of enriched uranium for its nuclear weapons, and the failure to
build Euratom facilities to produce enriched uranium. The effect of
these factors was to confine the Supply Agency to a middleman func-
tion of negotiating arrangements with non-Community countries to
supply nuclear fuel materials.
EURATOM MANUFACTURE OF ENRICHED URANIUM
Early expectations that Euratom would build and operate its own
enrichment plant to supply part of the nuclear fuel for Europe were
disappointing. U.S. policy, which was to discourage this venture, ap-
parently was influential at first. However, by the later 1960s the Com-
munity was restive over its dependence upon the United States as a
206 Articles 84 and 86. But a dispute between France and Euratom, infra, indicates inter-
pretation of these articles is not without ambiguity.
207 Articles 54-76.
218
sole source of supply. For example, the EEC in its report for 1969, ob-
served that the setting up of a uranium enrichment facility in the
Community before 1980 would help to achieve an aim of the EEC,
namely, to assure secure supplies of enriched uranium at stable prices.208
But reaching a policy decision to build an enrichment plant was not
easy for Euratom. The plant would require a large capital investment,
and a large supply of electricity, and might be uneconomical to operate
without subsidy should the United States decide to cut its prices for
enriching services. Complicating the decision for Euratom also were
the uncertain estimates for future use of nuclear power in Europe.
Forecasts of expansion in nuclear capacity ranged from 10,000 mega-
watts in 1970 — including the nuclear power plants of the United King-
dom— to 100,000 megawatts by 1980, and to perhaps twice this by
1985,209 but these estimates were so qualified as to provide a shaky basis
for raising the necessary capital.
SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE SUPPLY AGENCY
The monopoly of the Supply Agency was challenged by the French
and Italian Governments. In 1965 the Euratom Commission decided to
revise the charter of the Supply Agency. A now text Avas submitted to
the Euratom Council and to the European Parliament. But the Coun-
cil failed to agree and the revision was shelved. Five of Euratom's
member states regarded the previous Supply Agency's statute as
remaining in force, but France did not. Thereafter the French Govern-
ment entered into bilateral transactions with other countries and sup-
plied nuclear fuel materials directly to them as later did Italy, in seem-
ing violation of the Supply Agency's charter.
The EEC Commission in October 1970 attempted to reassert the con-
trol of the Supply Agency. Reportedly, it sent an ultimatum to France
to respect the fuel supply provisions of the Treaty. Barring compli-
ance, the Commission would bring the alleged violations before the
EEC Court of Justice. The French countered with a proposal to end
the Agency's control over nuclear fuel arrangements except in time of
nuclear fuel scarcity. France was said to have West German support
for its position that EEC member states be permitted to contract inde-
pendently for their own nuclear fuel supplies.210
1 1 ere again is an example of the divisive forces of nationalism.
SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR FUEL MATERIALS
For nuclear power to help resolve Europe's energy problems with-
out, unacceptably increasing (lie risk of proliferation of nuclear
weapons, there had to be credible assurance that diversion of nuclear
fuel materials would be promptly detected. In assigning a safeguards
functions to Euratom, the Treaty of Rome made a notable innovation
*» European Atomic Energy Community, Third General Report on the Activities of the
Communities, 1969, op. pit., p. 253.
** Uranium Resources, Production and Demand. A joint report by the European Nuclear
Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Ajrency (Paris: Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, September 1970) . p. 43.
"o Nucleonics Week, vol. 11 (October 29, 1970), p. 6. The EEC Commission's ultimatum
followed a scries of alleged violations by France which Included loan of uranium to the
Italian government, cut-rate purchase of plutonlum from Canada, and failure to report
uranium prospecting and marketing plans.
219
in international relations. By the Treaty, the Common Market nations
yielded some of their sovereignty to this multi-national, regional orga-
nization, and granted to Euratom supranational rights of inspection
and independent verification of holdings of nuclear fuel materials.
The Treaty provided that the Euratom Commission — now the EEC
Commission — shall satisfy itself that in the territories of the member
states :
(a) ores, source materials, and special fissionable materials are
not diverted from their intended uses as stated by the users;
(b) the provisions concerning supplies and any special under-
taking concerning measures of control entered into by the Com-
munity in an agreement concluded with a third country or an
international organization are observed.
This provision was to cause some difficulty for the United States, which
would have preferred to send its own inspectors into the Euratom
member states rather than rely upon Euratom's inspectors.
Considering that safeguarding of nuclear materials was also to be
a function of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it woidd have
been logical when establishing Euratom to put this function within
the IAEA. However, at that time the Soviet Union opposed the
creation of Euratom and had used its influence within the IAEA to
prevent any cooperative relation between the two agencies. Thus, the
negotiators had no choice but to equip Euratom with its own safe-
guards function.
The Treaty provided Euratom with plenary authority to carry out
safeguards. Any organization setting up or using facilities for the
production, separation, or use of nuclear materials, or for the process-
ing of used nuclear fuels, first has to declare to Euratom the technical
details of such facilities to the extent necessary for safeguards. Proce-
dures for the processing of used fuels are also subject to Euratom
approval. Records are to be kept to account for nuclear materials re-
ceived, used, produced, or sent out. In addition, Euratom requires that
any excess inventory of nuclear fuel materials be deposited with it, or
in a storage place controlled by it.
A vital innovation of the Treaty is the right accorded Euratom to
send its inspectors into the territories of member states to verify the
accuracy of information reported to it. On presentation of their creden-
tials, these inspectors are to have access at all times to all places and
data and to any person to the extent necessary to "control ores, source
materials, and special fissionable materials and to satisfy themselves
concerning the observation of safeguards." Inspectors of Euratom are'
to be accompanied by representatives of the state concerned, if that
state so requests.
Should a Euratom inspector be denied access, the matter would go
to the EEC Commission which could apply to the EEC Court of
Justice for a warrant to enforce the carrying out of the inspection.
If there is danger in delay, the Treaty authorizes Euratom itself to
issue a written order that the inspection be carried out. After serving
of such a warrant or decision, the national authorities of the state
concerned are expected ". . . to ensure access by the inspectors to the
places named in the warrant or decision." This power of Euratom has
yet to be tested in practice.
220
Should a member state resist inspection, Euratom is authorized to
impose sanctions. In order of severity, possible penalties include :
(1) a warning;
(2) withdrawal of special advantages, such as financial or tech-
nical assistance;
(3) placing the enterprise under the administration of a person
or board appointed jointly by the Commission and the state hav-
ing jurisdiction over the enterprise; and
(4) complete or partial withdrawal of nuclear fuel materials.
Tadate, no penalties have been imposed, no discrepancies have been
detected, and member governments have cooperated with inspections.
EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AND U.S. POLICY
Once Euratom was established, the United States negotiated a
bilateral agreement with it. One issue was safeguards. The United
States wanted a direct voice in the application of safeguards
to U.S.-supplied materials, including the right of inspection by U.S.
inspectors. Euratom would not agree. Ultimately the United States
and Euratom compromised as the United States agreed to rely upon
Euratom's system and inspectors, but with the right to audit com-
pliance with standards set out in the agreement. Congressional sen-
sitivity on this compromise is suggested by the following exchange
between Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
and AEC Commissioner-John Floberg in 1958 : 211
Senator Anderson : Mr. Floberg, does the language of the agreement as you
see it give this government the right to inspect facilities erected by Euratom?
Mr. Floberg: I don't know if I have your question completely in mind, Sen-
ator, but the agreement and the exchange of letters explaining the agreement
seem to give us the right to audit, for want, of a better word, the compliance with
the standards set forth in the agreement.
Senator Anderson : You used the term "audit" ; do you think it gives us a right
to look at the books?
Mr. Floberg : It certainly does, and it gives us the right to weigh, assay, and
count and otherwise verify. I apologize for that word "audit." It is not. a very
good one. But I think it is comprehensive enough if you don't take it too literally.
Euratom and. Nuclear Safety
The generation of nuclear power, reprocessing of used nuclear fuels,
and perpetual storage of radioactive wastes from these fuels are in-
herently dangerous activities. This fact caused the negotiators of the
Treaty of Rome to vest another supranational power in Euratom :
to set basic standards for the protection of workers and the general
public from these hazards of nuclear power.212 Signatories of the
Treaty committed themselves to enact national legislation to ensure
compliance with the basic standards determined by Euratom and to
take necessary measures with regard to instruction, education, and
professional training for radiological health hazards. Member states
in whose territories nuclear experiments of a particularly dangerous
nature may take place are committed to take additional health pre-
cautions with Euratom's advice. Consenting opinion of Euratom is
111 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom
Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Seas., 1958, p. 200.
n» Articles 80-83. The term "basic standards" Is defined In the Treaty to mean: (a)
the maximum radiation doses compntlhle with adequate safety : (b) the maximum permis-
sible decree of exposure and contamination ; and (c) the fundamental principles governing
the medical supervision of workers.
221
required also when such experiments are likely to affect the territories
of other member states.
As for the disposal of radioactive wastes, each signatory is obligated
to submit to Euratom "such general data concerning any plan for the
disposal of any kind of radioactive waste as will enable the Commission
to determine whether the implementation of such plan is likely to
involve radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of
such member states." 213
Euratom has used its authority to : 214
(1) establish regulations providing for uniform safety radia-
tion standards throughout the Community ;
(2) standardize and coordinate methods for the measurement
and control of environmental radioactivity ;
(3) review plans for reactor installations and their radioactive
waste disposal systems ; and
(4) study the movement of radioactive substances in the en-
vironment and safety aspects of nuclear marine propulsion.
Euratom and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power
The Treaty of Rome is silent on the issue of environmental protec-
tion, a matter of growing U.S. and European concern since the late
1960s. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining and con-
trolling the environmental effects of nuclear power and fuel reprocess-
ing plants. Should the public in Europe show the same interest and
concern in environmental quality as has been shown in the United
States, there could be proposals to extend Euratom's authorkv^ accord-
ingly. Such a development could pose a troublesome issue for U.S.
foreign policy. Recognition of Euratom's authority as an international
body to examine and approve design, construction and operation of
nuclear power plants within its member states could set a precedent
for international control that might be embarassing were continental
neighbors of the United States to seek such review of U.S. nuclear
plants built near their common borders with this country. For example,
it could point the way for continental neighbors of the United States
to request some voice in the siting, design, construction, and operation
of domestic nuclear power plants near U.S. national boundaries or on
rivers and bodies of water shared with neighboring countries. Con-
ceding such a voice to neighbor states would mark a shift in U.S.
foreign policy, a shift likely to be opposed by those who attach great
importance to preserving the sovereign powers of the United States.
Duplication and Dilution of Effort
Euratom, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (see section
IX), and the International Atomic Energy Agency overlap in many
of their interests and activities. The Common Market nations and Eura-
tom itself are members of the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. Com-
ing into existence in 1958 one month after Euratom, the NEA was
organized to promote international nuclear cooperation rather than
supranational nuclear integration. The Nuclear Energy Agency was
supported by the British as a counter-project to make atomic integra-
tion of the Six less attractive. It is interesting, in this context, that the
first European plant for chemical reprocessing of used nuclear fuels
213 \rticle 37.
214 Compilation of National and International Standards. Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Nuclear Safety Information Center, Report No. ORNL-NSIC-78,
(October, 1970), t>. 44.
222
was put into operation by NEA and not by Euratom, despite the fact
that the plant was built at Mol, Belgium, within a Euratom state to
process fuel from Euratom projects.215
Duplication in nuclear activities between the NEA and Euratom
extends to many areas including safety regulations, research, rules for
third party liability, and maritime nuclear propulsion. In maritime
nuclear propulsion, however, NEA was not successful and in 1962
abandoned that field to Euratom. On the other hand, NEA became
a useful direct channel of communication between Euratom and other
European countries, particularly the United Kingdom. The NEA's
international joint undertakings, the Halden and Dragon projects,
provided Euratom with its first opportunities for nuclear research.
It would appear that Euratom's usefulness is handicapped by the
dispersion of its member states' human and financial resources between
its own programs and those of the NEA and the IAEA.
Proposals for New Research Functions for Euratom
As nuclear energy in Europe has moved more into the industrial
sector for the design and manufacture of nuclear powerplants and
nuclear fuel, the laboratories of Euratom have had less demand for
their services. Instead, the final stages of development of competitive
nuclear power technologies have occurred in the laboratories of indus-
trial firms behind barriers of trade secrecy. What then will become
of Euratom's laboratories ? The answer to this question is still evolving,
and can have significance for American diplomacy. For example, a
successful redeployment of Euratom's scientific and technical assets to
resolve the problems of energy supply and conservation might not
only reduce Europe's dependence upon uncertain energy imports, but
also bring European manufacturers into a world market which the
United States hopes to dominate. Additionally, the success or failure
of efforts to redeploy Euratom's laboratories may provide useful in-
sights for the United States in dealing with its own problems of recon-
version of technological personnel and facilities from aerospace and
defense to other civil functions. One function for American diplomacy
will be to obtain current information on these evolutionary features of
Euratom for the benefit of U.S. policy makers.
THE m'kINNEY REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS OF 10 5 9
An early proposal that Euratom extend the scope of its technologi-
cal activities into non-nuclear fields is to be found in the 1950 report
of Robert McKinney to the Joint. Committee on Atomic Energv. Not-
ing how Europe's need for nuclear power had by then receded, he
questioned whether nuclear power for the sake of technological pres-
tige carried as much weight in the post-Sputnik era as it had previ-
ously. Tailing attention to a wide and growing scientific and tech-
nological disparity between Western Europe and the United States,
he speculated as to what European scientists could accomplish within
a more broadly based scientific community. A new course of action
for Euratom might be to emphasize collective creation of new sci-
*™ Folneh, op. clt, p. 130.
223
entific and technological resources by a regional integration of the
European scientific and technological community.216
To this end, Euratom could be reconstituted into a European Sci-
entific and Technical Community. Its laboratories would then be
open to all of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance. Their function
would be to advance science and technology upon a broad front. Ac-
cording to McKinney, the United States should continue to give as-
sistance including the funding of non-nuclear research. Although the
McKinney report produced no immediate movement in this direc-
tion, it foreshadowed the future emergence of this issue.
VIEWS OF THE EEC
The idea of opening Euratom's facilities to non-nuclear research
was revived in 1967 when a resolution of the EEC Council laid down
the guideline that wherever legally possible Euratom research might
also encompass non-nuclear activities. Two years later, in December
1969, the Council elected to permit use of the Joint Research Center
facilities for non-nuclear work.217 In this action the Council recog-
nized that as nuclear energy moved toward commercial application, the
research was shifting from public institutions to laboratories of pri-
vate nuclear industries. Thus Euratom came face to face with the is-
sues of conversion that were soon to plague the Government and pri-
vate laboratories of the U.S. aerospace and defense industries.
More recently, in November 1970, the EEC Commission proposed
a transformation of Euratom's research capabilities into a Research
and Development Agency for the Common Market. Euratom's Joint
Research Center would be merged into the Agency. By this proposal,
the EEC Commission sought to bring new fields of research into the
sphere of community action, including research for new materials,
medicine, meteorology, oceanography, and environmental control.218
Conclusions and Current Issues
Now well into the second decade of its existence, Euratom presents
a mixed picture of success and failure. Its various agreements with the
United States have allowed Euratom to supply European nuclear
power programs with considerable enriched uranium and plutonium
under its own safeguards system. The United States cooperated by
regrouping its bilateral agreements with Euratom members into a
single agreement with Euratom. The Agency has created an effective
European research capability for nuclear energy.
On the other hand, these encouraging moves toward European unity
have been steadily eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism. Since
1961, a marked trend toward nationalism in the nuclear industries of
218 Robert McKinney. A New Look at Euratom. Statement to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. May 20, 1959. In U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Background Material for the Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs
of the United States, S6th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 960, vol. 4, p. 1258. (Joint Committee print.)
317 The Council decided on December 6, 1969 that the facilities of the Joint Research
Center might be used for scientific and technological research other than nuclear. In
keeping with this decision, the Council also agreed to enter without delay into close
cooperation with the EEC Commission on the study and choice of subjects for such
research. Cf. European Atomic Energy Community, Third General Report on the Activities
of the Communities — 1969, op. cit., p. 210.
218 "Makings of a New Structure," Nature, vol. 228, (November 28, 1970), p. 796.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 16
224
the member nations has nearly drowned Euratom, leaving it since 1968
without a 5-year program, with sharply reduced funding and,
perhaps worst of all, without an involvement in application of nuclear
power technology in Europe. Political difficulties have blocked cooper-
ation with Euratom's supply function for nuclear materials and with
plans to develop a European enrichment capability.
Euratom's successes have come in activities which were distantly
linked to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of
France, Italy, and West Germany. These included model legislation
to encourage uniformity in national regulation of radiological effects
of nuclear power, research into subjects without immediate com-
mercial application, and safeguarding nuclear materials. But Eura-
tom has not been able to weld together the separate national nuclear
industries of its members. Euratom research and development which
approached commercial application has been opposed and was ulti-
mately terminated. The differing ideas of France, Italy, and West
Germany as to which kind of nuclear power technology to exploit
created tensions that on several occasions all but paralyzed Euratom's
research and development programs and led to the charge that some
member nations were benefiting disproportionately at the expense of
others. The inability to form a common European approach to nu-
clear technology has proved advantageous to the U.S. nuclear industry
and in the 1970's the use of U.S. nuclear power technologv is well estab-
lished in Europe, having overmatched the alternative favored by the
French. Among the Euratom members there is increasing use of joint
venturas between companies in the several national European nuclear
industries as an alternative to working through Euratom. There are
signs also that Euratom's laboratories may have outlived their useful-
ness and now face the problem of what to do with their human and
physical resources. Steps to open Euratom's facilities to non-nuclear
research and development are one indication of the situation. What can
be learned from this trend to convert Euratom's research installations
into general research facilities for the European Economic Com-
munity can be of interest to the United States for two reasons. First,
a successful transition of a substantial part of Euratom's research
capabilities to non-nuclear research could strengthen the competitive-
ness of European high-technology goods and services in the world
markets vis-a-vis those of the United States. Second, a successful
transition might well provide useful insights into the problems of
conversion of existing scientific and technical institutions into new
fields as their original field becomes worked out, or as changes in
national priorities and programs make them redundant. This transi-
tion, of course, is the problem of the U.S. defense and aerospace in-
dustries with the continuing unemployment of highly skilled scientists,
engineers, and technicians.
Several issues for United States foreign policy and Euratom that
may need future attention include :
(1) To what extent should the United States encourage Eur-
atom to build and operate a uranium enrichment plant in Europe?
(2) In supplying XLS. enrichment technology, if this is done, to
what extent should the United States attempt to recoup the do-
mestic investment in developing that technology through licensing
fees or royalties ?
225
(3) Considering forecasts that the United States will soon have
to decide whether to fund expansion of its domestic enrichment
plants, what would be the effect upon U.S. foreign policy of a
limitation or termination of the longstanding U.S. commitment
to supply enriched uranium to Euratom for commercial nuclear
power in Europe ?
(4) What voice should the United States seek in Euratom's
setting of standards governing the environmental effects of nu-
clear power plants, and standards for review and approval of the
siting, design, and construction of nuclear power plants? In ex-
porting nuclear power plants, will the commercial interests of the
U.S. nuclear industry be sufficiently protected by a U.S. policy of
non-intervention ?
(5) Considering the perplexing status of technology for long
term storage of the intensely radioactive wastes from nuclear
power, in what ways would domestic interests of the United States
benefit from measures to stimulate Euratom work in this field ?
(6) Considering the priority being given to development and
demonstration of the breeder reactor in the United States and the
considerable interest among Common Market countries in breeder
technology, to what extent should U.S. foreign policy attempt to
influence European breeder research in the direction of the tech-
nology favored by the United States? Conversely, considering
criticisms of the U.S. breeder program for concentrating too much
on only one breeder concept, to what extent might U.S. foreign
policy attempt to guide European breeder research toward other
potentially competing breeder concepts as insurance against an
unexpected setback or failure in the U.S. domestic program?
VIII. Joint United States-Euratom Research and Development
U.S. diplomatic efforts and interest which helped bring about the
creation of Euratom led naturally to the proposition that the United
States should work closely with this new multinational body. As
analyzed in retrospect by Jules Gueron,219 the following was the ra-
tionale for a 10-year period of direct technical cooperation between
Euratom and the United States. Europe had to import an ever-
increasing proportion of its conventional fuel ; therefore, atomic power
could become competitive in Europe earlier than in the United States,
and Europe could benefit economically and technically from being a
testing ground for United States atomic technology. At the same time
the United States would aid European unification.220 This theme is
examined and confirmed in the following discussion.
The United States-Euratom program was launched in 1958 and had
as its target the construction by 1965 of 5,000 megawatts of electrical
generating capacity in nuclear power plants based on U.S. technology.
It offered low interest loans from the Export-Import Bank, lease of
fuel by the AEC, and guarantees on supply of fissile material and per-
formance of nuclear fuel supply bv the U.S. nuclear industry. In addi-
tion, the United States agreed to Euratom control of nuclear fuel ma-
terials instead of direct U.S. control, and to a joint program of research
and development in support of the joint reactor program. Neverthe-
less, it proved impossible to reach the 5,000 megawatt target, and only
with difficulty were three nuclear power plants initiated that had a
combined output of 750 megawatts.
In Europe, these U.S. incentives were supplemented by advantages
provided bv the Euratom Treaty to "common enterprises,'' and bv the
"participation" assistance especially devised by the Euratom Com-
mission. Parenthetically, France opposed the whole scheme as a sell-
out to the United States, while influential voices in the United States
branded the joint programs as a giveaway.221
The joint United States-Euratom programs were a disappoint-
ment. Their shortfall from original goals was the result in part of an
unanticipated easing of the energy supply crisis in Europe, of unex-
pectedly slow progress in nuclear technology, and probably an over-
estimation of the willingness of European private utilities to risk sub-
stantial capital investments in demonstration nuclear powerplants. On
the other hand, the two joint programs did culminate in several work-
ing demonstrations of nuclear power; moreover, they provided 10
years of practical working experience of collaboration with a multi-
national organization to develop and demonstrate a new technology.
From 1959 to 1909, the United States provided technical and other
forms of assistance and incentives through Euratom for construction
of three demonstration nuclear power plants in Europe; it spent some
sl* FormpT rpnprnl rltrpptor of rpsparph for Euratom.
120 Gupron, op. pit., p. 149.
421 Loc. cit.
(226)
227
$37 million for further development of technology for these demon-
stration plants; and it offered many indirect incentives to stimulate
initial commercial use of U.S. nuclear power technology in Europe.
U.S. Interest in Euratom Demonstration of Nuclear Power
Even as the international negotiations for creation of Euratom were
Hearing completion, AEC Chairman Strauss was asserting the tech-
nological feasibility of nuclear power. In 1957, five experimental
nuclear power plants at AEC laboratories successfully provided a
proof of principle for five different technological approaches. But the
demonstrations were too small to provide cost and operational data
which would enable the domestic electric companies to decide upon
their commercial use. The next step for the U.S. domestic nuclear
power program was to build larger, engineering prototypes that would
work as part of a commercial utility.222 Such demonstration plants
were needed to provide reliable engineering, operational, and cost in-
formation for the designers and the customers of commercial nuclear
power. However, the U.S. demonstration power program was slow in
starting and some observers feared that the Nation's nuclear power
program would falter if engineering prototypes were not quickly built
and put into operation. At this juncture, U.S. collaboration with
Euratom offered a solution because economic conditions in Europe
were more favorable for practical demonstration of nuclear power
than were those in the United States.
AEC Commissioner Vance promptly endorsed this objective. In
1958 he informed the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the
AEC's foreign objectives for nuclear power were twofold : 323
To achieve competitive nuclear power in friendly foreign na-
tions during the next 5 years through a comprehensive program
of assistance clearly defined and vigorously pursued.
To fortify the position of leadership of the United States in the
eyes of the world in the peaceful applications of atomic energy,
particularly with regard to power.
Also in 1958, the AEC informed the Joint Committee of conditions
that would have to be achieved in Europe to demonstrate nuclear
power. These were : 224
(1) That the economic feasibility of nuclear power be proven,
not by theory and calculation, not by extrapolation from pilot
plant operation, but by the full-scale operation of power produc-
ing units on a scale large enough to assure statistical reliability of
the data ;
(2) That the utilities into whose grid the power from these
nuclear plants must flow become familiar with the technical and
management problems of operating nuclear stations and accept,
with confidence, nuclear powerplants ;
(3) That European equipment manufacturers gain knowledge
and competence in the production of reactor components ; and
222 By having the utilities build, own, and operate demonstration plants with the AEC
providing research and development, special service and materials, and training of per-
sonnel, the Commission hoped to avoid further entanglement in the public versus private
power controversy. Proposals that the Commission itself build and operate large nuclear
power plants did not gain acceptance.
223 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energv, Hearings, AEC Authorizing Legis-
lation, Fiscal Year 1959, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 195R, p. 215.
12i U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom
Agreements, op. cit., p. 226.
228
(4) That the various service industries, such as fuel production
and fabrication, scrap recycle, irradiated fuel reprocessing, etc.,
be developed as economic operations.
The AEC recognized that special incentives would be needed to at-
tract interest and participation of European utilities because nuclear
power and its economics were not then well enough established to war-
rant the requisite capital investment by a traditionally conservative
electric it v industry. The Commission informed the Joint Committee
that:225"6
Traditionally conservative and bound by rate ceilings, tbe utilities are not
prepared to take excessive risks or to invest large amounts of capital in plants
in which the costs of energy produced may well be above that of conventional
stations.
The fact that there is not already under way a program which would accom-
plish the objectives of the joint program speaks for itself. Discussions with
Euratom and European utility personnel indicate that the estimated high cost
of nuclear power from even proven type reactors and particularly the uncertain
ties of these costs could preclude a program under which 1 million EKW of
American type reactors would be installed by 1963, unless additional incentives
are provided.
The scale of the joint program, said the Commission, had to be large
enough that : 227
(1) The data produced would come from a sufficiently large
number of power reactors to be useful ;
(2) A significant number of European industries would have
an opportunity to participate in construction ; and
(3) A sufficiently large number of operating utilities would be
brought into the program to assure that the management of this
industry would be ready to accept nuclear energy and enter the
longer range nuclear program with enthusiasm.
Initiation of the Joint Programs
Within three months after creation of Euratom in 1058, a joint
U.S.-Euratom working party was at work. By June 23, 1958. negotia-
tions and arrangements were far enough along for President Eisen-
hower to request urgent approval of Congress for arrangements be-
tween the United States and Euratom, and to seek legislation author-
izing AEC participation with Euratom in the joint programs of
demonstration and development and research. The joint programs
anticipated the building within the Common Market nations of six
nuclear power plants by 1965 with a total electrical output of 1,000
megawatts.228
European sources were expected to finance the capital, then esti-
mated at about $350 million, and operating costs, while the United
States would finance research and development and other incentives.
President Eisenhower saw dual benefits for the United States.
Nuclear power in Europe would provide both a needed new source of
energy for those nations and also an impetus toward European unity.
As for European unity, he said : *"
tat Loc. fit.
22,1 1 million EKW (electric kilowatts) Is l.ooo megawatts of elc^ti-lcnl capacity.
a* Ibid., p. 93.
■w By way of comparison, some single nuclear power plants now being built in the United
Stntiv nave electrical outputs ereater than 1,000 MW.
331 U.S.. Conprcss, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom
Agreements, op. clt., p. 10.
229
. . . One motivation which has therefore led to the creation of this new Com-
munity is the growing sense of urgency on the part of Europeans that their
destiny requires unity and that the road toward this unity is to be found in the
development of major common programs such as Euratom makes possible. . . .
As for other benefits, he said :
. . . Another important motivation is the present and growing requirements of
Europe for a new source of energy in -the face of rapidly increasing requirements
and limited possibilities of increasing the indigenous supply of conventional
fuels. The Europeans see atomic energy not merely as an alternative source of
energy but as something which they must develop quickly if they are to continue
their economic growth and exercise their rightful influence in world affairs.
To initiate arrangements for the joint programs with Euratom,
President Eisenhower transmitted to Congress three documents which
required congressional assent. These were: (1) an agreement for co-
operation which recognized Euratom as a body with which the U.S.
Government could negotiate ; (2) a draft of legislation to authorize the
AEC participation in the joint programs and to authorize appropria-
tions; and (3) a draft of a bilateral agreement between the AEC and
Euratom.*30
THE UNITED STATES-EURATOM AGREEMENT OF 1958
The Agreement for Cooperation between Euratom and the United
States was signed in Brussels on November 8, 1958. Congress had pre-
viously approved the agreement on August 20, 1958. The Agreement
proved to be important to Euratom. Looking back with the benefit of
5 years hindsight. Federico Consolo, an advisor to the Euratom
Commission, wrote of the political importance of the agreement : 3Sl
... In addition to its intrinsic value from the scientific technical, industrial
and financial standpoint, the Agreement was of considerable political importance,
since, from the very outset Euratom was able to benefit by the assistance of the
world's major nuclear power.
Pierre Kruys, of Euratom, saw this Agreement as : ^
... A proof of U.S. support for the Community organizations as the corner-
stone of the new united Europe. [The Agreement] also paved the way for the
establishment of the first contacts of the technical departments of the Euratom
Commission with nuclear centers and industrial concerns in the Community
countries, as well as for the achievement of a certain number of concrete aims.
The Agreement provided for two well-defined, closely related joint
programs between the United States and Euratom :
(1) Construction of power reactors of a proven American
type, for a total of 1,000 megawatts electrical capacity, to go into
operation before the end of 1963, except for two plants sched-
uled for operation before the end of 1965 ; and
(2) Research and development on the types of reactors ac-
cepted under the power reactor program. The budget for the
joint research program was specified at $50 million for each
partner for the first five years, with the funds to be spent at home.
^The text of these documents appears In U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom Agreements, op. cit., pp. 11-18.
431 Federico Consolo, "The US/Euratom Agreement for Co-operation," Euratom, No. 1.
(1963), p. 2.
232 Pierre Kruys, "The Joint US/Euratom Research and Development Programme, Eura-
tom,So. 1 (1963), p. 8.
230
The United States also agreed to supply Euratom with 30 tons of
contained U-235.283 Deferred payment was provided for the nuclear
fuel, and favorable conditions were also offered for the processing of
irradiated nuclear fuel and for the repurchase by the United States
of the plutonium produced.234 Additionally, the U.S. Government
through the Export-Import Bank, extended long-term credit of $135
million to Euratom, which Euratom could in turn loan to partici-
pants in its power reactor program. Finally, the U.S. Government
recognized Euratom's value as an organ of inspection by conceding
to it the right of control over fissionable materials supplied by the
United States. Until then, in other bilateral agreements the United
States had directly exercised such control. , 'u
THE JOINT BOARDS : AN ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION
One problehi for American diplomacy was to arrange some form
of organization which would permit a joint program to go forward
while retaining substantial control over U.S. funds. The climate of
the late 1950's did not favor the supplying by the United States of
unrestricted funds to Euratom. The solution Was to form two joint
boards wherein the United States and Euratom each controlled their
own funds, rather than putting them into a common pool.
A Joint Reactor Board was established to examine proposals sub-
mitted for the construction of power reactors and to report its rec-
ommendations to the Euratom Commission and to the AEC. The
Board was presided over by a chairman from Euratom 235 and a vice-
chairman from the United States 236 with voting rights, and an equal
number of Euratom and American experts without voting rights.
A Joint Research and Development Board, similarly organized,
was established to examine proposals for research, and to recommend
action to Euratom and to the AEC.237 Despite administrative com-
plications, it appears that the joint boards functioned satisfactorily,
thanks to the cooperative and cordial attitude on both sides.238
A NOTE ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The bilateral agreement was negotiated in an atmosphere of con-
cern in Europe as to the possible consequences of the Suez crisis and
at a time when nuclear power was expected to offer early competition
with conventional sources of energy. But once the initial upsurge of
enthusiasm for the joint programs had slackened, and after the situa-
tion for conventional power supply in Europe had returned to normal,
there were observers who thought the Agreement had overreached
itself in favor of industry, while at the same time being too limited
for research. These considerations were to spark criticisms in Europe
that the Agreement had subordinated Euratom to U.S. domestic policy
and had invested Euratom with excessive powers."36
*« Of this 29 tons was for the power reactor program for fuel, and 1 ton for research
add development. I
»*In comparison, for the period 1958 through 1961, the United States* commitment
to supply uranium under Atoms for Peace was a total of 50 tons of Uranlum-235.
*« Eurn tom'8 Director General for Industry and Economy.
288 The head of the nuclear section of the U.S. Mission to the Communities.
*" Eum torn s Director General for Research and Training, and the Head of the Nuclear
Section of the U.S. Mission to the Communities.
m Consolo, op. cit. p. 3.
■• Ibid., p. 4.
231
The Eur atom Cooperation Act of 1958
During congressional consideration of the President's request for
authority to enter into the joint programs with Euratom, spokesmen
for the administration supported the proposed Euratom Cooperation
Act in glowing terms. Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon
outlined the benefits of strengthened European unity, Western leader-
ship in nuclear power,240 and meeting the Soviet challenge.241
Leaders of the U.S. nuclear industry supported U.S. cooperation
with Euratom. One executive spoke of the choice before the United
States : either to let the European nuclear industry evolve at a pace
governed by normal commercial considerations or to accelerate it.
If the first policy were chosen, he thought it would be probably 20
years before nuclear power would be commercially competitive. Un-
der the second policy it would be sooner. The joint program would
meet the needs for acceleration, give the U.S. nuclear industry an
immediate market, and give European utilities a ceiling on costs of
fuel for nuclear power.242 Benefits to the U.S. nuclear industry were
cited, although there was some doubt that helping Euratom would
speed the time when a European nuclear industry would compete
with its U.S. counterpart.243
Some doubt about the joint program was expressed by members
of the Joint Committee. One member saw it as a step to head off
capture of the nuclear power market by the United Kingdom 244 and
warned that there were limits to what the proposed joint program
could accomplish.245
Such doubts notwithstanding, the Joint Committee reported favor-
ably the proposed Euratom Cooperation Act, expressing its belief that
a vigorous program of cooperation by the United States with foreign
mo "Of strengthening European unity. Under Secretary Dillon said*: The agreement repre-
sents the confluence of two important historic developments : first, the peaceful application
of atomic energy, a policy high among the objectives of this Government ; second, European
unity, a result of European inspiration and a development on which the United States has
looked with great interest and favor. Proposed Euratom Agreement, op. cit., p. 23.
Of the leadership advantages he said : . . . Euratom is unique in having a political
status, including certain sovereign attributes of the state, which permits us to deal with it
unilaterallv. Combined with this political status is the scientific, industrial, and financial
potential of six of the most developed nations in Europe. The successful implementation of
the program will help maintain Western leadership in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The continuing attacks on Euratom by the Soviet Union would seem to indicate that they
draw the same conclusions. Ibid., p. 23.
241 On meeting the Soviet technological challenge, he said : Recently demonstrated evi-
dences of advanced Soviet scientific and engineering capability have caused a serious and
healthy reappraisal within the Atlantic Community of the extent to which the Western
countries have been exploiting to the full their potential scientific strength and whether
this strength is being mobilized through the most effective cooperative arrangements.
Voices in Europe have queried whether the historic position of the United States in the
fiel'' of science, engineering, and general industrial development is not being overtaken by
the Soviet Union. Atomic energy is rightfully considered a bellwether of scientific and
industrial accomplishment. Ibid., p. 25.
242 Ibid., p. 267.
243 A spokesman for one company in the U.S. nuclear industry anticipated that the
proposed program would be mutually beneficial to the United States nuclear industry in
greatly increasing practical experience. Ibid., p. 314. Another spokesman cautioned that
enabling Euratom to develop its own industrial capacity more quickly than would be the
case without American aid would undoubtedly reduce the time in which American equip-
ment could be sold in Europe. Ibid., p. 329.
241 At that time the United Kingdom was vigorously pursuing its national program of
building large nuclear powerplants fueled with natural uranium and there was some
concern lest the British dominate the world market with this technology.
245 Representative Craig Hosmer observed that : In considering this legislation the
Congress should be under no delusion that it will capture the entire European reactors
market for the U.S. suppliers. Although there are some that will disagree with me t
is my personal feeling that the bill goes no further than making us competitive in this
market with the British. The British atomic industry can be loosely described as a govern-
ment monopoly. They give fuel guarantees and other incentives that would prevent us from
competing in the European market at all without such legislation as this before us today.
Cf. his remarks, Congressional Record, vol. 104, August 20, 1958, p. 187S9.
232
nations in nuclear power was desirable.246 The Joint Committee
summed up the anticipated benefits of U.S. participation in the joint
programs as follows : 247
. . . The State Department has testified as to the role Euratoni will play in Un-
economic integration of Europe, and this is recognized as an important part of our
foreign policy. Euratom will become increasingly important to Europe as a sup-
plement to its growing energy requirements in a period when its oil supply from
the Middle East is in danger.
Moreover, from the standpoint of the United States atomic energy program, the
proposed Euratom arrangements offer an opportunity to develop and construct
United States type reactors abroad. There has been a great deal of testimony that
it is possible to achieve atomic power in Europe sooner than in the United States
because conventional power costs in Europe are considerably higher than in the
United States.
Perhaps of greatest interest to the United States is the opportunity in the
Euratom joint program to demonstrate United States leadership in atomic energy
development, an objective which the Joint Committee considers to be of the high-
est importance.
Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee was not impressed
by the argument that nuclear power could help resolve Europe's energy
problems.
On this point, he said in debate on the bill : 248
. . . The claim put forward by the more enthusiastic proponents of the original
Euratom sponsors, that this program would solve the dependence of the Euro-
pean countries on Middle East oil, is of course unrealistic. The six countries com-
prising the Euratom group have an installed kilowatt capacity of some 60 million
units. The pending atomic-power program will amount to 1 million, or one-sixtieth
of the total capacity.
Despite these misgivings the bill was passed and the Euratom Co-
operation Act became law on August 28, 1958, as Public Law 85-840
(72 Stat. 1084).
A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH EURATOM
While Congress quickly assented to the initial agreement for co-
operation and to the authorizing legislation, it did not move as quickly
upon the bilateral agreement. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
held hearings on the agreement 249 and insisted on changes, particu-
larly for the safeguarding of nuclear materials to be furnished by the
United States. After these changes had been worked out with Eura-
tom, President Eisenhower approved a final version on November 6,
1958, which was signed in Brussels 2 days later. On January 14,
1959, the bilateral agreement with Euratom was laid before the Joint
Committee 25° and when no objection was raised, it took effect on
February 18, 1959.
The only significant disagreement in the negotiations was over
U.S. inspection rights and safeguards for nuclear materials supplied
348 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Euratom Cooperation Act of 1938,
Sen. Rept. 2370. August 14, 195S.
947 Loc. clt. Note, the text of this report is also published in U.S. Code, Congressional
and Administrative News, 85th Cong., 2d Sees., 1958, vol. 3. The excerpt appears at p. 4307.
M"Cf. his remarks. Congrea*ional Record, vol. 104, Ausrust 20, 1958. p. 18794.
■»• U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera-
tion with Euratom, 8Rth Cong:., l«t. Sess., 19>59, 150 p.
*° Before submitting the agreement to the Joint Committee, the President, as required by
the Atomic Energy Act, made a determination that the "performance of the proposed
agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense
and security of the United States." The emphasis was upon security, not upon economic
benefit.
233
by the United States. The U.S. negotiators sought the right to send
inspectors into nuclear facilities of Euratom member states. The
Euratom negotiators refused. A resulting compromise was for Eura-
tom to establish a safeguard system for U.S.-supplied materials in
accordance with principles accepted by the United States, and to allow
U.S. assistance in establishing the sj^stem and to frequent consulta-
tions and visits. Both parties agreed to verification, by mutually
approved scientific methods, of the effectiveness of the safeguard and
control system. But the agreement was silent on inspection by U.S.
personnel. Euratom agreed in the bilateral agreement to consult with
the International Atomic Energy Agency to assure that its system
would be reasonably compatible with that of the IAEA. The agree-
ment also provided that should the International Agency establish
an international safeguard and control system, the United States
and Euratom would consult with the IAEA regarding its assump-
tion of these functions.251
With the IAEA now responsible for such a safeguards and control
system under the Nonproliferation Treaty, it will be interesting to
see how the Agency's functions will impact upon Euratom safeguards.
The Joint Power Program
The initial target of the joint power program was the construction
of six nuclear power plants in Europe with a combined electrical out-
put of 1,000 megawatts. These were to use U.S. nuclear technology.
The goal was partially achieved. By the time the joint power program
ended, three nuclear power plants with a combined output of 597 MW
had been built and put into operation, employing two different tech-
nological approaches.
The joint program was put into motion by two invitations for pro-
posals. Some details of these invitations are pertinent as illustrations
of measures to promote foreign use of a new technologj^.
THE FIRST INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE
On April 13, 1959, Euratom and the U.S. Mission to Euratom in-
vited proposals from would-be contractors to build nuclear power
plants to be completed by the end of 1963, and to operate for at least
10 years. To attract the interest and participation of the conserva-
tive European electricity industry, the invitations offered five
inducements : 252
(1) Financial guarantees for a 10-year operating period for
the cost of fabrication and the integrity of the nuclear fuel.253
(2) Long-term assurance of an adequate supply of nuclear fuel
at prices comparable to those offered to industry within the United
States. The U.S. agreed to furnish Euratom with up to 30,000
kilograms of U-235 on credit at 4 percent interest.
(3) Assurance for 10 years of a defined market for the pluto-
nium recovered from the used fuel.
811 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Proposed Euratom
Agreement, op. cit., p. 9.
262 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Agreement for Coopera-
tion with Euratom, op. cit., p. 21.
™ During: the late 1950's the technology for fabrication of nuclear fuel was still evolving
rapidly and there was little experience to .indicate how well it would perform in practice,
or that estimated costs of fabrication could be held down. For these reasons, financial
guarantees to the electric utilities for cost of fabrication and minimum performance were
considered to be important incentives.
234
(4) Long-term capital loans to cover part of the cost of con-
struction.
(5) Long-term assurance by the United States that reprocessing
of used fuel would be available to the joint program reactors
under terms comparable to those offered to nuclear power reactor
operators in the United States.
Selection among the proposals was to be made by a U.S.-Euratom
reactor board according to the following criteria :
(1) The extent to which the proposed nuclear powerplant was
expected to approach conventional power costs at the time of its
completion, and its potential for subsequent improvement.
(2) The extent to which the project would draw upon the funds,
materials and services available for the joint program.
(3) The extent to which the proposal would contribute to the
advancement of nuclear power technology and to a diversity of
plant types and designs.
(4) The extent to which the project would contribute to a strong
and competitive atomic equipment industry in the United States
and Europe.
In addition, Euratom would consider the need to arrive at a reason-
able geographic distribution of the projects among the member states
of the Community.254
The invitation made it clear that information was expected in return
for the inducements, specifying that : 255
... In return for the benefits received, the participants in the program will be
required to make available information developed on the design, plans, and
specifications, constructions and operating costs, operations and economics.
However, the participants were not obliged to disclose manufactur-
ing "know-how" or techniques. Subsequent experience indicated that
European companies tended to treat as commercially confidential
much information that in the U.S. domestic nuclear power program
would have been freely published.
The response to the first invitation was disappointing. Although
letters of interest were received from six Euratom utilities, by the
deadline of the invitation only one proposal was in hand. The Joint
Committee became concerned and questioned AEC Commissioner
Floberg, after his visit to the Euratom countries in 1959, about reports
that European business was disgusted and worried about Euratom.
In his reply, Floberg carefully distinguished between Euratom and
the governments of its member states and their business sector. The
governments remained optimistic. It was the utilities, said Floberg,
whose interest had waned. He attributed this changed attitude to a
number of factors : 256
The fact of 50 million tons of coal on the surface of the ground and the fact
of a $5 or so drop in the price of coal in Europe, and the fact of reduced shipping
rates on American coal to Europe, and the fact of oil discoveries in the Sahara,
and the fact' of what they call stability in the Middle East . . . and the fact
of new sources of natural gas to Europe — have all accumulated together with the
failure of the rate of power consumption to increase at the predicted rate, to
change the attitude toward the urgency of nuclear power in Europe. There just
is not any question about that.
a* Ibid., p. 27.
a* Ibid., p. 22.
** U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1961, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., I960, p. 101.
235
When I talk about the changing attitude toward urgency, I am talking about
the attitude of the utilities. I believe the attitude of the European governments
has not changed, and I am sure the attitude of the Euratom organization has
not changed.
... As far as the utilities are concerned — the ones who are the potential cus-
tomers— there is not the slightest doubt that there has been some dilution in their
feeling of urgency.
THE SECOND ROUND OF INVITATIONS
Despite the disappointing response to the first invitations and the
criticism of the Joint Committee, AEC Chairman McCone in 1960
decided to j>roceed with a second round of invitations.257 Accordingly,
on September 2, 1961, the AEC and Euratom tried again. This
time the invitation solicited construction of nuclear power plants that
would come into operation no later than the end of 1965. As with the
first invitation, plants were to be built, owned, and operated by orga-
nizations of the electricity industries of the Community. The invitation
also stated that in order to qualify for AEC inducements, the nuclear
reactors had to be of a type which had reached an advanced stage
of development in the United States.
FINANCING THE DEMONSTRATION PLANTS
The demonstration power plants were expected to require a greater
capital investment than corresponding conventional plants. Since Eu-
ratom itself had no funds for the extra capital costs, the United States
arranged for loans through the Export-Import Bank to provide $135
million to finance them. The basis for this figure was explained by
the Department of State as follows:258
Assuming a total cost of $350 million, we can say that the electricity com-
panies will normally be able to contribute out of their own sources or otherwise,
around $150 million, that is the cost of conventional powerplants with the same
capacity. The loan to come from the United States Government being estimated
at $135 million, there remains a gap of $65 million to be found from other sources.
This was a reasonable estimate of the dollar value of the nuclear
equipment and services to be purchased from the United States.259
However, by the time the money was needed, the interest rate in
Europe had dropped enough so that European capital was used.
THE FUEL GUARANTEE AUTHORITY
The invitations for the joint power program offered a guarantee on
fuel performance as an inducement. Authority for the AEC to
provide such guarantee was included in the Euratom Cooperation Act
of 1958 because the U.S. nuclear industry was not then ready to offer
the desired guarantee. Yet, only a year later the picture had changed
and the U.S. nuclear industry was offering guarantees of performance
that met or exceeded those in the invitations. Commissioner Floberg
attributed this change to the Euratom joint program. The U.S. fabrica-
tors began to offer their own guarantees because they wished to avoid
use of the AEC's authority, which would have required private indus-
257 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings. AEC Authorizing
Legislation. Fiscal Year 1961. 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, p. 101.
sa'U.'S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings. Proposed Euratom
Agreements, op. cit, p. 111.
, *» Ibid., p. 234.
236
try to divulge proprietary information about performance of its
products.260
The second invitation resulted in two demonstration projects. One
was a 210-megawatt nuclear power plant for the Societe d'Energie
Nuclearire Franco-Beige des Ardennes (SENA) built near Givet,
France, close to the France-Belgian border. The second was a 237
megawatt nuclear power plant of a "West German firm, Kernkraft-
werk-RWE-Bayerwerk (KRB) at Gundremmingen, Bavaria. For
both projects, a U.S. firm was the designer and supplier for the nu-
clear reactor.
The Joint Research Program
The joint research program of the United States and Euratom was
initially planned for an expenditure of $200 million over 10 years.
At the end of the program in 1969, the AEC had spent about $37 mil-
lion and Euratom about the same. For the first 5 years, the U.S.
funds were authorized annually as a separate item in the AEC's au-
thorizations. For the second 5 years, congressional interest in the
joint program had diminished and AEC funding for it was merged
with other AEC requests for research and development.
THE FIRST 5 -YEAR PLAN (1959-1964)
The goal of the joint research program was to improve the per-
formance of U.S. types of nuclear power reactors. The joint program
began on December 23, 1958, when Euratom and the U.S. Mission to
Euratom announced the formation of a Joint Research and Develop-
ment Board and solicited proposals for research and development. The
function of the board was to choose among proposals. Criteria for se-
lection included the potential contribution of the proposed research to
the goals of the joint program, the technical competence of the research,
the anticipated costs, and the willingness of the proposer to participate
in the exchange of technical personnel. The chosen proposals were re-
ferred to Euratom or to the AEC for negotiation and administra-
tion. Proposals from European organizations went to Euratom, and
those from the U.S. nuclear industry and universities went to the
AEC. In this way, there was no combining of AEC and Euratom
funds and each organization was in control of the research funded
by it.
The response to the invitation was enthusiastic. By the end of 1959
more than 340 proposals and letters of intent had been received. Of
some 250 definitive proposals, half were from European and half were
about equally divided between U.S. organizations and joint proposals
of U.S. and European concerns. But the selecting among these pro-
posals and the negotiating of contracts went slowly. Two years later,
in 1962, only 15 had been authorized for contracts in the United States
and 38 for Europe.
One problem was funding. The Euratom Cooperation Act had au-
thorized an initial appropriation of $3 million and the AEC re-
?uested an additional $14 million for fiscal year 1960. But the Joint
Committee cut the request to $5 million, which caused Commissioner
Floberg to ask the Committee for reconsideration and restoration. He
480 U.S. ConfcreRR. Joint Committee on Atomic Enerpy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing
Legislation, Fiscal Tear 1960, op. clt., p. 657.
237
expressed his fears that the cut would be a "body-blow" to the future
of the whole Euratom joint program and could even cause its demise.
At that time the AEC had in hand proposals from the U.S. nuclear
industry for research totalling $25 million. The Joint Committee sub-
sequently increased the authorization by another $7- million, bringing
the total to $12 million.
THE SECOND 5 -TEAR PLAN (196 5-1969)
If the first 5-year program of joint U.S. -Euratom research was dis-
appointing in terms of research begun, the second was even more so.
Originally planned at $100 million by both parties, by the start of the
second 5-year plan, the AEC called for only $15 million each for
the United States and Euratom. The reasons for this reduction were
twofold. First, the joint power program had produced proposals for
only two reactor types instead of the five or six originally expected, so
less research and development was needed. Second, there had been un-
expected technological advance in the U.S. domestic nuclear power
program. The AEC's director of reactor development explained the
situation to the Joint Committee as follows : 261
If you will recall, in the first place when we went in with this Euratom pro-
gram we expected to have five reactors. We had three instead of five. There
were two types of reactors that actually came under the joint program and
as we have looked at the type of progress that has been made since, it just
didn't seem that we could carry out a sensible research and development pro-
gram of water reactors because they have gotten so far toward commercial-
ity in the meantime. I think we didn't anticipate when we went into this pro-
gram originally that water reactors would have gotten as far along during this
period as they have.
The pace of the second 5-year program slowed so much that in
1966 the AEC requested no additional funds. Indeed, in August of
that year it proposed to Euratom that both parties reduce their level
of participation for the entire 10 years to about $33 million each.
Furthermore, the AEC proposed that Euratom accept certain research
already funded under the AEC's domestic reactor program as ful-
filling*the United States' commitment to the joint research program.
The cutback and financial pressure within the AEC stemmed from
assigning higher priority to research on reactor types other than those
of interest to the joint program.262 The situation was as bad in Eura-
tom. There, the General Advisor to the Euratom Commission for Ke-
searcli stated that in view of Euratom's current budget crisis, the
Euratom Commission would be unable to consider matching additional
research proposed by the United States. He advised further that the
Euratom budget for 1968 contained no funds to start new projects
under the joint research program.263 Consequently, the joint research
program came to a halt and ultimately faded away.
Conclusions and Current Issues
American diplomacy was able to arrange with Euratom for joint
programs of demonstration and research and development, but could
201 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1965, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, p. 370.
262 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, p. 908.
283 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEG Authorizing
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1969, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968, p. 366.
238
not assure the impetus needed to reach the desired goals. The negoti-
ators did not produce a truly joint undertaking, but rather two paral-
lel, closely coordinated programs in which each party controls its
own funds.
The diplomatic effort did produce several working nuclear power
plants in Europe that demonstrated U.S. nuclear technology both for
European and domestic U.S. nuclear markets. The joint programs
did provide experience in the operation of joint boards, experience
that could be useful for future multinational ventures. It may be
worth inquiring how much of this experience has been recorded and
analyzed for future reference.
The diplomatic effort of organizing the joint programs did bene-
fit the US. nuclear industry, which had the opportunity to build
several more working power plants than would otherwise have been
possible. On the other hand, the prqgram never measured up to the
initial expectations and suffered from long delays..
As the United States moves into the mid-19 <0's in the face of grow-
ing national and international imbalances in supply and demand for
energy, it maj wejll^e useful to inquire what can be learned from
the joint programs. There, was a working together of government
agencies, universities, and industrial organizations in several countries
and useful 'research wa,s perfprjned. Perhaps the experience with the
joint programs could point the way toward future ventures to de-
velop new energy sources, such as large-scale use of solar energy, or
toward conservation of energy through expedited development of
nifignei;6h^dt6^yh4irii6'§ (JlffiD), Both the strengths and weaknesses
of the Euratom venture could he, instructive in planning such new de-
velopments on an international basis.
!<
'i ■■'
> ■ •
IX. The Nuclear Energy Agency: Another Regional Ap-
proach to International Organization for Nuclear Energy
Another indication of the impact of the discovery of fission upon
U.S. diplomacy is to be found in the creation of the Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. With Euratom, NEA, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency all having functions of one kind or another relating
to nuclear power in Europe, it appears that diplomatic responses of
the United States and European governments have created a complex
web of interrelationships. While Euratom during its early years
enjoyed substantial financial support of the United States, NEA did
not attract equivalent support. The purpose of this section is to de-
scribe the origins, purposes and activities of the NEA, and to explore
the reasons for this difference.
Origins of the Nuclear Energy Agency
As was the case for Euratom, the initial impetus for the creation of
the NEA came from European fears of a fuel shortage. The then
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECC) re-
quested Louis Armand of France to survey the situation. Armand
was one of the "three wise men" who were so instrumental in the crea-
tion of Euratom and who had argued for Euratom as a way to ease
foreseen increases in costs and growing shortages of energy for the
economy of Europe. Armand's report to OEEC reflected this theme of
anticipated energy shortage, which was repeated in 1955 by a com-
mittee of experts led by Sir Harold Hartley. The latter committee
observed that Europe's energy deficit, which then amounted to about
20 percent of the energy used, was expected to exceed one-third of its
energy demand by the year 1975. These predictions led to two OEEC
responses: The promotion of an overall energy policy for member
nations: and the organization of joint European action to develop the
production and use of nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Agency
was the outcome of the latter.
NEA Functions
The Nuclear Energy Agency was established in 1957 by an inter-,
national statute which entered into force on February 1, 1958. NEA's
assigned objective is to " . . . further the development of the produc-
tion and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by the partic-
ipating countries." NEA's scientific and technological activities
include :
(1) Promotion of nuclear technological developments;
(2) Interchange of specialist knowledge and provision of
specialist information services ; and
(3) Studies of reactor characteristics, fuel supplies, and other
factors affecting the future of nuclear power.
(239)
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 17
240
Other NEA functions concern the administrative and regulatory
aspects of nuclear energy and the development of a uniform legal
system in Europe governing such matters as compensation for damages
from a nuclear accident.
Member states in the NEA include the European members of the
OEEC — which later became the OECD — plus Canada, Japan, and
the United States. Originally named the European Nuclear Energy
Agency (ENEA), the Agency was renamed the Nuclear Energy
Agency to reflect the participation of non-European members.
Like its parent organization, the OECD, the NEA is a forum
rather than an operational agency. Within the functions outlined
above, its strong point has been coordination and program confronta-
tion rather than direct operation. The Agency has led its members into
agreements on radiation health and safety standards, and on nuclear
insurance. By contrast, Euratom is an operating organization as well
as an agency involved in establishing an industrial structure for
nuclear power in Europe.
Some NEA Innovations in Organization of International Projects
In carrying out research and development in nuclear energy for its
member states, the NEA has made several noteworthy innovations
in organization. The Agency has three international projects : an ex-
perimental nuclear reactor in Norway, one in England, and a nuclear
fuel reprocessing plant in Belgium. The innovations of NEA in
organizing these projects are instructive for future international
ventures of limited scale and specific scope and purpose.
THE HALDEN PROJECT IN NORWAY
In the early 1950s the Norwegian Institute for Atomic Energy built
an experimental power reactor in southwest Norway at the town of Hal-
den. While this reactor does not produce electricity, it produces about 25
megawatts of heat output which can be used to make process steam for
an adjoining paper factory. In 1958. through a trilateral arrangement
involving the Institute, NEA and Euratom, the project became an
NEA undertaking:, with the Institute acting as an operating con-
tractor. The AEC subsequently entered into a bilateral agreement
with the Institute for exchange of technical information.
The Halden Project is modest in comparison with nuclear projects
in the United States. At the end of 1969 its professional staff totalled
43, of whom 13 were seconded by signatories other than Norway. Its
research program for 1967-69 was about $5.3 million, and its budp-et
for 1970-72 a bit less. By the end of 1972 the total financing of the
project is expected to amount to $14.5 million.264 The Institute owns,
manages, and operates the project for the signatories with the gui-
dance of a board of management and an operating committee.265
«• Eurona Yearbook, 1970 < London : Europa Publications, Ltd.. 1070), p. 309.
•* The Halden Board of Management consists of one member designated by each signa-
tory. Its principal functions are annually to approve the joint progrnm of research and
experiments and the budget for the program. The Board designates Its own chairman
and vice-chairman. It is reaulred to meet at least twice yearly. A representative of the
NEA mny attf-nd In an advisory capacity.
The Operating Committee is composed of one senior technical specialist designated by
each signatory. It assists the Board in formulating the joint program, and supervises
the carrying out of the joint program by the Institute. The committee approves large
contracts and approves the conditions for the scientific and technical personnel, who
are paid from the common budget.
241
THE DRAGON PROJECT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The second experimental nuclear power reactor is the high tem-
perature reactor project at the Winfrith establishment of the United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in Dorset. Known as
the Dragon Project, this reactor, which was originally built by the
UKAEA as part of its reactor program, became an international
project of the NEA through an agreement of March 23, 1959. While the
initial charter of the project emphasized research, development, and
demonstration, its objectives were modified in 1969 to permit the
project to assist the nuclear industries of participating countries in
their exploitation of this particular nuclear power technology.
As with the Halden Project, the Dragon Project is modest in size.
At the end of March 1970, its staff included ill secured from the
signatory countries. Project expenditures for the year ending March 31,
1970 were about $5.6 million, while the budget for fiscal years
1971 through 1973 was projected at about $17.3 million. Over the 14
years of its operation, the total funding of the project amounted to
$95 million.
The administrative arrangements of the Drasron Project are
characterized by flexibility in professional staffing. The UKAEA acts
as operating contractor to the NEA. The international character of
the project is emphasized by selection of staff from all participating
countries. Only minor difficulties have been experienced in assembling
the research team, and the working relations between persons of very
different backgrounds is reported to be good. The administrative sys-
tem enjoys the advantage that new persons with new ideas can readily
join the project, but it suffers from a comparatively high turnover rate
in its staff.266
Overall control of the project is exercised by a Board of Manage-
ment 267 which determines the work program and budget for each
year. Day-to-day operation of the project is entrusted to a Chief
Executive who together with other senior staff, is appointed by the
Board. The arrangement whereby the UKAEA acts as the legal
agent for the project seems compatible with control of the project's
affairs by the signatories and the arrangement has been found to
be an entirely workable solution to a difficult problem.268
The United States is involved in the Dragon Project through an
Agreement for Cooperation between the AEC and NEA under which
information from the project is made available to the United States
in exchange for information arising from the AEC's research on this
type of reactor.
Results from the project are distributed to the signatories who may
disclose the information to persons and undertakings in their own
territories, but not to others except with the agreement of all the
signatories.
The international character of the Dragon Project has been em-
phasized in its staffing, in the policies for carrying out its tasks, and
in its arrangements for the placing of contracts. As an international
283 C. A. Ronnie. G. E. Loekett and R. E. Reynolds. "The Dragon Project." Proceed-
ings of the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (New
York : United Nations. 196.rO. vol. 1. p. 319.
287 The Board consists of representatives from all the signatories and from the NEA.
2S8Rennie. Loekett and Reynolds, op. clt, p. 318.
242
organization, the project has enabled the participants, some of whom
could not readily afford so large an effort, to take an active part in a
major investigation of a potentially important type of power reactor.
It has also enabled the project to benefit from the knowledge and
specialist facilities available throughout a large part of Europe. An
optimistic assessment by several of the Dragon staff asserts the proj-
ect's experience has shown that : 269
. . . cooperation between individuals, firms and other organizations in a
number of countries can be established to mutual benefits, and that the coordina-
tion of the efforts of many and widespread contractors in both research pro-
grams and in complex engineering tasks can be achieved. The creation of an
integrated scientific, technical and administrative staff with clearly defined
objectives, within a fixed time scale and within a fixed budget, has engendered
the necessary feeling of unity of purpose and concern for the early achievement
of the tasks on an economical basis.
THE EUROCHEMIC PROJECT IN BELGIUM
Of the three international nuclear energy agencies, only the Nuclear
Energy Agency has a working fuel reprocessing plant. This facility,
may, however, be shut down in the face of competition from France,
the United Kingdom, and West Germany, who have banded together
in a trilateral arrangement to use their own reprocessing capacity.
The implications of this change for commercial nuclear energy in
Europe and for American policy vis-a-vis the European nuclear power
industry are not yet apparent.
The NEA fuel reprocessing plant is located at Mol in Belgium. It
is owned and operated by Eurochemic, an international company with
a $38 million paid capital whose shares are held by governments,
public or semi-public bodies, and private industry of NEA countries.
Eurochemic was established in July 1959 under a Diplomatic Con-
vention signed in December 1957. At the time its reprocessing plant
came into service in 1966, it was probably one of the most versatile in
the world, designed to accept nuclear fuels of virtually any composition
and manufacture. It has made substantial contributions to the tech-
nology for reprocessing used nuclear fuels.270
In 1971, it was reported that France and Germany, who dominate
Eurochemic, had decided to cut off their financial support for its
commercial reprocessing after 1974.271 Then in mid-October 1971, it
was further reported that the French and British Government nuclear
organizations had agreed with a West German consortium to set up
Europe's first multinational nuclear fuel reprocessing company —
United Reprocessors GmbH— in Frankfurt. Deprived of its market by
this venture, Eurochemic is tentatively scheduled to stop commercial
reprocessing in 1974 except to service small research reactors, and
possibly to carry on some new research.
Building the Infrastructure for Nuclear Power
In addition to its research and development functions, NEA has
worked to create the infrastructure of regulations and other arrange-
ments required for the commercial deployment of nuclear energy in
Europe. It has been active in development of regulations for nuclear
«* Ih1<1.. p. 323.
*"> "Work of the European Nuclear Energy Agency," Science Policy Newt, vol. 2 (Sep-
tember 1970). p. 18.
•" Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 16, 1971), p. 10.
243
health and safety, and for transport of radioactive materials. NEA
has also been a prime mover in defining and limiting liabilities in case
of a major nuclear accident.
Basic norms developed by the Agency for protection against ioniz-
ing radiations were developed by an NEA Health and Safety Com-
mittee in liasion with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These
were adopted by NEA member countries in 1959. Application of these
norms to specific circumstances are subject to separate recommenda-
tions by the Agency, usually in collaboration with the IAEA and other
international bodies such as the World Health Organisation. A deci-
sion to establish an emergency warning system in case of an increased
environmental radioactivity was adopted November 23, 1963.
As for limitation of liability on the part of the owners of nuclear
power plants, in 1960 an OECD Convention on Third Party Liability,
was developed in Paris under the auspices of the Agency. Signed by
most NEA members, the convention came into force in April 1968. It
defines the underlying principles of all international agreements on
nuclear liability, and is the basis for most national legislation in
Europe for this purpose.
NEA and Safeguards for Nuclear Materials
An NEA Convention on Security Control, which took effect on
July 22, 1959, established a safeguards system of inspection and con-
trol for the movement and use of nuclear fuel materials within the
Agency's jurisdiction. A Control Bureau adopted rules applicable
to nuclear facilities using nuclear materials recovered or obtained in an
NEA venture. The rules cover materials from all NEA undertakings.
The future of this NEA function after the Nonproliferation Treaty
takes effect remains to be seen.
United States Participation in NEA Activities
U.S. participation in NEA activities has been much closer to tradi-
tional types of international cooperation in scientific ventures than
has been its participation in Euratom. AEC's annual reports since
1960 describes U.S. participation in terms of information exchange,
cooperation, and participation in special projects — but with no
mention of U.S. funding of such projects. A typical description ap-
pears in the AEC's annual report for 1968, which said : 272
The AEC continued its participation in joint projects with the European
Xuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), including the Halden Heavy Boiling Water
Reactor in Norway, the Dragon High Temperature Reactor Project in England,
Eurochemic in Belgium, and the International Food Irradition Project at Seibers-
dorf, Austria. Information exchanges on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and participation in related study groups and symposia continued.
An earlier annual report, that for 1963, gives more detail about
U.S. participation in the Dragon Project, which began in 1959 under
an exchange agreement between the Dragon Project signatories and
the AEC. It reported that AEC cooperation with the Dragon Project
had been carried out through exchanges of technical reports and
correspondence, semiannual conferences, visits, long-term personnel
exchanges and a cooperative materials testing program.273
272 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 1968, op. clt., p. 205.
273 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission for 196S, op. cit., p. 239.
244
Since both the NEA and Euratom were created to foster commercial
use of nuclear energy in Europe, and since the membership of NEA
represented until recently a larger potential market for the U.S. nu-
clear power industry than the six Euiatom members, it seems curious
that U.S. support to Euratom has so exceeded that for NEA. For the
latter there are no joint undertakings with U.S. funding. One signif-
icant difference between the two multinational organizations may
explain the difference in U.S. suppoit. This, in the opinion of the
writer, was the presence of the United Kingdom in NEA but not in
Euratom. During the mid-1950s the U.S. nuclear industry was con-
cerned that the United Kingdom with its strongly backed government
program for development and application of nuclear power would be
able to capture much of the world's nuclear power market. For the
United States to have funded NEA projects may well have seemed to
give a principal competitor in the international nuclear market still
greater advantage. In these circumstances, U.S. suppoit could not
appear to benefit nuclear power research and development of interest
to the United Kingdom.
Conclusions and Current Issues
The comparative freedom from crises of the OECD's Nuclear
Energy Agency provides a marked contrast to the trials and difficulties
of Euratom. What accounts for this difference? It may well be that
the fundamental differences between the organiaztions provide an
answer. NEA appears as the traditional kind of international under-
taking, being more of a confederation of member states than a separate,
supernational organization. Perhaps relations with the NEA have been
easier in that the Agency is clearly a working tool of the members
rather than a form of international government. Perhaps, also, less was
expected of the NEA. For example, its charter was not to create a
European nuclear industry but rather to help with technical assistance.
Whatever the reasons, the history of the NEA has shown more co-
operation and less friction among participating members than was
the case with Euratom. Future planners of international technological
ventures may benefit from an identification and analysis of the factors
that have caused this difference.
The relations between the United States and the NEA on one hand
and the United States and Euratom on the other are also different. The
United States cooperated substantially with Euiatom in an ambitious
joint research program, but has preferred a more conventional role in
its relations to the NEA, limiting its participation largely to exchange
of information about projects of mutual interest. That the United
Kingdom was a member of NEA but not of Euratom may have been a
factor in the difference in U.S. participation. In the formative period
of the NEA, the United States was concerned with nuclear competi-
tion from the United Kingdom, which had begun a large-scale deploy-
ment of nuclear power well before the United States and appeared to
be a formidable future competitor in the world nuclear market. U.S.
financial support to NEA could have been seen as fostering a competi-
tive British nuclear technology, while U.S. finaneial support to Eura-
tom enjoyed the advantage of being earmarked for projects explicitly
beneficial to U.S. nuclear technology.
With the United Kingdom and other European nations now joining
the Common Market, the membership of NEA and Euratom will
further overlap. In turn, this raises the question about the separate
245
functions of these organizations, and also their relationship to the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Should all three continue as
now constituted? Should the NEA be combined into Euratom? Should
Euratom be permitted to fade away and its scientific resources be
transformed into a general European scientific capability, leaving
nuclear technology to the NEA ? How would such changes affect U.S.
interests ? These are some questions that seem likely to occur if nuclear
power in Europe is to fulfill the role projected for it.
X U.S. Fuel for European Nuclear Power
Another effect of the scientific discovery of fission was to engage the
United States Government in the enrichment of uranium, a large scale
industrial process that until now has provided the United States
with a strong bargaining position in international nuclear affairs. As
the United States enters the 1970's, it enjoys a virtual monopoly in the
non-Communist world market for the supply of enriched unranium or
enrichment services. Within the next few years, however, interacting
decisions of domestic and foreign policy will have to be made that will
affect this U.S. predominance, thereby influencing the foreign policy
leverage conferred by this position in the nuclear fuel market.
The 1970's are likely to see new diplomatic, economic, and technologi-
cal initiatives by European and other nations to reduce their depend-
ence upon U.S. supply of enriched uranium, while the United States,
in turn, appears inclined to preserve its competitive position. As the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sees the situation, supplying uranium
enrichment services offers the possibility for a great expansion in
international cooperation between the United States and Europe, even
though the supply function is attended by many complex problems
for U.S. foreign policy.274 Whatever the outcome of still-changing U.S.
policy, the results inevitably will affect the future of commercial nu-
clear power in Europe.
The Enriched Uranium Business
When Congress revised the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, it. retained
the original government monopoly of enriched uranium; there were
no private facilities to produce nuclear fuel. Accordingly, the develop-
ing nuclear industries at home and abroad leased these materials from
the AEC. When the Act was later revised to permit private owner-
ship of enriched uranium, the AEC changed its policies to permit
customers to supply their own normal uranium which the Commission
would then enrich. Enrichment service, rather than sale of enriched
uranium, is now the predominant pattern of AEC operation in
nuclear fuel supply.
Today in the United States all but two industrial services required
for the construction and operation of commercial nuclear power plants
are available from domestic nuclear industry. The two exceptions are
the enrichment of uranium and the indefinite storage of radioactive
products from the used nuclear fuel. The administration's policy is to
t ransfer these two functions to the private nuclear industry, but when
and how this will be done is still uncertain. Of the two, the enrichment
of uranium is by far the larger industrial activity in terms of capital
271 This idea was developed by Myron B. Kratzer. then Assistant Ocneral Manager of
the AEC for International Activities, In his testimony before the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics, May 1971. Of. U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Science and
Astronautics. Hearings, A General Revietc of International Conjuration in Science and
Space, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, p. £35.
(246)
247
investment, costs of operation, and demand for electricity. It also
appears to have the most far-reaching implications for foreign policy.
Provision of uranium enriching services by the United States to
domestic and to foreign customers has gone hand in hand with the
development and marketing of U.S. nuclear power technology by
the private nuclear power industry. Through 1970 more than 40 nuclear
power reactors of U.S. design and technology were in foreign operation,
being built or on order from abroad.275 While other major industrial
nations, particularly in Europe, are competing with the U.S. in the
world market for nuclear power plants, the U.S. nuclear industry
appears to hold a dominant position. United States nuclear reactor
sale** abroad; already have totaled more than $1 billion, mostly financed
by the Export-Import Bank. These sales are expected to increase
several fold in the future *76 Adding to these sales of nuclear power
plants will be sales of U.S. enriching services.
The cost of enrichment of uranium accounts for about a third of the
cost Of nuclear fuel, which makes enrichment the single largest item of
cost in the whole fuel cycle and an important determinant of the
ultimate cost of nuclear power. In the eyes of the AEC, the importance
of having an adequate supply of enriching capacity available when
needed and at a reasonable cost, coupled with the high cost of process
development and construction for enrichment facilities justifies the
closest possible cooperation and communications among the users and
suppliers of enrichment services.277
At present, the three enrichment plants owned by the AEC constitute
virtually the sole source of enrichment services to non-Communist
countries.278 A similar facility exists in the Soviet Union, a compara-
tively small plant at Capenhurst in England, a small facility at Pierre-
latte, France, and one of unknown size in China. The Union of South
Africa is reported to be building an enrichment plant based upon a
secret process. The facilities in the U.S.S.R., England, and France
were built to manufacture highly enriched uranium for military
purposes.
Requirements for Enriched Uranium and Enrichment Services
To remain the major supplier of uranium enrichment service for
commercial nuclear power in the non-Communist world, the United
States must be prepared to supply this service for domestic and foreign
orders. For the foreign market, U.S. readiness and ability to supply
this service must be credible to foreign officials who are responsible for
their countries' nuclear power programs.
The demand for enrichment services is expected to grow substan-
tially over the next few decades as commercial use of nuclear power
expands. For the United States alone, nuclear power plants are ex-
pected to increase in total electrical generating capacity from 5,000
megawatts in 1970 to 15,000 megawatts in 1980 and to 300,000 mega-
watts by 1985. The AEC estimates that by 1980, 29 percent of the
875 Kratzer, op. cit., p. 335.
276 Loc. cit.
277 Remarks of ABC Commissioner Wilfrid E. Johnson in U.S. Papers for the Fourth
United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Wash-
ington, D.C : U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1971), vol. I, p. 2.5-2.
278 These production plants for enriched uranium are located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee ;
Paducah, Kentucky ; and Portsmouth, Ohio. Together they represent a U.S. capital invest-
ment of over $2.3 billion.
248
electricity generated in the United States will come from nuclear
power plants, and in the 1990s about half. As for foreign nuclear
power, the AEC estimates that nuclear power plants in foreign mar-
kets accessible to the United States will represent a total electrical
generating capacity of from 70,000 to 100,000 megawatts by 1980.
Taking into account that some enriching services will be furnished from
foreign sources, the AEC projects that foreign and domestic nuclear
powerplants requiring U.S. enrichment services will total about 225,-
000 megawatts in 1980.279
The value of the enrichment market is estimated to be about $1 bil-
lion annually by 1980, and $1.5 billion by 1985. The AEC already has
signed long-term contracts for enriching services of 30 years dura-
tion. These contracts have an aggregate potential demand of about
$3 billion, including some $800 million from abroad.280
United States Supply Policy
To foster foreign interest in its nuclear power technology, the
United States has assured foreign users of a reliable supply of enriched
uranium. This assurance is necessary because other nations would not
be willing to make large capital investments in nuclear power plants
fueled from an external monopoly without strong assurance of the
long-term availability of enriched uranium. Thus, the cornerstone of
U.S. supply policies has been a long-term assurance of supply, com-
mensurate with the reasonable economic life of foreign nuclear power
plants, on non-discriminatory terms and conditions, and including
charges comparable to those for the domestic nuclear industry. U.S.
supply policy has been characterized by repeated assurances of the
dependability of nuclear fuel supply through export allocations of
enriched uranium to signatories of bilateral agreements, and through
enrichment services contracts.
The sucesss of this policy is illustrated by the fact that most nuclear
power reactors sold in international trade to date have been of U.S.
design, using enriched uranium. For the period of July 1962 through
December 30, 1970, the revenues from the sale of enriching services and
nuclear materials to foreign users came to $207 million.281
ADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES
Supplying fuel to nuclear power plants in Europe offers advantages
to the United States. The AEC identifies them as follows:282
National security : U.S. supply of enriched uranium for civil pur-
poses abroad under safeguards assures that the plutonium produced
in these reactors will not be available for military use. The avail-
ability of enriched uranium from the United States on attractive
terms also serves U.S. non-proliferation objectives by reducing the
incentive for other countries to develop their own enriching capacity.
Strong international ties: By supplying enriched uranium, the
United Slates encourages the formation of strong and mutually bene-
ficial economic ties.
^"Johnson, op. clt., p. 2.5 2.
280 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Authorizing
Legislation, Firsal Year 1072, op. clt., p. 22'M.
281 U.S. Concress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Uranium Enrichment
Pricing Criteria, 92d Cong., 1st SeSS., 1971. part 2. p. 29.
*8=U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings. Future Ownership
the AEC's Gaseous Diffusion Plant", 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 48.
249
Economic benefits: Important economic benefits are realized from
the sale of enriched uranium abroad. While prices charged by the
United States do not include profit, they are calculated to recover all
costs of production including amortization, interest on the govern-
ment's investment, and a factor for contingencies. The foreign sales
have helped to provide a cash benefit to the U.S. Treasury and to
amortize facilities built initially for defense purposes.
Foreign exchange: Foreign sales provide an important source of
foreign exchange. To help redress a serious balance-of-payments
deficit, the United States must look to the export of products based
on advanced technology and heavy capital investment where U.S.
superiority cannot be easily offset by labor cost differentials and other
factors favoring foreign products.
DISADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES
.: ■ .■•■:■■ ; v . : ' - - . - '. ; • :-,..;• ■• •:■: o* *■
Supplying enrichment services to foreign customers also has several
dra wfoacks : '
Commitment of public capital: Enrichment technology is very ex-
pensive in capital -investment.' A policy of long terni commitfnertt to
supply enrichment services to foreign customers carries with it an
implied obligation to make whatever future public or private invest-'
ment will be necessary to expand or build new enrichment plants.
Commitment of fossil fuel: Enrichment plants in the U.S. require
large amounts of electricity, most of which is generated in conven-
tional powerplants that burn fossil fuels.283 Not only is this fuel in
essence exported, but additional land is strip mined in the United
States for the benefit of electricity users abroad.
Implied responsibility for misuse of exported fuel: Although en-
riched uranium suitable for fuel for most contemporary commercial
nuclear power plants cannot be used directly to fabricate an atomic
explosive, it would be a very desirable material for clandestine enrich-
ment facilities to process into weapons grade materials. If the United
States freely supplies enrichment services in the world market, what
would be its responsibilities in the eyes of the world were some of that
material to be illicitly diverted to weapons manufacture ? In Section V
it was noted that materials were supplied according to the terms of
bilateral agreements which initially gave the United States unusual
authority to inspect use of materials supplied by it. Later this author-
ity was transferred through trilateral agreements to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Presumably, once the Nonproliferation
Treaty is fully implemented, the IAEA will have full responsibility
for safeguarding nuclear fuel materials, including enriched uranium,
as discussed in Section XI. Nonetheless, if enriched uranium supplied
by the United States does find its way into wrong hands, will it be
sufficient for the U.S. to simply shift the responsibility to the IAEA ?
."-"' EVOLUTION OP U.S. SUPPLY POLICY
A point of departure for the U.S. nuclear fuel supply policy was
established on August 8, 1955. On that date, the opening day in Geneva
283 Admiral Rickover, who heads the AEC's nuclear power program for naval propulsion,
estimates that the enrichment services required for a nuclear fuel loading requires about
600 million kilowatt hours of electricity, which would require about 500,000 tons of coal
to generate.
250
of the first United Nation's Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy, the AEC announced a price for enriched uranium
to nations which had bilateral agreements with the United States.
"Within the year, on February 22, 1956, at the recommendation of the
AEC and with the concurrence of the Departments of State and
Defense, President Eisenhower announced that the United States
would make available 40,000 kilograms of uranium-235 to assist in-
dustrial nuclear power development and research within the United
States and to enable friendly countries to develop the peaceful uses of
atomic energy. Of the uranium-235 thus allocated, 20,000 kilograms
was for domestic use and 20,000 for cooperating countries.284 By im-
plication, as additional nuclear projects were undertaken, additional
supplies of nuclear fuel would be made available. In a parallel state-
ment, Chairman Strauss added that the AEC would provide uranium-
235 to support nuclear power development for the expected life of
nuclear power projects abroad.
Although these announcements committed the United States to
supply nuclear fuels, there remained uncertainty as to terms and con-
ditions of supply. To minimize these uncertainties, the President on
November 18, 1956, announced details of terms and conditions of sup-
ply. His announcement permitted nuclear power plant operators
abroad to estimate more accurately the costs of nuclear power. The
announcement also emphasized the U.S. desire to sell rather than lease
nuclear fuel for foreign nuclear power plants, and set out the formal
criteria under which it would receive and enrich foreign owned
uranium.286
To reassure foreign users of a reliable supply, the AEC in 1968 an-
nounced that it would deliver supplies of enriched uranium for periods
as long as five years in advance of actual use so that the users could
have an inventory in hand. Furthermore, proposals for foreign inven-
tories of enriched uranium for even longer periods would be
considered.286
SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR EURATOM
When the Atomic Energy Act was revised in 1954, a special limita-
tion was included to control distribution of special nuclear materials
to any group of nations. Section 54 required specific authorization by
the Congress for such distribution. The Euratom Cooperation Act of
1958 subsequently authorized the transfer of specified amounts of
uranium-235 and plutonium. This initial authorization has subse-
quently increased from time to time by legislation. The latest increase
occurred in 1967 by Public Law 90-190, which authorized transfer
of up to 215,000 kilograms of contained uranium-235. In reporting
"•D.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twentieth Semiannual Report of Atomic Energy
Gomminnion (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. vlll.
""U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to the Congress of Atomic Energy
Commission, January-December 1966, op. clt., p. 274.
"•U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report to Congress of the Atomic Energy
Commission, 1968 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 210.
251
this legislation to Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
underscored the need to assure Europe of an adequate fuel supply for
its nuclear power plants. According to the Joint Committee, a survey
of uranium-235 needs for the Community had indicated that the
earlier ceiling would be insufficient to meet the long-term fuel
requirements for nuclear power plants which were expected to be
in operation or under construction in the near future. Additional ura-
nium-235 would be necessary to fuel an installed nuclear power plant
capacity of 13,000 electrical megawatts (Mwe) that Euratom ex-
pected to have in operation or under construction by 1972. The Joint
Committee observed that this increase represented a logical continua-
tion of the U.S Government's previous uranium supply policies.
Assuming that all of the additional uranium-235 was supplied to
Euratom through U.S uranium enrichment services, the revenues to
the United States would be about $500 million. There could also be
additional revenue to the domestic nuclear industry through sale of
uranium concentrates, conversion services, and reactor equipment.287
TOLL ENRICHMENT
Beginning January 1, 1969, the industrial role of the AEC changed
when the United States began to offer "toll enrichment" to European
users of nuclear power.288 The AJEC processes customer-supplied
uranium in its diffusion plants to increase the U-235 content and
returns to the consumer the desired enriched fuel, plus the residual
uranium that has been depleted of its normal U-235 content. For this
enriching service, the AEC charges a toll based on the amount of
separative work needed to produce the desired enrichment.
To provide toll enriching service to Euratom, the Atomic Energy
Commission needed special legislative authorization. This was pro-
vided in 1967 through Public L&w 90-190 (81 Stat. 575).
Through November 1970, the AEC had signed 31 contracts with
foreign customers to supply enrichment services worth $688 million,
based on a charge of $26 per separate work unit. In comparison, at that
time AEC's enrichment commitments to the domestic nuclear industry
totaled $1.6 billion. Of the foreign commitments, those with Euratom
totaled $124 million. Table V gives the details of the United States
foreign commitments.
In estimating enrichment requirements, each nuclear power plant of
1,000 Mwe generating capacity represents a demand of over a 30-
year working life of about $110 million, based on AEC prices in effect
in November 1970. OECD estimates that the nuclear power market of
the non-Communist world may reach 610,000 installed megawatts by
1985. If so, the market for toll enrichment could approach §2.5 billion
annually.289
*" U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic Energy Acta — Amend-
ments, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967. Sen. Kept. No. 743. .
888 With toll enrichment, the customer furnishes his own natural uranium and thus can
sav» the initial dollar cost of this material.
288 Robert L. Loftness. "Nuclear Power Abroad : A Time of Change," Combustion, vol. 113
(August 1971), p. 13.
252
TABLE V.-AEC CONTRACTS FOR TOLL ENRICHMENT WITH FOREIGN CUSTOMERS, NOVEMBER 1970
Value of
Number of contracts
Customer contracts (millions)
Euratom - If $124.3
Japan - — 8 335.3
Switzerland. - 2 83.3
Sweden 2 139.1
Spain , - 1 •»
Total - 31 688.4
Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, press release N-206, Nov. 24, 1970.
FINANCING NUCLEAR FUEL INVENTORIES
Throughout the later 1950s, one question for U.S. foreign nuclear
policy was what financial assistance, if any, should be given to foreign
countries purchasing U.S. nuclear fuel materials. Shouldthe^ U.S. sell
them, lease them, or loan money to buy them? The final decision was
in favor of direct sale for the following reasons : 290
(1) The cost of the fuel inventory was considered part of the
capital cost of the facility and hence one that should be borne
by the owner of the facility.
(2) The material was expensive and the total value of the fuel
inventory in the aggregate could reach billions of dollars when
atomic power came into general use ; and
(3) It would be unwise for the Commission to establish a prece-
dent that might lead to its financing very large sums of money
overseas (which more appropriately was a banking function).
THE DEFERRED PAYMENT PLAN
AEC policy of sale rather than lease had its drawbacks, partic-
ularly for cooperation with Eurotom. The initial heavy capital outlay
for enriched fuel could be an obstacle in financing nuclear power
projects of interest to the United States. To reduce this obstacle, the
AEC announced on February 2, 1959, that it would supply enriched
uranium fuel on a deferred payment basis to countries and interna-
tional organizations that had bilateral agreements of cooperation with
the United States.
Under this arrangement, a foreign reactor operator could use the
fuel for ten years before beginning payments on principal, which
would be spaced over the following 10 years. Interest on the unpaid
balance was the same as the use charge for such materials in effect for
the domestic nuclear industry. Fuel consumed was to be paid for as
consumed. Tl>e effect of this policy was to defer repayment of a major
capital cost until the productive period after a nuclear power plant
had been built and brought into operation.
To be eligible for deferred payment, the power reactors had to- be
scheduled for operation before June 30, 1964, and had to use U.S.
designs and a substantial portion of U.S. components.
280 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Background Material for the
Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1960, vol. 2, p. 392. (Joint Committee print.)
253
By early 1964, the AEC and Euratom had signed two deferred pay-
ment agreements for two Italian projects, and during that year a third
arrangement was concluded with Euratom for fuel for a French nu-
clear powerplant.291
PRICING URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICE
A potential divergence between domestic and foreign policy for
nuclear energy arose in 1971 following two successive increases in the
AEC price for uranium enrichment. The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy held hearings at which AEC Commissioner Ramey dissented
from this price increase.292 He argued for a policy of stability in
pricing to retain the U.S. position as a fuel supplier, and to discourage
foreign construction of enrichment plants. He said:*93
Because of the AEC's unique position as the supplier of enriching services, to
the United States and most of the free world, I believe it has a responsibility
to maintain a stable price for the vital enrichment services which domestic
and foreign utilities and equipment companies must purchase. . ' , • l !
. . .:the inteijnatiqijial implicatipns Qfr tbe; price increase cap be, serious. Our
foreign customers, botjh present and potential, are going to be concerned by the
two price increases in rapid Succession. They are certainly going to want an
alternative 'Supply of enriching services. This will serve to' reduce the demand
on. our .capacity and to ^further the construction of- enrichment plants in other
countries, . : r. ; \ ' ' ■ . . r
While this. latter faction is already underway or being seriously considered in
several countries, this proposed pricing action will discourage either the use
ef United States technology of a partnership with the United States rh con-
structing the new capacity. A proliferation of enrichment facilities abroad is
not in anybody|s best interest. ...... i- .--..•.,.
So domestic policy decisions to increase the charge for enrichment had
unfavorable implications for U.S. foreign policy. - .
Apropos of foreign policy, the AEC did not consult the State De-
partment about these pricing actions. An AEC representative advised
the Joint Committee that it was a domestic decision : 294
. . ^. This was a decision that was taken by the Atomic Energy Commission,
and the State Department was not consulted in advance. I think that while
this is a very important consideration, the policy we followed is to establish
our price primarily on the basis of the whole power industry, of which the do-
mestic industry is the greater part, and then try to treat everybody on a non-
discriminatory basis. While thought was given to the implications on the foreign
business, we did not consult outside of the agency on this subject.
The AEC did, however, inform the Department of State shortly
before announcing the price increases so that the news could be "prop-
erly communicated to our embassies and our customers abroad." 295
European Opposition to U.S. Enrichment Monopoly
Through the late 1960's, whether Europe might produce its own en-
riched uranium for nuclear power was a speculative but not imminent
question. During this time the French and the British sought to
develop commercially competitive nuclear powerplants fueled with
natural uranium. While the joint U.S. -Euratom program did result
281 TT.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Annual Report to Congress, J96i (Washington, D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office. 1965), p. 202.
283 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Uranium Enrichment
Pricing Criteria, on. cit., p. 13.
288 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
284 Ibid., n. 21.
286 Loc. cit.
254
in construction of three prototype plants of prevailing U.S. design
and fueled with enriched uranium, the outcome of the competition
between natural and enriched uranium fuel cycles was still open.
Then, in the late 1960's both France and the United Kingdom became
interested in enriched fuel, which the West Germans and Italians had
used from the outset. The decision of the French in 1969 to turn from
natural to enriched uranium brought with it renewed interest in con-
struction of a European facility to supply this material. A parallel
proposal that the AEC sell its gaseous diffusion plants to the American
nuclear industry seems to have shaken European assumptions as to the
long-term reliability of U.S. supply.
The European enrichment idea took on new life in mid- 1970 when
the Commission of the European Communities argued that the setting
up of a European uranium enrichment capacity must form part of
the overall scheme of the Community and European efforts towards
industry oriented scientific and technological development.298
In May 1972 the technical and economic problems involved in the
enrichment of uranium were considered at a meeting of the EEC
Parliamentary Committee on Energy, Research, and Atomic Prob-
lems. There, experts reviewed and confirmed the Commission's fore-
casts of enriched uranium requirements. According to these fore-
casts, which covered the whole of Western Europe, separative require-
ments would double every 5 years. It appeared to them impossible
to obtain a firm, long-term undertaking from the United States to
supply the necessary materials, and therefore the experts urared the
community to build its own enrichment plants. However, the con-
ference was marked by differences of opinion as to the enrichment
technologv to be adopted.297 298
The, U.SjS.R. as an Alternative Source of Supply
Since the Soviet Union also possesses the industrial facilities to
enrich uranium for fuel, presumably it, too. could become a supplier
of enriched uranium or toll enrichment services in the world market.
The U.S.S.R. has indeed indicated interest in supplying nuclear fuel
for European power reactors. For example, in March 1971 the French
Government announced it had signed a short term contract with the
U.S.S.R. for toll enrichment of 80 tons of French materials. The
contract was between the French national atomic energy organization
and the Soviet agency, Technab Export. It called for delivery of the
feed material by the French in 1973 with return of enriched product
in 1973 and 1974 at a guaranteed price of between $5.6 and $7.2 million.
In comparison, AEC policy is to bill customers at the price in force at
time of delivery. The enriched Soviet uranium is fuel for a new French
power reactor being built with U.S. technology.
Speaking of this contract, an aide to the French Minister of Industry
commented that it might force the Americans to think twice about
more price increases for enrichment services. The Soviet price was less
than the AEC's price and was not subject to escalation. Whether the
»• "uropean Enrichment." Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 15 (July/ August
1970). p. 556.
■» h '"ar Engineering International, vol. 17 (July. 1972), p. 516.
"• Three separative processes were proposed : gas centrifuge, gas diffusion, and nozzle
separation. The French favor diffusion, the Dutch and English favor the centrifuge, and
the West Germans favor the nozzle process.
255
Soviet Union is willing to offer toll enrichment services on a long term
basis over the life of a power plant remains to be seen.299
The French emphasized that they were buying enrichment services
from the Soviet Union on a trial basis. An advantage for France was
the absence from the contract for any requirement that the material
supplied by the Soviet Union be placed under safeguards. France has
steadily maintained that because it is a nuclear weapons power, apply-
ing safeguards to nuclear fuel imported by its nuclear industry is
meaningless. The Soviet Union apparently agrees with the French
position. Had the French placed the enrichment contract with the
AEO under the AEC-Euratom bilateral agreement, Euratom safe-
guards would have applied to the material. Moreover, the Euratom
Supply Agency, whose jurisdiction the French have challenged, would
have been an intermediary to the transaction. By contrast, the Soviet
supply contract bypassed Euratom.300
It remains to be seen whether these preliminary signs of a Soviet
interest in supplying enriched uranium or enrichment services outside
of the Soviet bloc signal a future drive by the U.S.S.R. to penetrate the
free world nuclear fuel market. If the Soviets were to do so, the United
States would be faced with troublesome diplomatic decisions as to
what extent and in what way it would counter such a Soviet move.
Supply Policy Alternatives
If present AEC projections for the growth of nuclear power in the
United States and abroad are correct, the United States can expect
to maintain its dominant position in the world market for enriched
uranium and uranium enriching services through the 1970's with its
present facilities. If foreign policy interests of the United States
warrant preservation of a favorable position in world nuclear com-
merce, this country within the next few years will have to make
several basic policy decisions and commitments. For example, will the
United States decide to make the capital investment in new produc-
tion capability needed to sustain its position ? Will the United States
continue its present policies of full cost recovery for its enriching
services, or will it, if necessary, adopt competitive pricing to compete
in the market, or to discourage other nations from building their own
enriching facilities? These are some questions that will have to be
answered within the next few years.
Maintaining the Competitive Position of the United States in the
World Enrichment Market
Whatever may be the ultimate position of the United States in the
world's enrichment market, present AEC thinking anticipates that
this country will retain a dominant position well into the 1980's.
Commissioner Johnson at Geneva in 1971 reported estimates that
foreign enrichment would supply perhaps 5 percent of the market
by 1975 and rise to about one-third by 1985, still leaving two-thirds
of the market for the United States. He was confident the United
States would meet these demands : S01
m Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (March 18, 1971), p. 2.
saa'Nuc1ear Industry (April 1971), pp. 40—41. The Soviet Union also has agreed to supply
nuclear fuel to Finland and has opened enrichment talks with Sweden and West Germany.
301 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. Claims Capability to Meet Crowing Demands
for Uranium Enrichment Services, AEC Press Release No. 0-152, September 8, 1972, p. 1.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 18
256
... We are confident that by pre-producing some enriched uranium, by im-
proving the efficiency and increasing the capacity of our existing plants, and by
optimizing their operating modes, we can meet all of our domestic and foreign
enriching requirements until about 1982 — even if no new plant is brought into
operation before that date.
Two U.S. policies affected the planning for these increases. First
was the Presidential policy for eventual transfer of uranium enrich-
ment to the private sector. Second was the AEC announcement in
June 1971 of a program to give U.S. companies full access to the
enriching process technology so that they might decide what role they
would play in providing commercial enrichment services. If govern-
ment plants are transferred to the private sector, there will be the
questions of arrangements between the AEG and the private owners
.to fulfill the foreign commitment of the United States.
- ?or' : ■• ' ■ . ENRICHMENT REQUIBEMENTS
, Assuming enriched uranium will fuel much of the non-Communist
world's nuclear power plants unt^l .nuclear, breeders are introduced in
'#i©_ Jateij 1980's, and that the demand far enriched uranium and enriqh-
ing .services will continue to.gw>w(until then,302 there arises the question
of the U.S. ability to deliver during the l&JOV That ability will depend
upon the production capacity of U.S. industrial plants, the availa-
bility of electricity to operate, the separation process, and the cost of
that electricity. To put the 'capital and the electrical power require-
ments of a large diffusion plant into perspective in relation to nuclear
power plants they serve, each megawatt of electrical power supply
committed: to operation at the enrichment plants will produce enough
enriched uranium to fuel from 24 to 45 megawatts of nuclear power
plant output.303
. Viewed another way, the U.S. commitment to supply uranium en-
richment services for foreign users of nuclear power calls for a power
plant with an electrical power output of 1,000 megawatts for each
additional 24 to 45 nuclear power plants of comparable power output
to be fueled with enriched uranium. It remains to be seen whether
the commitment of this much generating capacity in the United States
for the benefit of electricity industries abroad is acceptable at a time
when the United States is itself facing the prospect of electricity
shortage. The issue will certainly require the balancing of foreign
policy and domestic policy considerations.
Three means are at hand to meet these commitments. The AEC
can bring its present production plants up to full capacity; it can
modify present plants to increase their productivity; and it can
build new plants. Complicating these options is the administration's
policy that the government's uranium enrichment plants should be
sold to private industry.
AEC Commissioner Johnson discussed these options at Geneva
in 1971. Considering the present separation capabilities, he observed
that the AEC's three enrichment plants during the fiscal year 1972
had operated at about half their production level, and that even at
these reduced levels the AEC was still producing enriched uranium
aoafThese assumptions could be upset by challenges of the breeder programs by some
environmentalist croups, or by delays In the demonstration of this technology.
*» Ibid., p. 2.5-7.
257
in excess of current requirements. AEC's operating plans call for
continuing "pre-production" of enriched uranium for nuclear fuel,
with the present pre-production inventory large enough to satisfy
nuclear power needs for about the next two years. As domestic and
foreign demands increase, the AEC plans to return the existing three-
plant complex to full output by 1978. Parenthetically, this will require
the AEC to find an electrical power supply of about 3,400 megawatts,
equivalent to about three large new power plants, at a time when
construction of such plants has been delayed.
Concerning expansion of the present plant capacity, planned im-
provements would substantially increase the output of enriched
uranium for the same electrical input at an estimated capital cost of
$500 to $600 million. If, in addition, the electrical power supply for
the three plants can be increased by about one-sixth, from 6,100 mega*
watts to 7,400 megawatts (an increase equivalent to the output of a
large, modern electrical generating plant), and an additional invest-
ment of $200-$300 million be made, the United States enrichment
capacity could be sufficiently increased to meet AEC estimates for
foreign and domestic requirements for the 1970's.
Looking into the early 1980's and beyond, and assuming present
forecasts are valid, one can estimate that the needs for enrichment
will exceed the capability of the present U.S. complex, even after
modification and increased power supply. New production plants will
be needed, together with electric power plants if the United States is
to hold its dominant position as a world supplier of enriched uranium.
The AEC estimates that the latest date for a firm decision to build
new production capacity is 1975. If the present output is not expanded,
then a decision will have to be made no later than 1973 to build new
production capacity. Beyond these dates, assuming present demand
estimates are correct, without additional capacity this country will
be unable to meet combined domestic and foreign demands for en-
riched uranium.304
THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDING U.S. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
While the AEC was optimistic at the last Geneva conference on
atomic energy that it would obtain funds to increase the productivity
of its existing enrichment plants, some members of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy were less optimistic. In opening a hearing
in March 1971 on uranium enrichment programs, Congressman Chet
Holifield said the Joint Committee agreed that the AEC should im-
prove its production plants, and that this should be done before other
U.S. alternatives were considered for enrichment supply such as
sharing U.S. technology with foreigners. But, he observed, the ad-
ministration over the three preceding years had not requested the
funds for these improvements and the Office of Management and
Budget was even withholding some $16 million aDproDriated for this
purpose. The Joint Committee was of the opinion that the United
804 As this report was being completed, there were Indications In the trade press of the
nuclear industry that shortages of U.S. enrichment capacity would appear by 1985. How-
ever, there was disagreement as to how soon to begin work to avert this problem. The
Atomic Industrial Forum released a study in October 1972 in which an AIF committee saw
no way of avoiding a future shortfall in uranium separative work capacity unless plans for
the first major increment in new plant -capacity are Initiated before the end of 1972. On the
other hand, AEC spokesmen were Quoted as saying that a decision on Increased capacity
need not be made before 1976. Cf. Nucleonics Week, vol. 13 (October 19, 1972), p. 1.
258
States should keep itself ahead in this important technological market
instead of helping other nations to become competitors.305
Sharing the U.S. Monopoly
If other nations acquire their own enrichment capabilities, either
individually or through a multinational organization, there arises the
foreign policy question whether the United States should seek to in-
fluence such foreign ventures and, if so, by what means.
While the European Economic Community has the ability to
develop and build enrichment plants, for these to have a reasonable
chance of economic success they must be economically competitive
with the United States and, possibly, the U.S.S.R. One major cost for
a European plant would be the duplicating of research, development,
and experience of the United States. That cost could be minimized
were the United States to supply the technical information, and per-
haps certain critical materials and components. In return for such
assistance, the United States would expect some voice in the organiza-
tion and its operations. A U.S. policy decision to supply its technology
could hasten the end of the American monopoly in enrichment serv-
ices and perhaps increase the risk of undesirable proliferation of the
world's capability to make nuclear weapons materials.306
The proffering of U.S. enrichment technology was broached before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1969. Some members viewed
it as a way to reduce the scale of the future government commitment
to expand the AEC's production plants. Representative Craig
Hosmer was impatient with foreign complaints about the realibility
of the United States as a supplier of enriched uranium. He remarked
with some asperity that : 307
I am personally sick and tired of hearing them complain about the un-
reliability of the United States. As far as I am concerned, I want to make it
clear I don't care who enriches this stuff. I think that the proliferation feature
can be taken care of. Where our danger exists is that a bunch of people are
going out and installing more capacity in an unrelated fashion to the existing
capacity and growing demand so that we reach the point where the demand
for enriched uranium goes down and we have a lot of unamortized plants on our
hands somewhere in the world, and I hope that they are in Europe and Japan.
The following year, after some speculation in the newspapers that
the United States was planning to share enrichment technology
abroad.308 Commissioner Johnson sooke about this possibility and indi-
cated the AEC would be open-minded to foreign inquiry.309
so" The hearing inouired Into the AEC's ability to meet future domestic and foreign com-
mitments. Of. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, AEC Author-
izina Lcaislation Fiscal Year 1972, 92d Coner., 1st Sees., 1971. part 4, p. 2238.
3ns While the separation plantR themselves probably would not produce weapons grade
materials, the slightly enriched uranium they would produce would be n convenient feed
material for the clandestine manufacture of highly enrlcbed uranium for weapons.
807 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearings, Future Ownership of the
AEC's Oaseous Diffusion Plants, 91st Cone., 1st Sess.. 1969. p. 55.
•""The Washington Post of October 23, 1970, carried a feature article about a plan to
share secret American nuclear technology with foreign countries as being recommended by
the AEC and the State Department. One major reason for the proposition was that at least
six other countries were on the verge of producing their own enriched uranium. The Wall
Street Journal of October 26. 1970, reported that the Administration was weighing an
AEC proposal that United States Interest* would benefit from the sharing of its uranium
enrichment technology with friendly nations.
809 Wilfrid E. Johnson, "Uranium enrichment — U.S. Policy, Requirements and Capabili-
ties," AEC Press Release S-38-70, November 17, 1970.
259
Early in January 1971, Representative Hosmer enumerated the
advantages to the United States of a European diffusion plant based
upon U.S. technology. These were : 310
United States is relieved from financing this increment of enrichment capacity.
United State.s conserves its irreplaceable energy fuels.
United States stands to receive royalty income.
All parties gain more time for centrifuge R. & D.
Slowdown of centrifuge development postpones its possible contributions to-
ward proliferation.
A cooperative international pattern is established for dovetailing enrichment
capacity to enrichment requirements.
Precedent may be created for effective IAEA controls over enriched uranium.
Other countries are relieved from dependence on the United States for uranium
enrichment services.
If the deadline for decision is missed, Mr. Hosmer cautioned, these
advantages will be lost and the United States and other countries will
be forced to make other arrangements for post-1980 enrichment
capacity.
In his second foreign policy message to Congress on February 25,
1971, President Nixon called attention to U.S. preeminence in technol-
ogy and posed the policy question : How far should the United States
share the fruits of its research and technology ? Taking nuclear energy
as an example, he announced that the administration had undertaken
consultations with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning
ways in which the United States could assist its allies to construct a
multinational uranium enrichment plant.311
In a separate statement of U.S. foreign policy for a technological
age, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, restated the question of
whether the United States, with adequate safeguards, should offer
to share uranium enrichment technology with other nations. He
said : 312
The current situation with respect to enriched uranium fuels offers signifi-
cant opportunities for furthering international cooperation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Because of its advanced technology and plant capacity
the United States has been in effect the only exporter of enriched uranium fuel
for power reactors. Indeed, our export earnings from sales of nuclear power
plants, fuels, and related services are over $1 billion now and are expected to
reach $5 billion by 1975.
But worldwide demand for this fuel continues to grow, and it is clear that other
nations intend to diversify their sources of supply. But we are now considering
whether, with adequate safeguards, we should offer to share our uranium
enrichment technology with other nations building a civil industry.
Going further, Secretary Rogers saw the sharing of uranium enrich-
ment technology as an example of opportunities open for scientific
cooperation when political cooperation may not be feasible : 313
Because the problems dealt with by science usually have a low specific gravity
in political terms, scientific cooperation is often possible where political co-
operation is not.
The habit of cooperation is a good one to keep. If it is kept, it surely will have
spillover effect in increasing the constructive role of international organizations
310 Remarks of Congressman Craig Hosmer, Congressional Record, vol. 116, January 2.
1971, n. 44805.
311 "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s : Building for Peace," Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents, vol. 7 (March 1, 1971), p. 374.
812 Cf. William P. Rogers, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age." An address
by . . . Department of State publication 8571, General Foreign Policy Series 252 (March
1971), p. 11-12.
313 Loc. cit.
260
in establishing new patterns of international cooperation, and in strengthening
observance of international law.
As to whether U.S. foreign policy interests preferred a multina-
tional venture or separate national ventures, the AEC said it was
preferable for the Europeans to go to the multinational route and build
a plant under adequate safeguards. Commissioner Ramey agreed that
cooperation could help rationalize the future expansion of U.S. and
foreign enrichment capacity and would provide the United States
with revenues that would otherwise be lost through the establishment
of completely independent foreign efforts. He said : 314
It is worthy of npte that the French have recently announced plans to initiate
detailed economic and technical studies on construction of a diffusion plant . . .
and planned for operation in the late 1970s. If such a plant were constructed
as a multinational effort, it might fit into our plans in this program, and I gather
that the French would be interested in exploring possible cooperation along
these lines with the United States.
Clearly, other countries are determined to acquire an independent enrichment
capability and will be successful to some degree in this effort. Thus, under a
sound businesslike arrangement, I believe we stand more to gain than to lose by
joining these foreign developments rather than by remaining outside.
The State Department confirmed the U.S. interest in the multi-
national approach, advising the Joint Committee that : 315
First, we assume that the cost of the gaseous diffusion plant is such that it
probably would be more attractive to a multinational group than it would be to
a single nation. Secondly, we feel our interest would be better served if the
enrichment facilities are built by a multinational group rather than under the
control of a single country. So the whole approach we have tin mind is to en-
courage the multinational approach.
Most recently, the AEC reported at Geneva in 1971 that the
United States had notified certain nations of Europe and the Pacific
Basin of its willingness to enter into exploratory discussions on the
possibility of a multinational uranium enrichment project. To support
such a venture, the United States would be prepared to make avail-
able, for fair compensation, the advanced gaseous diffusion tech-
nology and know-how of the AEC for the establishment of one or
more multinational projects for the construction of separations plants
of substantial capacity, subject to appropriate controls.319
According to the nuclear trade press, AEC and State Depart-
ment officials met informally at Geneva with representatives of 10
nations and the European Economic Community to define earlier
announcements that the AEC was ready to talk about sharing U.S.
enrichment technology. The United States reportedly sought to es-
tablish whether the EEC was absolutely determined to build its ura-
nium enrichment plant in Europe or whether it would consider another
site that might have economic advantages of lower power costs.317
In separate messages during August, the EEC nations and the
United Kingdom expressed varying degrees of enthusiam for estab-
lishing a multinational gaseous diffusion plant with U.S. technology,
and called on the EEC to conduct formal talks with the United Stales
on their behalf. The EEC message, expressing a noncommittal will-
ingness to talk, noted the AEC/s diffusion data would be included in
31«T\S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, 1EG luthorteing Legis-
lation Finrnl fear 1972, op. rit., p. 2247.
w Ibid., p. 2267.
*i«U.S. Atomic Bnerpv Commission, U.S. Claims Capability to Meet droning Demands
for Uranium Enriching Services, op. Hi., p. 2.
'"Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 9, 1971), p. 0
261
a comparative -study of the merits of otheV processes $ or manuf aefcu*^
ingen^iched uranium.318 ■ rYniavi
r.«T! . • •> ' . ■-■ ■ • . ' ?y • .• ■ ; • ..' mmu
! ■ •
SOME VIEWS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
The 'Joint ■•Committee on Atomic Energy has closely followed pro-:
posals to'sell U.S. diffusion technology. Considering the close relation
between the Joint Committee and the AEC, and its insistence upon
being Currently informed of the Commission's activities, the Commit-
tee's views must be taken into account by U.S. diplomats seeking to
arrange ior export of this technology.
• In 1969 the Joint Committee was not convinced that the United
State*' should encourage the building of a European enrichment
capacity. One member of the Conimittee bluntly warned other conn-'
tries that onee they established their own enrichment capacity, there
was not a single, solitary reason for the United States to retain the
"incredibly generous" terms of its toll-enriehment contracts. Should
the Europeans persist with their plans to build their own facilities,
he said, then the United StatesI should consider alternatives. For in-
stance, the United States might sell enriched uranium at competitive
prices in the world market .rather than at production costs. Were this
to be done, the capacity of the U.S. production plants and their operat-
ing efficiencies would permit sale of enriched uranium at prices well
below those feasible for a European plant. While such a policy might
increase AEC's domestic operating expenses, it could substantially
help alleviate the U.S. balance-of -payments deficit in word trade.319
The Joint Committee kept pressing the administration for details
about the export or sharing of U.S. diffusion technology. For example,
on September 16, 1970, it met in executive session with the Atomic
Energy Commission to express its concern that the executive branch
did not have specific and detailed plans to propose. The Committee
clearly regarded possible export of enrichment technology as a signif-
icant and fundamental change in U.S. policy for international atomic
energy. At the close of the 91st Congress, in December 1970, it an-
nounced its intention to take a hard look at any proposal that this
technological asset be provided to foreign entities; The Committee
said it would examine the question not only from the "giveaway"
aspects, friit also from the point of view of its possible effects on na-
tional security and obligations of the United States Under the Non-
Prolrferation Treaty.380
The Gas Centrifuge: A Technical Perturbation for U.S. Policy?
3y early 1972, three European nations were working together to
perfect and demonstrate the gas centrifuge m process for enriching
uranium. They saw this as an alternative to depending upon the
United States for enrichment service, or for gaseous diffusion tech-
nology. If the gas centrifuge development is proven to be technologi-
cally and economically successful, the subsequent deployment of this
process could raise problems for U.S. diplomacy. Even now, there is
«* Loc. cit . .
*»Xu(teo*lC9 Week, vol. 10 (April 17, 19«0), p. 5.
8ao U.S. .Cj>ngressk Joint Committee 011 Atomic Energy, "Activtty and Accomplishments of
the Joint Gomnrtttee on Atomic Energy during the Second Session of the Olst Congress,"
Congressional Record, vol. 116, p. 44324.
881 Cf. Section II for a description of the «as centrifuge process.
262
question regarding U.S. efforts to discourage development of the
centrifuge process at home and abroad because of possible effects
upon the U.S. position in the world enrichment market, and, perhaps
more importantly, because of the implications of centrifuge tech-
nology for nonproliferation. On the other hand, if the commercial
use of the centrifuge enrichment process appears to be inevitable,
what could U.S. diplomacy do to influence the use and control of that
technology ?
The centrifugal process is not a new technological surprise. It was
one option open to the Manhattan Project during World War IT and
some research and development has been carried on since then. What
is new now is the concerted effort of several European states to develop
the process as an alternative to that now used by the United States,
the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and France.
The new work is being carried on by Dutch and German groups.
Not committed by past technological decisions and investments, these
groups in the early 1950's revived work on the centrifuge to enrich
uranium. The United States also kept some centrifuge work alive at
Oak Ridge, but did not deploy it. By the late 1950's, enough progress
had been made in West Germany for the British to reopen their centri-
fuge studies and later in the 1960's, the first steps were taken toward
multinational development of a working uranium enrichment capa-
bility using this process outside the framework of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the European Nuclear Energy Asrencv, or
Euratom.
THE CENTRIFUGE AND PROLIFERATION
In addition to significant technological differences between the gas
centrifuge and the gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of ura-
nium, there are other economic and security differences of international
concern. Whereas the gaseous diffusion process of the United States
requires major capital investment in large facilities and great amounts
of electricity, both of which are difficult to conceal, the gas centrifuge
process in principle can be employed on a much smaller scale, at less
capital investment, with considerably less demand for electricity for
each kilogram of enriched uranium produced ; all these make it easier
to conceal. Gas centrifuge factories offer flexibility in construction
and operation; additional units can be readily added, which means
that plant investment can be closely geared to actual growth of the
nuclear fuel market, and the capital investment can be spread out in
time. Of course, the smaller the installation the less the rate of produc-
tion for enriched uranium. On the other hand, the centrifuge process
should in principle be able to produce weapons grade materials as
well as nuclear fuel material. Existing enriched nuclear fuel from
other sources might be illegallv diverted to gas centrifuge factories,
thus making the production of weapons quality material easier and
more feasible in smaller facilities.
For these reasons, the construction of gas centrifuge plants would
>aiso questions about the effectiveness of safeguards. It would be pos-
sible in practice for smaller nations to join the "nuclear club" by
building concealed centrifuge enrichment plants which might use
for their feed materials enriched uranium ostensibly obtained to fuel
nuclear power reactors.
263
BREAKING THE SECRECY BARRIER
As a result of U.S. actions to inhibit work and publication of in-
formation on the centrifugation process,322 foreign centrifuge research
proceeded in secret and little was heard of it until an announcement
in 1968 by the Dutch, West Germans, and the British suggesting that
a tripartite arrangement to build a centrifuge enrichment plant was
under discussion. Notably absent from the initial discussions were the
French who had been emphatic in their desire to reduce their de-
gmdence upon the United States for uranium enrichment services,
arenthetically, the French several years earlier had opposed a British
proposal that European countries join with Britain in expanding its
diffusion plant.323
Accordingly, on March 4, 1970, a tripartite agreement of collabora-
tion on developement of the gas centrifuge process was concluded
by the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United
Kingdom. A few months later, in August, the tripartite members
offered associate membership to Belgium and Italy. The three govern-
ments claim the centrifuge process can provide cheaper enrichment for
Europe than can other processes.
The British Minister of Technology, Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn,
at the signing of the tripartite agreement, spoke of the enterprise as
a cornerstone of United Kingdom technological collaboration with
other countries in Western Europe which, he hoped, could lead to
fuller economic and political cooperation of the European Economic
Community.324
The French Drive for a European Diffusion Plant
In February 1971 the French Government complicated the diplo-
matic aspects of the enrichment market by its decision to promote con-
struction of a diffusion plant in Europe. Apparently this action was in
part a reaction to the tripartite centrifuge undertaking. Subsequently,
on March 11, 1971, the Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique (CEA)
announced that it was ready to build a commercial diffusion plant
with or without partners. The proposed French plant may also nave
been in response to the Algerian decision to take over French oil inter-
ests. Later, French President Georges Pompidou anounced that his
nation's sixth development plan for the years 1971 to 1975 would in-
clude construction of 8,000 megawatts of nuclear electric generating
capacity, to be fueled with enriched uranium. This announcement
underscored the seriousness of French interest in a European gaseous .
diffusion plant. •
a23 Centrtfugation separation is defined by AEC regulations (10 CFR 25, Appendix A)
to be Secret Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act. Under this regulation, no one
may have access to this Information unless the applicant fulfills several stringent conditions
and also gives the United States an Irrevocable license to use or have used any U.S. patent
on an Invention relating to this process made by the access permit holder. In addition,
the permittee Is required to grant the AEC the right to use any technical information
or data of a proprietary nature developed during the permit and for 1 year thereafter.
Finally, the permittee has to make quarterly reports to the AEC on its work, even though
the research is funded wholly from private sources. Cf. 10 CFR 25.23.
328 Of this omission, a British nuclear journal commented :
... It will no doubt interest the political commentators to speculate on the reasons
for leaving out of the initial discussions other countries who have been particularly
active in this field, notably France and Japan. From the technical point of view, it is a
pity that greater efforts were not made to overcome the present political high temperatures
to include France. . . . Cf. "Centrifugal Feelers," Nuclear Engineering International,
vol. 14 (January 1969). p. 5.
324 "Gas Centrifuge Agreement Signed," Atom, No. 162 ( April 1970) , p. 62.
264
By 19V0 the French Government was planning for an enrichment
facility with a capacity about three times the estimated need for
1980. The substantial excess capacity would be available to sell on the
world enrichment market. As for competition with the United States,
the planned sales price would be less than that currently charged by
the AEC. The proposed facility would be financed two-thirds by loans,
leaving $200 million to be raised through direct capital investment of
$40 million a year, a sum which would be well within French means.
French technology would be used, which the French consider equal
to that of the United States and superior to Britain's. However, they
would like access to U.S. technology, if this access is not top expensive.
An interesting aspect about the French plan was its circumvention
of normal diplomatic channels and government-to-government negoti-
ations. Instead, the French invitation was informally addressed to
European industry with the thought of securing participation by
corporations rather than governments. While the latter may have been
preferred, the French reportedly had grown tired of diplomatic de-
lays. Also, an appeal directly to industrial firms could permit in-
direct support from governments publicly committed to the gas
centrifuge project. France apparently hoped that Britain, the Nether-
lands, and West Germany can be attracted to join in a diffusion plant
venture and to abandon their centrifuge project. From the standpoint
of the U.S. interest, the French proposal of a single, multinational
enrichment plant would be preferable to a possible proliferation of
nationally-owned, gas centrifuge plants. Time for a final decision is
beginning to run out. One must be made by 1973 if Western Europe is
not to risk a shortage of nuclear fuel.325
Conclusions and Current Issues
During 1970-71. diplomacy and diplomats were involved with, or
affected by, a number of initiatives taken by European governments
to secure for themselves a role in uranium enrichment. Taken as a
whole, these initiatives suggest that the forces of fragmentation
within the European nuclear community remained strong. They re-
flected also U.S. desires to encourage multilateral construction and
operation of a large enrichment plant in Europe as an alternative to
a proliferation of smaller separate facilities. The initiatives included :
(1) A declaration by the EEC of the need to construct a Eu-
ropean enrichment facility ;
(2) A tripartite agreement among Britain, West Germany,
and Holland to develop the gas centrifuge for enrichment of
uranium;
( 3 ) A decision by the French Government to plan construction
of an enrichment plant in Europe ;
(4) A French decision to study construction of an enrichment
facility by means of collaboration of technical companies;
(5) The announced AEC intention to permit a limited number
of American companies to have access to secret enrichment tech-
nology ; and
(6) An AEC offer to help foreign countries, particularly Eu-
ropean, to build an enrichment plant.
»*Nucleonic8 Week, vol. 12 (March 18, i:iTn, pp. 1-2; Nuclear Industry (April 1971),
p. 40 ; Wall St net Journal (March 12, 1971), p. 5.
265
Although the United States had built its uranium enrichment plants
to produce nuclear materials for weapons, these facilities have become
an important economic asset for the United States and for its nuclear
foreign policy. Because of these facilities, the United States has been
able to offer long-term commitments to supply enriched uranium for
nuclear power plants in Europe. For the next few years, these plants
have sufficient capacity to do so. But within this decade, decisions
must be made that will decide the future competitive standing of the
United States in the enriched-uranium market. Some related issues
include the following : 326
Will the United States, for reasons of economic and foreign
policy, seek to preserve its position as the world's leading supplier
of enriched uranium and enrichment services ?
What measures should the United States consider if other na-
tions, singly or in concert, attempt to break the long-standing U.S.
enrichment monopoly by building their own enrichment facility ?
Is the further development of gas centrifuge technology in
Europe likely to lead to a technological surprise for the United
States, should the economic and technological feasibility of this
technology be demonstrated ?
What measures can or should the United States consider to
discourage further development of the gas centrifuge ?
What diplomatic options are open to the United States should
the Soviet Union seriously enter the world enriched-uranium
market ?
Since supplying enrichment services requires the use of large
amounts of electricity which, in the United States, comes from
coal-burning powerplants, and considering present air pollution
problems of the United States and the environmental impacts
of mining coal, do the foreign policy benefits of supplying en-
richment services to foreign customers balance the energy and
environmental costs to America ?
328 As this case study went to press, two events underscored the possibilities for change
in the role of the AEC in furnishing enrichment services for foreign and domestic customers.
On December 6, 1972, the AEC gave notice of a temporary suspension of new contracts for
enrichment services except for (1) firm quantity type contracts under negotiation on that
date, (2) contracts which have been submitted to customers for execution, and (3) new
short-term contracts to provide firm quantities of enriching services needed by domestic
and 'foreign customers to cover near-term requirements. The Commission imposed this
temporary suspension to permit time to complete its review of alternative methods of
contracting and to establish ". . . such modified method as will provide greater assurance
that the needed enrichment capacity at the Commission's plants will be available on a
timely basis. . . ." Another reason was to provide further assurance of ". . . augmenta-
tion of available enriching capacity in the 1980's and beyond by private resources." Cf.
Federal Register, voL 37, December 8, 1972, pp. 26145-26146.
The second event was an AEC announcement of December 6, 1972 which stated that it
is not the intention of the Commission to construct new enrichment plants to meet growing
requirements since it believes that the private sector can undertake to provide the required
capacity on a timely basis. The AEC, however, will remain in a position to furnish enrich-
ment services to the private sector to the extent of its available capacity. To stimulate the
requisite private effort, the AEC announced proposed modifications to its regulations which
would make the government's enrichment technology available. (Cf. Federal Register,
vol. 37, December 9, 1972, pp. 26345-26348.) At a press conference, AEC Chairman Schles-
singer said that If industry does hot do the job, the government must do it. He also said
that a vigorous industry could maintain the "clear" U.S. advantage in exporting nuclear
power technology and by the 1980's might produce $3.5 billion a year in foreign sales
compared With $900 million In 1972. (Cf. Washington Post, December 9. 1972, p. A-3.)
XI. The Noxproliferation Treaty and Safeguards
A recent impact of the scientific discovery of fission upon American
diplomacy and foreign policy is to be found in the Treaty on Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Thirty years after scien-
tists correctly interpreted the meaning of small light pulses upon a
cathode ray screen, the U.S. Senate, on March 13, 1969, gave its advice
and consent to ratification of an unprecedented concept in interna-
tional relations: a general commitment to international inspection
within national borders. The concept is radical in two respects : first,
it divides nations into two classes — those which have the atom bomb
and those which do not ; second, it commits the non-weapons signatories
to the Treaty to yield up some of their sovereignty to international in-
spections, in return for which they are assured against the dangers of
undetected diversion by their neighbors of nuclear materials to manu-
facture nuclear weapons. The Treaty is unusual, too, in its operative
provisions which bind the non- weapons countries to negotiate bilateral
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Whether this commitment to
agree will prove effective, or whether, as some critics claim, it will
prove to be worthless; whether IAEA safeguards can, in fact, provide
sufficient assurance to alleviate international fear of clandestine
diversion on nuclear materials to weapons — these are presently un-
answerable questions.
The entry into force of the Nonproliferation Treaty on March 5,
1970 has put into motion a whole host of new international negotiations
between the IAEA and the non-nuclear weapons countries, and also
negotiations with those nuclear weapons powers which would volun-
tarily place their civil nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.
Complicating the diplomatic effort is the refusal of France and the
People's Republic of China, which both possess their own nuclear
weapons, to sign the Treaty, and its rejection by India which appears
technologically capable of making such weapons.
New Urgency for Safeguards
Discussion of safeguards is timely now because the amounts of nu-
clear materials present in the fuel cycles of commercial nuclear energy
remain modest. Before the end of the decade of the 1970's, however, this
situation is expected to change. Amounts involved by then will present
a tempting target to those who may wish to obtain fissionable material
for weapons. By the end of the 1970's many countries are likety to
be generating significant amounts of nuclear energy with concurrent
production of plutonium, and thus possess a potential for making
nuclear weapons in quantity.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 1972
yearbook <>n world armaments warns that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons would lead to a totally new situation in military and strategic
affairs. According to SIPRI, the, main factor behind the anticipated
spread of nuclear weapons technology is that for most environments
nuclear power reactors provide the cheapest means of producing elec-
tricity. While, some energy analysts are not this optimistic, pro-
ponents of nuclear power anticipate its widespread use within the
next two decades.
(266)
267
SIPRI points out that in 1971, 16 countries had 128 nuclear power
reactors in operation with a total generating capacity of 35,000 mega-
watts. By 1977, 32 countries are expected to have 325 working nuclear
power plants with a total output of 174,000 megawatts. By 1980, the
world nuclear capacity estimated by SIPRI will probably exceed
350,000 megawatts.
These nuclear power plants will produce plutonium as a by-product.
SIPRI estimates that 13 tons will be produced in 1972, increasing to
65 tons annually in 1977 and to 130 tons in 1980. By 1980, about one-
third of this plutonium will be owned by countries which do not now
have nuclear weapons. This amount of plutonium, in theory, might
supply nuclear explosives to manufacture 100 weapons per week of
the size dropped on Hiroshima.327
In SIPRI's analysis of the potentialities for proliferation, it identi-
fies 15 countries capable of developing nuclear weapons within the
short- or medium-term future. Therefore the attitudes of these coun-
tries toward the Nonproliferation Treaty are of intrinsic interest.328
The Four Functions of the Nonproliferation Treaty
In broad outline, the Nonproliferation Treaty has four major
functions, which are to :
(1) Commit the nations of the world which do not now have
nuclear weapons not to produce or to receive them in the future ;
(2) Assure equally that such nations have the full peaceful
benefits of the atom ;
(3) Provide assurance, through international safeguards, that
the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already
developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making sucn
weapons ; and
(4) Recognize the determination of the parties that the Treaty
should lead to further progress toward arms control and dis-
amament.
The Treaty identifies two classes of nations : those which have the
atom bomb, and those which do not. The latter are expected to open
their borders and nuclear facilities to international inspection,
which nations that possess the atom bomb have not agreed to
do. In return, the non-weapons countries have the pledge of the
weapons-possessing powers not to give nuclear weapons to non-
weapons states. Among the major nuclear nations, the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom are parties to the Treaty..
France and the People's Republic of China have not signed it, nor
have three nations thought to be able to produce weapons: India,
Israel, and the Union of South Africa. The South Africans assert that
they are developing a secret process to enrich uranium. Among other
leading countries, early in 1972 eight had signed but had not ratified
the Treaty. These included Australia, Belgium, Egypt, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Switzerland and West Germany.
Among the nations party or signatory to the Nonproliferation
Treaty are several which have a strong enough industrial and finan-
cial base to produce nuclear weapons. These include Australia, Can-
827 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarma-
ment; SIPRI Yearbook 1972 (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 288-290.
338 The 15 countries identified by SIPRI fall into two groups : the non-signatories and
those which have signed hut not ratified the Treaty. Early in 1972 the nations in each
froup were as follows : Non-signatories included Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan,
outh Africa and Spain ; signers included Australia, Belgium, Egypt, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
268
a da, Japan, perhaps Argentina, the Scandinavian nations, and West-
Germany. These nations naturally expect something in return for
foregoing development of their own nuclear weapons capability. In
addition to sharing in benefits from nuclear power, they expect to be
protected from proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among
their neighbors..
The Nonproliferation Treaty obliges nations having nuclear weap-
ons to share the benefits of nuclear energy with the other nations,
and also to support the International Atomic Energy Agency as it
struggles to perfect credible and acceptable safeguards systems. Each
state party to the Treaty needs to be assured that fissionable material
in the possession of each non-nuclear- weapon neighbor is not used to
make weapons. IAEA has the unenviable task of an international
watchdog to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapons states fulfill their
obligations under the Treaty. Each such state has committed itself to
negotiate an agreement with the IAEA under which it will accept
safeguards to verify compliance with these obligations. But the
Treaty does not itself specify the nature of the safeguards system to
be adopted.
U.S. Ratification and Support of the Treaty
As a nuclear-weapons state, the United States is exempt from
IAEA safeguards. Nonetheless, when President Johnson signed
the Nonprohferation Treaty on July f, 1968, he offered to put com-
merieal nuclear power in the United States under IAEA safeguards.
He said : 329
We will cooperate fully to bring the Treaty safeguards into being. We shall
thus help provide the basis of confidence that is necessary for increased coopera-
tion in the peaceful nuclear field. After the Treaty has come into force, we will
permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to :ill
nuclear activities in the United States — excluding only those with direct na-
tional security significance. Thus the United States is not asking any country
to accept any safeguards that we are not willing to accept ourselves.
In this commitment, President Johnson repeated his earlier offer of
December 2, 1967. The United Kingdom made a similar offer on De-
cember 4. 1967. The Soviet Union did not join in these offers. Instead,
it took the position that inspection of any atomic activities within
the nuclear-weapons countries was unnecessary and irrelevant as the
Treaty does not prohibit these nations from having or manufacturing
nuclear weapons.
The Ratification Treaty was opened for signature on July 1. 1968,
and was signed that same day by the United States, the United King-
dom, the Soviet Union, and 53 other members of the United Nations.
President. Johnson transmitted the Treaty to the Senate on .Inly 9.
lie advised the Congress thai the Treaty would do more than just pro-
hibit the spread of nuclear weapons. It would also promote the fur-
ther development of nu, deai- energy for peaceful purposes. Elaborat-
ing the anticipated benefits of the Treaty, the President said :
I believe Hint tins treaty will greatly advance the goal of unclear cooperation
for peaceful purposes under international safeguards.
It will require that all parties which export nuclear materials and equip-
ment n. non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful purposes make sure that such
materials, and those used or produced in such equipment, are under international
safeguards.
3=8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 4 (July 8 1968) p 1044
^"Nuctc'ir Nonproliferation Treaty," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
vol. 4 (July 15. 1968), p. 1091.
269
It will require all noninuclear parties to accept international safeguard? on
nil peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction,
or carried out under their control anywhere.
It will help insure cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
and the exchange of scientific and technological information on such peaceful
applications.
It will enable all countries to assist non-nuclear parties to the treaty with their
peaceful nuclear activities, confident that their assistance will hot he diverted
to the making of nuclear^weapons. x '
It obligates the nuclear- weapon parties to make potential benefits from any
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions available— oh a non-discriminatory
basis, and at the lowest possible cost— *o parties to the treaty that are. required
to give up the right, to have their own nuclear explosives.
The next day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations opened
hearings on the Treaty. 'On September 17 the committee- voted 13 to
3, with three abstentions, to recommend ratification. However, the
Senate did not act before adjournment and President Johnson's term
of office ended with the Treaty not yet approved. President Nixon on
February 5, 1969 sent a special message to the Senate recommending
its approval. In it, he reendorsed the previous commitment that the
United States would permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all
peaceful nuclear activities in the United States. Also he repeated U.S.
willingness to join with all Treaty parties to insure that the potential
benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be
made available to non-nuclear- weapon parties.331
Brief additional hearings were quickly held by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee 332 and the Senate gave its advice and consent
on March 13, 1969. The Treaty was ratified at Washington on Novem-
ber 24, 1969, and the instrument of ratification was deposited on
March 5, 1970, at which time the Treaty entered into force.
U.S. Support for Safeguards
The commitment of the non-weapons nations to open their nuclear
activities to international safeguards is a notable innovation in inter-
national relations. Arriving at this commitment was a major feat
of international diplomacy. In testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recounted some
of the difficulties. The problem which had most complicated the nego-
tiations arose out of the existence of two international safeguards sys-
tems : those of IAEA and of Euratom. It has always been U.S. policy
to work toward a single, worldwide system of safeguards. However,
the Common Market countries were reluctant to allow the IAEA
safeguards system to operate in their countries for fear that this ar-.
rangement would lead to abandonment of Euratom with unfavorable
effects on progress toward European unity. As a result, the United
States in its negotiations had to seek accommodation for both systems.
But this was contrary to the interests of the U.S.S.R. The" Soviet
Union was agreeable to mandatory safeguards requirements for the
non-weapons signatories of the treaty, but held that those safeguards
should be administered by the IAEA. The U.S.S.R. was a member
of the IAEA but not of Euratom. From the outset of the negotia-
tions, the Soviets had opposed accepting Euratom safeguards as a
substitute for those of IAEA on the ground that this alternative
amounted to self -inspection by Euratom members.
fV'^clear Nonproliferation Treaty," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
vol. 5 (February 10. 1969), p. 219.
^U.S Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonproliferation
Treaty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969 part 2.
270
The safeguards impasse was not resolved until May 1968 when the
United States and the Soviet Union jointly presented a final draft
of the Treaty to the United Nations, which avoided the issue by
committing; non-nuclear weapons states to negotiate safeguards agree-
ments with the IAEA either individually or together with other
states. The Secretary of State, in submitting the Treaty to the Presi-
dent and recommending its transmittal to the Senate, pointed to the
statement of principles enumerated by the U.S. Co-chairman of the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (now the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament, or CCD) and by Ambassador Arthur
Goldberg when the Treaty was presented to the United Nations
General Assembly. The principles were : 333
(1) The safeguards system of the IAEA must be credible;
(2) Individual nations or groups of nations could negotiate
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. By indirection this meant
Euratom could do so ;
(3) Existing national records and safeguards should be used
by the IAEA.
Safeguards Provisions of the Treaty
Probably the most controversial part of the negotiations concerned
the issue of verification of nuclear materials holdings. Article III sets
out terms and conditions for safeguards, prohibited acts, non-inter-
ference with safeguards, and for agreements between the IAEA and
signatory states. The arrangements finally agreed to were as follows :
Scope: Safeguards shall be applied on all source or special fission-
able material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory,
jurisdiction, or control of non-nuclear-weapon parties, for the exclu-
sive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations
under the Treaty not to divert fissionable materials to weapons use.
Prohibited acts: Transfer is prohibited of source or special fission-
able material or equipment or material especially designed or pre-
pared for the processing, use, or production of special nuclear material,
to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the item
shall be subject to safeguards.
Non-interference : Safeguards shall be implemented ?o as to avoid
hampering either the economic and technological development of the
parties or international cooneration in peaceful nuclear activities.
Safeguards agreements : The Treaty commits the non-weapons signa-
tories to negotiate details of a safeguards agreement with the Inter-
national Agency, and specifies how these agreements are to be nego-
tiated. Non-weapons parties may enter into such agreements with
838 The detailed statement of those principles follows :
(1) There should he safeguards for all non-nueloar weapons parties of such a nature
that all parties ean have confidence in their effectiveness. Therefore safeguards estab-
lished bv an agreement negotiated and Concluded with the IAEA in accordance with
the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system must enable the IAEA
to ctrrv out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion Is taking place.
(2) In discharging their obligations under Article III. non-nuclear-weapons parties
may negotiate safeguards agreements with the 1 VKA individually or together with
other parties : 'ind sneciflcallv. ail agreement covering such obligations may be entered
Into between tbe IAEA and other international organization the work of which is
related to the IAEA and the membership of which Includes the parties concerned.
(3) In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make nnnronriate
use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed
arrangements the IAEA can satisfy Itself that nuclear material is not diverted to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Of. U.S. Congress. Senate. Commltl >n Foreign Relations. Hearings, Nonproliferation
Treaty, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968 part 1 p. 255.
271
the IAEA either individually or together with other states. This latter
provision could enable Euratom member nations, for example, to
work out group arrangements for Euratom.
Safeguards are not mandatory for parties who already possess
nuclear weapons. This situation was upsetting to many non- weapons
states during negotiations, but ultimately the distinction was accepted.
Chairman Seaborg of the AEC, in supporting the Treaty, men-
tioned the concerns expressed by several countries that the application
of IAEA safeguards might place the non-weapon states at a commer-
cial disadvantage by compromising their commercial secrets or by
interfering with the operation of the facilities. He called these fears
groundless and explained : 334
Agency inspectors are precluded from interfering in plant operations and they
normally require access only to information that is not commercially sensitive.
Nevertheless they are barred from transmitting any information that they
receive to unauthorized parties and any state has the right to declare a proposed
Agency inspector unacceptable.
Negotiation of safeguards agreements was to begin within 180 days
from the original entry into force of the Treaty.
To date, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved safeguards
agreements with three states : Austria, Finland, and Uruguay. More
approvals are expected at coming meetings of the Board.
ELEMENTS OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
The IAEA safeguards system under the Treaty is based on four
main elements to be incorporated into individual safeguards agree-
ments during negotiations :
( 1 ) A review of the design of nuclear facilities ;
(2) Specification of a system of facility records and accounts;
(3) Specification of a system of facility reports; and
(4) Inspections of safeguarded nuclear facilities to verify
compliance with the safeguards agreement.
The design review, based on information given to the Agency by the
state or obtained by initial inspections, is to ensure that each facility
will permit the effective applications of safeguards. The review will
also be used to determine the material balance areas 335 and to select
those "strategic points" 336 which will be used for measuring nuclear
material flows and inventories.
Agency inspectors will be sent into states to audit records and
reports ; to verify the information in the records and reports by physi-
cal inspection, independent measurements, and sampling; and to ex-
amine facilities to check on measuring equipment and operations
carried out. The frequency and duration of IAEA inspections are to
be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation
of the safeguards procedures. The inspectors are expected to carry
out their duties in a way which will avoid hampering the operation
of nuclear facilities or the technological development of a nation's
nuclear industry. However, the Agency's inspectors must be given
access to any location where earlier reports and inspections have indi-
331 Ibid., p. 100.
335 A materials balance area Is an area within which the accounts for nuclear materials
entering, leaving, and stored must be kept In balance.
336 For a discussion of "strategic points" see page 144.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-19
272
cated that nuclear material is present. Information about the inspec-
tors is to be given to the state before the inspection is made, and the
state may, if it wishes, object to an individual inspector and ask that
another be sent. Moreover, the state has the right to have inspectors
accompanied by its officials.
NEGOTIATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS: THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS
COMMITTEE
In April 1970, the IAEA Board of Governors created a Safeguards
Committee to recommend the contents of draft safeguards agree-
ments. The Committee was open to all member states of the Agency,
whether Board members or not. This open membership was in recogni-
tion of the general interest in safeguards and the desire of many non-
weapons member nations to participate directly in formulating con-
tents of the safeguards agreements which they ultimately would be
asked to conclude. The Committee met intensively over many months
and issued three reports, covering all aspects of the proposed safe-
guards agreements.337 With the approval by the Board of Governors
of the final report on April 20, 1971, the IAEA was ready to nego-
tiate and conclude all aspects of the necessary safeguards agreements
with parties to the Treaty.
In defining the basic content of the agreement between the states
and the IAEA, the Safeguards Committee recommended a text similar
to that in the Nonproliferation Treaty itself. But whereas the Treaty
refers to the Agency's right and obligation to verify the prevention
of the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes, the Com-
mittee's document 338 limits the verification procedure to nuclear ma-
terials. This change should make the agreement more acceptable to
Euratom countries, for it shifts the emphasis away from facilities
and toward materials.
SOME FACETS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Underlying the IAEA's guide for the structure and content of
safeguards agreements are two principles that deserve attention.339
It called for (1) arrangements that would provide the Agency with
an effective means to detect the diversion of nuclear materials or to
identify unusual circum stances that warrant further investigation;
and (2) the fullest possible use of existing national systems of ac-
counting and control for nuclear materials, and the requirements that
their findings be verified by independent measures.
**» Mr. Peter Kelly, a United Kingdom representative on the Board of Governors and
a participant in the Committee's work, gives some insight into the daily workings of
this group of nearly 50 very different delegations. Relating his experiences, he wrote:
Quite early In our work a moderate, compromising spirit displayed itself in the
Committee. Then the atmosphere became friendly, at times even humorous. Instead
of confronting opposed views in the Board room, delegates took to talking them
over in the lounge, or in one or two nearby restaurants. In such environments, even
tie i :i Intractable looking problems proved soluble : even the prickliest-looking
delegate proved to have a human side, informal consultation came to count for
more and more in our work: and when we got hack to the Hoard room even the
Intractable problems had been one daren'1 say "fixed," but, perhaps, "adjusted.'
Cf. International Atomic Energu Igency Bulletin, vol. L3, No. •". (1971), p. 10.
338 IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and states
Required m Connection With the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
\. publication INFCIRC/153 (May 1971), 29 pages.
The following diSCUSSion draws extensively upon a commentary liy Myron I?. Kratzer,
then Assistant General Manager for International Activities of the I'.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, in into national Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (11)71),
pp. 11 13.
273
One of the most important actions of the Safeguards Committee
was to specify the use of national systems of accounting and control
for nuclear materials. The United States consistently supported this
idea to avoid duplication of systems. For the United States the princi-
ple of independent verification is the cornerstone of any meaningful
system of safeguards. Deciding whether there has been a diversion
must rest on objective evidence examined by international inspectors
and not on information made available by the inspected party itself.
As analyzed by the United States, it was impractical for the Agency
to operate a materials accountability system with its own accountants
and auditors in each nuclear facility. This approach would have de-
manded far more resources than would be available to the Agency, as
well as far more intrusion into national nuclear operations than would
be tolerable. Independent verification to authenticate findings and
data in, national systems was seen as the solution.
The .Federal Republic of Germany, likely to be a principal Euro-
pean user of nuclear power, wanted a national accounting and control
system, to serve as a fink between the IAEA and operators of nuclear
power plants. According to one analysis: "This arrangement reduces
the Agency's safeguards costs and. at the same time avoids the arising
of substantial differences in the .application of safeguards between
countries forming part of a regional safeguards systems," 340
,A satisfactory national svstem would include a measurement system
for the determination of the quantities of nuclear fuel material im-
ported, produced, shipped, lost, or otherwise removed from inventory.
It would #lso ;need procedures for evaluating accumulations of un-
measured inventory and losses, the precision and accuracy of measure-
ments, differences in shipper/receiver measurements, and so on. A
state having a national svstem with these characteristics would pre-
sumably Tbe subject to a minimum of Agency verification.
PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
Another important result of the Safeguards Committee's work was
to provide a state being inspected with assurances that its legitimate
commercial interests would be protected. The guidelines enjoin the
Agency to exercise extreme care in the protection of commercial se-
crets, to avoid undue interference with the nation's peaceful nuclear
activities, and to conduct safeguards in a manner consistent with
the economy and safety of the activities concerned.
The Safeguards Committee's report incorporates the principle that
information about design of nuclear facilities supplied by member
states should be limited to that necessary for safeguards. It also con-
tains an important new feature that if a state so requests, the review
of information of particular commercial sensitivity can take place in
the country concerned so that reports and drawings do not have to
leave the country or remain on file in the IAEA.
INSPECTIONS AND THEIR SCHEDULING
The draft agreement lays down formulas for determining the
"intensity" of inspection for several categories of nuclear facilities.
mo Werner Ungerer, "Safeguards : Five View?," International Atomic Energy Agency
Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), p. 4.
274
Reactors would be subject to a predetermined inspection rate, while
that for other facilities would depend upon the throughput of nuclear
materials or their inventory. The inspection effort contemplated under
the new approach ranges'from one inspection per year for modest
facilities, such as research reactors, to several man-years of continuous
inspection in the case of commercial scale reprocessing or fuel fabrica-
tion plants. The arrangements also permit the Agency to employ a
part of its routine inspection effort on an unannounced basis. In the
case of sensitive facilities such as fuel reprocessing plants, the maxi-
mum inspection effort would rise in proportion to the square root of
the throughput, reflecting the concept that large size plants give eco-
nomies of scale not only of operating costs but also for the inspection
effort needed.341
"strategic points"
The Safeguards Committee proposed one answer to the question
of how far IAEA inspectors could go in performing their functions.
It advanced the concept of "strategic points,'' which are also explicitly
recognized in the Treaty. The "strategic points" concept means that
Agency inspectors would normally confine their access to locations
selected by the Agency in advance, where nuclear material can be
most easily measured, contained, or observed. IAEA inspectors would
stay at these points and not roam throughout the facilities. In this
way. the chance that an inspector might obtain technological informa-
tion of commercial value can be reduced and interference with plant
operations held to a minimum.
The effectiveness of this limited inspection concept depends on new
technological advances and administrative skills. Development of
tamper-proof instruments and seals, for example, will be needed. Some
procedures that have been developed will impress some countries or
observers as too harsh ; others as too lenient. Disagreements can be
expected between the IAEA and the countries subject to inspections.
Nevertheless the fact that many nations have agreed to subject a po-
tentially significant, future undertaking — the commercial use of
nuclear power — to international inspection is encouraging.
enforcement or safeguards
The Safeguards Committee of the IAEA inevitably has had to deal
with the question : what would be done in the event of a known or
suspected diversion? This question, it will be recalled, was one of the
most thorny and unresolved issues in the abortive negotiations of the
Banich plan.
The draft agreement provides for procedures designed to afford op-
portunity for resolution of any diversion issue through consultation
between the TAEA and the nation concerned. Should this not be pos-
sible, the TAEA Board of Governors is empowered to apply the pro-
vision of the Agency statute relating to noncompliance which includes
among other steps, a report to the United Nations Security Council.
The agreement also provides for the arbitration of disputes by an
impartial tribunal, except those relating to a finding of non-
verification.
M1Frnnk Bnrnnhy. Director of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, quips that
this must he the first time a square root appears In an International agreement.
275
U.S. SUPPORT OF THE SAFEGUARDS COMMITTEE
The United States has consistently supported the Safeguards Com-
mittee's work. Addressing the 14th session of the IAEA's General
Conference in September 1970, AEC Chairman Seaborg said that the
United States was very satisfied with the work of the Committee in
formulating principles, and in providing for independent verification
by the Agency. He urged that the Agency should make full use of
national systems in carrying out safeguards. Chairman Seaborg em-
phasized U.S. desire for these principles and for their constructive
refinement : 342
We believe, on the basis of our direct experience with IAEA safeguards, that
they are not intrusive and will not interfere with the economical operation of
plants or the security of proprietary information. At the same time, we strongly
favor the continuing evolution of the IAEA safeguards system to take full
advantage of all technical advances permitting improved efficiency of safeguards.
THE SOVIET VIEW
The Soviet Union also supported the work of the Safeguards Com-
mittee. Professor I. D. Morokhov,343 commented on the Committee's
recommendations as follows : 344
Its recommendations on the content of the agreements concerning the Agency's
supervision of the nuclear activities of non-nuclear- weapons States will enable
the Agency effectively to discharge its functions under the Treaty, on the basis
of a judicious combination of national safeguards systems and independent
verifications by the Agency. The procedures for the conduct of inspections, desig-
nation of inspectors and settlement of disputes, which the Committee has worked
out, take full account of the sovereign rights of States.
The Committee's recommendations ensure protection of the industrial and
commercial interests of States by providing for communication to the Agency
of only the minimum of data on the nuclear activities of a State necessary for
safeguards purposes and by requiring the Agency to treat as strictly confidential
such commercial and industrial information of importance to States as may come
into its possession in connection with safeguards.
Criticisms of IAEA Safeguards
Critics have contended it has not been proved that IAEA will be
able to perform adequately the inspection role assigned to it in the
Treaty. They challenge the reliability of estimates of the costs to
sufficiently strengthen the IAEA to fulfill its inspection role and
they ask what share of the increased burden the United States might
be asked to underwrite.
Even with the successful application of inspection procedures by
the IAEA on declared peaceful nuclear activities, critics contend that
a nation could still manufacture nuclear weapons in secret. Could a
nation which desires to produce weapons hide some fissionable ma-
terial before the inauguration of the safeguards? Or could it secretly
build separate facilities to produce fissionable material and to fabri-
cate weapons which could not be detected by the circumscribed visits
of IAEA inspectors? Could illicit facilities be detected without gen-
eral inspection of the entire countryside? Has a feasible way been
found to detect hidden stockpiles of fissionable material ? These ques-
tions await answers.
343 "General Conference of the International Atomic Ene^v Agencv holds 14th session
at Vienna," State Department Bulletin, vol. 63 (October 26, 1970), p. 487.
"» First Deputy Chairman of the U.S S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic
Energy and representative from the U.S. S.R. on the IAEA Board of Governors.
*" I. D. Morokhov. "Safeguards : Five Views," International Atomic Energy Agency
Bulletin, vol. 13, No. 3 (1971), pp. 7-9.
276
An even bigger potential loophole, critics contend, is the lack of any
inspection of the nuclear- weapon powers: China, France, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Without auditing
the use of the fissionable material they produce, much less the stock-
piles they have produced in the past, is there a way to be sure that they
are not secretly transferring fissionable material to non-nuclear coun-
tries ? In the view of some critics, only comprehensive inspection, per-
haps covering all exports from nuclear to non-nuclear countries, could
provide assurance against the illicit international transfer of nuclear
weapons of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.
One student of the proliferation problem has questioned the whole
approach of the inspection system and believes that accounting for
nuclear fuels is an inadequate safeguard. He argues that what is
needed instead is a method of internationally acquiring, storing, and
guarding the plutonium produced by civil nuclear reactors. Leonard
Beaton, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1967, said : 345
The proposed nonproliferation treaty must be judged primarily for its effect
on the growing threat of a worldwide diffusion of plutoniiun. If it reinforces
the false security of the safeguards system by persuading the legalists that no
country which has signed is ever capable of building nuclear weapons, it will
do a grave disservice to the cause of nonproliferation. It could provide the
cover under which the plutonium silently spreads, as it is now spreading to
Italy and India. Like a fine row of Georgian houses condemned to come down,
everything would be gradually let go. When the houses are finally bulldozed
away they have usually become so ramshackle that no one minds. Equally, under
the placid rule of safeguards as they are now understood, the plutonium will
spread for and wide. When the collapse comes, no one will remember how easy
it might have been to hold a narrow ring.
Finally, critics point out, any nation can withdraw upon 3
months' notice. A nation could sign the Treaty but proceed secretly
as far as possible with all the plans for making nuclear weapons and,
whenever it felt ready, merely notify the other parties and the Secur-
ity Council of the United Nations that it was withdrawing.
Some Congressional Doubts
Although the Senate assented to the Treaty, and thus to the antici-
pated role of the International Agency in safeguards, there have l>een
some congressional doubts. For example, the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs during hearings in 19P>S heard pointed criticism and
a warning from a leading member of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy who questioned the enforceability of Article III. the ability
of the International Agency to carry out the safeguards function, and
the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the nego-
tiations. Representative Craig Hosmer said, in part. : 346
. . . ACDA now comes up with the NPT article III which it claims provides
an enforcing mechanism in the form of inspection. This is a sad delusion made
a tragic one because it is self-induced by ACDA whose spokesman . . . actually
believe article III lias real teeth, when in truth and in fact, it has false teeth
for tlie fo'lowing reasons:
A. Article TII only calls upon signatories to "undertake to accept safeguards
as set. forth in an agreement to I>e negotiated and included with the International
Atomic Energy Agency" and (hat such negotiations commence within ISO days
after the treaty goes into effect. This is no more than an "agreement to make
an agreement." No legal system recognizes as valid or enforceable any such
ambiguous present, promise to come to a future unspecified agreement. Article
n4r' l>r>nnrd Ronton. "Nurlenr Fu<>1 for-All," Foreign Affairs, vol. 45 (July, 19R7). p. fifiO.
849 U.S. Conpross. House, Cnmmlttpp on Forolpn Aff.iirs, Hearings, Arms Control and
Disarmament Aet Amendments, 196S, 90th Conp.. 2d Scss., 1968, p. 9fi.
277
III is just as blank as if it remained without words. The words it contains mean
nothing. The treaty remains without any provisions for enforcement whatever.
B. In any event, to speak of IAEA safeguards as something which exist and
can be relied upon to enforce this treaty is ridiculous to the point of absurdity.
Anyone familiar with the primitive capabilities either technological or financial,
of IAEA in the safeguards area knows this. I personally verified it myself only
last September at IAEA headquarters. To assert or imply that IAEA safeguards
are something which can be relied upon for the heavy purpose of policing this
treaty is misleading and unconscionable. It will take years for IAEA to achieve
even a minimum inspection capability. . . . IAEA inspection is simply a facade
like a Hollywood movie setting, there is a front with no structure behind it.
As a matter of fact, IAEA has fewer inspectors than this committee has mem-
bers . . . for all of Europe they have five inspectors. . . .
Costs of Safeguards
Questions were raised during negotiations of the Treaty whether the
IAEA could recruit the staff to administer its safeguards responsi-
bilities. There were also fears that the costs would be enormous. Chair-
man Seaborg countered these two points >m 1968. He regarded the
IAEA safeguards staff while then modest in size as nevertheless in bal-
ance with the worlrtio be done. He also expressed confidence that the
Agency would be able to recruit the necessary people for its expanded
function. As for expenses, obviously the costs for administering safe-
guards would go up. However, these Costs, when pro-rated against the
cost of nuclear power, would represent no more than a fraction of one
percent of the cost of electricity produced. A projection of manpower
and funding, prepared by the AEC's Brookhaven National Labora-
tory, estimated requirements of IAEA safeguards as increasing from
775 persons and $29.8 million in 1971 to 2,374 persons and $143 million
by the year 1990. Comparing these costs with the estimated value of
nuclear generated electricity produced an estimated cost increase of
0.16 mills per kilowatt-hour for 1971, which would drop to 0.02 mills
per kilowatt-hour by 1990.347
• More recently, in 1970? Brookhaven revised its estimates for man-
power and financial requirements for IAEA safeguards.438 Table VI
lists the latest BNL estimates of manpower requirements and the
future costs of implementing IAEA safeguards. It assumes that power
reactors and nuclear fuel facilities in 17 non- weapons countries — which
would include all of the European nations except France and the
United Kingdom — will be safeguarded under the Treaty.
A summary of the number of nuclear facilities in non- weapons states
to be safeguarded by IAEA is given in Table VII. Little change in
the number of conversion, fabrication, and reprocessing facilities is .
expected, but by. 1980 the number of power reactors should increase,
and likewise the number of Countries safeguarded.
ljhe present safeguards staff of the IAEA numbers about 60. Brook-
Raven estimates this must, increase to 275 if the Treaty is to be fully
implemented by 1^73. This growth of almost 500 percent in less than
3 ydars would probably fee difficult for IAEA to attain. If so, the
Agency initially may ha^e to accept a lower level of safeguards.
":. ^i number of conditions ap'pears necessary to achieve effective safe-
gfudrcls at acceptable eodts; These iriclude : (1) standarization of the
existing systems of control and management, (2) adoption of a uni-
'««-ibtti.,p. 154, • ••:>.. >-th '•:■.'■!■■.'•• ' ,• ;■' ' ..'■..'' ':':.'
848 L. Green, H. Kouts, and W. Marcuse, IAEA Costs and Manpower RequlreYnetita tinder.
VPT (Upton, •'N'.'Y.;: Technical Support Organization, Broofchaven National , laboratory,
September 1970, report No. BNL 50263), 34 pp. . - -,■ .'•■•',' V
278
349
form national control system, and (3) adaptation of the IAEA safe-
guards system to the new circumstances arising from the Treaty
TABLE VI.— TOTAL MANPOWER AND COST ESTIMATES FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS
[Dollar amounts in millions]
1973
1975
1980
Operating cost
Equipment cost
Total
Manpower:
Professional
Secretary or clerk
$9.6
1.3
$10.8
1.5
$13.6
1.9
10.9
12.3
15.5
262
30
297
32
378
36
Source: L. Green, H. Kouts, and W. Marcuse, "IAEA Costs and Manpower Requirements Under NPT" op. cit, p. 15.
TABLE VII.— SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN NONWEAPONS STATES
1973
1975
1980
Number of countries
Power reactor sites
Fuel conversion and fabrication plants (natural and low energy U).
Reprocessing plants
Research reactors (low power)
Critical facilities
Plutonium fabrication plants
17
17
25
69
91
200
12
12
12
>5
7
9
50
50
53
4
3
0
3
3
4
■2 small plants for special fuels.
Loc. cit.
Financing Safeguards Under the Treaty
Financing was discussed by the U.S. delegation at the 14th session of
the IAEA General Conference in September 1970. AEC Chairman
Seaborg said that the United States attached great importance to the
principle of financing Agency safeguards costs under the Agency's
regular budget, which would spread the costs among all members.
Nonetheless, the United States recognized that there was room for
difference of opinion as to the relative weight to be given to factors
used to determine the participation of each Agency member in meeting
these costs, and the United States would play an "active and construc-
tive role" in the discussion of the matter.360
Putting the costs of safeguards into the IAEA's regular budget
offered the advantage of lower national outlays by the nuclear power
countries, for the safeguards costs would be shared by nations not yet
using nuclear power. The developing countries were quick to protest.
At the summer 1970 session of the Safeguards Committee, a spirited
debate on financing took place. The developing countries objected to
the idea that costs of safeguards should be shared by all members.361
Delegates from nations with small or no nuclear programs argued that
those members who were using nuclear power should bear the costs of
safeguards. On their part, the nuclear nations argued that all member
states should pay in proportion to their contributions to the IAEA
848 George C. Delcolgne and G. Rubinstein, "Nonnrollferatlon and Control : Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy," Bulletin, of the Atomic Scientist*, vol. 27 (February 1971), p. 5.
860 "General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency holds 14th Session at
Vienna," op. cit., p. 487.
161 Myron B. Kratzer. "A New Era for the International Safeguards," Nuclear Netca,
vol. 14 (February 1971), p. 42.
279
budget. Those IAEA members who had not signed the Treaty, pri-
marily France and India, expressed concern lest money be diverted
from other Agency activities to pay for safeguards in which they had
no interest.362
The Safeguards Committee recommended one of two approaches to
financing safeguards.353
(a) An agreement with a member of the Agency should provide
that each party thereto shall bear the expenses it incurs in imple-
menting its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the state or
persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a
result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall re-
imburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to
do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional
measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or
(b) An agreement with a party not a member of the Agency
should . . . provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the
Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs. However, if
the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary ex-
penses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency
shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in
advance to do so.
A JOINT COMMITTEE RESERVATION
Some members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have ques-
tioned costs of IAEA safeguards. Representative Craig Hosmer esti-
mated that if the Agency had undertaken inspection of peaceful
nuclear activities in 1968 it would have needed a total of 245 inspec-
tors at a cost of $17 million. Based on five full-time inspectors for each
1,000 megawatts of installed nuclear capacity, plus one and one-half
full time mspectors for every two power plants, and estimating a world
total of 4,000 power reactors by the year 1990, he forecast that some
16,725 IAEA mspectors would be needed for safeguards at an annual
cost of $1.1 billion.354 He asked whether such an international burden
would be tolerable.
More recently, in its annual report for 1970, the Joint Committee said
it was mindful of the importance of safeguards, but was looking very
cautiously at the growing IAEA safeguards program and what could
develop into a need for increased funding to support the numbers of
personnel which may be necessary.855
Physical Security of Nuclear Materials
IAEA safeguards under the Treaty have only one purpose : to detect
the diversion of nuclear fuel materials from authorized purposes.
Physical security measures to prevent thefts have no place in the
Treaty. It is assumed that governments will maintain appropriate
physical security and will deal with theft. But is this a tenable assump-
•"Thls point was made by Frank Barnaby, Director of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, in "Safeguards — With or Without Strings?", New Scientist and
Science Journal, vol. 49 (February 25. 1971), p. 432.
868 INFCIRC/153, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
tu U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, International Agree-
ments for Cooperation — 1967-68, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1968, p. 74.
858 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Activity and Accomplishments
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy During the Second Session of the 91st Congress,
op. cit., p. 44324.
280
tion ? Can a system not concerned with prevention of theft or catching
and punishing thieves, accurately be called "safeguards" ?
There may be a tendency for international safeguards to become the
glamour segment of the overall anti-proliferation effort. Representa-
tive Hosmer addressed this issue : 356
Safeguards people, their systems and analyses, methodologies, black boxes, game
theories, non-destructive test paraphernalia preventing diversion. This may be a
very dangerous assumption in the real world, populated by very fallible people,
some of whom are very certain to be just no damn good.
In any event, the world political community probably ought to be doing a lot
more than it is now. . . .
Deterrence can be made more certain by boosting the illicit diverter's risk of
getting caught, thereby both incurring punishment and losing the profits of his
crime.
If, under our safeguards system of international public opinion, when a diver-
sion is discovered, the alarm sounds, whistles blow, sirens scream, the United
Nations is notified, and it all strikes fear and terror in the hearts of the general
public, that is one thing. Quite another and far better thing is if it scares the hell
out of the criminal because he knows that the jig is up.
Every increase in the likelihood of a quick and positive identification and appre-
hension of a nuclear criminal plays a key role in fortifying the deterrent equation.
So also does every increase in the degree of certainty with which the stolen item
can be recovered.
Physical security of nuclear fuel materials appears not to be a con-
cern of the IAEA. Mr. Hosmer raised the issue whether the Agency
should be involved with physical security by establishing guidelines
for police training, indoctrination, and equipment for this highly
specialized responsibility. He would have the major nuclear nations
actively assist other countries in developing a worldwide network of
nuclear police systems.
Providing an ultimate answer to this question is another task for
U. S. diplomacy in this nuclear age.
Nonprollferation and Euratom
Had the Soviet Union succeeded in having IAEA safeguards apply
to all peaceful nuclear activities, IAEA would have had to take over
the safeguards already established by Euratom. The United States,
however, favored a continued safeguards function for Euratom. The
diplomatic situation on this issue was outlined for the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs early in 1968 by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was
deeply involved in negotiation of the Nonproliferation Treaty.357
As late ns August 19G7 the provisions for non-proliferation remained
blank. As Mr. Fisher explained the situation : "*
We bad no safeguards article primarily bcause we couldn't agree with the
Soviets on a safeguards article that was acceptable to our NATO allies. The prob-
lem of negotiating a safeguards article with our NATO allies was as important
in our minds as negotiating one with the Soviet Union.
The principal issue was the relative role of Euratom and the IAEA on safe-
guards and on the other side of the coin whether or not the nuclear weapons states
accepted any safeguards on their own peaceful nuclear activities. They have been
unwilling to do so on the ground that it doesn't relate to the purposes of the
treaty.
aw Keynote remarks of Coneressmnn CraJe TTosmcr hoforc the Symposium on Imple-
menting Nuclear Safejruards, Kansas State University, October 25. 1071. In Conqrexaional
Record (October 26. 1071). p. TT9002 (Dully edition).
857 Statemenl of Adrian S. Basher, In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign AfT.-iirs,
Hearings, ASmt Control and Disarmament Art Amendments, 1968, op. cit., pp. 59-91.
"8 Ibid., p. 60.
281
As for Euratom, he underscored the concern of its member
nations : **
Our Euratom friends were very concerned that Euratom safeguards not dis-
appear, the Euratom structure not disappear, as a result of any IAEA safeguards
agreement. They opposed, for example, a provision which on its face would seem
the simplest, which said that this treaty shall be safeguarded by the IAEA ; that
is, IAEA safeguards shall be applicable to non-nuclear activities.
Our allies opposed that, and they opposed it with good reason. They opposed
it because they didn't want a duplicative set of safeguards, because if there were
such, the Euratom safeguards themselves might disappear as unnecessary.
U.S. policy, Mr. Fisher went on to say, was that we did not wish to be
a party to any attempt to undermine the structure of Euratom in terms
of national programs. mo
EURATOM CONCERN
Euratom members have been disturbed over the Nonproliferation
Treaty.891 One concern has been expressed that Euratom's inspection
system, which has been a major factor in binding the members to-
gether, would lose substance if it is subordinated to the inspection sys-
tem of the IAEA. Other observers had hoped that were Euratom to be
given an inspection role under the Treaty it would give the organiza-
tion a needed boost. As finally adopted, the Treaty does not recognize
Euratom by name, but does permit nations or groups of nations to
enter into inspection arrangements with the IAEA. This provision has
been interpreted as permitting the IAEA to enter an agreement with
Euratom giving Euratom's inspection system some role.
Another concern of members of Euratom is that if IAEA safeguards
were applied, it would result in a discriminatory control system within
the Euratom community, and that it would hinder the creation of a
European nuclear industry. Because France as a nuclear weapons
power would not be subject to inspection under the Treaty, other Eura-
tom members feared this exemption might result in a displacement of
nuclear research and industry from the controlled members to France,
or that the Treaty would impede joint nuclear activities involving
France and other states. ;
A State Department memorandum prepared in January 1969 for
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained that the safeguards
article was incorporated in the final drafts of the Treaty only after
consultation by the United States with its Euratom allies and with
the Commission of the European Communities. The three Euratom
members who had signed the Treaty did not consider that there was
any incompatibility between the goals of nonproliferation and Eura-
tom. It was their position that the safeguards provided in the Treaty'
would be the subject of agreements to be concluded with the IAEA
and that to avoid the possibility of incompatibilities with the provi-
sions of the Euratom treaty, safeguards must be defined so that the
rights and obligations of the member states and the Community remain
intact. The Euratom members which had signed the Nonproliferation
858 Ibid., p. 61.
880 Loc. clt.
an Much of the following discussion of the impact of NPT uDon Euratom draws heavily
SES. a„ repc rt 0f E1r?n C- Coilip,r- Analyst in U.S. Foreign Policy, of the then Legislative
Reference Service Library of Congress, entitled "Effects of -the Nonproliferation Treaty
£«j£,fr£atii0Mal In|*ltution8.*' It is reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate. Committee on
462^475 Relations' Heartn08> Nonproliferation Treaty, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, pp.
282
Treaty expected that the Commission of the European Communities
would enter into negotiations with the IAEA. To emphasize their
desire to preserve Euratom safeguards, they expressed their intention
not to ratify the Treaty before such negotiations has produced an
agreement.362
A RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The most recent development affecting Euratom safeguards under
the Treaty is the reported agreement in principle between Euratom
and the International Agency for IAEA inspection of nuclear activities
in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany,
but not in France. European Economic Community sources say the
five will drop their insistence that tighter Euratom inspections be
allowed in France as a prerequisite to their approval of IAEA inspec-
tion of their facilities. Thus by giving in to the French, who had agreed
only to Euratom inspection of French facilities for nuclear materials
from non-French sources, the way could be cleared for ratification of
the Treaty by Euratom members.363
Conclusions and Current Issues
The development of international safeguards is an evolving inter-
action between nuclear technology and American diplomacy. The
United States has consistently supported international safeguards
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. U.S. sup-
port of the Nonproliferation Treaty has reaffirmed the importance
that this Nation attaches to effective performance of safeguards — a
technological activity growing out of the discovery of nuclear fission.
As a gesture to persuade other nations that the inspection provisions
of the Treaty do not impose an unacceptable interference with na-
tional sovereignty, the United States has volunteered to place its civil
nuclear industry under IAEA safeguards, and the United States has
already voluntarily placed several nuclear facilities under these safe-
guards.
Another task for U.S. diplomacy will be to assure a satisfactory
outcome of the agreement reached between the IAEA and Euratom
for continuation of the Euratom safeguards system in cooperation
with IAEA safeguards. These safeguards arrangements between two
international agencies will be important for the future of Euratom.
A success would add reason for future support to this declining orga-
nization. Also, success could present an interesting issue for U.S. diplo-
macy should the Soviet Union propose a similar arrangement for na-
tions within its bloc.
So far the IAEA safeguards system has proven tolerable to na-
tions exposed to it under the "trilateral" nuclear assistance agree-
ments between the United States, individual other nations, and the
Agency. Can IAEA experience, derived from safeguarding compara-
livelv small amounts of nuclear materials in special curcumstances,
provide an adequate base for the routine safeguarding of large quan-
tities? The amounts of nuclear fuel materials now used for civil nu-
clear power are modest, as is the amount of plutonium being produced
382 Memorandum relating to minority and individual views on the Nonproliferation
Treat v. In U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nonprolijera-
tin» Treaty, op. dt., pp. 310-311.
*» Nucleonics Week, vol. 12 (September 30, 1971), p. 8.
283
as a byproduct of commercial nuclear power in Europe and the
United States. Yet if present estimates for growth of nuclear power
are correct, within the decade there will be a marked increase in
both the number of nuclear power plants and supporting facilities
to be safeguarded and the amounts of material in process, transit, and
inventory, factors which would be expected to increase the tempta-
tion and opportunities for attempted diversions. U.S. foreign policy
toward commercial nuclear energy in Europe can be expected to have
some influence on the nature and pace of this future growth, and upon
the attitude of the governments involved toward the IAEA and the
safeguards system.
Specific issues of importance in U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's
and the 1980's appear to include the following :
(1) A point-of -no-return decisian: At this time, in 1972, nuclear
power, while growing rapidly, is still not a major component of electric-
ity supply in either the United States or Europe. If the risks to world
peace from potential diversion of nuclear materials cannot adequate-
ly be controlled by safeguards, there may still be time to deemphasize
nuclear power despite the economic loss of much of the past national
investments in bringing nuclear power to its present state. Within
a .few years, however, the nations of the world will pass a point of
no return beyond which a decision to abandon or limit nuclear power
will no longer be a njanageable policy alternative. At issue for U.S.
foreign policy is a final decisive international risk-versus-benefit
analysis for nuclear power in terms of dangers to* world peace from
diversion of materials to use in clandestine weapons.
(2) U.S. support for IAEA safeguards : The present demonstra-
tion of IAEA safeguards would not have been possible without U.S.
support and cooperation. But what of preparing the IAEA to apply
its safeguards systems to commercial nuclear power throughout the
world ? For U.S. diplomacy there are interacting foreign and domes-
tic considerations. On the one hand, strong past U.S. support would
suggest that future U.S. support should be expanded so that the
Agency can prepare for the anticipated rapid, worldwide growth in
the use of nuclear power. On the other hand, domestic demands for
funds and changing attitudes toward foreign aid seem likely to make
such expansion difficult. In these circumstances, it would seem that
U.S. diplomacy has a two-pronged responsibility for the future of
this international control of a potentially dangerous technological
product. First, it will have to help assure conditions for the IAEA
adequately to perform its safeguards function. Second, it will have
to help generate the domestic understanding and commitment needed
to assure adequate U.S. support.
Another related function for U.S. diplomacy is likely to be that of
working to determine the future shape, scale, and balance of the
IAEA activities. If only the safeguards function expands, then bit by
bit other Agency functions may atrophy so that ultimately the IAEA
may become primarily a safeguards agency. This condition may or
may not be m the ultimate U.S. interest. IAEA concentration on
safeguards should improve the management and effectiveness of this
function. However, the Nonproliferation Treaty offered non- weapons
states the promise of benefits from nuclear energy. Could this promise
be adequately fulfilled by an international agency whose technical
284
assistance and related functions have been stunted by asymmetrical
preoccupation with safeguards? ""
U.S. diplomacy inevitably will have a major responsibility for work-
ing out answers to these issues.
(3) Voluntary safeguards in the United States: Two Presidents
have committed the United States voluntarily to place its nuclear in-
dustries under IAEA safeguards as an inducement to persuade non-
weapons nations to sign and ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty. At
the moment, the ratification process is incomplete and the United
States has not been called upon to honor this offer. However, it may
be timely to consider foreign and domestic policy implications of the
offer, such as :
The acceptable scale of IAEA inspections ;
The degree of reliability desired ;
Whether the function of IAEA safeguards will be independ-
ently to detect unauthorized diversions, or to assure that national
safeguards systems are adequate to do so and to test them occa-
sionally ;
Necessary limitations upon IAEA use of inspectors who are
nationals of nations whose foreign and domestic policies are in
conflict with those of the country to be inspected; and
Available measures to protect trade secrets of the host coun-
try's nuclear industry while at the same time providing adequate
access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear materials in process and
in inventory.
(4) The -physical security issues: The IAEA safeguards system is
limited in purpose to detecting diversion of nuclear materials. It does
not extend to security and other measures to protect the materials
against attempted diversions. To what extent, if any, should U.S.
foreign policy attempt to extend the IAEA safeguards function into
physical protection and security of nuclear materials and to apprehen-
sion of would-be diverters?
(5) Increased U.S. assistance in nuclear energy: A premise of the
Nonprol iteration Treaty is that the nuclear weapons states will share
with the non- weapons states the benefits of nuclear energy to induce
them to agree to international safeguards. This commitment has im-
plications for foreign and domestic U.S. policy for nuclear energy.
To what extent is the United States prepared to shape its develop-
ment of nuclear power technology to meet the needs of the non- weapons
states? Are present forms and channels of U.S. nuclear technological
assistance sufficient for purposes of the Treaty, or need they be broad-
ened and expanded? Should the U.S. develop those nuclear power
technologies which can use natural uranium or thorium as fuel and
thus avoid the requirements for enrichment and safeguards? These are
some of the questions that combine elements of nuclear technology,
domestic energy policy, and diplomacy which will have to be answered
during the 1970's.
XII. Some Issues Recapitulated
How the discovery of nuclear fission came to influence American
diplomacy and foreign policy has been examined in this case study.
Clearly these interactions are of interest to students of the relations
among science, technology, and American diplomacy. But why should
the Congress and the public be interested in the past and future impli-
cations of nuclear energy for diplomacy in the face of all the other
matters clamoring for attention '.
Two primary reasons support such interest. First, after several
false alarms in Europe — or perhaps they were preliminary warnings
unrecognized — it is now becoming evident that the nations of the
world are facing a growing gap between demand for and supply of
fuels for energy. The United States and other nations, including those
of the European Economic Community and the Soviet bloc, expect
that nuclear energy will supply a large part of the electricity reoxuired
in the future, perhaps as much as half by the 1900's. U.S. diplomacy
and foreign policy should prepare now to take this anticipated energy
gap into account, especially since this Nation is expected to import
greatly increasing amounts of oil and natural gas in the decades
ahead. Thus considerations of foreign policy may become an input
into formation of domestic policy to develop nuclear power further
as a means of reducing the U.S. need to import fuels, thereby easing
international tensions and competition for scarce resources. Second.
European experience with international safeguards with its feature
of international inspection could provide a working demonstration of
inspection for future arms control and disarmament. Realization of
this benefit alone would, for many observers, be well worth the U.S.
effort thus far devoted to fostering nuclear power in Europe.
The United States, by deliberate foreign policy decisions, has chosen
to foster commercial nuclear power in Europe. While it is not clear
in the literature what quantitative effects U.S. policies and programs
have had, they did contribute to the creation of one global and two
regional international organizations for nuclear power, and to the
establishment of commercial nuclear industries in technological nations
of Europe, primarily France, Italy, and West Germany. Yet U.S.
support has not led to a unified European nuclear industry, which
is splintered among; competing national industries. So the grand hope
of the European Economic Community for a truly European nuclear
energy industry remains unrealized. This shortfall from the goals
of A Target for Euratom has benefited the U.S. nuclear industry,
which by itself is today appreciably larger and stronger than any
one of the European nuclear industries.
Commercial nuclear power in Europe is beginning to lessen Euro-
pean dependence upon imported fuels. x\ssumin<r that European prog-
ress with the demonstration and deployment of the breeder reactor
will further reduce this dependence upon uncertain sources of fuels,
(285)
286
such as those of the Middle East or the Soviet Union, Europe should be
less vulnerable to energy blackmail.
Granted the historical validity of the reasons for U.S. foreign
policy toward commercial nuclear power in Europe, what of the
future? Are new issues emerging that are of sufficient urgency to
compete successfully for public and legislative attention ?
No straightforward answer is at hand. It is easier to say what
may be theoretically possible in the world of physical sciences than
it is to predict the directions that men and their institutions may take.
Nonetheless, there are several probable future interactions between
nuclear power and U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. These inter-
actions can be categorized under the headings of nuclear power for
U.S. foreign policy, and foreign policy for U.S. nuclear power.
Nuclear Power for U.S. Foreign Policy
Likely issues having to do with nuclear power as an element of
U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's include : 3<54
SUSTAINING U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE 19 7o's
From World War II to Sputnik U.S. world technological leadership
went unchallenged and was sustained in large part, by advances in
nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek to monopolize
this leadership, the United States offered and supplied technological
assistance to many countries, especially in Furone, to develop their
own use of nuclear power. During the late 1960's, U.S. world leadership
was challenged by other nations. Looking to the 1970's and to an era
of greater peaceful rather than military competition, there are several
fundamental issues involving nuclear energy: To what extent should
U.S. foreign policv and diplomacy continue to foster commercial use
of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with future
U.S. technological leadership to be worth the effort., or would the
required financial and other resources be more profitably dedicated
to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S. technological
leadership be more than offset by economic losses through competition
from other countries receiving U.S. technological assistance? Most
important of all, are there any significant risks and dangers from the
standpoint of U.S. national security in continued U.S. support of
foreign nuclear power development?
REDUCING EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE UPON IMPORTED ENERGY
Assuming that U.S. foreign policv objectives continue to call for a
European community stirmg enough to withstand pressures from
other blocs of nations, and taking into account the si ill increasing
demand of European economies for energy, can development of
aw There Is one .'isixi-t of national and International development of nuclear power
which has nol I ii ii ti'ii in this ense-study, hut that should he mentioned. Tf is the
expanding role <>f multinational cornoratlons In tin- nuclear Industry. Recently major
companies "f the U.S. nuclear Industry have been entering Into arrangements with their
counterparts In Europe and elsewhere that may presage the penetration <>f powerful
multinattoa.il corporations Into the world's nuclear market. Sucb ;i development could
pose problems of national and foreign policy. Multinational corporations In the nuclear
field could raise issues of uncontrolled export "r transfer of technology, or Questions of
control over movement of nuclear materials and associated safeguards, or the ability of
some government effectively to regulate use of nuclear power In the face of the resources
ami pressure from such powerful organizations.
287
nuclear power significantly reduce Europe's dependence upon un-
certain imports? To what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign
policy reflect an objective of reducing a potential trap between demand
and supply for energy in Europe? In particular, do present arrange-
ments for U.S. technical assistance for nuclear power need updating?
What future balance is desirable between a U.S. foreign policy
objective of assuring European nations of a reliable, accessible supply
of enriched uranium from the United States and a domestic energy
policy which might prefer to limit U.S. foreign supply, commitments
and thus reduce the need to expand U.S. enrichment capacity I
CONTROLLING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROLIFERATION
It is safe to predict that U.S. foreign policy will continue to empha-
size the fostering of world peace by international measures to reduce
proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly into the hands of less
stable nations or other organizations. Questions arising out of this
policy posture include :
To what extent should the United States support the expansion
of the safeguards function of the International Atomic Energy
Agency ?
How much is it in the U.S. interest for the IAEA to focus
upon safeguards in comparison with its other technical assistance
functions ?
In what way and within what limitations, if any. should the
United States fulfill its commitment to place its nuclear industry
voluntarily under IAEA safeguards?
To what extent should U.S. foreign policy attempt to extend
the safeguards concept to include physical security of nuclear
materials, prevention of their theft, and apprehension of thieves?
To what extent should U.S. diplomacy support fulfillment by
the nuclear weapons nations of their commitments under the
Nonprolifcration Treaty to share benefits of nuclear tcchnology
with non-nuclear weapons states?
DEMONSTRATING THE PRACTICABILITY OF INSPECTION FOR ARMS CONTROL
U.S. foreign policy supports arms control and disarmament. One
critical issue has been that of international inspection to assure the
reliability of control. Commercial use of nuclear power in Europe of-
fers useful experience with international inspection. To what extent
can this experience be used by the United States in its advocacy of
arms control ? Would support of IAEA or of Euratom safeguards be
more useful in this context ? Would U.S. support of Euratom safe-
guards encourage counterpart safeguards through a regional bloc of
nations within the Soviet orbit?
IMPROVING THE U.S. POSITION IN WORLD TRADE
Assuming that economic losses due to competition from foreign
countries whose nuclear power development has been assisted by the
United States can be avoided, to what extent can further encourage-
ment of commercial nuclear power in Europe, and elsewhere overseas.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 20
288
benefit the U.S. position in world trade \ Can export of nuclear power
products and services provide the United States with foreign income
comparable to that, for example, of aviation exports '.
A POTENTIAL LIMITATION UPON NUCLEAR POWER FOR FOREIGN POLICY
The President's energy message of June 1^71 clearly anticipated a
growing role for nuclear power in the United States. On the other
hand, nuclear power has been under continuing attack in the United
States during recent years by those critical of its environmental ef-
fects and fearful of the potential dangers of its radioactive wastes.
What effect this criticism will have upon the future of nuclear power
in the United States remains to be seen. Pending the outcome of this
controversy, there may be the question of how far U.S. diplomacy
should go in further encouraging the use of nuclear power abroad
while it is being challenged at home.
Foreign Policy for Nuclear Power
If nuclear power can be used as an clement in U.S. foreign policy,
then conversely U.S. foreign policy may be turned to the benefit of
the domestic nuclear industry. Several issues in this category of for-
eign policy benefits for the U.S. nuclear industry include:
MAINTAINING THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
IN THE WORLD MARKET
To date, the largest export market for the U.S. nuclear industry
has been in Europe. However, as the United Kingdom joins the Euro-
pean Economic Community and Euratom, there is the possibility that
this market may wish to favor its own internal nuclear industries.
What diplomatic measures and foreign policy decisions, if any. would
be appropriate to preserve access of the U.S. nuclear industry to the
nuclear market of the European Economic Community \
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY ABROAD
The long-term future of nuclear power will require the commercial
use of the breeder reactor. The nuclear industries of the United States
and Europe are seeking to complete the development and demonstra-
tion of breeder technology. The U.S. nuclear industry has chosen to
concentrate its efforts on the liquid metal fast breeder reactor, one of
several technological approaches. This decision lias provoked the cril i-
cism that too much is being risked on the success of one approach.
To what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy seek to en-
courage European governments and nuclear industries to develop and
demons! rate alternal ives to the I \S. approach \ To what extent could
diplomatic and foreign policy measures reduce the barriers to the flow
of technical information on breeder technologies from European nu-
clear industries, keeping in mind that trade secrecy is often applied in
Europe at an earlier stage of industrial development than in the
United States?
289 ,
EXPEDITING THE SOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR
POWER
Several technological problems for nuclear power technology re-
main to be solved before large-scale commercial use of nuclear power
is likely to occur, namely, improvements in technology for reactor
safety, for perpetual storage of radioactive wastes, and for better ways
to dissipate or use waste heat from nuclear power plants. To what ex-
tent should U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy seek to encourage Eu-
ropean nations, individually or through the Common Market, to per-
form research and development on these problems which would be of
benefit to the U.S. nuclear industry ?
ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
The ability of the U.S. nuclear industry, and for that matter of
other technologically intensive U.S. industries, to compete in foreign
markets will be affected by the setting of international standards and
perhaps international regulations. To what extent should U.S. for-
eign policy and diplomacy seek to assure a voice for the United States
in the setting and application of international standards for the de-
sign, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants? Should this
concept be encouraged or discouraged ? If international standard set-
ting for nuclear power is to be encouraged, what should be the respec-
tive roles of the Government and the U.S. nuclear industry in their
establishment ?
PROTECTING THE U.S. POSITION IN URANIUM ENRICHMENT
Past U.S. policy determinations have judged as advantageous the
strong position of the United States as the principal supplier of en-
riched uranium or enrichment services in the free world market. To
what extent should U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy seek to preserve
this position? To what extent should the U.S. attempt to prevent,
limit, or control the development and use of alternative enrichment
technologies that might threaten U.S. facilities with technological
obsolescence, or increase the possibilities of proliferation of foreign
capabilities to produce nuclear weapons materials ?
GLOSSARY
Atomic energy — The energy released by a nuclear reaction or by radioactive
decay*. (See radioactive, fission, fusion, nuclear reactors, i
Atomic number— The number of protons in the nucleus of an atom, and also its
positive charge. Each chemical element has its characteristic atomic
number, and the atomic numbers of the known elements form a complete
series from 1 for hydrogen to 103 for the man-made element lawrencium.
Atomic reactor — See nuclear reactor.
Atomic weapon — An explosive weapon in which the energy is produced by nuclear
fission or fusion.
Atomic weight — The mass of an element relative to other elements. The atomic
weight of an element is approximately equal to the total number of
protons and neutrons in its nucleus.
Boiling water reactor — A nuclear reactor in which water, used as both coolant
and moderator, is allowed to boil in the reactor core. The resulting steam
can be used directly to drive a turbine.
Breeder reactor — A nuclear reactor so designed that it converts more uranium-
238 or thorium into useful nuclear fuel than the uraniumr-235 or Plu-
tonium which it uses. The new fissionable materials are created by
capture in the fertile materials of neutrons from the fission process.
There are three types of breeder reactors : the liquid metal, fast breeder
(LMFBR) : the gas cooled fast breeder (GCBR) ; and the molten-salt
breeder i MSBR).
Breeder ratio — The ratio of the number of fissionable atoms produced in a
breeder reactor to the number of fissionable atoms consumed in the
reactor.
Byproduct material — Any artificial radioactive material obtained during the
production or use of source material or fissionable material. It includes
fission products and radioisotopes produced in nuclear reactors, but not
radioactive materials occuring in nature or those made with accelerators
such as cyclotrons.
Chain reaction — A nuclear reaction that stimulates its own repetition. In a fission
chain reaction, a fissionable nucleus absorbs a neutron and fissions,
releasing additional neutrons. These in turn can be absorbed by other
fissionable nuclei, releasing still more neutrons. A fission chain reaction is
self-sustaining when the number of neutrons released equals or exceeds
the number of neutrons lost by absorption in nonfissionable material or
by escape from the system.
Containment The provision of a gastight shell or other enclosure around a
nuclear reactor to confine fission products tli.it otherwise might be
released to the atmosphere in the event of an accident.
Conversion ratio The ratio of the number of atoms of new fissionable material
produced in a converter reactor to the original number of atoms of
fussionable fuel consumed.
Converter reactor -A nuclear reactor that produces some fissionable material,
but less than it consumes.
Coolant A substance circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer
heat. Common coolants are water, air. carbon dioxide, liquid sodium,
and helium.
Core- The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements
and usually t lie moderator.
Decay hea< The heat produced by the decay of radioactive nuclides.
Decay, radioactive The spontaneous transformation of one nuclide into a
different nuclide, or into a different energy state of the same nuclide.
Depleted uranium— Uranium having less uranium-235 than the 0.71 percent
found in natural uranium.
(290)
291
Deuterium — An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one neutron and
one proton, and is therefore about twice as heavy as the nucleus of
normal hydrogen, which is only a single proton. It occurs in nature as
1 atom to 6500 atoms of normal hydrogen and is not radioactive.
Energy — The capability of doing work.
Enriched uranium — Uranium in which the amount of uranium-235 present has
been artificially increased above that found in nature. Enriched uranium
for civil nuclear power is generally enriched to about 3 to 6 percent ;
enriched uranium for weapons is above 00 percent.
Fast breeder reactor — A nuclear reactor that operates with neutrons at the
fast speed of their initial emission from the fission process, and that
produces more fissionable material than it consumes.
Fast reactor — A nuclear reactor in which the fission chain reaction is sustained
primarily by fast neutrons rather than by thermal or intermediate
neutrons.
Feed materials — Refined uranium or thorium metal or their pure compounds
in a form suitable for use in nuclear reactor fuel elements or as feed for
uranium enrichment processes.
Fertile material — A material, not itself fissionable by thermal neutrons, which
can be converted into a fissionable material by irradiation in a nuclear
reactor. The two basic fertile materials are uranium-238 and thorium-
232. When these fertile materials capture neutrons, they become fission-
able plutonium-230 and uranium-233. respectively.
Fission — The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal parts
(which are radioactive nuclei of lighter elements), accompanied by the
release of a relatively large amount of energy and generally one or more
neutrons. Fission can occur spontaneously, but usually is caused by
nuclear absorption of neutrons or other particles.
Fissile material — "While sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material,
this term has also acquired a more restricted meaning, namely, any
material fissionable by neutrons of all energies.
Fission produces — The nuclei formed by the fission of heavy elements, plus
nuclides formed by the fission fragments' radioactive decay.
Fissionable material — Any material fissionable by slow neutrons. The three basic
ones are uranium-235. plutonium-239 and uranium-233.
Fuel cycle — The series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power
reactors. It includes mining, refining, fabrication of fuel elements, their
use in a nuclear reactor, chemical processing to recover remaining
fissionable material, reenrichment of the fuel, and refabrication into new
fuel elements.
Fuel element — A rod. tube, plate or other shape or form into which nuclear
fuel is fabricated for use in a reactor.
Fuel reprocessing — The processing of reactor fuel to recover the unused, residual
fissionable materials.
Fusion — The formation of a heavier nucleus from two lighter ones, such as
hydrogen isotopes, with the attendant release of energy.
Gas centrifuge process — A method of enrichment in which heavier uranium
adorns are partially separated from lighter ones by centrifugal force.
Gaseous diffusion process — A method of uranium enrichment based on the fact
that gas atoms or mo^cules with different masses will diffuse through
a porous barrier, or membrane, at different rates.
Isotope — One of two or more atoms with the same atomic number but with
different atomic weights. Isotopes usually have very nearly the same
chemical properties, but somewhat different physical properties.
Licensed material — Source material, special nuclear material, or byproduct
material received, possessed, used or transferred under a general or
special license issued by the Atomic Energy Commission.
Magnetohydrodymmics (MHD) — A process for converting energy of very hot.
electrically conducting gases into electricity by the movement of streams
of such gases in a magnetic field. The process in theory offers a sub-
stantial improvement in thermal efficiency over conventional steam-
turbine-generator systems.
Maximum credible accident — The most serious reactor accident that can reason-
ably be imagined from any adverse combination of equipment malfunc-
tion, operating errors, and other foreseeable causes.
Megawatt — One million watts, one thousand kilowatts.
292
Megawatt-day per ton— A unit that expresses the burnup of nuclear fuel in a
reactor; specifically the number of megawatt-days of heat output per
metric ton of fuel in the reactor.
Metric ton — loot) kiln-nuns (2205 pounds).
Moderator— A material, .such as water, heavy water, or graphite, used in a
nuclear reactor to slow down high-velocity neutrons emitted by fission-
ing atoms, thus increasing the likelihood of capture to cause further
fissi
Natural uranium— Uranium as found in nature, containing 0.7% uranium-23o,
99.39! of uranium-238 and a trace of uranium-234. It is also called
normal uranium.
Normal uranium — See natural uranium.
Nuclear power plant — Any device, machine, or assembly that converts nuclear
energy into some form of useful power, such as mechanical or electrical
power.
Nuclear reactor — A device in which a fission chain reaction can be initiated,
maintained, and controlled. Its essential component is a core with fission-
able fuel. It usually has a moderator, reflector, shielding coolant and
control mechanisms. It is the basic machine of nuclear power.
Nuclide— A general term applicable to all atomic forms of the elements. It is
not a synonym for "isotope." which properly has a more limited defini-
tion. Whereas isotopes are the various forms of a single element, undid, s
comprise all the isotopic forms of all the elements.
Plutonium — A heavy, radioactive, man-made element of atomic number t>4. Its
most important isotope is fissionable plutonium-239, produced by neu-
tron irradiation of uranium-238. It is used for reactor fuel and in
weapons.
Pressurized water reactor — A power reactor in which heat is transferred from
the core to a heat exchanger by water kept under high pressure to pre-
vent it from boiling. Steam is generated in a secondary circuit.
Pu-239 — The isotope of plutonium of weight 239.
Radiation — The emission and propagation of energy through matter or space
by electromagnetic waves, or by particles. Nuclear radiation is that
emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear reactions.
Radiation standards — Exposure standards, permissible concentrations, rules for
safe handling, regulations for transportation, regulations for industrial
control of radiation and control of radiation exposure by legislative
means.
Radioactive contamination — Deposition of radioactive material in any place
where it may harm persons, spoil experiments, or make products or
equipment unsuitable or unsafe. The presence of unwanted radioactive
matter.
Radioactivity — The spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable atomic
nucleus, usually accompanied by emission of ionizing radiation.
Source material— As defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, any material.
e\c pt special nuclear material, which contains 0.05% or more of ura-
nium, thorium, or any combination of the two.
Special nuclear material — As defined in the Atomic Energy Act or 1954, this
term refers to plutonium-239, uranium-238, enriched uranium, or any
material artificially enriched in any of these substances.
Toll enrichment A business arrangement whereby privately owned uranium
is enriched in uranium-235 content in government facilities upon pay-
iin m of a service charge.
Tritium A radioactive isotope of hydrogen. It is man-made and is heavier
than deuterium.
U-235, U-238 — Uranium of atomic weights 235 and 238, respectively.
Uranium— A radioactive element with atomic number 92 and, as found in
natural ore-;, an average atomic weight of approximately 238. The two
principle natural isotopes of uranium are uranium-235 (0.7% of natural
uranium), which is fissionable, and uranium-238 (99.3% of natural
ii'-;. uimn > . w liich is Perl ile.
Uranium hexafluoride — A volatile compound of uranium and fluorine. In ira^i ous
form, this is the process material Cor the gaseous diffusion and gas
centrifuge methods of enrichment.
Wastes, radioactive Equipment and materials, from nuclear operations, which
are radioactive and for which there is no further use. Wastes are gen-
erally classified as high-level (having radioactivity concentrations of
hundr< ds to thousands of curies per gallon or cubic foot), low level (in
the range of 1 microcurie per gallon or cubic foot), or intermediate.
Chapter 5 — The Political Legacy of the
International Geophysical Year
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction 297
II. Background of the IGY (1957-58) 300
Antecedents of the IGY 300
The First International Polar Year (1882-83) 301
The Second International Polar Year (1932-33) 301
Origin and Evolution of the IGY 301
Impetus for a Third International Polar Year 302
The Scientific Response 304
The Political Response 305
Organization and Funding of the IGY 305
International Organization and Funding 306
U.S. Organization and Funding 309
III. The Scientific Program 313
The Scientific Rationale 313
Organization of the Program 314
Implementation of the Program 316
IGY Reporters 317
Data Centers 317
World Days and Alerts 318
Publication of Results 318
"Gemutlichkeit" 319
Political Constraints on the Program 320
The Two Chinas 320
Soviet Missiles 321
Arctic Flights 321
Radioactive Fallout 322
Antarctic Bases 322
Mapping 322
The "Stolen" Satellite Rocket 322
Censorship 323
IV. The Scientific Results 324
Summary of Scientific Findings of the IGY 324
Aurora and Airglow 324
Cosmic Rays 324
Geomagnetism 325
Glaciology 325
Gravity 325
Ionospheric Physics 325
Longitudes and Latitudes 325
Meteorology 326
Nuclear Radiation 326
Oceanography , 326
Seismology 326
Solar Activity 327
Upper Atmosphere 327
Appraisal of Findings 327
Continuation of IGY Programs 329
(295)
296
Page
V. The Political Impacts 331
General Impacts on the United States 331
Specific Impacts on the United States 332
Federal Support of Basic Science 334
The Space Program 336
Federal Science Advisory Structure 337
Science Education in America 338
Public Attitudes Toward Science 339
Communications Satellites 340
Effect on National Defense 341
Effect on Foreign Policy 341
International Impacts 341
The Effect on International Science 342
Science in Foreign Affairs 343
International Cooperation and Good Will 345
VI. Analysis and Discussion 347
Scientists as Eternal Optimists 347
Scientific Vis-a-Vis Political Good Will 348
International Diplomacy and the IGY 351
The Antarctic Treaty 351
The Test Ban Treaty 353
The Space Treaty 355
Concluding Remarks 357
Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations 359
Appendix 2. A Brief Chronology of the IGY 360
TABLES
1. Plenary Meetings of the CSAGI 304
2. Congressional Appropriations for the IGY 311
3. Congressional Appropriations for the IGY by Individual Scientific Area.
4. Scientific Areas Represented During the IGY 314
5. Budget Obligations of the National Science Foundation, 1951-72 335
6. Comparison of the Provisions of the Antarctic and Space Treaties 357
FIGURES
1. Evolution of the Concept of the IGY 303
2. International Organization of Science 306
3. The IGY Constitution and Associations of the ICSU Special IGY
Committee, CSAGI 308
4. Schematic Flowchart for International Funding of the IGY 310
5. International Coordination of the IGY 317
6. The IGY Calendar of Special Events 319
CHAPTER 5— THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR
I. Introduction
Increasingly, science is being blamed for many, if not most, of the
world's ills. It is science which has made possible a highly technological
world, and it is ever-expanding technology which has led to some of
that world's seemingly most intractable problems.1 Not only do these
problems severely tax domestic capabilities at home, they threaten
to engulf relations with countries abroad. Seemingly, science and
technology have become the genie escaped from the bottle, no longer
subject to man's command alone. Rather, the genie seems possessed
by a will of its own, increasingly beyond man's control. At the same
time, ironically, it appears unlikely that many of today's problems,
whether domestic or international, can be solved other than through
the application of additional science and technology. Calls by the
neo-Luddites2 to return to the technological womb, while one part
of the world attempts to cope with technology's problems and another
part still struggles for its fair share of technology's fruits, appear
both inhumane and unrealistic. What, then, to do?
This study, in accordance with the objectives of the entire series
of which it is one part,3 is concerned with the role of science and
technology in helping to solve (or, conversely, in sharing the re-
sponsibility for generating) problems of international affairs. Con-
tributing to these problems is the fact that science has, in relatively
quick succession, provided man with the chemical, the atomic, and
the hydrogen bomb, with other, more potent bombs waiting next on
the horizon. The extent to which these devices are likely to be used
remains largely unresolved. Having provided these singularly power-
ful tools of destruction, has science contributed to that diplomacy
upon which avoidance of their use depends? That question reflects
the general concern of this study.
In seeking to shed light on the role of science in international
affairs, it seems reasonable to examine in some detail the workings of
the world scientific community and the way in which its various
components interact. Rather than undertake such an examination
theoretically, this case study focuses upon one particular international
scientific undertaking and seeks to find ways m which the participa-
tion of scientists in this activity may have helped contribute to the
ultimate resolution of some problems of international concern.
The International Geophysical Year (IGY) 4 was chosen for study
because it represents the largest, most complex, and most compre-
hensive international scientific undertaking thus far conceived and
i Current public awareness of technologically induced problems would appear to be sufficiently widespread
to require no elaboration here. For a brief discussion of the subject earlier in this series, see: U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-
ments, The Evolution of International Technology, 91st Cong., 2d sess., December 1970 (vol.
II, pp. 615-616).
* A term applied to those opposed to technology on value grounds. Opposition to technology is taken as a
moral position: economic determinism has been found inadequate to regulate the production and adoption
of good technology while restraining the bad, or (according to another view) there are so many technological
innovations that society is increasingly incapable of adjusting to them.
3 For an overview of the series of studies, see: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Toward a New Diplomacy in a
Scientific Age, 91st Cong., 2d sess., April 1970. For a list of studies published to date, see p. ii.
• For a list of abbreviations used throughout this study, see app. 1.
Note : This chapter was prepared in 1973 by Harold Bullis.
(297)
298
successfully carried out by scientists. Sixty-seven nations partici-
pated, represented by 20,000 to 40,000 scientists and as many volun-
teer observers, manning about 4,000 principal stations and an equal
number of secondary stations and sites scattered throughout the
world from pole to pole.6 Estimates of the total expense of the under-
taking have been as high as $2 billion, including logistical support.
Throughout the 18 months of the activity fl scientists generated an
unprecedented aura of international cooperation and good will as
they attacked the scientific problems while largely avoiding the
political ones. Their efforts were hailed variously as "a major turning
Eoint in history,"7 as opening up "a new era in the history of the
uman race," 8 and as having been "the single most significant peace-
ful activity of mankind since the renaissance and the Copernican
revolution."9 In view of these assessments by responsible observers,
the IGY was an attractive subject for analysis of possible contribu-
tions of science to the conduct of international affairs.
Significantly, the IGY took place at a time of considerable inter-
national political distrust and hostility, the period of the so-called
cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would be
naive to suggest that the political tensions of the period had no effect
upon the conduct of IG Y scientists or their activities, and equally
mistaken to suppose that the IGY brought about fundamental changes
in the prevailing pattern of confrontation. The influences of such
tensions and confrontation upon international cooperation, however,
have been discussed in some detail in previous studies of this series.10
Here, rather, an attempt is made to illuminate the other side of the
picture: to show how scientists and political leaders of many countries
worked together with a purposefulness and vigor which suggested not
only a spirit of adventure and anticipated accomplishment but also,
perhaps, a sense of gratitude or relief over the opportunity to cooperate
m an undertaking largely removed from the arena of political conflict.
It may be that the IGY, representing as it did an island of relative
tranquillity in a sea otherwise lashed by violent political storms, has
been overpraised and undercriticized. Certainly those who knew it
best were most enthusiastic and lavish in their praise, and no record
appears to remain of any significant criticisms of their exuberance and
optimism. A considerable but unsuccessful effort was made to find
• U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, National Science Foundation, National Academy
of Science*, Hearings; Report on the International Geophysical Year, 86th Cong., 1st sess., February 1959,
p. 6. Subsequently referred to as NSF-NAS Hearings; IOY Report. From the statement of Dr. Joseph
Kaplan, Chairman of the U.S. National Committee for the IQ Y. The 67 nations were: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Chech-
oslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, East Africa, Ecuador. Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel. Italy. Japan, Jugoslavia, Korea (Democratic People's Republic),
Malaya, Mexico, Mongolian People's Republic, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal. Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan (Academia Slnica), Thailand, Tunisia, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam
(Democratic Republic), and Vietnam (Republic). (A committee formed by the People's Republic of China
In September 1955 withdrew in June 1957).
• The year actually encompassed 18 months, rather than the calendar 12 months, to accommodate the full
period of estimated maximum solar activity.
» Walter Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown; The International Geophysical Year (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1961), p. 416.
• Sidney Chapman, IOY; Year of Discovery , The Story of the International Geophysical Year (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 107.
• NSF-NAS Hearings; IOY Report, p. 17. From the statement of Dr. Hugh Odishaw, Executive Director
of the U.S. National Committee for the IOY.
«• 8ee, in particular, the following: Lenice N. Wu, The Baruch Plan; U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear
Age (August 1972) and Warren H. Donnelly, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe; The Interaction of
American Diplomacy with a New Technology (December 1972). U.8., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 92d Congress, 2d sess.
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office).
299
such criticism for the sake of a more balanced account. However, it
is not the purpose of the study to dissect the IGY in an attempt to
judge what it failed to accomplish. The primary intent is to search
for positive contributions the IGY may have made to building bridges
between science and diplomacy, and to determine whether the mo-
mentum generated by its activities was sufficient to continue thereafter
to help translate a variety of international hopes and plans into con-
crete realities.
Too much should not, of course, be read into the apparent detente
reflected in this one scientific enterprise, and assessment of its effects
on world diplomacy must be tempered by the recognition that many
other factors were at work both for and against international amity.
Sorting out and weighing the particular impacts and consequences of
the IGY would be a manifest impossibility. Nevertheless, it is possible
to identify specific attitudes, behavior patterns, and rules of procedure
that are consistent with or even promote detente. Without overstating
the case, the study attempts to highlight these factors.
The first part of this analysis provides background information on
the IGY, including its antecedents, origin, and evolution, and organi-
zation and funding. The scientific program is described in section III ;
the scientific results are discussed in section IV. The political impacts
are considered in section V, including both general effects and those
specific effects due primarily to the Soviet IGY artificial satellite
program. In section VI some general comments are made concerning
the possibility of applying the international goodwill generated by the
world scientific community to the solution of international political
problems. Finally, some specific examples are given of the influence of
the IGY upon subsequent international diplomacy.
II. Background of the IGY (1957-58)
The IGY has been called "perhaps the most ambitious and at the
same time the most successful cooperative enterprise ever undertaken
by man." u This assessment was voiced by the late Lloyd V. Berkner,
originator of the proposal which ultimately led to the IGY, and
Vice President of the international body which coordinated all IGY
activities.12 Yet this remarkable effort might never have taken place
had it not been preceded by a history of growing international
scientific cooperation from ancient times to the present day.
Antecedents of the IGY
Scientific cooperation appears evident even in ancient times, when
travelers exchanged information needed to develop maps for their
mutual use.13 Francis Bacon, early in the 17th century, proposed
cooperative efforts as the best way of obtaining information about the
nature of the world. Such efforts as did take place, however, were
undoubtedly more a matter of happenstance and chance than of
premeditated planning. Not until the 18th century did coordinated
efforts by many men at many points become more common. Observa-
tions of the transit of Venus in 1761 represented an early attempt at a
concerted international effort, largely by European nations. In 1769
a subsequent transit of Venus, some portions of which were visible
in the American colonies, afforded the opportunity on the part of the
New World to link scientific observations with the Old.
For the most part, these initial early cooperative efforts were
independently conceived and only poorly coordinated. During the
19th century, international efforts intensified and close coordination
became more common. Largely as a result of efforts by a group of
French scientists, a network of weather observation stations was
established, data first being published in 1800. To facilitate coordinated
weather observations at sea as well as ashore, an international con-
ference in Brussels in 1853 decided that warships of the participating
nations would utilize standard forms for data-taking, and the in-
formation would be distributed to all. This effort moved Matthew F.
Maury, an American naval officer who had initially proposed such
cooperation, to comment:
Rarely before has there been such a sublime spectacle presented to the scientific
world : all nations agreeing to unite and cooperate in carrying out one system of
philosophical research with regard to the sea. Though they may be enemies in
all else, here they are to be friends. M
The need to learn more about the earth's magnetism, as well as its
weather, led to other international cooperative efforts during the 19th
century. Worldwide magnetic observations were carried out from
" J. Tmo Wilson, JOY; The Year of the New Moons (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. vil.
" This group was known as the Bureau du Comlte Special de l'Annee Geophysique Internationale, or
C8AQI.
" Much of the following material has been summarized from Sullivan, Assault, pp. 4-19.
» Matthew F. Maury, The Physical Geography of the Sea (New York: Harper Bros., 1856), p. xiii. Maury,
known as the Pathfinder of the Beas fur his researches of ocean currents following an injury that incapacitated
him for sea duty, Joined the Confederacy during the Civil War and became its foremost naval officer.
(300)
301
Peking, China, to Sitka, Alaska, and an international magnetic union
was established to fix, in advance, specific days for the simultaneous
recording of data. Increased cooperation led rapidly to the formation
of other international scientific organizations, including the Inter-
national Association of Geodesy (1864), the International Bureau of
Weights and Measures (1875), and the International Meteorological
Organization (1878). The most direct antecedents of the IGY, how-
ever, were the First and Second International Polar Years, which to
some extent may be considered models for the IGY.
- THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL POLAR TEAR (1882-83)
The First International Polar Year (FPY), which took place in
1882-83, has been called the grandfather of the IGY. During this
period, scientists from 20 nations carried out cooperative efforts in
the high northern latitudes, placing primary emphasis upon studies of
surface meteorology, geomagnetism, and the aurora borealis.15 Al-
though no fundamental discoveries resulted from these studies, many
valuable data were obtained in many fields, including those of the
aurora, geology, geomagnetism, earth currents, meteorology, glaci-
ology, oceanography, and latitude and longitude.16 The success of
these efforts led, 50 years later, to the much larger effort of the Second
International Polar Year.
THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL POLAR TEAR (1932-88)
Although the primary emphasis of the Secondllnternational Polar
Year (SPY), which took place in 1932-33, was also on studies of the
weather, the earth's magnetism, and the aurora, the program also
included studies of earth-sun relationships and of atmospheric elec-
tricity. Scientists from 40 countries participated,17 publishing analyses
and observations in the fields of meteorology, radiation, ozone,
aerology, geomagnetism, earth currents, atmospheric electricity,
ionospheric physics, auroral physics, cosmic rays, hydrography,
glaciology, noctilucent clouds, nacreous clouds, biology, and as-
tronomy.18 Substantial progress was achieved toward understanding
magnetic storms and other magnetic disturbances, associated auroral
and ionospheric phenomena, and wind and pressure systems in high
latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere.19 Perhaps the most important
result of the SPY, however, was increased knowledge of the ionosphere,
which greatly advanced the science of radio communications.20
Origin and Evolution of the IGY 21
The success of the SPY, following the FPY by exactly. 50 years,
raised expectations that a Third International Polar (TPY) would be
held at an interval of another 50 years, or during 1982-83. However,
» Allen V. Astin, "The Scientific Community and International Cooperation," Department of State
Bulletin 61 (July 14, 1969), p. 34.
i« N. C. Oerson, "From Polar Years to IGY," Advances in Geophysics 5 (1958), p. 43.
" Astin, "The Scientific Community," p. 34.
" Gerson, "Polar Years," p. 44.
'• Elliott Roberts, "The IGY in Retrospect," Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian
Institution, Publication 4392 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 265.
20 National Academy of Sciences, Report on the U.S. Program for the International Geophysical Year (Wash-
ington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1965), p. 50-v. Subsequently referred
to as NSF IOY Program Report.
11 A brief chronology of the IGY is given in app. 2.
302
the accelerating pace of technological achievement was generating a
need for more frequent international efforts. By 1950, at least three
compelling reasons for reducing the time interval between "polar
years" had evolved: (1) existing basic scientific data in the earth
sciences had been largely exploited, making desirable the accumulation
of new data; (2) the need for new information regarding the earth,
the oceans, and the upper atmosphere was becoming critical with the
development of supersonic aircraft and new communications systems;
and (3) a period of unusual solar activity was predicted for 1957-
58, thereby offering an unparalleled opportunity for observing solar
phenomena.
IMPETUS FOB A THIRD INTERNATIONAL POLAR TEAR
It was therefore suggested by Berkner that a Third International
Polar Year (TPY) be held during 1957-1958, only 25 years after the
SPY, rather than the anticipated 50 years. The suggestion, which was
made at a small gathering of scientists at the home of Dr. James A.
Van Allen, was enthusiastically welcomed by Van Allen and his guests,
who suggested that Berkner should present his idea at the next meet-
ing of the Joint Commission on the Ionosphere (MCI).23 Following
this suggestion, the basic concept of the TPY was presented to a num-
ber of international scientific organizations which readily supported
and promoted the idea. A schematic representation of the progress
of the concept through the world scientific community is given in
figure 1. Initially, as suggested at the Van Allen meeting, Berkner
and Dr. Sydney Chapman, who later was to serve as president of the
governing IGY committee, presented the concept at the Brussels
meeting of the MCI in July 1950. The MCI endorsed the proposal,
amplified the suggested program somewhat, and recommended the
proiect to the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU),
and the three groups comprising ICSU: the International Union of
Scientific Radio (URSI),23 the International Union of Geodesy and
Geophysics (IUGG), and the International Astronomical Union
(IA U) . The URSI and IAU officially endorsed the plan in September
1950, and the IUGG followed with its endorsement in August 1951.
The ICSU Bureau, the executive body responsible for operations of
IC^U^approved the plan in January 1951 and recommended it to
the ICSU executive board, which granted its approval in October
1951. On May 16, 1952, the ICSU established a committee to take
•charge of the program, which was still being considered primarily
as a Third Polar Year.
M 8ometlmes referred to as the Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere.
* The Initials are derived from the French version of its name: the Union Radlo-Scientiflque Internation-
ale.
303
Fioure 1. Evolution of the Concept of the IG Y.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 21
304
Early in 1952, invitations to participate were sent to member na-
tions of the ICSU, as well as to the U.S.S.R., which was not an ICSU
member. M The response to this initial solicitation was modest, largely
because many of the national academies were not greatly interested
in participating in a polar scientific activity. Several international
organizations, particularly the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), the International Meteorological Association, and the Inter-
national Association of Terrestrial Magnetism and Electricity, took
the position that the TPY program placed too much emphasis upon
the polar regions and, instead, should be expanded to encompass
worldwide phenomena.
The ICSU considered these suggestions for enlarging the scope of
the TPY, and Dr. Chapman proposed that the suggestions be adopted
with the name of the program changed to the International Geo-
physical Year. This change in name and scope was approved by the
ICSU general assembly in October 1952, to reflect the need for world-
wide synoptic observation and analysis. Followup notices, sent to
ICSU member countries and calling for participation in the IGY,
resulted in a much better response than had the initial invitation for a
TPY. One result of the improved response was that the original special
ICSU committee was enlarged and, early in July 1953, was renamed
the Comite Special de l'Annee Geophysique Internationale, or
CSAGI. At this time, Dr. Chapman was named president of the
CSAGI and Berkner vice president. One of the first decisions made
by the CSAGI was that the IGY would continue for 18 months, from
July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, so as to include the entire period
of anticipated maximum solar activity.
THE SCIENTIFIC RESPONSE
The concept of an IGY, as opposed to a TPY, gained immediate
and widespread acceptance throughout the world scientific community.
Following the initial provisional meeting of the CSAGI in October
1952, five additional meetings were held, as listed in table 1, below:
TABLE 1.
PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CSAGI
Location
Date
Year
First
Brussels
Rome
June39-July3
1953
Second
Sept. 30-Oct. 4
1954
Third
Sept. 8-14
1955
Fourth
Sept. 10-15..
1956
Fifth
July29-Aug.9
1958
At the first meeting, 26 nations participated; at the second, 38
nations; at the fourth, 51 nations; and by the final meeting, 67 nations
were represented.
The general spirit of the scientific community was summarized by
Berkner as follows:
But most encouraging in all has been the genuine enthusiasm with which the
scientists of the earth, and the nations that support them, have embraced this pro-
gram. Tired of war and dissension, men of all nations have turned to "Mother
Earth" for a common effort on which all find it easy to agree.24
* Although not a member of the TC8TJ, the TJ.S.S.R. was a member of the IAU and also of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO). Inasmuch as Soviet participation in any large-scale international
■scientific undertaking was Important to the success of that event, the Soviets were also approached through
the IAU and WMO. 6
"Lloyd V. Berkner, "International Scientific Action: The International Geophysical Year, 1957-58,"
Science 119 (Apr. 30, 1954), p. 575.
305
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE
Interest in the IGY was not confined to the World scientific
community, but was shared by th6 various governments concerned,
by heads of state, and by the public at large. This interest was aroused
by the strong appeal of the IGY as a cooperative venture representing
many nations working together for the Denefit of all mankind. Con-
sequently, the collective response of the many legislative bodies arid
governments whose approval was necessary ' to' make the program a
success was on a far more generous scale than that prompted by any
previous international scientific enterprise.
Governmental support consisted not only of unprecedented financial
contributions, but also of equally valuable and necessary logistic
support. Governments cooperated by facilitating the movement of
participating scientists from one country to another, and in assuring
prompt movement through customs of scientific equipment upon which
the various programs depended. President Eisenhower, in a White
House press release on June 25, 1954, called the IGY "a striking
example of the opportunities which exist for cooperative action among
the peoples of the world." M Pope Pius XII commended the effort as
one likely to contribute to peace and cooperation among all people
and to their material well-being.27 Widespread interest in the IGY
was aroused in the general public by numerous articles in the daily
press and in popular magazines. Consequently, more was undoubtedly
known concerning the IGY than had been the case for any previous
international scientific effort, and expectations were correspondingly
raised.
Although it would seem unlikely that no voices were raised in
protest concerning an effort of this cost and magnitude, such ex-
pressions do not appear to have survived the passage of time. Vir-
tually no criticism of the IGY exists throughout the vast quantity
of published material concerning it. Congressional debate on the
IGY during the period 1954-59 was almost devoid of criticism.
Similarly, appropriations hearings and committee reports accompany-
ing appropriations bills did not criticize the scientific intent of the
effort, but were largely limited to discussions of the reliability of cost
estimates made by scientists. Thus the question was never "whether"
but "how much," as discussed later.28
Organization and Funding of the IGY
One of the outstanding features that characterized the IGY was
the relative smoothness and efficiency with which its governing
apparatus functioned despite the enormous size of the effort. Partly,
this success was due to the utilization by the scientific community
of existing organizations and institutions wherever feasible. Of
perhaps even greater significance, however, was the ability on the
part of the IGY leadership to structure the urdertaking so as to
* U.8. President (Eisenhower), "Letter to Dr. Chester I. Barnard, Chairman, National Science Board,
Concerning United States Participation in the International Geophysical Year. June 26, 1964." In: Public
Papers of the Pre*iderU$ of the United States. Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1954), p. 698.
" Sidney Chapman, "The International Geophysical Year, 1957-58," Nature 175 (Jan. 8, 1955), p. 56. A sum-
mary of the Pope's remarks, as translated from the French by Lloyd Berkner, appears in U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations for 196G, Hearings, 84th Cong.,
1st sess., Feb. 9, 1955, p. 343. Subsequently referred to as House, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1956.
«• For Congressional debates on the IGY, see the following in the Congressional Record: Vol. 100, pp.
10932, 11462-11464, 14807 (1954); vol. 101, pp. 4055, 4068, 7629 (1965); vol. 102, pp. 6267, 6209, 8358 (1956), and
vol. 104, pp. 14643, 17535 (1958).
306
maintain as sharp as possible a demarkation between international
concerns, on the one hand, and more purely national concerns on
the other. This separation was instrumental in reducing both the
number and the intensity of the inevitable nationalistic issues which,
if permitted to ferment and grow, could have undercut and arrested
the growth of the international scientific program. The way in which
the IGY was organized largely prevented national political concerns
from unduly interfering with international scientific objectives.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING
Both international organization and funding of the IGY were
under the general oversight of the ICSU, a federation of several
international and scientific unions. Although independent and not
directly linked with any nation, the ICSU was organizationally
linked to national Governments through their national academies
and through the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), as shown schematically in figure 2. This
existing arrangement provided a convenient, efficient mechanism
development of the IGY, which probably would never have been
initiated without the influence of the ICSU and its member unions.
The chief governing body for all IGY activities was the CSAGI,
which was established by the ICSU for that purpose. The status
and functions of the CSAGI were specifically international. As
originally constituted, the so-called Bureau of the CSAGI consisted
of three people representing the ICSU: Sidney Chapman, President
NATIONAL
ACADEMIES
INTERNATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC
UNIONS
ASTRONOMY
GEOPHYSICS
RADIO
PHYSICS
CHEMISTRY
MATHEMATICS
BIOLOGY
GEOGRAPHY
HISTORY OF SCIENCE
INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL
OF
SCIENTIFIC
UNIONS
ICSU
I !
i ^. _
Appoints to membership
Supports financially
Border national
Border international
Border governmental, political
{scientific,
academic
Figure 2. International Organization of Science (not including medical or
agriculture). Taken from: Sidney Chapman, "International Cooperation and
the IGY," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 16 (May I960), p. 174.
307
(United Kingdom), Lloyd V. Berkner, Vice President (United States),
and M. Nicolet, Secretary General (Belgium). This group, or Bureau,
was subsequently expanded to include V. V. Beloussov (U.S.S.R.)
and J. Coulomb (France), both members of the IUGG, so as to
include representation from the four major powers: the United States,
the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., ana France. Gradually the
CSAGI was enlarged to include additional members of various inter-
national unions, organizations, and committees until there were 24
members in all. In keeping with the nonnationalistic character of
the CSAGI, little attempt was made to have the representation
correspond in any way to the IGY efforts of the individual nations.29
Thus, the composition of CSAGI was based upon the relative effort
being expended m the various scientific areas, and to some extent
upon the physical location of CSAGI, rather than upon the magni-
tude and cost of the scientific programs of individual participating
nations. This arrangement was sometimes questioned by members of
Congress who felt that, in view of the relatively large costs of the U.S.
program, more American scientists should have been members of
CSAGI. The scientists pointed out that such representation had no
political significance or importance and was unrelated to the cost of
the various IGY programs, which were national whereas CSAGI was
international. This international concept was essential in order to
preserve the completely nonpolitical character of CSAGI, a factor
which proved to be vital in preventing nationalistic issues from inter-
fering with IGY scientific activities.
It was evident early in the IGY preparations, however, that a need
existed for bringing national problems before the IGY for solution,
since many activities required coordination between the national
committees of participating nations. A formal means was also needed
to enable the national committees collectively to discuss and express
their views on IGY matters. Such local matters as one nation's as-
sisting another with funds, equipment, or personnel, or permitting
workers to carry out or cooperate with assignments on foreign terri-
tory, could not be dealt with by CSAGI. Hence, CSAGI recommended
that ICSU form an advisory council for the IGY composed of one
delegate from each national committee, but not to include members
of CSAGI.
The Advisory Council was thereby established, and proceeded to
deal with problems of a largely national character, usually after such
problems had been considered first by representatives of the particular
nations concerned. The Advisory Council, made up of representatives
of all the nations participating in the IGY, advised and assisted the
much smaller CSAGI. The main areas of Council responsibility were:
(1) To arrange for mutual assistance between and among nations,
(2) to arrange regional meetings on specific subjects, and (3) to allocate
responsibility to various nations for storing IGY data. The Advisory
Council, which met in parallel sessions during each plenary session
of CSAGI, became highly influential and added much strength to the
central organization. The presence of designated official delegates
from IGY nations made it easier to arrange bilateral mutual assistance,
like establishment by one national committee of operations on another
committee's territory.30 These were the kinds of arrangements which
« Sidney Chapman, "International Cooperation and the IGY," BuOttin of the Atomic Scientist* 16 (May
1960) p. 174.
M Chapman, "International Cooperation," p. 176.
308
CSAGI itself expressly avoided. The general organizational arrange-
ment is shown in Figure 3.
The separate existence of CSAGI, on the international level, and
the Advisory Council, on the national level, has been considered the
key element in the efficient and effective functioning of the IGY.
Scientists of each participating country devised their own research
programs within their own national committees, and the output of
these committees then served as the input for the Advisory Council.
The IGY was thus an international scientific enterprise, operated by
scientists with the consent, cooperation, and support of their indi-
vidual governments, but in effect without the direction of these
governments.31
This dual organizational structure — CSAGI and international sci-
entific bodies, vis-a-vis the Advisory Council and national IGY
committees — was considered by many observers to be the major
reason why the IGY was so generously funded. Berkner, for example,
pointed out that various national governments responded favorably
to requests for money and support because the actual work was direct-
ed and carried out by national committees rather than by an inter-
national body.32 In testimony before congressional appropriations
NATIONAL
ACADEMIES
NATIONAL
IGY
COMMITTEES
IGY
ADVISORY
COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL
SCIENTIFIC
UNIONS
GEOPHYSICS
RADIO
ASTRONOMY
PHYSICS
GEOGRAPHY
BIOLOGY
Consultation
on IGY matters
WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION
(under UNO)
Figure 3. The IGY Constitution and Associations of the ICSU Special IGY
Committee, CSAGI. Taken from: Sidney Chapman, "International Cooperation
and the IGY," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 16 (May 1960), p. 174. (Key:
as in Figure 2.)
»' Lloyd V. Berkner, "Geography and Space," Ths Geographical Rtvinr 49 (July 1969), p. 313. The budget
for the U.S. IOY program, of course, was carefully scrutinized by the appropriate congressional appropria-
tions committees and justification for each element of the program was required on a line-item basis. In no
instance, however, was a suggestion made for reducing or expanding any particular element in the program.
» Statement to the Second United Nations International Conference ou the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, Geneva, Sept. 12, 1958, p. 13.
309
hearing, considerable emphasis was placed by scientists upon the fact
that the IGY program was "preeminently national in character and
scope." w Dr. Alan T. Waterman, at that tune Director of the National
Science Foundation, stated that —
. . . this Geophysical Year is entirely handled by this country; it is not an
internationally pooled effort; the United States has its own program, in keeping
with the general plan under which all the nations are participating.24
Only a relatively small proportion of IGY funds was spent to
finance the international IGY organization: somewhat more than one
quarter of a million dollars out of an estimated total expenditure of
approximately $2 billion, or slightly more than about 0.01 percent.35
General operating funds were obtained from a number of different
sources, as shown in figure 4. Most of these funds were obtained from
national and international members of the ICSU, special contribu-
tions from participating members and foundations, and from UNESCO.
One indication of the popularity of the IGY with national govern-
ments was that funding requests by the ICSU were oversubscribed,
thus permitting a substantial balance to be carried forward to assist
in post-IGY publication of scientific results.86
U.S. ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING
Different countries approached the problem of gaining and ad-
ministering funds in different ways. In the United States, a National
Committee for the IGY (the USNC) was established by the National
Academy of Sciences, which was a member of ICSU.37 The USNC
served as a focus for all U.S. technical panels, geographical com-
mittees, and special groups, as well as for a broad cross section of
leading American geophysicists. The USNC provided technical
guidance for the National Science Foundation, which was responsible
for preparation of budget estimates and for obtaining congressional
appropriations. Originally questions were raised as to whether NSF
possessed the necessary authority to participate in the IGY, but these
questions were resolved satisfactorily.38
' •» Testimony of Dr. Alan T. Waterman in: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, The
Supplemental Appropriation BUI, 1966. Hearing*, Pt. t. 83d Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 27, 1954, p. 901. Subsequently
referred to as: House, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1966.
** Testimony In: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, The Supplemental Appropriation
Bm, 1966, Hearing* on H.R. 9936, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 28, 1954, p. 551. Subsequently referred to as:
Senate. Hearing* on H.R. 99S6.
* Sidney Chapman, "The International Geophysical Year," .4017 Transaction* XL (June 1959), p. 118.
The chief contributors, and the approximate amounts contributed over the period 1955-61, were: the United
States, $76,000; the Soviet Union. $45,000: Great Britain, $21,000; and Canada, $10,000. In addition,
UNESCO gave $85,000 and the ICSU, $40,000.
n Wallace W. Atwood, Jr., "The International Geophysical Year in Retrospect," Department of State
Bulletin 40 (May 11, 1959), p. 884.
*> A detailed, comprehensive description of U.S. organisation and funding is given in NAS IOY Program
Report, pp. 896-900.
*• House, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1966, p. 937.
310
SCOR
CSAGI
Figure 4. Schematic Flow Chart for International Funding of the IGY. Taken
from: Wallace W. Atwood, Jr., "The International Geophysical Year in Retro-
spect," Department of State Bulletin 40 (May 11, 1959), p. 685.
The original budget presented to the Congress for the IGY was for
$13 million. Dr. Waterman emphasized that this budget was "entirely
separate and distinct from the regular programs of the National
Science Foundation," 39 a fact of considerable importance inasmuch
as the entire NSF budget at that time was of similar magnitude.40
Later, a considerably greater budget of $40 million for an expanded
IGY program was presented.41 In all, $43.5 million was appropriated
by the Congress in support of the U.S. scientific program for the
IGY, as shown in table 2.
*• House, Supplemental Appropriation BUI, 1966, p. 901.
40 The 1955 NSF budget was $12,486 thousand, and the 1956 budget was $16,038 thousand. See: U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development,
The National Science Foundation; A General Review of Its First 16 years, 89th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 24, 1966,
pp. 32-35.
41 For details of this expanded program, see U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Second
Supplemental Appropriation BUI, 1966, Hearings, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 8, 1956, pp. 427-440. Subse-
quently referred to as: House, Second Supplemental Appropriation BUI, 1966.
311
TABLE 2. CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE IGY «
Appropriated Obligations Unobligated <
Fiscal year—
1955 .._.-.-..„ $2,000,000 $1,836,542 $163,458
1956 37,000,000 14,904,593 22,172,936
1957 15,036,898 17,337,064
1958 2,000,000 19,337,064
1959 2,500,000 5,932,004 1,707,589
1960 1,597,585 110,004
1961 20, 429 36, 629
1962 88 39,717
> Financial reports of the National Science Foundation.
TABLE 3. CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE IGY BY INDIVIDUAL SCIENTIFIC AREA"
Program Amount
Aurora and airglow _- $1, 718, 022
Cosmic rays 1, 164, 812
Geomagnetism _■ 1,580,894
Glaciology 1,137,905
Gravity .-. 505,289
Ionospheric physics 3,237,816
Longitudes and latitudes r. 24,100
Meteorology 2,226,800
Oceanography 2,007,054
Rocketry 2,598,952
Seismology 877,049
Solar activity 307,378
World days. ■„ 229,050
Interdisciplinary research _■ 1,750,526
Earth satellites _• 19, 843, 210
World data center 1, 513, 587
General scientific support 1,076, 551
Technical direction 1, 377, 266
Total ._- 43,176,261
Almost half of this money was spent in support of the IGY earth
satellite program, as shown in table 3. However, as pointed out by
Hugh Odishaw, Executive Director of the U.S. National Committee,
these apprpriated funds represented only about one-third of the
total U.S. research effort: another third resulted from contributions
from private institutions (particularly universities) , with the remaining
third being provided through already existing programs in both public
and private laboratories.44 Other Government agencies providing sup-
port for the USNC included the Department of Defense, the State
Department, the Commerce Department, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization.45 The Navy, for
example, initially estimated its support for the Antarctic IGY pro-
° U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on 8cience, Research
and Development, The National Science Foundation; A General Review of Itt Firtt IB Yeart, 89th Cong.
2d sess., H. Kept. No. 1219, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 77.
« Report on the U.S. Program for the International Geophysical Year (Washington: National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council, November 1966), p. 897.
" Hugh Odishaw, "The Meaning of the International Geophysical Year." In: NSF-NAS Hearings;
JOY Report, p. 20.
« House, Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 19S5, pp. 901, 923.
312
gram to be almost $30 million.48 Eventually the logistical and opera-
tional support for IGY activities increased the U.S. outlay to
approximately $500 million.47
Although both Houses of Congress supported IGY requests en-
thusiastically, the House frequently reduced the amounts requested
whereas the Senate usually voted for the full amounts. The final
figures arrived at represented a compromise between the two bodies.48
Action in the House reflected a belief that the budget estimates
arrived at by the scientists were necessarily rough and could be
reduced without damage to the U.S. IGY program, whereas the
scientists insisted that the budget estimates were conservative and
that any reductions would indeed severely damage the program.49
Irritation was also expressed in the House that the scientists were
making use of administration prestige to "sell" the IGY program,
thereby relegating the Congress to a back seat in the endeavor.60
These difficulties were relatively minor, however, and for the most
part the Congress granted the scientists what they requested.
«• House, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1966, p. 523.
*> Much of this support was provided for two major areas: Antarctic research, and rocket and satellite
activities. This estimate is very rough, however, and represents a best estimate by those having an intimate
knowledge of the U.S. program. It includes not only explicit expenses, but also such expenses as the salaries
of scientists on loan at full pay from their respective institutions.
« See these House and Senate reports: H. Rept. 2266 (July 16, 1954), 304 (Mar. 26, 1955), 1897 (Mar. 15, 1956),
and 2221 (July 18, 1958); and S. Rept. 2034 (July 31, 1954), 411 (June 2, 1955), 1725 (Apr. 11, 1956), and 2350
(Aug. 13, 1958).
" See, for example: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appro-
priation* for 1956, Hearings on H.R. 6240, 84th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 26, 1955, pp. 441-443. Subsequently
referred to as: Senate, Hearing on H.R. 6240.
M House, Second Supplemental Appropriation BUI, 1956, pp. 440-442.
III. The Scientific Program
The scientific program proposed for the IGY was both ambitious
and complex. Having agreed upon the scientific rationale for the
undertaking, however, scientists quickly organized and implemented
the program, subject only to several seemingly unavoidable — but
not overly restrictive — political constraints.
The Scientific Rationale
The scientific rationale for undertaking the IGY 25 years sooner
than had been anticipated was based upon a number of factors. First,
since the world's scientific "storehouse" of data concerning man's
physical environment was considered largely exhausted, it was
maintained that the scientific community could not wait until 1982
(50 years after the SPY) to replenish this storehouse.61 In particular,
many scientists considered that further progress in the geophysical
sciences was being hampered by lack of information that could only be
obtained by a coordinated, worldwide cooperative data-taking venture.
Second, soon after the SPY there had been an unprecedented
development of new research tools in the geophysical sciences. These
included radiosonde balloons capable of investigating 90 percent of
the earth's atmosphere, and rockets (developed during World War II)
capable of investigating the remaining upper 10 percent, as well as
the fringes of outer space. New cosmic ray recorders, spectroscopes,
and other instruments were available to permit in-depth investigation
of the nature and composition of the aurora, the newly-discovered
"air-glow", the sun and its corona, and the earth's magnetic field.
Furthermore, electronic computers had sufficiently evolved to enable
efficient handling of the vast amounts of data that a massive worldwide
scientific effort would generate.
Third, geophysicists had become increasingly fascinated by the
earth's remote polar areas. The Arctic was of great interest from the
standpoint of radio communications and weather forecasting. The
Antarctic remained the largest unexplored landmass on the earth's
surface. With scientists encircling the globe in unprecedented numbers,
the IGY offered an excellent opportunity for obtaining information
regarding these remote polar regions.
Fourth, and finally, a period of intense solar activity had been
predicted for 1957-58. The actual 18-month period finally chosen for
the IGY represented an attempt to span, as completely as possible,
the anticipated period of maximum sunspots so that the effect of solar
storms upon the earth could be investigated. Such storms were
particularly interesting to the scientific community because sunspot
activity had been at a minimum during the SPY. This prediction of
high solar activity turned out to be gratifyingly accurate: sunspot
«' Wallace W. Atwood, Jr.. "The International Geophysical Year: A Twentieth Century Achievement In
International Cooperation," Department of State Bulletin 35 (Dec. 3, 1956), p. 880.
(313)
314
fluctuations during the IGY reached the greatest intensity ever
recorded since scientists first began to observe such phenomena in the
18th century.62
Organization oj the Program
Programs of the IGY were selected primarily to assist in solving
specific planetary problems of the earth, criteria for selection having
been specified by the CSAGI as follows:
(i) Problems requiring concurrent synoptic observations at many points involv-
ing cooperative observations by many nations.
(ii) Problems of branches of geophysical sciences whose solutions will be aided
by the availability of synoptic or other concentrated work during the IGY in
other geophysical sciences.
(iii) Observations of all major geophysical phenomena in relatively inacces-
sible regions of the earth that can be occupied during the IGY because of the
extraordinary effort during that interval, in order to augment our basic knowledge
of the earth and of the solar and other influences acting upon it.
(iv) Epochal observations of slowly varying terrestrial phenomena, to establish
basic information for subsequent comparison at later epochs.63
Where questions of priority arose, the first requirement (i) was
recognized as controlling. This emphasis upon synoptic observations,
the need for carrying out measurements throughout the entire globe,
and the great expense necessitated in so doing, were all major elements
in the readiness of the Congress to provide the needed funds, as
discussed earlier.
Primary emphasis of the IGY, as summarized by the National
Academy of Sciences, was
... to observe geophysical phenomena and to secure data from all parts
of the world; to conduct this effort on a coordinated basis by fields, and in space
and time, so that results could be collated in a meaningful manner."
Within this context, problems generally fell within these three
broad areas:
(a) The earth itself as a structure;
(b) Atmospheric and oceanic circulation and heat and water budget of the
earth; and
(c) Upper atmospheric physics and solar-terrestrial relationships."
TABLE 4. SCIENTIFIC AREAS REPRESENTED DURING THE IGY
Aurora and airglow • Meteorology '
Cosmic rays > Nuclear radiation >
Geomagnetism » Ocebnogriphy '
Glaciology Seismology
Gravity Solar activity
Ionospheric physics) Upper atmospheric studies utilizing rockets and satellite
Longitudes and latitudes' vehicles
> Disciplines of major interest.
Reference: Report on the U.S. Program for the International Geophysical Year (Washington: National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council. November 1966), p. vii.
» NAS JOY Program Report, p. vii.
« CSAOI, HulUlin a" Information, No. 4 (London: IUOQ Newsletter No. 9, 1955), pp. 54-65.
m NAS JOY Program Report, p. vii.
m NAS IOY Program Report, p. vii.
315
These broad areas were subdivided into 13 scientific areas, as shown
in table 4. Of these, first priority was given to those requiring con-
current, coordinated observation, as indicated in the table. The
remainder, including glaciology, gravity, and seismology, did not
require synoptic observations, but were included because scientists
would be available in areas where these fields, too, could be studied.
Comprehensive summaries of activities carried out in each of these
disciplines have been published by the National Academy of Sciences
and will not be described in detail here.66 However, a capsule rationale
for inclusion of these particular disciplines is given below.67
Synoptic studies of the aurora were planned, particularly relative
to magnetic storms. Also planned were the improvement of auroral
charts, detailed spectrograph^ and photometric studies, and study
of airglow phenomena. Of particular interest was the detailed char-
acterization of the Antarctic aurora, of which little was known.
By the use of artificial earth satellites, scientists hoped to learn
more about the cause and formation of the aurora. Studies were
planned to determine the solar and geophysical effects of cosmi
rays, including their relation to the magnetic fields of the sun, the
earth, and space, as well as their interaction with the atmosphere.
Plans for geomagnetic studies included the morphology of magnetic
storms and transient effects, relations with the ionosphere, and the
equatorial electrojet. Particular interest was to be focused upon
greater understanding of the earth's magnetic field as it extended
into outer space.
Glaciology studies were not originally planned as part of the IGY,
primarily because they did not meet the requirement for concurrent
sunoptic observations. The importance of such studies was well
recognized, however, because of their influence upon heat balance
and chemical problems of meteorology. Glaciers affect the world's
weather, although admittedly less than atmospheric disturbances
and changes in the oceans. However, since IGY activities would
necessarily result in the presence of many scientists in the Arctic
and Antarctic regions, it seemed reasonable to take advantage of
their presence to conduct glacier surveys to establish a data base
which would permit determination of glacial changes by comparison
with similar surveys in the future.
Plans for ionospheric studies included extensive recordings of
layer heights, radio absorption and scatter effects, and galactic
noises. Of special interest were plans for conducting ionospheric
experiments northward from the South Polar plateau during the
long, total-night season to shed light on the physical characteristics
of the ionosphere during periods of prolonged absence of sunlight.
Studies of latitude and longitude were planned primarily to improve
time determinations and star catalogs, and to determine irregularities
in the earth's rotation. Plans for meteorological studies included
* NAS IGY Program Report, pp. 3-661.
" For more detail concerning the U.S. IGY program, see: Senate, Hearing* on H.R. 99S8, pp. 643-549; and
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1969, Hearingt,
86th Cong., 2d sess., 2 July 1968, pp. 804-814. Much of the summary in the text is also based upon information
from: Sullivan, Atiault p. 346; Sullivan, "The International Geophysical Year," International Conciliation
(January 1969), p. 276; Roberts, "The IGY in Retrospect," pp. 266-268; Chapman, Year ofDiecovery, p. 12;
and Chapman, "International Cooperation," p. 174.
316
global atmospheric circulation, energy content and dynamics, ozone,
cloud physics, and radio atmospherics and electricity. Plans for
oceanographic studies were included because of the interrelationships
among the oceans, the weather, and terrestrial dynamics, and also
because of the enormous natural resources of the oceans. It was well
known that the oceans exert a sizable impact upon the weather of
the lower atmosphere, and it was hoped that investigation of the deep
ocean basins would shed light on the structure and history of the
earth.
Plans for seismological studies were included as part of the general
effort to gain further understanding of the solid earth: its form, size,
and rotation; its bodily tides; and its earthquakes, which provide the
best means of studying the interior of the earth. Solar activity plans
included observations of radiation, sunspots and flares, the corona,
and general spectroscopy. It was known that the "electrical weather'
was greatly influenced by changes in the sun, and it was hoped that'
these studies, utilizing vastly improved instruments, would advance
man's knowledge of these cnanges, particularly in the Antarctic. Fi-
nally, upper atmospheric studies were included because of their close
relation to large-scale topography determinations of the earth. Such
determinations depend partly on radio time signals between distant
astronomical observatories. Intensive studies of the upper atmosphere
enabled the time of passage of such signals to be estimated with high
accuracy. Considerable interest existed in obtaining complete north-
south profiles of air circulation and the electrified layers of air above
the weather. Much interest also concerned explorations of outer space.
It was anticipated that satellite vehicles would provide otherwise
inaccessible information concerning the aurora, fluctuations in the
earth's magnetic field, the influence of solar ultraviolet and other
radiations, and cosmic ray phenomena, as well as providing scientists
with their first views of the earth from outside its atmosphere.
Implementation of the Program
Various participating nations devised separate means for implement-
ing their individual IGY programs, but all of these diverse programs
were coordinated on an international level by the CSAGI and its
advisory council, as shown schematically in figure 5. The U.S.
technical program was directed by the IGY Committee of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with many scientists from
both public and private organizations and institutions. Technical
panels, representing the various scientific disciplines, were established
to plan the basic technical program for each discipline and assure its
execution by appropriate groups of scientists.
The overall tasks of program and budget planning, of coordinating
various activities among projects and related scientific fields, of
assisting in the technical direction of the U.S. program, and of prepar-
ing technical and general articles on operations and results, were
under the direction of the National Academy of Sciences IGY staff,
working closely with the USNC.68
« NAS IOY Program Report, p. vlll.
317
S NATIONAL k
PLANNING f
INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATION
I
OBSERVATIONAL PERIOD
k WORLD DATA k
f CENTERS f
RESEARCH ANO
EVALUATION
I
PUBLICA-
TIONS
THE IGY
66 IGY
Participating
Committees
CSAGI
IAU IGU WMO
URSI ILK5G CCI8
IUPAP IUBS
CSAGI Reporters
IGY Participating
Committees
IACIGVI
CSAGI Reporters
Annals I
ol the IGY I
Nat. IGY Committees
9 Scientific Institutions
Individual Scientists
Scientific
Journals
and
other media
19S7 - 1958
CSAGI
Secretariat
Symposia I
Coordination
5 Discipline I
Confer eno
through
\nt\ 5 General j 9 Regional |
etsj Agemblios I Conference*!
Figure 5. International Coordination of the IGY. From: Wallace W. Atwood, Jr.,
"The International Geophysical Year in Retrospect," Department of State Bul-
letin 40 (May 11, 1959), p. 687.
IGY REPORTERS
Coordination of various IGY programs was enhanced through the
appointment of 14 reporters, each of whom was responsible for a
particular scientific area.6' The reporters were scientists chosen for
their demonstrated ability and wide previous experience. They organ-
ized the discussion and planning of the central program, prepared
working manuals, made plans for data collection and publication, and
assisted in the analysis and interpretation of the data.
DATA CENTERS
It was evident at the outset of the IGY that free exchange of data,
and protection of data from loss, would be essential ingredients of the
undertaking. One unfortunate aspect of the SPY had been the loss
of much data, both through delays in reporting and because of de-
struction of records during World War II. Therefore, most of the
scientific observations made by IGY were collected at three World
Data Centers. Two of the centers, one located in the United States 60
and the other in the Soviet Union, maintained complete duplicate
records of all data collected. The third center consisted of a number
of partial centers maintained by individual participating countries
in one or more specific disciplines.61 Duplication of records m this way
M For a complete list of subject areas and individuals who served as reporters, see Wilson, New Moons, p.
3*4.
M World Data Center A, assigned to the United States, consisted of 11 subcenters: visual auroral obser-
vations f Cornell University); instrumental auroral observations (University of Alaska); airglow and iono-
spheric physics (National Bureau of Standards, Central Radio Propagation Laboratory): cosmic rays (Uni-
versity of Minnesota); geomagnetism, gravity, and seismology (U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey); glaciology
(American Geographical Society); latitudes and longitudes (U.S. Naval Observatory); meteorology (U.S.
Weather Bureau, National Weather Records Center); oceanography (Agricultural and Mechanical College
of Texas); solar activity (University of Colorado, High Altitude Observatory); and rockets and satellites
(National Academy of Sciences). From U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, The Sup-
plemental Appropriations Bill, 1969, Hearings on H.R. 13460, 86th Cong., 2d sess., July 22, 1958, p. 360. Sub-
sequently referred to as: Senate, Hearings on H.R. 13460.
•' Senate, Hearings on H.R. 13460, p. 360. The locations were: Japan, Australia, and Western Europe.
318
assured their safekeeping from loss by fire or other catastrophe, and
each center provided copies of data, in whole or in part, to any
qualified applicant at cost.62
WORLD DAYS AND ALERTS
A major objective of the IGY was to obtain simultaneous observa-
tions of phenomena by observers distributed throughout the world.
To achieve this capability, a communications headquarters was
established at Ft. Belvoir, Va., to notify participants when interesting
phenomena developed, like sudden flareups on the surface of the sun
or a fast-developing solar storm. At such times an alert would be
called which might be followed by a special world interval during
which more intensive observations of phenomena would be under-
taken. In addition, certain world days were selected in advance for
intensive worldwide observation of particular phenomena, as well
as world meteorological intervals for the making of special weather
observations. These events are indicated in figure 6.
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS
Essential to most scientific undertakings is the publication of
results. Because the results of the 2 polar years had .been published
primarily by the participating countries as they saw fit, few copies
were printed; many important scientific libraries still lack copies.
To avoid such a gap in programing, arrangements were made to
publish IGY results in an international journal created for that
purpose: the Annals of the IGY. In this journal were published not
only the results of IGY observations, but a history of the IGY, and
a brief account of the 2 polar years.83
« For additional information on the World Data Centers, see: Chapman, Year of Discovery, p. 107; and
Chapman, "International Cooperation," p. 176.
•* Chapman, Year of Discovery, p. 107.
319
June 1967 (Advance Trial)
Ion Moo Tim Wed Ttw Fri Set
1
t 3 4 5 6 7 1
July 1957
Sun Men Tue Wed Thu Fri Set
1 2 3 (T) 6 6
7 6 9 10 11 12 13
August 1957
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Set
1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
September 1957
Sun Men Tee Wed Thu Fri Sal
(7) 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 9 10 11 12 13 14
£ IS 11 12 13 14
15
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 @ 13 14 15 16 17
15 16 17 1 18 19 20 2lJ
16 17 18 19 1 20 21
22
21 22 23 24 25 @(2^)
28 29 30 31
18 19 20 21 22 23 24
22 U3)(W) 25 26 27 [28
23 24 26 26(27)(28
^5X26)27 28 29 30 31
29 (TO)
30
October 1967
Sun Mon Tee Wed Thu Fri Set
November 1957
San Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
December 1957 January 1958
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
12 3 4
5 1 2
12 3456789
19 10 11 12 13 M4) 15 16
26 17 18 19 20(2n(22)23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
12 3 4
6 6 7
1 2®£
6 7 8 9 10 11
8 9 10 11
12 (l3)l4
19 20 @f)
aWTa*^
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
13 14 15 16 17 18
15 (l6) 17 18
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
20 21 (22%23J(24) 26
27 28 29 30 31
[22) 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31
^?)(20)21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29 30 31
February 1958 March 1958
Sun Mon Tuc Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tua Wad Thu Fri Sat
April 1958 May 1958
Sun Mon Tua Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 yy/
12 3 4 5 12 3
2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 4 (5) 6 7 8 9 10
13 14 15 16 17 @Rf] 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
[20)21 22 23 24 25 26 ^@2° 21 22 a 2*
27 28 29 30 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
9(lo)l1 12 13 14
15 16
17 18 19
^C2i) 22 1
16 17(^?)(l9)20 21
22
23 24 25 26
27(28)29 1
23 24 25 (26) 27 28
30 31
June 1958
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri
July 1958
Set Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
August 1958 September 1958
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri &L
12 3 4 5 6
7 12 3 4 5
12 1 2 3 4 5 (^6,
ft (^)lfi U 12 13
14
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 4 5 6 (V) 8 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 p?
15 16lj7Xl8) 19 20
21
13 14 15(^6)(l7) 18 19
10 11 @13 M4Yl5*)l6
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
(14) 15 16 17 18 19 (20)
22 23 (24)| 25 26 27
28
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
21 22 1 23 24 25 26 27
29 30
(27)28 29 30 31
y{,25 26 27 28 29 30
28 29 30
October 1958
Sun Men Tue Wed Thu Fri
November 1958
Sat Sun Mon Tua Wed Thu Fri Sat
December 1958 January 1959
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
12 3
4 1
J) 2-3 GO 5 6 7 8
is 9 (limy 12 13 14 15
25 16 17 (li) 19 20 21 22
12 3
7. 8 9 u?)
4 5 6
1 2 (3.
5 6 7 8 9 (kT)
Vl)|l2 @
18 19 20
(V) 5 6 7 8 (^XjOJ
^2^13) 14 15 16 17
14 15 16 (17)
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
19 20 21 22 23 24
21 1 22 23 24 25 26 27
18 19 20 21 22 23 24
26 27 28 29 30 31
n s
yal
24 25 26 27 28
29
28 29 30 31 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
World Meteorological Inter
120 21 22
1
23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Regular world day (n)
Regular world day at new moon (10 )
Unusual meteoric activity 8. (but not world day)
Regular world day with unusual meteoric activity (w)
Day of total ed ipse ml
Adopted dy CSAGI, September 1966
Figure 6. The IGY Calendar of Special Events. From: Sidney Chapman, "IGY:
Year of Discovery. The Story of the International Geophysical Year (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 103.
"gemutlichkeit"
Much has been written about the spirit of cooperative good will that
existed among scientists during the IGY and which continued in large
measure thereafter. Dr. Joseph Kaplan, Chairman of the U.S. National
IGY Committee, observed that both the national and international
Elanning for the IGY were marked by a spirit of "objectivity and
armony." M Wallace W. Atwood, Jr., then Director of the Office of
*• Testimony In NSF-NAS Hearing*: IGY Report, p. 6.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-22
320
International Relations of the National Academy of Sciences, re-
marked that "scientists from countries whose political leaders were
snarling at each other worked on in amity . . . ." M Walter Sullivan,
science writer for the New York Times assigned to cover the IGY
full time, remarked that the program was "... carried forward by a
seemingly irresistible tide of scientific enthusiasm." w Sidney Chapman
commented upon the "co-operative and harmonious spirit" among
the scientists of the 67 nations associated with the IGY, pointing out
that "Their common interest in its subject and purposes made it pos-
sible for them to work together despite differences of race, creed, or
political organization." OT
J. Tuzo Wilson, who served as president of the IUGG. during the
IGY, attributed this cooperation and harmony to the fact that "The
senior scientists trusted one another and expected, in turn, to be
trusted. Generally speaking, this faith was justified and generated
confidence." a8 However, Wflson recognized that all political influences
in so broad an undertaking could not completely be avoided, and that
the scientists involved were not unrealistic in their expectations in
that ". . . the participants were alive to human frailty and to the
reality of political influences, so they did not expect perfection."69
Although, according to Atwood, "At no time did the scientists allow
political differences to block their course," 70 nonetheless, such
differences did on occasion arise and had to be dealt with.
Political Constraints on the Program
Political constraints upon the IGY were minimized by adherence
to a fundamental principle of the ICSU and its affiliated bodies: that
scientists from any country or territory were welcomed as participants,
and that such participation carried no implications for diplomatic
recognition of the government of the country or territory concerned.
As pointed out by Atwood, "This principle made possible the virtually
universal enrollment of national scientific communities in the IGY." "
However, the principle could not at times surmount the de facto
recognition which the existence of national committees implied,
particularly when two opposing groups or committees claimed the
same nationality.
THE TWO CHINAS
Political difficulties concerning the two Chinas — the People's
Republic of China (Red China) and the Republic of China (Nation-
alist China) — were perhaps the most marked of all political influences
that affected the IGY. According to Chapman, these difficulties left
the members of the CSAGI with ". . . some of their most painful
IGY memories." n Given the attitudes of the protagonists, the
problem was inherently insoluble.
The People's Republic of China formed an IGY Committee late
in 1955 through the Peking Academia Sinica, which had built a
worldwide reputation for scientific scholarship. The Pekirig Committee
« Atwood, "The IQ Y In Retrospect," p. 682.
" Sullivan, "The I(1Y," p. 299.
w Chapman, Year of Discovery, p. 107.
M Wil.-on, New Moon*, p. 326
«• Wilson, New Moon*, p. 326.
w Atwood, "The IGY In Retrospect," p. 688.
73 Atwood, "The IOY in Retrospect," p. 6K I
n Chapmun, "International Cooperation," p. 178.
321
announced that it would participate in the IGY upon the condition
that the Chinese Nationalists would not. Peking participation was
accepted by the CSAGI despite this condition, which was essentially
ignored as irrelevant since the Nationalist Chinese had not responded
to an invitation sent 3 years earlier. In 1956, however, the Nationalist
Chinese indicated a desire to participate, demanding that the Peking
group be excluded. This demand, which was rejected by the CSAGI,
subsequently was withdrawn in 1957, by the Nationalist Chinese, who
then officially joined the IGY. The Peking group thereupon withdrew.
Sullivan has called this action "... the only case in which the IGY
was significantly affected by political considerations." 73
SOVIET MISSILES
Political considerations also influenced the extent to which the
Soviets released data concerning their Sputnik satellites. It had been
agreed among IGY participants that, before the launching of any
satellites, certain data would be released, including time of launch;
weight, shape, and dimensions of objects placed in orbit; and infor-
mation concerning transmission of data and details of orbit. It soon
became apparent that the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to release all
the agreed-upon information, primarily because military rockets had
been used to launch the satellites and it was feared that such infor-
mation would disclose military secrets, especially with regard to the
location of launch sites. Much discussion during the latter part of the
IGY concerned exactly what satellite-related information the Soviets
would release. However, the American and Soviet representatives
were never able to reach complete agreement on this issue. American
representatives, to be sure, were at a decided advantage in that
information on Vanguard firings, largely utilizing nonmilitary hard-
ware, was quite open and unrestricted by comparison.
ARCTIC FLIGHTS
One aspect of Arctic studies centered around the fact that little
information was available concerning drifting ice in the Arctic Ocean,
sometimes clogging Alaskan waters, sometimes Siberian. Hence,
American scientists suggested to Soviet scientists that a cooperative
program be established to enable aerial photographic mapping of the
Arctic ice packs and their patterns of drift. Soviet scientists accepted
the suggestion, proposing that flights be made between Murmansk and
Fairbanks, which would permit mapping of the entire Arctic ocean.
This suggestion was vetoed in Washington, however, apparently
because two important Air Force bases had been built near Fairbanks.
Instead, Washington proposed that flights terminate at Nome, a
much less satisfactory location than was Fairbanks. Meanwhile, the
Hungarian and Suez crises erupted in 1956, and the Soviet reply to
the American suggestion of Nome was that the Soviet Air Force
would map the Siberian side by itself. Thus, a mixture of political
and military considerations prevented the implementation of the
scientific program as originally conceived.
n Sullivan. "The IGY," p. 294.
322
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
Much thought was given by meteorological scientists during the
IGY to determination of air mass movements by the use of radio-
active fallout techniques. In particular, plans were made to determine
the extent of nuclear radiation in the atmosphere, the amount of
fallout reaching the ground, and the quantity of dust already ac-
cumulated. Although indications were that Soviet IGY leaders backed
the program, Soviet scientists did not participate. Sullivan has specu-
lated that rejection of Soviet participation was "... a political
decision in Moscow not to take part in any activity which implied
that fallout had some usefulness." u Nonetheless, a limited fallout
study was conducted by other IGY participants.
ANTARCTIC BASES
A significant proportion of IGY activities was carried out in the
Antarctic, where a number of participating nations had made terri-
torial claims, some of which overlapped. It was therefore inevitable
that political considerations could not be completely excluded from
the Antarctic program. In particular, it was clear that Australian
representatives were disturbed over the establishment of Soviet bases
that close to Australia, and the extent to which such bases appeared
of a permanent nature. Through informal agreement and mutual
understanding, however, these various claims were not enforced in
any way, thus permitting the Antarctic program to be pursued largely
unaffected by such claims.
MAPPING
Soviet delegates to the IGY proposed that all expeditions to the
Antarctic cooperate in preparing a detailed map of the continent
primarily through aerial photography. This proposal was rejected on
the grounds that mapping did not meet the basic requirements for
IG i programs. American participants also objected to the program
on the grounds that mapping represented a quasi -political activity
which should not be included in what otherwise were purely scientific
activities. The American view was inadvertently reinforced when the
U.S. Navy, in its Operation Deepfreeze plan, used the phrase "United
States rights in the area," 75 a phrase to which the American scientists
strongly objected. Although the Soviets eventually proceeded to map
half the continent, the American contingent did not participate in
these activities. Subsequent technological developments in recon-
naissance by artificial satellites have rendered the disagreement
irrelevant.
THE "STOLEN" SATELLITE ROCKET
Politics also intruded into the IGY with regard to the recovery
of the rocket which launched Sputnik I. By coincidence, a large
meteor fell over Alaska almost precisely at the time predicted for
the final pass of the Soviet rocket over that area. Subsequently,
local U.S. Army headquarters erroneously announced that the rocket
" Sullivan, "The TOY," p. 282.
" Operation De«pfrrezp, Operation Plan No. 1-65, Commander, U.S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica,
p. 2. For details, see: 8ullivan, Atiault, p. 402.
323
had fallen into an Army reservation in the vicinity of Fairbanks.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev commented later, "We know [the rocket]
fell on the United States, but they do not want to give it back to us." 78
Correspondence regarding the rocket and its recovery then ensued
between the Soviet and American IG Y committees, until the American
delegates were able to demonstrate conclusively that the rocket
must have fallen in Siberia rather than in Alaska.
CENSORSHIP
A basic principle of the ICSU, and therefore of the IGY, was
that all scientific information would be reported as soon as possible
and thereafter quickly disseminated to all interested parties. However,
some newspaper and radio reports covering a CSAGI conference in
Moscow, held from July 29 to August 9, 1958, were held up by Soviet
censors. Chiefly, the censored material concerned Japanese infor-
mation regarding radioactive rain samples which demonstrated that
radioactivity in Japanese rainwater resulted primarily from Soviet
nuclear weapons tests. Protests over this censorship of reporting
IGY results successfully prevented further censorship, and news
stories that had been held up were released.
» New York Timet, Dec. 7, 1957, p. 1.
IV. The Scientific Results
Tremendous masses of data were obtained during the IGY. For
example, approximately 17 tons of records were generated by Ameri-
can Antarctic stations alone. This dramatic outpouring of information
posed more questions than were answered. Berkner likened the situa-
tion to that of coming from outer space and finding a new planet.77
Summary of Scientific Findings of the IGY
The assimilation of this wealth of new information required con-
siderable time, and the process is still continuing. However, com-
prehensive summaries of the major scientific results of the IGY are
available,78 as well as numerous more popularized summaries.79 Hence,
only a brief synopsis of the major findings will be given here.80
AURORA AND AIRGLOW
It was found that the aurorae are continuous along a "magnetic
dip line" on the dark side of the earth, and that movements within
them pass from west to east. Also discovered was the fact that airglow
results from light emitted upon the decay of chemical compounds
formed in the outer fringes of the atmosphere by incident solar energy,
and that auroral displays typically result from solar activity. Follow-
ing a particularly outstanding solar flare during the IGY, activity
was observed at altitudes as high as 800 kilometers, and the effects
were visible as far south as Cuba. Worldwide disruptions in communi-
cations by radio, land telegraph lines, and ocean cables were observed.
For example, magnetic activity in the upper atmosphere induced
potentials m transatlantic cables of up to 2,650 volts.
COSMIC RAYS
Cosmic rays, believed to represent possibly half of all the energy
in the universe, were found to be influenced by solar activity, with
diminished cosmic ray intensity being noted during periods of high
sunspot activity. However, fundamental questions concerning the
origin and nature of cosmic rays remained unanswered. Sullivan com-
mented that cosmic ray physics ". . . emerged from the IGY
as . . . the broadest-ranging of all man's intellectual endeavors,"
dealing not only with the immense concepts of galaxies and inter-
galactic space, but with the opposite spectrum of atomic and nuclear
particles and forces as well.81
" Roberts, "The IQY In Retrospect," p. 269.
'• See. (or eiample, the NAS IQY Program Report.
'• Included are: Chapman, Year of Ditcocery; Sullivan, Assault; and Wilson, Nm Moon*.
••Summarized primarily, but not exclusively, from: Roberts, "The IQY In Retrospect," pp. 269-284;
Atwood. "The IQY In Retrospect," pp. 686-688; and Odlshaw In NSF-NAS Hearings; JOY Report, pp. 23-
48.
•> Sullivan, Assault, p. 211.
(324)
325
GEOMAGNETISM
IGY magnetic observatories and recording stations provided
working material for extensive investigations into many aspects of
natural electric and magnetic phenomena and their relation to solar
events. Existence of an equatorial electrojet — a powerful, concen-
trated stream of current close to the magnetic equator — was con-
firmedj chiefly on the sunlit side of the earth. Currents in the earth's
crust, induced from ionospheric currents, were found in unexpectedly
great intensity and wide distribution. Additional light was shed on
the old and unresolved question of whether any real correlation of
meteorological and geomagnetic effects exists. Many unknown mag-
netic anomalies were discovered in the ocean depths.
GLACIOLOGT
IGY investigations showed that ice depths may extend to more
than 14,000 feet, giving rise to estimates that the ice content of the
earth is about 4.5 million cubic miles, or 40-percent greater than
previously thought. Approximately 90 percent of this ice is in Ant-
arctica. New information dramatically advanced the theoretical
analysis of glaciers, especially theories concerning the deformation
and flow of ice, and the heat now in ice sheets.
GRAVITY
New gravimeters, faster and more portable than the classic pendu-
lum apparatus, were used during the IGY to carry out widespread
detailed surveys of the earth's gravitational field. Results showed that
the earth's mass distribution is highly irregular, with regard not only
to mountains and ocean depths, cmt also to hidden ore bodies and
structural irregularities of the earth's rocks. Antarctic profiles were
obtained, as well as information concerning the earth's tides and the
rise and fall of the earth's crust (approximately 6 inches in amplitude
at Washington, D.C.). Much was learned concerning knowledge of
the elastic constants of the earth and its crust, and of world mass
distribution.
IONOSFHEBIC PHTSIC8
Research showed that although ionospheric electric currents exist
everywhere in some form, they are especially intense and complex in
the auroral zones. A particularly strong electric current was found
close to the earth's magnetic equator. Much information was obtained
concerning neutral and ionized ionospheric gases and their effect upon
radio communications, particularly as a function of radio frequency.
LONGITUDES AND LATITUDES
Improved measurements were made with the help of special moon-
position cameras located at 20 astronomical observatories distributed
around the world. These cameras were capable of taking simultaneous
exposures of the moon and surrounding stars while holding the moon's
image fixed relative to the stars. By taking several observations on a
single night at a given station, it was possible to fix the position of that
station accurately relative to the center of the earth, without depend-
ence upon a plumbline.
326
METEOROLOGY
Possibly the most important IGY contribution to meteorology was
the study of Antarctic weather. Old theories of air circulation were
disproved, and fundamental contrasts with northern polar weather
were made possible. In particular, it was found that the Antarctic
continent did not, as previously thought, impede the free flow of
tropospheric winds across it, distributing heat and moisture and
greatly slowing temperature drops during the polar night. Rather,
stratospheric air masses were found to be contained by a strong jet
stream which encircles the continent and Causes continuously dropping
temperatures in the winter. Much of what was learned during tnese
IGY studies should assist in developing better weather prediction
capabilities, as well as contributing to long-range efforts to exercise
some degree of control over the earth's weather.
NUCLEAR RADIATION
IGY experiments confirmed the fact that atomic bursts in iono-
spheric regions can produce artificial radiation and other widespread
effects similar to those produced by nature. By exploding small
nuclear devices between tne Van Allen radiation belts, the scientists
injected a known quantity of electrons of known energies into the
earth's magnetic field at known times and places, thus producing
artificial auroral luminescence. These experiments represented the
first time in history that worldwide synoptical measurements were
made on a completely controlled geophysical phenomenon.
OCEANOGRAPHY
Studies of ocean currents demonstrated that the ocean depths are
very much in motion. The discovery that movements were much
greater than those necessary to compensate for windblown currents on
the surface led to the conclusion that thermal forces are primarily
responsible for the massive circulation of ocean water. Three major
countercurrents — one in the Atlantic flowing deep beneath the Gulf
Stream, and two in the Pacific — were located, clocked, and measured.
Studies of the deep ocean trenches of the Pacific showed that life,
including fish, crustaceans, and fauna, exists even under conditions
almost 40,000 feet below the surface. Also, it was shown that, contrary
to previous belief, the water of deep ocean trenches is not stagnant,
and hence it was demonstrated that such trenches are unsuitable for
dumping of radioactive wastes.
SEISMOLOGY
The IGY afforded unique opportunities to place seismographic
recorders in remote parts of tne world, particularly in the polar
regions. Antarctic observations were especially useful in obtaining
valuable readings on a broad range of far-southern quakes covering a
vast area, and for helping to determine propagation velocities through
ocean crustal formations. Reflected waves from small surface explo-
sions were used to determine subsurface structure, disclosing the ice
327
depths in Antarctica and Greenland, and providing information
about the continental structure of Antarctica. Explorations in South
America showed the crust of the Andean massif to be unexpectedly
thin. Ground waves of ultralong period were subjected to intensive
study, demonstrating the value of such waves in detecting distant
earthquakes and underground explosions.
SOLAR ACTIVITY
IGY studies resulted in unprecedented observations of solar
activity, including an almost complete record of hydrogen gas flares.
Observations were enhanced by occurrence of the greatest number of
sunspots since 1612, when such phenomena were first observed by
Galileo. Solar clouds were shown to be the source of ultraviolet light,
solar flares the source of gamma radiation, and the corona the source
of X-rays.82 Magnetic fields of varying intensities were found to
accompany sunspots and flares, with residual magnetic fields extend-
ing outward possibly beyond the solar system. Possibilities were
raised that much thermal energy might be transferred to the earth's
atmosphere by way of direct contact with the thin but hot gases of
the sun's corona.
UPPER ATMOSPHERE
IGY research established that there is no definite end to the
earth's atmosphere. As far distant as 10 earth diameters a sub-
stantial hydrogen atmosphere was found to exist, fading into the
atmosphere of outer space itself, dominated by the effects of untold
meteors, X-rays, ultraviolet light, protons, electrons, cosmic rays,
and electric and magnetic fields. Thus, the upper atmosphere was
found to be a place of considerable activity, affecting many phenomena
on the earth itself. Of tremendous interest was the discovery of the
two Van Allen radiation belts, • existing as annular shrouds about
the earth, shaped by terrestrial magnetic fields. These belts of intense
radiation were seen as important factors in determining and per-
haps limiting man's future exploration of space.
Appraisal of Findings
. If one particular field of activity were to be singled out as the most
outstanding scientific achievement of the IGY, it would undoubtedly
be the launching of artificial earth satellites. Although the IGY was
primarily an exercise in pure science, one of its primary objectives
was to exploit contemporary technology in the pursuit of scientific
objectives. The launching of the IGY artificial earth satellites repre-
sented a remarkable technological achievement that, despite advance
warning, nonetheless created astonishment and a sense of wonder
throughout the world. Thus, these scientific space probes clearly
initiated the space age, opening a new era of exploration and dis-
covery which nas progressed much more rapidly than could possibly
have been foreseen during the IGY. Sullivan has likened the scientific
* X-rays are emitted when a beam of high-velocity electrons impinges upon a suitable metallic target
within an evacuated, or partially evacuated, glass tube. Powerful natural emitters of X-rays outside the
solar system are believed to Include radio sources, and novae and supernovae. Gamma rays, similar in
many respects to X-rays but generally of higher frequency and greater penetrating power, are emitted upon
the decay of radioactive substances.
328
importance of orbiting the first artificial satellites to the release
of atomic power,83 and has commented as follows:
By now, references to the Space Age have become hackneyed, yet upon reflec-
tion it seems possible that, a thousand years hence, the year 1957 will be to the
schoolchildren of the world what 1492 is to young Americans today. In M92
the Old World opened the door to the New; in 1957 man opened the door to the
solar system, and perhaps beyond.*4 •
Furthermore, it was the IGY space satellite program which led
to the aforementioned discovery of the Van Allen radiation belts,
characterized by Roberts as "one of the great physical science dis-
coveries of all time," the implications of which "are yet unimagin-
able, but they are certainly tremendous — quite possibly comparable
with those attending the discovery of radio waves." K
If the launching of artificial earth satellites was the most outstanding
IGY accomplishment, then the exploration of the Antarctic was
undoubtedly the next greatest achievement. Before the IGY, most
of man's knowledge of his native planet had been based on data
derived from observations made on the six continents he inhabited;
Antarctica remained the unknown continent.8* On a global scale,
information regarding atmospheric circulation, ionospheric conditions,
and geological history of the earth necessarily remained incomplete.
IGY activities initiated in the Antarctic and continued thereafter
; . . resulted in numerous significant discoveries which contributed to better
knowledge and a clearer picture of the physical processes of [the earth]. Geologic,
paleontologic, and paleomagnetic discoveries . . . were largely responsible
for the revival of the Continental Drift theory and the emergence of a new and
more accurate picture of Earth's geology, this time with the seventh continent
included."
The IGY was, of course, much more than the launching of earth
satellites and exploration of the Antarctic, dramatic as those accom-
plishments were. It was, according to Kaplan, "primarily a program
of basic research, a seeking after first causes." 88 Atwood has described
it as "a good program, carefully planned, and magnificently executed,"
which led to 'new scientific knowledge of untold wealth." 89 In
particular, important new discoveries were made regarding man's
environment, the earth itself, the oceans, and the atmosphere. Thus, as
stated by Roberts,
The borders of our knowledge of man's environment were pushed back in several
Important respects, with an already vast and growing store of new knowledge
which will sharply influence the course of human development.'4
The mere production of data is in itself no guarantee of scientific
advancement. The IGY did much more than generate data: it pro-
duced new scientific understanding and knowledge. It permanently
increased both the .amount and quality of geophysical and solar
observations, served to catalyze much research that might never have
•Walter Sullivan, "The IQY— Scientific Alliance in a Divided World," Bulktia of On Atonic BdtnUtU
14 (May 1958), p. 78.
« BoUrvan, AnmnU, pp. 2-8.
■ Roberts. "The IOY In Retrospect," p. 364. _
• George Doomanl, "Science Policy tor Antarctica," BulUiin of the Atomic Sckntittt 24 (April IMP),
D 80
'« Doumanl, "Science Policy (or Antarctica," pp. 80-40.
•Joseph Kaplan. "What We've Learned from toe IOY," The Rotation 108 (March I960), p. Ml
» Atwood, "The IOY in Retrospect," p. 680.
« Roberta, "The IOY la Retrospect," p. 203.
329
been initiated otherwise, stimulated thought and imagination in
opening up unparalleled new horizons, and transformed earth science
into planetary science. As summarized by Wilson, it "vastly enlarged
the scope of man's activities and gave him a new vision of his place in
the universe." 91
Continuation of IGY Programs
One of the major scientific outcomes of the IGY was the establish-
ment of new means — and new international organizations — to con-
tinue many of the scientific undertakings initiated or expanded during
the IGY. Without the IGY, these programs might have been delayed
for many years or possibly might never have been initiated at all.
Major credit for the continuation of many programs was due the
ICSU, which, through CSAGI, had begun to consider as early as June
1957 proposals for the formation of new groups through which the
central IGY organization could be perpetuated. The first such group
to be formed was the Special Committee on Antarctic Research
(SCAR), established in March 1957. There soon followed creation of
the Special Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR), which held its
first meeting at Woods Hole, Mass., during the period August
28-30, 1957.
A broad program for establishing special committees for continuing
IGY activities in various fields, as exemplified by SCAR and SCOR,
was given general endorsement by the CSAGI at its fifth assembly
meetmg in Moscow during the period July 30 to August 9, 1958, at
which time the name International Geophysical Cooperation — 1959
(IGC-1959) was coined to describe the program,92 In a sense, this
proposal represented a compromise between the Soviet and American
positions on formal continuation of the IGY. The Soviet leaders, it
appeared, had a very urgent and demanding need for both the IGY
name and the IGY organization to help maintain their position at
home.93
A direct continuation, however, posed a delicate problem for the
American scientists, who had repeatedly emphasized to the Congress
that the IGY was to be a specific, time-limited undertaking. Early
in 1954, while seeking the initial appropriation for the IGY, Dr.
Waterman had pointed out that the scientific community regarded
the activity as "a one-shot program." M Early the following year, in
seeking additional appropriations, Dr. Berkner, speaking on behalf of
the USNC, agreed that a cutoff date of July 1960 would be satisfactory
for the U.S. program.95 This agreement was somewhat qualified later
in the year when Berkner, looking forward to the post-IGY period,
raised the possibility of further development of IGY activities.98
Although this possibility fell upon receptive congressional ears, the
American position had become solidified to the extent that support
for the Soviet direct continuation proposal was impractical. Thus, as
Waterman explained:
•» Wilson, New Moon*, p. 324.
•> NAS IOY Program Report, p. vil.
« Sullivan, Assault, p. 409.
M House, The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 196S, p. 936.
M House, Independent Offices Appropriations for 196t>, p. 320.
" Senate, Hearings on H.R. 6t40, p. 447.
330
The Russians have proposed an extension recently, but our delegation feels this
would be a mistake. It may be that certain special fields of global interest might
be continued in some cooperative way, but this would not be desirable, in our
opinion, for the complete IGY program.97
Acceptance of the IGC-1959 as the "some cooperative way,"
leaving the extent of participation entirely up to each participant,
helped resolve the conflicting American and Soviet positions.
The proposal for the IGC-59 was endorsed by the ICSU during its
meeting in Washington, October 2-6, 1958, at which time a successor
body was created, the Special Committee for Inter- Union Cooperation
in Geophysics (SCG) of the ICSU. The last meeting of the CSAGI
and the first meeting of the SCG were held concurrently in May
1959, both committees having essentially the same representation.
At this joint meeting it was proposed that a committee somewhat
different in composition from the SCG be formed, a Comita Inter-
nationale de Geophysique (CIG) which would be composed of a
larger membership, including the IGY reporters. This proposal was
approved by the ICSU Executive Board in October 1959 and the
first meeting of the CIG took place in November 1959. Thus, the
CIG assumed essentially the same responsibilities for the IGC-1959
as the CSAGI had assumed for the IGY,98 including publication of
such IGY publications as the Annals and oversight and support of the
work of the World Data Centers."
Other organizations set up to continue various IGY programs in-
cluded the Inter- Union Committee on Contamination by Extra-
Terrestial Exploration (CETX), the Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR), and the International World Days Service (IWDS).100
Formation of these various organizations assured that work accom-
plished during the IGY was suitably reported and published, and pro-
vided for its continuation thereafter. The existence of these inter-
national organizations and programs must be considered one of the
most important legacies of the IGY.101
w Senate, Hearings on H.R. lStfO. p. 384.
•» NSF-NAS Hearings: IOY Report, p. 21. Testimony of Hugh Odlshaw.
•• NAS IOY Program Report, p. x.
100 NSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 21.
101 For a comprehensive analysis of the organizational structure of the international scientific community
and the role of COSPAR in particular, see: International Cooperation and Organization for Ovter Space,
pp a^S— 42fi and Richard W. Porter, "International Scientific Community: International Council of Sci-
entific Unions and COSPAR" in: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautica' and Space Sciences,
International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium, 92d Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 9, 1971, pp. 527-567.
V. The Political Impacts
Much emphasis has already been placed upon the fact that the IGY
was not an international undertaking in the literal sense of the term,
but rather an internationally coordinated collection of otherwise
independent national activities. These national activities, once
approved and funded by their respective governments, were in turn
almost exclusively under the control of individual scientists and thus
were almost entirely apolitical. Berkner has emphasized the fact that
the IGY programs were "operated by scientists [italics his], with the
consent, cooperation, and aid, but not the direction, of govern-
ments." 102 The individualized nature of the activities has been under-
scored by Odishaw, who called the IGY "a gathering together of
private human beings, each of whom had a vital personal interest in
a particular subject, each of whom felt that this subject needed . . .
a concerted attack." 103
Despite this basic scientific individualism of the IGY, its ultimate
impact reached considerably beyond individual scientists and the
scientific community itself and was felt within the political community
as well. Chapman, for example, commented that "it cannot be doubted
that the IGY . . . had significant political results." 104 An examina-
tion of those political results is the primary purpose of this study.
In carrying out this examination, it should be noted that the IGY
represented a major technological achievement as well as a scientific
achievement. Indeed, the eventual political impacts of the program
perhaps owe more to.IGY technology than to its science. In discussing
the results of these impacts, it is well to keep in mind the fact that the
specific technology employed in the artificial earth satellite program
of the IGY required agreements among nations which subsequently
made further agreements in related areas much easier to accomplish
(see section VI). Thus, although primary emphasis in the preceding
section has been given to the scientific results of the IGY, there is no
intent in this study to minimize the importance of the technology
employed in the pursuit of those results, especially insofar as the
employment of that technology impacted upon subsequent political
affairs.
In this section, the political effects of the IGY are examined first
as they affected the United States, in both general and specific ways,
and then as they affected the international political scene.
General Impacts on the United States
Political impacts of the IGY were felt within the United States
on two levels, one general and one more specific. First, considerable
impact was evident hi general in what is frequently termed the
"politics of science," which roughly may be considered a matter of
"who spends how much money for what." It was inevitable that an
undertaking of the magnitude of the IGY should benefit the earth
102 Berkner, "Geography and Space," p. 313.
i" From testimony in NSF-NAS Hearings: IOY Report, p. 20.
lM Chapman, "International Cooperation," p. 174.
(331)
332
sciences and shift attention toward projects supporting the four
major goals discussed earlier in section III. To the extent that scientific
manpower, technical resources, and available funds were allocated
in support of IGY-oriented programs, the earth sciences clearly
received high priority. A reflection of this emphasis is contained in
the highly international philosophy that appears to have prevailed
during the IGY period. Certainly the earth sciences benefited enor-
mously, never before having enjoyed especially great largess as
compared with more spectacular fields like high-energy physics or
atomic energy. As Kaplan remarked,
The impact of the International Geophysical Year in the geophysieal sciences
has been remarkable. In my opinion, the International Geophysical Year has
usheied in a new era in geophysics.105
Specific Impacts on the United States
On a more specific level were the large number of national impacts
which occurred primarily as a result of the Soviet IGY artificial
satellite program. The launching of artificial satellites was an im-
portant and integral part of the total IGY effort.106 Although only
two of the 67 participating nations — the United States and the
U.S.S.R. — took part in these activities, they represented the world's
two most powerful countries, and the proportions of their respective
IGY outlays which went into the satellite effort were substantial.107
The possibility of launching artificial earth satellites had been
discussed long before the IGY, and Van Allen had outlined the
scientific usefulness of satellites as early as 1948. 108 In November
1953, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences told the World
Peace Council in Vienna that "science has reached a state when it
is feasible ... to create an artificial satellite of the Earth." 109 In
view of the optimism regarding the technology available for satellite
launching and the ability to make measurements encompassing the
globe through their use, it is not surprising that especially serious
attention was given the use of satellites as part of the IGY.
At the Rome meeting of the CSAGI in 1954, a formal proposal
was made that those nations able to do so should include artificial
satellites within their IGY programs. In particular, it was felt by the
CSAGI that use of such satellites should provide information regarding
the aurora, the earth's magnetic field, the solar ultraviolet, X-ray
and particle radiation, and cosmic ray phenomena that could not be
acquired in any other way. As stated by Roberts, "A direct result
of the agreement reached at Rome [was] that the United States and
the Soviet Union embarked at this time on what was to become per-
haps man's most adventurous scientific enterprise . . . destined to
produce results far beyond the initial expectations of CSAGI." uo
">» Testimony in NSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 8.
10* S unple: U.S., Co enate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space
Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications, s7th Cong., 2d sess., May 31, 1962,
p. 123. This staff study calls the launching of Sputnik 1 the tGY'8"mos1 dramatic event" (p. 173).
""As mentioned eai Her in chap 2, almost half of the $-13 million appropriated by Congress for the 10 Y
was used for earth satellite acth ii I
101 Sullivan, "The I<> V," p. J75. Some discussion took place in military department reports possibly as
early as l
'MSi« P. J. Kroner, Behind the Sjmtniks, A Survey of Soviet Space Science (New York: Public Affairs
Press, 1958), p. ■'*.
»° Roberts, "The IO Y in Retrospect," p. 268.
333
In retrospect, the way in which the Soviet and American responses
to the CSAGI proposal developed can be held responsible to a large
degree for the subsequent American, and world, reaction to Sputnik
I. On April 16, 1955, only 6 months after passage of the CSAGI
proposal, the Soviets announced creation of a Commission on Inter-
planetary Communication which, as one of its functions, was to
organize work on the construction of artificial earth satellites.111
No mention was made of the IGY, however, and the report went
largely ignored by the rest of the world.112 Three months later, on
July 29, 1955, President Eisenhower announced that artificial satel-
lites would be launched as an integral part of the U.S. IGY program.113
Unlike the earlier Soviet announcement, the Eisenhower announce-
ment received widespread attention. Of particular interest was the
U.S. plan to develop a nonmilitary rocket, the Vanguard, specifically
for IGY purposes, rather than make use of existing military rockets.
This decision was made by American scientists who hoped to develop
not only their own launching rockets, but also the necessary tracking
facilities, computers, and related support systems in order to ". . .
remain independent of military security and military requirements
and to develop a satellite designed solely for the gathering of scientific
information." 1H Only a few days after the Eisenhower announcement
of American plans, the Soviets announced that they, too, would
launch IGY satellites, but no specifics were given at that time.
Thus, the stage was set for the beginning of the "space race" be-
tween the two powers.
Following these initial announcements of IGY satellite activity,
a number of further clarifying announcements were made from time
to time by both participants. The gist of these remarks was that the
American satellites would be relatively small, light spheres, about 20
inches in diameter, weighing about 20 pounds.115 The original plan
called for 12 rocket propulsion vehicles, thus theoretically making
possible the launching of 12 instrumented research satellites.118 Sub-
sequently, the size of the satellites was revised somewhat higher, from
20 to 30 inches, inclusive, but the satellites continued to be popularly
referred to as basketballs.117 The U.S. effort was described by Dr.
Homer E. Newell, Jr., who substituted for Berkner as CSAGI reporter
for rockets and satellites, as being
. . . simply an extension of the conventional rocket program, which in turn
has been thought of as an integral pari and natural extension of the overall IGY
effort. 118
Comment concerning the Soviet effort, on the other hand, indicated
that Soviet satellites might be considerably heavier than the American
111 Krieger, Behind the Sputniks, p. 330. The formation of the Commission, headed by L. I. Sedov, was
announced in the newspaper Vechernyaya Moskva.
112 Sullivan, "The IGY," p. 301.
1,3 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-
70, 92d Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 9, 1971, p. 160.
114 Wilson, Neiv Moons, p. 66.
'i° House, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, pp. 451, 461.
i" House, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, p. 452.
117 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill,
1956, Hearings on H.R. 10004, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 20, 1956, p. 222. As the U.S. plan actually developed,
!he first Vanguard satellite was a 6-inch test sphere weighing 3.5 pounds, containing only a radio transmit-
ter. Vanguard II weighed 20.7 pounds, and Vanguard III 100 pounds. These were the only Vanguard sat-
llite~ launched: eight other attempts to orbit Vanguard satellites failed.
1,8 Speech of Sept. 9, 1955, reproduced in the CSAGI Bulletin a" Information.
334
ones,119 and remarks of Soviet Academician Sedov indicated that
Soviet military rockets might be used for the launchings:
It seems to me that the time has come when it is possible to direct all forces and
means toward mutual efforts for creating an artificial satellite and to switch the
military potential in the technology of rockets to the peaceful and noble purposes
of developing cosmic flights. I think that such work would be an important con-
tribution to the cause of eliminating the cold war and would serve the cause of
consolidating peace.120
Again, Soviet announcements did not arouse much interest and
went largely unnoticed.121 Thus, as a result of widespread publicity
given the U.S. effort as contrasted with the relative lack of attention
paid the Soviet effort, the launching of Sputnik I was almost univer-
sally greeted with great astonishment and surprise. As expressed by
Sullivan,
In the consternation that ensued in the West, either it was forgotten that the
satellite launchings were part of an international scientific effort or there was a
strong feeling that the Russians had not played the IGY game according to the
rules.122
This strong reaction to the news of Sputnik I was summarized by
Walt W. Rostow, as follows :
There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by the
launching of the Soviet earth satellite on October 4, 1957. This intrinsically
harmless act of science and engineering was also, of course, both a demonstration
of foreseeable Soviet capability to launch an ICBM and a powerful act of
psychological warfare. It immediately set in motion forces in American political
life which radically reversed the Nation's ruling conception of its military problem,
of the appropriate level of the budget, and of the role of science in its affairs.
The reaction reached even deeper, opening a fundamental reconsideration not
only of the organization of the Department of Defense but also of the values and
content of the American educational system and of the balance of values and
objectives in contemporary American society as a whole.123
These reactions are discussed in greater detail below.
FEDERAL SUPPORT OF BASIC SCIENCE
The net effect of the IGY and Sputnik I on Federal support for
basic science in the United States was unprecedented. Many effects
were evident, including the restoration of Federal funds for scientific
facilities that previously had been closed, strengthening of the Federal
Government's in-house research efforts, and increased benefits for
Federal scientists and engineers. Perhaps the most striking effect,
however, was the change in appropriations for the National Science
Foundation (NSF). Established by Congress in 1950, the NSF
had "struggled through its first few years with appropriations far below
even its fixed ceiling of $15 million." 124 By 1956, the NSF budget had
increased to almost $30 million, about half of which, however, was
specifically budgeted for IGY activities, as shown in table 5. Three
years later, as pointed out by Berkner,
'• Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 160.
» » S »: K richer. Behind the Sputnik*, pp. 330-331.
>" Sen itc, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 160.
»' Sullivan "The IGY, p. 300.
>" Wait W. Rostow, The I nil t<l States in the World Arena; An Essay in Recent History (New York:Harper
an I Row, 1'60), p. 366.
i" NSF-NAS Hearings: IQY Report, p. 191.
335
As a direct result of Sputnik, [the NSF's] 1959 appropriations total $130
million, certainly a radical recognition of the neglected importance of science
and technology.12*
Furthermore, the 1959 NSF budget was entirely devoted to Federal
support of basic research; less than 5 percent, or only $6 million,
represented formal IGY expense. By 1968, the NSF budget had
peaked at over $500 million. As stated in a review of NSF activities,
the IGY ". . . permitted the Foundation to support basic research
to meet needs of science somewhat sooner than might have other-
wise been possible." 126
In retrospect, it is unfortunate that this increased Federal funding,
and the considerable public interest in the IGY, were not translated
into widespread public understanding and support of basic research.
Unlike many of the activities of the IGY, which took place dra-
matically in remote and exciting areas of the globe, basic research
was a difficult area of scientific activity for the general public to under-
stand and appreciate, and still remains so. Although the IGY was,
to scientists, primarily an exercise in basic research, to the public it
appeared largely a matter of polar adventures and space satellites.
Thus, were such an effort proposed today, it would appear doubtful
that it would receive widespread public support unless the activities
involved were sufficiently broadened so as to appeal to a wide variety
of interests.
TABLE 5. BUDGET OBLIGATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
1951-72.'
Fiscal year Basic NSF IGY
Total
Percent IGY
1951 153
1952. 3,466
1953 4,431
1954.. 7,962
1955 12,486
1955 16,068
1957 38,630
1958 49,973
1959 132,940
1960 158,600
1961 174,995
1,837
14,323
12.8
14,905
30, 973
48.2
15,037
53,667
28.0
19,337
69,310
27.9
5,932
138,872
4.3
1,598
160,198
1.0
20
175,015 ...
1962 260,821
1963 320,754
1964 354,584
1965 M16.000
1966.... 2 466,000
1967 2 465,000
1968.... 2 505,000
1969. 2433,000
1970... 2461,000
1971... 2495,000
1972 2 598,000
1 Figures in thousands of dollars.
2 Figures rounded off to nearest thousand dollars.
Data for 1951-64 are taken from: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on
Science, Research, and Development, The National Science Foundation: A General Review of Its 1st 15 Years, 89th
Cong., 2d sess. Jan. 24, 1965, pp. 32-35. Data for 1965-72 are taken from: National Science Foundation, Databook NSF
73-3 (Washington: National Science Foundation, January 1973), p. 15.
mNSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 191.
12« NSF: Its First 16 Years, p. 78.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 23
336
THE SPACE PROGRAM
The launching of artificial earth satellites during the IGY, thereby
initiating mankind's exploration of outer space, has frequently been
characterized as the most significant result of the IGY. Berkner, for
example, remarked that space research was perhaps "... the
area of the IGY's greatest impact. For it was the IGY mechanism
. . . which stimulated the first steps forward into space within the
context of a peaceful, international program." 127 Similarly, Odishaw
commented that the artificial satellite program of the IGY, represent-
ing a "striking departure" from the kinds of research techniques
previously employed by scientists, might be the innovation that
would determine "the ultimate place of [the] IGY in history."128
Gerson observed that
. . . the truly remarkable feature of the IGY [was] its boldness of execution
in the space-age era. . . . Undoubtedly, the space age would have been launched
by 1960-65 [but] the inclusion of satellite vehicles ... in the IGY hastened
[its] fruition. ,2*
Sullivan commented that
Under the auspices of the IGY the door to outer space has been opened. . . .
The placement of the first space vehicles in orbits around the earth has marked
the IGY as a momentous event in scientific history, comparable to the release of
atomic power.130
More recently, in a report of the United Nation's Economic and
Social Council, the role of the IGY in space research was summarized
as follows :
One of [the IGY's] projects was to have satellites circling the earth equipped
with instruments to measure the earth's forces and the influences from outer
space. From the original modest program in which the U.S.S.R. and the United
States agreed to put small satellites into orbit emerged the space race, with cos-
monauts and astronauts going first into orbit and then to the Moon, with rockets
to Venus and Mars and the positioning of manmade satellites to reflect broadcast
signals and make long-range television possible; to maintain day and night obser-
vations of the weather system and report back and in later refinements of detection
to give a pattern of natural resources.131
Within the United States, the primary result of the Soviet achieve-
ment was the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration (NASA), which was formed in 1958 "either directly or
indirectly [as a result of] activities of the IGY."132 As discussed by
Sullivan, the IGY forced the Federal Government "to undertake a
new function — that of large-scale exploration. It became necessary to
form a new organ, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and to allocate to it an increasing share of the national budget." l33
A corresponding response was evoked in the Congress. On March 5,
1958, the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Ex-
ploration was created, followed on July 21 by the establishment of the
i» NSF-NAS Hearings: JOY Rtport, p. 177.
m NSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 22.
"• Oorsen, "Polar Years to IO Y," p. 44.
>«> Sullivan, "Scientific Alliance," p. Tl.
'»' United Nations Economic and Social Council, Science and Technology, Role of Modem Science and
Technology in the Development of Nations and the Need to Strengthen Economic and Technico-scientiftc Coopera-
tion Among States (New York: United Nations ESC. Jan. 26, l'.)73), pp. 20-30. As of the present writing
of cours«, only [U.S.J astronauts have succeeded in going to the Moon.
>" Atwood, "The IO Y in Retrospect," p. 689. See also remarks of Berkner in NSF-NAS Hearings: IQY
Report, i>. 191 and remarks earlier In this series In Toward l \ etc Diplomacy in A Scientific
' -: Sulilv'an Assault, p. 416. The Increases in funds fur space activities was discussed in
The Evolution <>f International Technology (vol. II. p. tiiMii : "The must direct response [to
Sputnik 1] In the United States was an expansion In outlays for space activities. These
virtually doubled In each fiscal year after Sputnik until 1961 ; they peaked at $7,688.5 mil-
lion In 1966."
337
Committee on Science and Astronautics. In the Senate, the Special
Committee on Space and Astronautics was created on February 6,
1958, followed on January 14, 1959, by establishment of the Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration was established by passage of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, simultaneously creating the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Council. Appropriations were passed
funding both these and other space groups and activities. These
moves effectively ushered both the legislative and executive branches
of the Federal Government into the space age.
FEDERAL SCIENCE ADVISORY STRUCTURE
The launching of Sputnik I during the IGY resulted in radical
changes in the Federal science advisory structure. Most important
were the appointment of a Science Adviser to the President and the
location of the President's Science Advisory Committee directly
within the White House.134 The latter step, according to Berkner,
"has profoundly influenced all that has followed, for the needs of
science, scientific research, and science education can now be under-
stood and discussed at top governmental levels. Scientists finally
have a definitive access to Government." 135 This much-expanded
science advisory apparatus within the Executive Office in turn led to
"the designation of a number of Assistant Secretaries for Science and
Technology (or equivalent) in old-line departments." 136 This struc-
ture continued largely intact until it was dismantled by Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 1 of 1973.137
Additional effects were felt within the State Department, which in
1950 had created an Office of the Science Adviser and had appointed
scientific attaches to several embassies in Western European countries.
The Departments Science Office, which had been drastically curtailed
in 1955, was revived and strengthened following Sputnik I. Science
attaches, appointed to serve at U.S. embassies in London, Paris,
Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, and Tokyo, were the first to serve under
Wallace R. Brode, newly appointed as Science Adviser to the Secre-
tary, and constituted the first of a series of such appointments follow-
ing Sputnik I. Additional appointments to embassies in the U.S.S.R.,
India, and South American countries soon followed. The primary
duties of the science attache, according to the State Department, was
. . .to serve as an adviser to the Ambassador and his staff in the evaluation
of the interaction of science with foreign policy, the assessment of current scien-
tific progress abroad, and the enhancement of the liaison between United States
and foreign scientists and engineers.138
The fact that 24 countries had scientific attaches attached to their
embassies in Washington attested to "the need and usefulness for
representation of science in international affairs." 138 Transferred to
the Office of the Science Adviser in May 1962 were several nonmilitarv
functions of the Space Affairs Section of the Office of the Special
«« These moves are discussed in detail by Atwood, "The IGY in Retrospect," p. 689, and in NSF-NAS
Hearings: IOY Report, p. 191.
1M Testimony of Berkner in NSF-NAS Hearings: IOY Report, p. 191.
'*> Toivard a New Diplomacy. See vol. I, p. 12.
«w Reproduced in: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 197$, Hearing, 93d Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 26, 1973, pp. 97-104.
'» Department of State Bulletin 39 (Dec. 29, 1959), pp. 1048-1049.
»»• Department of State Bulletin 39 (Dec. 29, 1959), p. 1049.
338
Assistant for Atomic Energy, established in 1957. This consolidated
office ultimately became the present Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs, one office of which is the Office of Space
and Atmospheric Science Affairs.140
SCIENCE EDUCATION IN AMERICA
The IGY and Sputnik I, according to Sullivan, "precipitated a
reexamination of the educational system and, in fact, of the entire
American scale of values." U1 According to Senator Lyndon Johnson,
then Senate Majority Leader, "We have lost an important battle in
technology. That has been demostrated by the satellites that are
whistling above our heads." 142 In a unanimous statement, the Senate
Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee declared: "We had ex-
pected to be first with this achievement. In fact, we have yet to prove
second. . . . We are engaged in a race for survival, and we intend to
win that race." 143
Such concerns raised serious questions regarding the quality of
science education in America and led to an analysis of the kind of
education system necessary to "produce the well-informed and highly
competent men of science and public affairs required if our Nation is
to retain its position of responsibility and leadership in world af-
fairs." 144 Congress requested the National Academy of Sciences to
look into ways in which the IGY, as an undertaking of great public
interest, could help to educate the public with regard to the value of
science. The Academy responded by publishing the IGY bulletin and
full-color educational posters on "Planet Earth," and by producing
a series of 13 half -hour color films, one describing each IGY dis-
cipline.145 As a result of these and other related IGY activities, parents,
school boards, and legislators became more aware of the importance
of science training for the Nation's youth.
Demands were voiced that highly qualified students be given
better preparation for science careers. Curricula for secondary educa-
tion were revised, and books by Conant, Kickover, and others sought
to provide guidelines and stimulate discussion. Mathematics and
science courses began to reappear in high schools on a substantial
scale. Efforts were made to bring textbooks and teaching methods up
to date as exemplified by the work on physics teaching by MIT and
the revision of high school mathematics curricula by Yale. These
and other efforts helped to stimulate a new, widespread interest in
science in young people in schools and colleges throughout the coun-
try. Perhaps the greatest effect, however, was passage of the National
Defense Education Act of 1958, which made available substantial
Federal appropriations for these purposes.
In retrospect, this emphasis was not entirely beneficial. Science
careers may have been made attractive to some students who lacked
either the necessary qualifications or the sustained motivation re-
'•» Personal communication from Mr. Arthur E. Pardee, Jr., Executive Director of the BISTA.
t« Sullivan, Assault, p. 416.
|i« Statement before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee. In: U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs, Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d sess.,
1968, p. 3.
•« U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Hearings on Reports of the Secretary of Defense on Accomplishments of the Defense Department on Recommen-
dations of the Preparedness Subcommittee, 86th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 23, 1968, p. 2427. I
i« NSF Eighth Annual Report, p. 6.
i« NAS IQY Program Report, p. x.
339
quired for such careers. Furthermore, as Dean Harvey Brooks has
pointed out, curriculum reform was largely undertaken for the wrong
reason, namely, ". . . on the grounds that it was needed to make
our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts,"
rather than because of a fundamental desire to improve the way in
which science was being taught.146 Thus, while the Sputnik motiva-
tion increased interest in science and made changes easier, the danger
also existed that both interest and programs might collapse once the
motivation subsided.
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SCIENCE
The impact of Sputnik I upon the American public was profound
convincing Americans that they no longer possessed an undisputed
lead over the rest of the world in science and technology. The Soviet
accomplishment "caused a great deal of turmoil in the United States"
and was "a real jolt to the complacency of the American people."147
Unlike such previous Soviet successes as the atomic and hydrogen
bombs, which Americans could rationalize as having been stolen
from them through espionage, no such rationale was possible any
longer. Furthermore, the large and shiny rocket that had propelled
Sputnik I into the heavens was now circling the earth, clearly visible
in the dark sky when illuminated by the rising or setting sun. Large
numbers of Americans viewed this speck of light not only with awe,
but with a shudder, recognizing the value of rocketry in warmaking.
Public attitudes were intensified by the extensive publicity given
the Soviet achievement. As Chapman observed, "Never before was
an international scientific enterprise made so widely known, by press
and other publicity, to the parliaments and peoples of the world."148
Detlev W. Bronk, then chairman of the National Science Board,
declared that "The fact that . . . the newspapers of our country
have given such a tremendous amount of space to the achievements
of [the IGY] I think is evidence of the fact that they recognize that
the imagination of the peoples of our country, the peoples of the world
have been captured by this great adventure."149 This widespread
publicity and public interest, according to the National Science
Foundation, made Sputnik I
... a symbol of competition between Russian and American science, and
a sign that we had "lost" a "scientific race." To the extent that the symbol
became identified with such a "race," it was erroneous and destructive — we did
not think of the undertaking in these terms, but regarded it as a part of a coopera-
tive international scientific undertaking, the International Geophysical Year." 15°
This universal concern helped focus public attitudes upon the
necessity for basic research, as well as its value. As stated further
by the NSF,
144 Harvey Brooks, "Impact of the Defense Establishment on Science and Education." In: U.S., Con-
gress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop-
ment, National Science Policy. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 666, 91st Cong.. 2d sess., July, August, and Septeiu*
ber 1970, p. 962.
147 See The Evolution of International Technology, vol. II, p. 633.
"« Chapman, "International Cooperation," p. 178.
i" NSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 4.
»*> NSF Eighth Annual Report, p. 3.
340
Public discussions following the satellite launchings brought out once again the
fact that Americans customarily think of science in terms of applied work, or
engineering, despite the highly significant accomplishments of research workers
in the areas of fundamental investigation. Nevertheless, the connection between
ba«ic and applied research, and the degree of dependence of the latter upon the
former, has become increasingly clear during the past year.151
A nation of predominantly "practical" people, not overly concerned
with "impractical" basic research, began to appreciate its value
better as a result of the IGY.152 Citizens became, according to Atwood,
"more keenly aware of the contributions being made by scientists
and by scientific institutions." l53 The leadership provided by the
National Academy of Sciences brought it greater recognition, and the
public became more aware of the value of the NSF and other scientific
organizations, both public and private. The IGY also captured the
imagination of children who, having lived always in an age of great
scientific achievement, found artificial satellites less marvellous,
miraculous, threatening, or unnecessary than did their parents. How-
ever, ". . . once the United States had begun to launch its own
space vehicles there was an improvement in American attitudes, a
thrill at witnessing the inception of a new era." u*
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
An important outcome of the IGY artificial earth satellite program
was the development of international communications satellites. As
pointed out by Ambassador Abbott Washburn, chairman of the U.S.
delegation to the INTELSAT Conference in 1971:
After the first artificial earth satellite was launched in 1957, orbiting satellites
for communications moved rapidly from theory to practical reality.165
Progress was facilitated because the potential usefulness of earth
satellites for communications purposes had been widely discussed
and the theory of their application was relatively well developed.
At a sufficiently high altitude, individual satellites each can relay
microwave signals directly to more than one-third of the earth's
surface, reaching remote and less accessible areas as well as major
world centers of economic and political power. The Communications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) was organized in 1963 as a result
of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act to represent the "chosen
instrument" of the United States in bringing commercial satellite
communications to the world. The International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) was created by interim inter-
national agreement in 1964 to provide an international mechanism
through which a single, unified, global commercial communications
satellite system could be operated. Permanent arrangements for
INTELSAT were completed after much negotiation during 1968-71
and entered into force on February 12, 1973, providing the world
with ". . . the first peaceful use of outer space for everyday com-
mercial purposes." l56
i" NSF Eighth Annual Report, p. 4.
IM Kaplan, "What We've Learned," p. 13.
'" Atwood, "The IGY in Retrospect," p. 688.
'*« Sullivan, Astault. p. 2.
"» Ambassador Abbott Washburn, "The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization,"
in: International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences, Senate Document No. 9t-67, 92d Cong., 1st sess.. Dec. 9, 1971, p. 437. Much of
the material in this section is summarized from Washburn, pp. 437-452.
'"Ibid. For additional information concerning the interim and definitive Intelsat agreements, see:
Treatiet and Other International Act* Seriu, Nos. 6646 and 7632, respectively.
341
EFFECT ON NATIONAL DEFENSE
As previously discussed, the size of the initial orbiting sputniks
(180 pounds for Sputnik I and 1,120 pounds for Sputnik II) made
it immediately evident that the Soviets possessed rockets capable
of traversing intercontinental distances with quite heavy payloads.
Concern was expressed that this Soviet capability might lead to a
race to produce military space vehicles at the expense of scientific
space research.157 Although research did not flag, U.S. efforts to
develop long-range missiles were greatly speeded up, no doubt leading
to further efforts on the part of the Soviets. To promote U.S. efforts,
the position of Director of Research and Engineering was established
within the Department of Defense, ranking above the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense and possessing the authority to manage in-
terservice projects without following the normal military chain of
command. He was supported by an Office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, as well as by the Advanced Research
Projects Agency. In addition, some parts of the DOD were reor-
ganized to permit "a more intelligent treatment of some of our most
urgent and difficult defense problems." 158
Sputnik I also led to a revoking of the initial decision to use only
nonmilitary rockets in the American IGY artificial satellite program.
The great weights of the Sputnik satellites made it clear that Soviet
IGY scientists, far from being required to develop their own rocketry,
were being furnished with the U.S.S.R.'s most powerful military hard-
ware. The effect of this knowledge, coupled with a succession of
failures of the Vanguard program, was to establish a parallel satellite
program in which the U.S. Army took responsibility for the launchings.
This decision resulted in the successful orbiting of the highly useful
Explorer satellites.
EFFECT ON FOREIGN POLICY
The IGY, according to Atwood, "further demonstrated the signifi-
cance of scientific factors in formulating and executing foreign policy,"
particularly as evidenced in the daily activities of the State Depart-
ment and pronouncements of other Federal agencies. With its asso-
ciated scientific and technological achievements, the IGY "clearly
indicated that science could facilitate the attainment of peaceful
objectives of foreign policy." 159 Certainly the IGY engendered un-
precedented international cooperation and good will, at least on the
part of scientists. The extent to which this rapprochement was
effectively utilized as a tool of U.S. foreign policy is difficult to assess
and is discussed later.
International Impacts
International impacts of the IGY and the orbiting of the first
sputniks were every bit as spectacular as were the impacts upon
the United States and would be difficult to exaggerate. Foremost
was the impact upon the cold war. Tensions heightened in East-
West relations as the Soviet leadership sought to use its success in
space to further its goals in foreign and military policy and as the
United States countered Soviet thrusts with crash programs in space
•" Sullivan, "Scientific Alliance," p. 72. As noted earlier in The Evolution of International Technology,
the Soviet achievement "erased the issue of the 'Bomber Gap' [and] created a 'Missile Gap' " (p. 24).
us NSF-NAS Hearinos: IGY Report, p. 192.
"• Atwood, "The IGY in Retrospect," p. 689.
342
and missile development. Sputnik I catalyzed the cold war and not
until the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis 6 years later were
Soviet-American leaders able to take the first steps decelerating the
spiralling pressures of the arms race. Additional impacts were the
effect upon the international politics of science, the use of science as
a vital element in foreign affairs, and the generation of a remarkable
degree of international cooperation and good will in politically non-
sensitive pursuits.
THE EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE
The impact of the IGY upon the politics of world science was
considerable. Although international scientific adventures had taken
Elace before the IGY (as discussed in section II of this study), none
ad approached the IGY in magnitude. As stated by Gerson, the
physical entirety of the IGY was almost majestic, the number of
participating nations was impressive, a veritable army of scientists
were deployed, the number of participating stations exceeded all
expectations, and the cost was astronomical.160 It was thus inevitable
that the IGY should exert considerable influence upon the future con-
duct of international science.
A major influence was the strengthening of old ties among scientists
and the forging of many new ones. The previous system of somewhat
limited bilateral cooperation in developing and exchanging information
was replaced by true international cooperation in coordinated and
continuing investigations. Methods developed so successfully by the
ICSU and its various unions during the IGY were seen as ideally
suited for the furtherance of international cooperation in science, and
suggestions were made that these methods should be emulated in the
future and used in other scientific areas.
International organizations like the ICSU and its member nations
were considerably strengthened by their roles in the IGY, and thus
tsubsequent efforts were made easier. For example, Sullivan commented
hat the ICSU, "largely because of the IGY . . . emerged as the
world's supreme non-governmental organ in science."161 The Soviet
rocletiy and space scientist, previously leading "a solitary life in his
cloistered laboratory cut off from the world scientific community," re-
gained contact with the Western world.162 Furthermore, Western scien-
tists gained a deeper appreciation of the quality and value of the work
of their Soviet counterparts. The IGY also served to stimulate, on a
world wide basis, the interdisciplinary approach to problem solving.
Finally, the IGY helped to spur the revival of science in underde-
veloped nations newly experiencing their independence, and facili-
tated the reopening of major scientific facilities like observatories
which had been closed when vacated by scientists returning to their
native countries.
Significantly, the IGY legacy also includes formative influences
upon entirely new, governmentally sponsored programs which fre-
quently use as models corresponding programs which had been de-
veloped during the IGY and then continued after the expiration of
the IGY and the IGC-1959 (discussed in section IV). One of these
'•» Gerson, "Polar Years to IGY," p. 44.
"•' Sullivan "The IGY," p. 331.
'« Senate, ''Soviet Space Programs: Organization [etc.]," p. 23. The role of the Soviet scientist Is also
discussed by Sullivan in: "The IGY," p. 327.
343
new programs was the international years of the quiet sun (IYQS),
held from January 1, 1964, through December 31, 1965, which was
organized in much the same fashion as was the IGY but was geared
for a period of relatively quiet solar activity.183 Another was the
upper mantle program, held in 1966-70.164 Other new programs
included the global atmospheric research program, the international
geodynamics project, the international magnetosphere survey,165 the
world weather watch, Indian Ocean research, and the international
biological program. Typical of the long-lasting effects of the IGY
is a reference appearing in a 1966 Senate report giving credit to the
IGY for providing impetus to the Soviet use of meteorological rockets
that is still being felt.166 ____ ___
It is worth noting 'Ii^ere^that the^ciehtitic leadershrp~ofTrTe lGY~was~
largely composed o? a distinguished elite having considerable influence
within their respective countries. The IGY was effective in helping to
consolidate these various national elites into an international elite,
the influence of which has not been confined, over the years, to purely
scientific matters. Thus, the effect of the IGY on both international
science and political affairs upon which international science depends,
is doubtless still being felt in many areas today.
SCIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Given the wide-ranging character of the IGY in international
scientific affairs, it was natural for hopes and expectations to be raised
regarding the ability of scientists to function as international diplomats.
Their possible success in doing so is difficult to evaluate, but it seems
reasonable to assume at least a certain degree of effectiveness. Sullivan
has remarked that "The IGY's construction of scientific bridges across
political chasms coincided with a general growth of science's role in
diplomacy, as well as in national policymaking." He further points
out that "Russian academicians, many of them bearers of a venerable
humanistic tradition, had reestablished contact with the Western
World and had shown the extent — and limitations — of their influence
on Soviet policy." 167 George B. Kistiakowsky, science adviser to
President Eisenhower, has pointed out that, in terms of its potential
impact on political relations, participation in international scientific
activities like the IGY remains perhaps the most important role that
can be played by scientists today :
For science is today one of the few common languages of mankind; it can
provide a basis for understanding and communication of ideas between people
that is independent of political boundaries and of ideologies. Science also provides
a sometimes unique opportunity for cooperative endeavors that can contribute
in a major way to the reduction of tension between nations and, more positively,
to close relations between the United States and other countries.188
Sullivan speculates that the IGY "could prove, from the perspective
of the future, to have been a turning point in the history of mankind —
1U For a discussion of the IYQS, see: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, International Cooperation and Organization for Outer Space, Document No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st sess.,
Aug. 12, 1965, pp. 95-97, 375; and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Soviet Space Programs, 1968-66; Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans, and International Implications,
89th Cong., 2d sess., Dec. 30, 1966, pp. 627-633.
1M National Academy of Sciences, Physics in Perspective, vol. I (Washington: National Academy of
Sciences, 1972, p. 569.
"* NAS, Physics in Perspective, p. 509.
»« Soviet Space Programs, 1962-66, p. 229.
w Sullivan, Assault, pp. 415, 417.
>« George B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* 16 April
(1960), p. 115.
344
the start of a period in which scientists assumed a greater role in
helping to solve international problems." 169 Atwood similarly ex-
pressed the belief that the IGY helped open many eyes to the signifi-
cance of science in world affairs.170 Undoubtedly it helped make
possible further participation of scientists in "unofficial, exploratory
investigations of possible future diplomatic opportunities," including
such ventures as the Pugwash conferences.171 Although the diplomatic
consequences of these international contacts are difficult to evaluate,
they appear to be significant. In Sullivan's view, one cannot "separate
the IGY from the growth of science's role in diplomacy during 1957
and 1958." 172
On a largely political scale, the rocketry and outer space activities
of the IGY provide an excellent example of the role of a scientific
program in the conduct of foreign affairs. On the surface, the early
space activities were purely scientific endeavors, aimed at the explora-
tion of natural phenomena high above the earth's atmosphere. How-
ever, Mr. Arnold W. Frutkin, Director of Information for the USNC
during the IGY, has expressed the belief that the Soviet IGY space
program had primarily political rather than scientific objectives.173
His view conforms with the widespread agreement that still appears
to exist in the West that "An important governing principle in the
Soviet system of research and development is the close interrelation-
ship of science, technology, and military affairs." m In keeping with
this view, it is maintained that
. . . the Russians have approached space exploration not only as a strictly
technical matter but aa an important component of politics, both national and
international. For them space is only one part of a much larger political ideological
effort, namely, to achieve the historically determined goals of communism.17'
More recently Frutkin, speaking as Assistant Administrator for
International Affairs, NASA, pointed out that, particularly with
respect to the Apollo-Soyuz test project, Soviet cooperation with the
United States in peaceful activities for outer space has greatly accel-
erated since 1969. m This cooperation has also resulted m agreement
. . . for the exchange of lunar samples, for exchanges of scientific results and
objectives for certain coordinated scientific activities, and on procedures for
recommending additional cooperation in space science and applications.1"
This cooperation, says Frutkin, is ". . . more than a pleasant and
useful gesture in an era of political accommodation," but in addition
should "... point the way to future joint activities which should
help both countries gain more in space than they would from separate
programs." 178
However, the Soviets are by no means unique in this respect. Al-
though an exact parallel cannot be drawn between Soviet and Ameri-
can attitudes, nonetheless, a strong relationship exists also between
the U.S. research and development community and the Department of
Defense, and Americans are not immune from exploiting their scientific
'«« Sullivan, "The IOY," p. 259.
"• Atwood, "The IQ Y In Retrospect," p. 689.
m Toward A New Diplomacy, vol. I, p. 26.
>" Sullivan, "The IOY," p. 334.
"» Arnold W. Frutkin, "The Character of International Cooperation In Space," address before the Amer-
ican Rocket 8oclety during its symposium. Space Flight Report to the Nation, Oct. 9-16, 1961. See: Soviet
Space Programs: Organization, etc., p. 177.
"4 Senate, Soviet Space Programt: Organization, [etc.], p. 177.
"» SenaU^ Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 63.
"• U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on AeronauUcal and 8pace Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal
Year 1911,, Hearings on S. 880, pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 22, 1973, p. 1368.
•" Senate, Hearings on S. 880, pp. 13fl8~1369.
>'• Senate, Hearings on S. 880, p. 1369.
345
accomplishments politically. The Soviets, it is claimed, maintain in
"what has come to be a fairly traditional propaganda line ... that
the United States uses space for military purposes." 179 The difference,
it is said, is that "the United States has never denied that it has
military space programs [whereas] the Soviets, seeking to maintain
their propaganda image as a 'peaceful' user of outer space, have, in
contrast, never made such admissions." 18° Furthermore, it is stated
that the Soviets have attempted to link "the militarization of space
with other foreign policy issues," including American involvement in
Vietnam.181
Thus, space exploration, although in essence primarily a scientific
and technological enterprise, inevitably is deeply involved in current
international politics. Space politics has become a matter of major
concern between the two great space powers, as a result of decades of
rivalry and confrontation. 182 The Soviet Government, on the one
hand, is said to see limited reason for cooperating only in those areas
which can (1) pay off in military strength, or (2) promise opportunity
for spectacular developments politically useful in shaping world
opinion. 183 Space exploration has provided the Soviets with a unique
instrument for achieving this political purpose of reaffirmation through
glorification; that is, using the glory derived from success in space to
reaffirm the legitimacy of the party and the state.184 Space triumphs
. . . have been used to affirm the glory of the Communist Party and the
Soviet state . . . [and] have been attributed to the workings of the Soviet sys-
tem. The foundations of the space program have been tied to Lenin and Leninism.
The pride in space accomplishments has been seen as a way of raising citizen
morale, and the resulting prestige of space successes has been exploited for what
political value it had.18*
The United States, on the other hand, has generally sought to pre-
vent such total subjugation of its space activities to national and in-
ternational politics. In recent years as Soviet- American relations have
shifted gradually from confrontation to negotiation, as the cold war
has been appreciably decompressed, as American space activities
have far outdistanced Soviet efforts, and as a nuclear balance has been
achieved, rivalry in space has been reduced to the extent that joint
Soviet-American space flights are now in the realm of the possible.
Thus, the efforts begun during the IGY appear at last to be promoting
the kind of cooperation and good will hoped for by so many nearly
two decades ago.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND GOOD WILL
Participants in the IGY, although scientists keenly aware of its
major scientific value, have nonetheless frequently been moved to
claim that the most valuable benefits of the IGY were not scien-
tific, but were those derived from the generating of international co-
operation and good will. Atwood, for example, has stated :
I think that it is fair to say that the international significance of the program,
as its name bears out, has been of greater significance than even the very impor-
tant discoveries which have been made. At a time when we are torn asunder by
i?» Senate, Hearings on S. 880, p. 43.
»» Senate, Hearing* on S. 880, pp. 43-44.
'« Senate, Hearing* on S. 880, p. 44.
"2 Senate, Hearing* on S. 880, p. 1.
l» Senate, Soviet Space Program*; Organization, [etc.], p. 175.
"* Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 15.
183 Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. xxl.
346
ideological differences and by selfish national attacks upon the freedom we stand
for, it is heartening to find that there are some things that people can do together
with common amity.188
Somewhat similar sentiments were expressed by Tuve :
Perhaps the most important result of the IGY is the demonstration that the
people of the Earth, despite their differences, can get together and work with
complete wholeheartedness in studying things which are of concern to all of us
and which could be of great nationalistic value if they were emphasized from a
selfish point of view.187
To participants, this international cooperative fellowship appears to
have been a constant source of unexpected pleasure and, to observers,
a constant source of amazement and surprise. Odishaw, a participant,
remarked how the IGY succeeded brilliantly in marshaling interna-
tional cooperation.188 Roberts, another participant, remarked:
As a result [of the IGY] we have new and powerful ties on an individual level
between leading scientists of many lands, mounting understanding for one another,
a great breach in the Iron Curtain, and a demonstration that men of many races
and political faiths can work together fruitfully. Even if these accomplishments
cannot be exactly evaluated, their meaning for the world is deep and pervasive.181
Wilson, also a participant, commented that:
It is perhaps not unreasonable to maintain that the greatest achievement of
the IGY lay not in its remarkable technical advances, but in the demonstration
that scientists are good humanists, for they successfully organized a small but
complex segment of society which worked [and thus] helped achieve a better
balance between humanism and science.190
Chapman called the IGY the greatest example of worldwide scientific
cooperation in the history of our race,191 and to Berkner the Antarctic
Erogram of the IGY represented international collaboration of the
ighest type.192 These expressions of gratification on the part of scien-
tists reflected their pleasure in the IGY as an international scientific
undertaking that had exceeded even their greatest expectations both
scientifically and diplomatically. But in a larger sense, underlying
these expressions, and sometimes openly voiced, was the further ex-
pectation or hope that this immense spirit of cooperation and goodwill
could somehow be caused to flow unimpeded into the political arena,
there to ease the political tensions so prevalent at the time, and pro-
mote peaceful coexistence among diverse political powers. The extent
to which these hopes were met is discussed next.
im NSF-NAS Hearings: WY Report, p. 3.
•w NSF-NAS Hearings: I OY Report, p. 65.
im NSF-NAS Hearings: WY Report, p. 20.
im Roberts, "The IO Y in Retrospect," p. 263.
iw Wilson, New Moons, pp. 327-328.
'•' Sullivan, "The IQY," p. 283.
'« Lloyd V. Berkner, "The International Geophysical Year, 1957-58: A Pattern for International Co-
operation in Research," Proceedings of the American Physical Society 101 (Apr. 19, 1957), p. 160.
VI. Analysis and Discussion
The specific questions addressed by this study are simple: does
evidence exist that the tremendous spirit of international cooperation
and good will generated by the IGY was to any extent successfully
transferred from the scientific to the political arena? Can it be said
with any confidence that the techniques so successfully employed by
IGY scientists in dealing with one another to solve problems of com-
mon interest are at all applicable to political behavior?
The discussion which follows suggests that a reasonable case can be
made for the observation that at least some degree of cooperative
spillover occurred; that is, that certain subsequent international
political agreements were furthered by the climate created, in some
instances many years earlier, by the IGY. After considering the scien-
tific good will which was mainly responsible for the cooperative suc-
cesses of the IGY, this section concludes with a brief discussion of
three such agreements.
Scientists as Eternal Optimists
The participants in the IGY were primarily physical scientists,
largely concerned with the study and control of scientific phenomena
rather than with the conduct of human society. They may therefore
be excused their apparent naivete in voicing expectations that the
cooperative spirit and techniques they developed so successfully in
dealing with each other as scientists might work equally well in deal-
ing with one another as social and political creatures. The esprit de
corps engendered by the IGY appears to have replaced natural human
conservatism, and expressions of optimism flowed freely in the after-
math of that spectacular scientific activity. Wilson, for example, ob-
served that
. . . the International Geophysical Year brought many men together under
conditions that tended to create harmony and sympathy between them [and]
showed that scientists could play a fruitful role in international negotiations and
could strengthen international organizations such as ICSU and its parent body
UNESCO . . . .in
These and other joint efforts by scientists, he maintained, must be
extended to include the control of nuclear fission and the problem
of an increasing population; or we are lost.19* Berkner pointed out
that:
Even more than nuclear energy, the satellite has symbolized the cohesive force
of science in bringing together and cementing political, social, and economic
elements of man's civilization.195
Chapman suggested that:
The harmonious development and execution of the IGY enterprise set a
pattern that might serve as an example to be emulated in more difficult, political
fields.1 ••
"» Wilson, New Moon*, pp. 325, 328.
1M Wilson, New Moon, p. 328.
'•* Berkner, "Geography and Space," p. 306.
,M Sydney Chapman, "Earth and Beyond: The International Geophysical Year In Retrospect. Was It
A. 'Turning Point in History?,' " Science 133 (July 7, 1961), p. 41.
(347)
348
Atwood commented that "As a consequence, peaceful cooperation
among people of all nations is a little closer to realization," and ex-
pressed the hope that "the United Nations and its specialized
agencies . . . will call upon organizations such as ICSU for advice
and assistance." 197 Similarly, Kistiakowsky remarked on the potential
role of science in international affairs :
The significance of international scientific activities to the relations between
nations is perhaps the most important of the roles science and scientists can play
in today's embittered and divided world — not a new role in the sense that inter-
national activities of science are part of the lifeblood of science; but new in its
potential impact on political relations.188
Perhaps not surprisingly, the optimism of the scientific community
spread to nonscientists as well. On the eve of the IGY, Prince Philip,
the Duke of Edinburgh, in a television interview remarked:
The IGY is the world studying itself. It is seldom that this world of ours acts
together. . . . Yet, for the next 18 months, east and west, north and south, will
unite in the greatest assault in history on the secrets of the earth. ... At the
same time, it may well help to solve the real problem — the conflict of ideas.m
Representative Albert Thomas, while chairing a subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee, commented:
I think you gentlemen of the International Geophysical Year have set a pat-
tern of worldwide cooperation that nations and governments, and particularly
our good State Department, can take a leaf out of your book.200
And Walter Sullivan, having served as a full-time observer of the
IGY for the New York Times, expressed the hope that the efforts
of scientists, as exemplified by the IGY, might "provide a meeting
ground where East and West can find mutually acceptable techniques
for disarmament." 201
These comments represent a cross-section of the frequent direct or
indirect exhortations to politicians to employ in their political affairs
the techniques of science and scientists. Implicit in these exhortations
is the notion that political problems are amenable to scientific prin-
ciples, properly applied. Refreshing as the intent underlying such
beliefs may be, it nonetheless underestimates the formidable differences
existing between the scientific and political communities.
Scientific vis-a-vis Political Good Will
One of the difficulties in attempting to transfer scientific method-
ology into political reality is suggested by Sullivan's observation that
"science, in treating our planet as indivisible, is far ahead of politics,
which treats it as two worlds." 202 In view of today's multiple ideologies,
"multiple worlds" might be a more appropriate political designation.
During the IGY, as a result of their common participation in efforts
which opened up to man not only Antarctica but outer space, scientists
were said to have experienced unusually strong feelings of humility and
brotherhood.203 These feelings served to reinforce the traditional atti-
tudes most natural scientists develop as a result of sharing with others
the common objective of unveiling nature's secrets. There is but one
universe for scientists to study, and its singularity unites all scientific
minds.
'»» Atwood, "The IO Y in Retrospect," p. 689.
188 Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign AfT:urs," p. lit.
"'■•Illustrated Sens (London). Julv 27, 1957, pp. 2G-27.
*» NSF-NAS Hearings: IGY Report, p. 20.
soi Sullivan, "The 1UY," p. 260.
SM Sullivan. "Scientific Alliance," p. 68.
*» Wilson, New Moon*, p. 325.
349
Traditionally, cooperation in solving scientific problems has always
appeared immeasurably less complex than cooperation in solving
political problems. As pointed out by Astin, since —
. . . science is concerned with external phenomena which are usually measure-
able and whose manifestations are demonstrable and repeatable, there is less
cause for disagreement, for controversy, than there is ... in politics ....
Furthermore, the preoccupations of . . . scientists are usually less charged with
emotion than are those of . . . politician [s] .... The consideration of po-
litical . . . plans or policies tends to arouse . . . passions, whereas delibera-
tions [on scientific matters] tend to proceed more calmly.204
Thus scientists tend to have fewer social problems since their research
is generally focused upon common, well-defined objectives offering
"a natural point of convergence, namely, the correct result." 205
Unlike politicians, they are not engaged in conflict resolution as a
profession and are not charged with responsibility for the protection
of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the existence of a
common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency toward
social cooperation despite all obstacles, a tendency which has become a
characteristic of the international scientific community.206 Scientists
tend inherently to recognize the interdependence of their efforts
and accept that interdependence as one of the basic conditions of the
environment in which they work. It is then relatively easy for them
to accept the extension of this principle to the environment in which
they live.
Despite these inherent advantages scientists possess over their politi-
cal brethren, some pitfalls persist. It is possible "to interject political
considerations into scientific and technical discussions so that a con-
sensus of opinion can deliberately be prevented from emerging into a
group decision." 207 This appears to have occurred during the IGY
when the Soviets made agreement impossible on what kinds of
launch and telemetering data would be provided to all participants.208
In general, however, such behavior tends to be minimized among
scientists because of their overriding concern for success of the project
itself. Scientists appear unusually skilled in finding "common de-
nominators which enable them to cooperate in attaining generally
desired objectives." 209
In view of the substantial differences between the scientific and
political communities in the kinds of problems they are respectively
called upon to solve, prudence would suggest caution in looking for
too bold a transfer of techniques from one community to another.
The IGY itself was apolitical and closed-ended, whereas the political
process is, a priori, political and open-ended.210 Yet, politicians and
scientists do share some important human characteristics. Politicians
and governments, no less than scientists and scientific organizations,
are capable of and motivated toward uniting to achieve common
objectives. A major difficulty is that the procedures for finding
solutions to problems facing politicians and governments are less
clearly defined than are the procedures for finding solutions to the
specific types of problems commonly faced by scientists and engineers.
JM Astin, "The Scientific Community," p. 32.
205 Senate Document No. 56, International Cooperation and Organization, p. 208.
J» Astin, "The Scientific Community," p. 32.
107 Senate Document No. 56, International Cooperation and Organization, p. 209.
508 Discussed in detail in: Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1965).
206 Senate Document No. 56, International Cooperation and Organization, p. 209.
S1° Comment by Murray Todd, executive director, Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy of
8ciences.
350
Scientific and engineering problems are typically more specifically
defined than are political problems, which tend to be overburdened
with value systems in which rational and irrational factors are inter-
mixed. Nonetheless, if men can unite to solve problems under one
set of circumstances (the scientific), there presumably is room for
hope that they can learn to do so under another (the political).
Scientists, as already indicated, tend to share this hope.
Several factors help provide at least some degree of optimism that
the scientists may be justified. One is the great importance of first
perceiving and assessing, and then communicating, technological
impacts. Scientists and technologists are likely to comprehend the
possible consequences of new discoveries and applications in the fields
of energy or of ecology, for example, more immediately or fully than
are politicians. Partly because of the IGY, both technological develop-
ments and political (or institutional) developments which significantly
affect the human condition can be more readily appreciated and uti-
lized today. First, they can be brought to the attention of both
political leaders and the public within countries (it is becoming
increasingly difficult for leaders to withhold them even in dictator-
ships); secondly, they can be shared among the countries of the
world far more readily than was possible just two or three decades
ago. Wider public understanding of technological impacts and a
stronger institutional framework (governmental, professional, and the
press) for increasing that understanding still further are in large part
responsible in the first instance; technological advances in rapid
communications and transportation are among the factors responsible
in the second.
More effective communication does not necessarily serve the
interests of peace and stability; it can be used to increase strife and
tension. Even well-intentioned communication could conceivably
do more harm than good, as by inducing excessive anxieties. In gen-
eral, however, the friendly (or at least nonhostile) communicating,
both within and among countries, of knowledge relating to human
survival on earth is a responsibility which cannot be evaded by the
present generation. Scientists and politicians have an obvious common
mterest in meeting that vital challenge; scientists, again, are likely
to be the first to perceive it in specific forms. Moreover, as Wilson
has pointed out, "The dangerous tensions that can so easily be . . .
generated between nations can best be resolved by friendly com-
munication." Such communication can first be initiated with subjects
like science "for which standards of excellence are universally accepted
and applicable across national barriers."211 As long as scientists con-
tinue to talk to one another without regard for national boundaries,
hope exists that diplomats from various nations (whose very business
is communicating) may also begin to speak to one another in similar
fashion, raising their sights and their expectations of accomplish-
ment. It is not unreasonable to suggest that in view of the enormous
scope of the IGY and the number of scientists involved, the example
set by discussion of scientific problems may well have provided some
impetus for undertaking significant political discussions as well.
A factor of growing importance and urgency is the universal need
for cooperation in solving problems. No better example of inter-
national cooperation exists than the IGY which, as pointed out by
«" Wilson, New Moom, p. 325.
351
Wilson, "provided an example of how international agreements can
be made to work smoothly."212 Astin has commented that "valid
and important scientific goals can lead governments away from narrow
nationalistic rigidities toward free and constructive international
cooperation."213 Although these comments may tend to oversimplify
the transfer process, implicit in them is the recognition that, having
agreed once in one area, it is easier for human beings to move forward
toward agreement in another area than had there been no original
agreement at all. Agreements made during the IGY were sufficiently
widespread and long-lasting as to make plausible the possibility that
their consummation helped contribute to eventual agreements in
political areas.
Still another factor is that of common understanding, without
which agreement in any area is impossible. Berkner has remarked
that the
. . . rule of law among nations will not be achieved until men are bound
together by common threads of cultural understanding. Certainly science is one
of those threads — perhaps a major line that permits men to speak to one another
with comprehension, confidence, and common purpose. Coming in times of inter-
national tension, the IGY was a clear demonstration of the power of such cultural
bonds.21*
Thus the IGY, in helping to ameliorate international tensions and
spread good will, provided "a common meeting ground and a common
goal for nations that disagreed on about all else."216
International Diplomacy and the IGY
As indicated earlier, the specific objective of this study is to deter-
mine to what extent, if any, the IGY contributed to international
diplomacy by opening up new communication channels, stimulating
cooperation, and promoting increased understanding among the 67
nations that participated jointly in its activities. A review of the
circumstances suggests that these factors may have contributed
substantially to at least three major diplomatic achievements: the
1961 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and the 1967
Space Treaty.216
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
Perhaps no better example exists of the direct effect of scientific
affairs on international diplomacy than the Antarctic Treaty, of
which the first sentence of article I states, "Antarctica shall be used
for peaceful purposes only."217 As a result of this agreement, "a whole
continent on this planet was, for the first time in man's history,
reserved as a universal laboratory for one and all, whoever desires to
freely pursue scientific investigation for peaceful purposes."218 This
as Wilson, New Moons, p. 326.
218 Astin, "The Scientific Community," p. 34.
a« Remark by Berkner in his introduction to- Wilson, New Moons, p. ix.
"» Gerson, "Polar Years to IGY," p. 43.
218 Exact titles of these agreements and the dates when they entered into force for the United States are
as follows: The Antarctic Treaty, June 23, 1961; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmos-
phere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963; and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Oct. 10, 1967. From: U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force on Jan. 1, 1973. State Department Document No. 8697 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, no date), pp. 284, 357, 386.
a' The complete text of the treaty appears in: The Conference on Antarctica, Department of State Publica-
tion 7060, International Organization and Conference Series IS (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, September 1960), pp. 61-67. See also: TIAS No. 4780.
«• Doumani, "Science Policy for the Antarctic," p. 40.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 24
352
remarkable event, unprecedented in international politics, is generally
agreed to have resulted directly from IGY activities in Antarctica.
Chapman, for example, stated that the IGY led to the drafting of the
Antarctic Treaty that aims to exclude military action from Ant-
arctica,"219 and Sullivan commented, "The stated objective of the
proposed treaty was to perpetuate the cooperation that had marked
the IGY in Antarctica."220 Indeed, the IGY is mentioned twice in
the treaty itself :
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation
and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investi-
gation in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year
accords with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind [preamble];
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that
end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject
to the provisions of the present treaty, [art. II).221
Antarctica, for many decades prior to the IGY, had been an object
of continued interest and investigation to many nations. Of these,
seven had established territorial claims upon the continent, some
of which overlapped.222 As early as 1948 the United States, which
officially recognized no claims, had proposed an international solution
to other claimants, but without success. Similar efforts by India in
1956 before the United Nations General Assembly also met with
no success, ostensibly being shelved to avoid controversy during the
IGY; and discussions of the problem by Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom also led nowhere. Thus, throughout the
IGY the status of Antarctica was not only politically unresolved,
but remained an issue of political controversy.
This controversy, by and large, did not significantly affect relation-
ships among scientists carrying out work in Antarctica during the
IGY. The general apolitical tone of this activity was set quite early
during the first IGY regional conference on the Antarctic held in
Paris during July 6-10, 1955. As noted by Sullivan, a somewhat
awkward situation existed at this meeting because both the Chilean
and Argentine delegations were headed by ambassadors rather than
by scientists. However, the forcefulness of the chairman of the meeting
"was unquestionably responsible for subduing the political contro-
versies that repeatedly seemed about to erupt." 223 Subsequent scienti-
fic activities in the Antarctic demonstrated convincingly that scien-
tists of various countries, including those having overlapping Antarctic
claims, could work peacefully together, relatively unaffected by the
unresolved political difficulties. That they could do so was due partly
to common scientific objectives and partly to the forbidding nature
of the area. As Sullivan commented:
The stark, perilous environment of Antarctica had a remarkable effect in
submerging political differences. The expeditions there were bound together by
the presence of a common enemy.224
218 Chapman, "Earth and Beyond," p. 41.
*>° Sullivan. "The TOY," p. 328.
221 Department of State, Conference on Antarctica, pp. 61-62.
232 The seven nations were Argentina, Australia, Chile, Fiance, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and
(unofficially) the United States. The overlapping claims were those of Argentina, Chile, and the United
Kingdom.
223 Sullivan, "The fOY," p. 320.
224 Sullivan, Assault, p. 413.
353
An additional factor was that scientists were not personally responsi-
ble for protecting their respective national interests in the area, since
such interests were not at stake in the IGY.
It was clear to all nations involved that much could be gained if the
scientific work begun during the IGY could be continued thereafter.
On May 2, 1958, the United States proposed to other participants
that all should join "in a treaty designed to preserve the continent
as an international laboratory for scientific research and insure that
it be used only for peaceful purposes." 225 All accepted, but preliminary
talks in Washington were largely stalled by Soviet opposition to
existing Antarctic claims of other nations, and by Chilean and Argen-
tine reluctance to agree to international control. However, the ad-
visability of maintaining the Antarctic free for the kinds of scientific
observations and studies begun during the IGY ultimately prevailed.
A formal treaty conference was opened on October 15, 1959, and the
treaty was signed on December 1, 1959. On August 4, 1960, Japan
became the first nation to ratify the treaty, at that time considered
"unique in diplomatic history." 226 U.S. ratification followed on Au-
gust 18, 1960, and the treaty entered into force for the United States
on June 23, 1961. Major provisions of the treaty are as follows:
Article 1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. All measures of a
military nature, including weapons testing, are prohibited.
Article 2. Freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation shall continue.
Article 3. Scientific plans, personnel, observations, and results shall be freely
exchanged.
Article 4. Signatories do not recognize, dispute, or establish territorial claims.
Article 5. Nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastes in the area
are prohibited.
Article 6. All land and ice -masses below 60 degrees south latitude are included,
but international law with regard to the high seas shall prevail.
Article 7. Observers from treaty nations have the right of free access to any
area and may inspect all stations, installations, and equipment
within those areas. Aerial observations are permitted, and each
signatory must provide advance notice of its activities within the
area.227
THE TEST BAN TREATY
The spirit of international cooperation and good will resulting
from the IGY, and the communication channels thereby opened
up among nations, may have played an appreciable part in negoti-
ations which led to the Test Ban Treaty.228 It would be difficult to
overestimate the role of communications in international affairs,
especially since technical talks appear to have become an accepted
approach to difficult international problems. Lloyd Berkner, in
addressing the Second United Nations International Conference on
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, in Geneva, had emphasized
the value of the experience gained during the IGY. Sullivan pointed
224 Sullivan, "The IGY," p. 325. Participating nations, in addition to the United States, we're: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of South.
Africa, and the United Kingdom.
229 Neal Stanford. "Antarctica- Where Territorial Claims Are Barred," The Christian Science Monitor,
Jan. 9, 1971, p. 5.
>st Summarized from: Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 4780
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 36 pages. The Antarctic Treaty, in banning nuclear
explosions from the Antarctic, established a precedent for what was to become a steadily expanding con-
cept of "nuclear free zones" throughout the world. One such proposal would have progressively moved the
area covered by the Antarctic Treaty to further latitudes. Other proposals would have expanded the
concept to include Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Western Europe. To the extent that such proposals
represent additional efforts to achieve diplomatic agreement, they owe much to the spirit of international
cooperative good will that evolved from the IGY.
828 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. State
Department Document TIAS No. 6433.
354
out that "The IGY had helped significantly to contribute to the
atmosphere of international scientific cooperation in which the
Geneva talks were held," 229 and U.N. Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjold, in his Annual Report to the United Nations General
Assembly, had noted that "the Geneva agreement suggested a way
by which further progress might be made in separating the political
from the nonpolitical." Hammarskjold went on to point out that
discussion by scientists
. . . would not in itself bring about disarmament, but it might help to im-
prove the atmosphere and clarify many of the problems involved, thus preparing
the ground for a time more politically propitious than the present seems to be
for a general disarmament agreement.230
Although it is too soon to judge its significance, the Test Ban
Treaty appears to have been a critical forward step toward the
responsible international control of arms in the interest of world
peace and security. President Kennedy is said to have attached
great importance to the treaty as a symbol winch
. . . would provide a turning point, a way to break out of the circle of fear»
distrust, conflict, insistence on strength, demands for guarantees, insistence on
the unchanging and implacable hostility and activist role of the Soviet Union,
and the futile search by the United States to bring back the total security of the
preatomic period.231
To a considerable extent, the President's attitude thus was in close
agreement with the political expectations raised by scientists during
the IGY. It seems a fair assumption that at least some aspects of
the IGY experience were translated into political attitudes and
behavior which ultimately led to the Test Ban Treaty.
The treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, received
Senate approval on September 24, was signed by President Kennedy
on October 7, and entered into force for the United States on October
10. In article I of the treaty, each signatory agreed to prohibit all
nuclear explosions on territory within its jurisdiction and control,
including tests of nuclear weapons, in the atmosphere or under water.
This prohibition also encompassed outer space and the high seas.
Nuclear explosions were prohibited in any environment whatsoever if
they might result in the presence of radioactive debris outside the
territorial limits of the nation conducting the explosion. Furthermore,
signatories agreed to refrain from offering help or encouragement for
any nuclear weapons tests whatsoever within the prohibited
environments.232
These provisions bear a resemblance to article I of the Antarctic
Treaty banning "the testing of any type of weapons." It is clear from
congressional hearings and debates on the Test Ban Treaty that the
IGY experience and the Antarctic Treaty were prominent in the
thoughts of many participants. Reference was made to the fact that
the Antarctic Treaty had been in force for almost 5 years without
incident, and the debate prompted the first formal inspections to be
carried out under article VII or the treaty.
»• Sullivan. "The TOY," p. 334.
J" United Nations General Assembly, Official Record*, 13th sess., 1058, snpp. No. !A, p. 1.
"' U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research,
and Development, Technical Information for Congress, 92d Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 16, 1971 (revised edition),
a* Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. M33 (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1963), 76 pp.
355
THE SPACE TREATY
The need for future cooperation in space was already evident at the
time the Antarctic Treaty 233 was signed. As discussed by Sullivan,
Before putting their pens to [the Antarctic Treaty] several of the signers pointed
out that, contingent upon the treaty's ratification, it could serve as a precedent
for the settlement of the more difficult problem of outer space. 234
As early as March 15, 1958, while the IGY was still in progress, the
Soviet Government had proposed an international agreement "for
cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space," and
had referred the question to the United Nations for consideration.235
In the fall of 1958, when the General Assembly convened for its
13th session, the Soviet resolution was debated along with a similar
resolution proposed by the United States on September 2, 1958. 236
The primary difference between the two proposals was that the Soviet
resolution incorporated the question of removal of military bases from
foreign soil, whereas the American resolution did not. Subsequently,
a compromise resolution was introduced on November 13, 1958, by
20 nations, including the United States, entitled "Question of the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space," which was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 13, 1958. 237 Incorporated in this resolution
were two specific references to the IGY. In the preamble, the resolu-
tion called to attention the fact that the General Assembly noted
. . . the success of the scientific cooperative program of the International
Geophysical Year in the exploration of outer space and the decision to continue
and expand this type of cooperation ....
The resolution then established the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to report to the General Assembly on
the
. . . continuation on a permanent basis of the outer space research now being
carried on within the framework on the International Geophysical Year.238
Difficulties were encountered, however, with the space treaty itself.
The United States was willing and made "... numerous gestures
in an effort to elicit Soviet participation in cooperative space activities,
but to no avail." 239 On the surface, the Soviets clearly supported the
principle of international cooperation, citing their participation in the
IGY, and giving "special emphasis to the need for international co-
operation in space exploration." 240 In practice, however, the Soviets
m "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (State Department Document TIAS 6347). Furthermore,-
in like manner, the IO Y can be considered as having played a similar role in the more recent Agreement on
the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space (signed on Apr. 22, 1968,
and entered into force for the United States on Dec. 3, 1%8; see State Department Document TIAS 6599);
and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (signed on Mar. 29,
1972, and entered into force on Sept. 1, 1972).
"« Sullivan. Assault, p. 415.
•« U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
Analysis and Background Data, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Mfirch 1967, p. 5.
238 S. Doc. No. 56, International Cooperation and Organization, p. 184.
"' S. Doc. No. 56, International Cooperation and Organization, p. 185.
238 S. Doc. No. 56. International Cooperation and Organization, p. 186.
"» Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65, p. 428.
s<° Senate, Soviet Space Programs: Organization, [etc.], pp. 173-174. In particular, V. V. Kuznetsov ex-
pounded on this point in a speech before the 14th General Assembly; see "Unanimity in Outer Space,"
United Nations Review 6 (February 1960), p. 34. Later, on Sept. 20, 1963, in a speech before the Assembly,
President Kennedy called for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to join forces in exploring outer space. In
particular, the President called for both nations to cooperate in a manned lunar landing: "Why . . . should
man's Qrst flight to the Moon be a matter of national competition? . . . Surely we should explore whether
the scientists and astronauts of our two countries— indeed, of all the world — cannot work together in the
conquest of space, sending someday in this decade to the Moon not the representatives of a single nation but
the representatives of all of our countries" Department of State Bulletin 45 (Oct. 7, 1963), pp. 532-533.
356
appeared to be less candid. The years immediately following the IGY
represented " a period of acute international distress," with Soviet
policy becoming "confidently outgoing, aggressively assertive, and
dangerously risk taking." M1 As a consequence, the Soviets were pro-
fessing one course of action while following another. This behavior
was aptly described by Frutkin:
The Russians have accepted such cooperation in principle, and have suggested
a cautious step-by-step procedure. But we have not yet been able to identify
the first step.14*
Not until December 20, 1961, did "a breakthrough in the politics
of space cooperation" seem to take place with the adoption of the
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), which
cleared the way for initiation of a "comprehensive program of spare
cooperation under the auspices ... of the United Nations." 243
Progress was such that by 1965 Frutkin was able to write,
Soviet attitudes and performance, and, indeed, personal relationships with
their representatives, all have come a long way since the early days of the In-
ternational Geophysical Year.244
By 1973 American-Soviet relations had improved so remarkably that
Frutkin could comment that collaboration between members of the
joint working groups of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was
"unmatched" in their experience.245
Provisions of the Space Treaty, which was signed on January 27,
1967 and entered into force for the United States on October 10, 1967,
bore marked similarities to principles established earlier by the
Antarctic Treaty. Major provisions were as follows:
Article 1. The exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all
nations. There shall be access to all areas, including celestial bodies,
for exploration and scientific investigation.
Article 2. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall not
be subject to claims of sovereignty by any nation regardless of
use or occupation.
Article 3. International law shall prevail in outer space.
Article 4. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
used for peaceful purposes. All measures of a military nature,
including the presence of nuclear weapons in outer space, are
prohibited.
Article 5. Signatories shall treat astronauts as envoys of mankind, rendering
all possible assistance in the event of accidents or emergencies, and
shall inform one another of all dangers to human life and health.
Article 6. Signatories shall bear the responsibility for their activities in outer
space.
Article 7. Signatories shall bear responsibility for all damage caused by launching
of objects into outer space.
Article 8. Signatories shall maintain individual ownership of all objects launched
into outer space.
Article 9. Signatories shall not conduct activities in outer space which may prove
harmful to other nations.
341 Senate, Soviet Spaa- Programs, 1962-66, p. 427. The report goes on to state that "Khrushchev seemed
to be i oncerned less with cooperating in space than with mnking a concrete political reality of t tie abstract
Soviet claim that a shift in the balance of world i>ower against the West had occurred, and that this was
attributed, among ol b.er factors, to Communist superiority."
m> Senate, Soviet .s'/>arr Programs: Organization, [etc.], p. 176. Speech to the Phi Beta Kappa alumni of
New York City on Mar. lfi, 1961. Frutkin was referring to Soviet cooperation during the IGY itself, stating
that "the Soviet voice was often raised to limit tho scope of exchange agreements" (Senate, Soviet Sjhicc
Programs, 1961-66, p. 443). In retrospect, however, his remarks appear more appropriate to the immediate
post-IGY period under discussion above.
"! Senate Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 399. For further detail, see: Senate, Soviet Space Programs,
1969 85, p. 427.
3" Senate, Soviet Space Programs, 1966-70, p. 462.
>" Senate, Hearings on S. 8S0, p. 1308.
357
Article 10. Signatories shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other
signatories to observe the flight of objects launched into outer
space.
Article 11. Signatories shall make public the nature, conduct, location, and
results of their activities in outer space to the fullest extent feasible
and practicable.
Article 12. All stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon
and other celestial bodies of each signatory shall be open to repre-
sentatives of all other signatories.248
Six of the basic concepts of the 7 major articles of the Antarctic
Treaty are included within the 12 articles of the Space Treaty, as
shown in table 6.
TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANTARCTIC AND SPACE TREATIES
Antarctic Treaty Provision Space Treaty
Art. 1. Peaceful use, ban on military activities Art. 4.
Art. 2. Freedom of scientific investigation Art. 1.
Art. 3. Free exchange of information Art. 11.
Art. 4. No recognition of territorial claims Art. 2.
Art. 5. Ban on nuclear explosions
Art, 6. Validity of international law Art. 3.
Art. 7. Free right of inspection Art. 12.
Article 5 of the Antarctic Treaty, prohibiting the carrying out of
nuclear explosions, was unnecessary in the Space Treaty in view of the
previous signing of the Test Ban Treaty. Arthur Goldberg, in his
capacity as U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly,
remarked that the arms control provision of the Space Treaty ". . .
is similar to that embodied in the Antarctic Treaty . . . namely,
free access by all parties to one another's installations." M7
This free access principle, as well as other basic principles established
by the Antarctic Treaty, could be applied to outer space largely be-
cause, as during the IGY,
... no nation protested the flight of satellites over its territory. No nation
requested the launching states to obtain permission to fly over its sovereign lands
and territorial waters . . . No nation reserved its rights with regard to space-
flights in the future. Nor did any nation set an upper limit on airspace that might
have been construed as the lower boundary for outer space.248
Thus, as pointed out by Ambassador Goldberg, the three treaties
represented a "historic progression":
First was the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, reserving that large area of the world
for exclusively peaceful activity; second was the limited test ban treaty of 1963,
and third is the treaty [on outer space] which now lies before this committee.249
Concluding Remarks
As indicated earlier, the main objective of this case study has been
to shed light on whether the good will and cooperative spirit generated
by the international scientific community can be utilized to any extent
in the international political arena. In particular, the objective was to
determine whether the unprecedented scientific legacy of the IGY
exerted any significant impact upon subsequent international politi-
cal behavior.
2« Summarized from: Department of State, Treaties and Other International Actt Series, No. 6347 (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1067), 89 pp.
«' Department of Stale Built tin 49 (Jan. 9, 1967), p. 80. From a speech before the U.N. General Assem-
bly. Goldberg was referring specifically to art. I, II, and XII of the treaty.
248 Rilenp Galloway, "Law, Order, and Outer Space," Electronic Age !9 (autumn 1970), p. 4.
2« Department of State Bulldin 49 (Jan. 9, 1967), p. 78. Goldberg mentioned this "historic progression"
twice during his remarks.
358
It would appear that this question can now be answered affirma-
tively. The evidence is highly suggestive, if not conclusive, that the
new communications channels, the tremendous cooperative spirit,
and the increased understanding among participants of the 67 nations
which took part in the IGY led directly to the Antarctic Treaty.
Whether or not the IGY can be credited in such strong terms, it
clearly played an important part in helping shape that treaty, which
in turn reinforced the cooperative pattern for the other treaties and
agreements which were to follow. Just as scientists approach their
objectives through a step-by-step process, so did politicians appear
to approach these international objectives in similar fashion, with
similar success.
It may be argued, of course, that the implications of the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962 had more to do with the test ban than did the
IGY, that only after facing up to the unpleasant realities of a possible
nuclear war did the Soviets opt for agreement, thereby making possi-
ble the essential conditions in which the promise of the IGY could be
fulfilled. To acknowledge the reality of political and military power,
however, is not to diminish the power of the IGY as an idea whose
time had come.
Perhaps an even more persuasive testament to that power is to
be found not in the symbolic, formal language and protocol of treaties
but in the quickened pace and broadened scope of the many inter-
national meetings to exchange both basic knowledge and techno-
logical know-how which can trace their origins to the IGY example.
It" was 50 years between the First Polar Year and the Second, and
25 years from that to the IGY. Today hardly a year goes by without
one or more major conferences addressed to phenomena and problems
of the environment, the oceans, energy, or new aspects of mankind's
relationships with regard to outer space. To say that the IGY was
responsible for these developments to advance the human condition
would be gross overstatement, since the phenomena and problems
themselves are ultimately responsible simply by their existence. But
human perception of them was furthered by the IGY; international
good will in collaborating to explore them was fostered by it; and it
seems quite possible that the IGY conferred on political leaders of most
of the world's nations an enlarged appreciation of the potential of con-
structive international collaboration for solving political, as well as
scientific and technological, problems.
Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations
ACIGY — Advisory Council of the International Geophysical
Year.
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee.
CETX Inter- Union Committee on Contamination by Extra -
Terrestrial Exploration.
CIG Comite Internationale de Geophysique (International
Geophysical Committee) .
COMSAT Communications Satellite Corporation.
COSPAR Committee on Space Research.
CSAGI Bureau du Comite Special de l'Annee Geophysique
Internationale 1957-58 (Special Committee for the
International Geophysical Year).
FAGS Federation of Astronomical and Geophysical Services.
FPY First International Polar Year.
IATME International Association of Terrestrial Magnetism
and Electricity.
IAU International Astronomical Union.
ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions.
IGU International Geographical Union.
IGY International Geophysical Year.
IMU International Mathematical Union.
INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Consor-
tium.
IUB International Union of Biochemistry.
I UBS International Union of Biological Science3.
IUCr International Union of Crystallography.
IUGG International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.
IUHPS International Union of History and Philosophy of
Science.
IUPAC International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry.
IUPAP International Union of Pure and Applied Physics.
IUPS International Union of Physiological Sciences.
IUTAM International Union of Theoretical and Applied
Mechanics.
IWDS International World Days Service.
MCI Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere (or, Joint Com-
mission on the Ionosphere).
NSF National Science Foundation.
SCAR Special Committee on Antarctic Research.
SCG Special Committee for Inter-Union Cooperation in
Geophysics.
SCOR Special Committee on Oceanic Research.
SPY Second International Polar Year.
TPY Third International Polar Year.
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization.
URSI Union Radio-Scientifique Internationale (Interna-
tional Scientific Radio Union).
USNC-IGY United States National Committee for the IGY.
WMA World Meteorological Association.
WMO World Meteorological Organization.
(359)
Appendix 2. A Brief Chronology of the IGY
Aug. 1 , 1 882 Beginning of the First International Polar Year.
Aug. 31, 1883__ End of the First International Polar Year.
Aug. 1, 1932 __ Beginning of the Second International Polar
Year.
Aug. 31, 1933 End of the Second International Polar Year.
April 5, 1950 Berkner's proposal for a Third Polar Year, at a
meeting in Van Allen's home.
July 1950 Meeting of the MCI at which it was decided to
commend the Berkner proposal to the ICSU
and its unions.
Sept. 1950 Approval of the Berkner proposal by URSI.
Sept. 1950 Approval of the Berkner proposal by IAU.
Jan. 1951 ICSU Bureau commends the Berkner proposal
to its Executive Board.
Aug. 1951 Approval of the Berkner proposal by the IUGG.
Oct. 1951 Creation by the ICSU of a Special Committee
for a Third International Polar Year.
Oct. 1952 Suggestion by Chapman that the name be
changed to International Geophysical Year
approved by ICSU.
Oct. 1952 Provisional meeting of the CSAGI; all nations
are asked to form national IGY committees.
June 30- July 3, 1953 First plenary session of CSAGI in Brussels,
attended by 26 nations.
Early 1954 Program devised for world days and 10-day
meteorological intervals.
March 1954 Completion of proposed IGY program by the
USNC.
May 1954 Deadline for submission of detailed national
programs.
Sept. 30-Oct. 4, 1954 Second plenary session of the CSAGI in Rome,
attended by 38 nations.
March 1955 Recommendation by ICSU that an Advisory
Council be formed to assist CSAGI.
Sept. 8-14, 1955 Third plenary session of the CSAGI in Bni6-
sells. Parallel sessions of the Advisory Council.
Decision was made that the IGY be officially
begun at zero hours, Greenwich time, on
July 1, 1957.
Sept. 10-15, 1946 Fourth plenary session of the ICSU in Barcelona.
Jan. 10, 1957 Creation by the U.S.S.R. of the "Consultative
Committee for Preparing for and Imple-
menting the IGY at Establishments of the
Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R."
July 1, 1957 Official beginning of the IGY at zero hours
Greenwich time.
Oct. 4, 1957 Sputnik I injected into orbit to become the
world's first artificial earth satellite.
Julv 29-Aug. 9, 1958 _ Final plenary session of the CSAGI in Moscow.
Dec. 31, 1958... Official end of the IGY.
(360)
Chapter 6 — The Mekong Project:
Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction 1 365
Regionalism as a System for the Application of Science and
Technology 365
The Timing of the Johns Hopkins Speech 366
Regional Development Proposal in the Johns Hopkins Speech __ 366
Diplomatic Environment of the Johns Hopkins Speech 367
Diplomatic and Political Reactions to the Speech 368
Some Possible Longer-Range Consequences of the Mekong
Concept 370
II. Varieties of National and International Regionalism 372
Regional Development in the United States 373
Early Proposals for International Regional Development 374
Forms of International Regionalism 376
III. Evolution of the Program To Develop the Region of the Lower
Mekong Basin 380
Adoption of the Regionalism Principle into the United Nations
System 380
Geography of the Lower Mekong Basin Region 382
Complex Social and Cultural Patterns of the Basin 384
Early Planning for Development of the Mekong, 1952-1957 385
Socio-Economic Research Planning: The Ford Foundation Study. 388
Action Programs on the Mekong, 1962-1965 389
Status of the Mekong Project in the Spring of 1965 390
IV. Accelerated Progress in 1965 395
President Johnson's Contacts With Regionalism 395
Relationship of U.S. -Vietnamese War Goals to Regionalism 398
U.S. Measures To Raise the Tempo of Mekong Development 400
The Nam Ngum Dam..r 401
The Asian Development Bank 402
The Pa Mong Dam Project 404
Infrastructure for the Mekong Project 406
Status of the Mekong Project at the Close of 1965 408
V. Slump and Recovery: The Mekong Project, 1966-1971 409
Postwar Planning in Vietnam: The Thuc-Lilienthal Report 410
Action on the Large Main Stem Projects 413
Status of the Mekong Project, Beginning of 1972 414
Environmental Quality and Regional Development of the Me-
kong 418
The Nixon Doctrine and Asian Regionalism : Security Plus Devel-
opment 420
Regionalism for National Security and Economic Development.. 421
VI. Issues, Problems, and Opportunities Offered by World Regionalism __ 425
Southeast Asia as a Regional Security Bloc 425
Regional Development as an Instrument of Foreign Aid 427
Global Regionalism as a Long-Range Means Toward U.S. Diplo-
matic Goals 430
Appendix: Comments by Eugene R. Black on Topics Relating to This
Study 433
TABLES
1. Mekong Project: Operational Resources as of January 11, 1965 391
2. Comparison — Large Dams and Hydroelectric Plants 405
3. U.S. Military Forces in Vietnam 409
4. Mekong Project, Operational Resources as of December 31, 1971 416
5. Mekong Tributary Projects: January 1972 417
(363)
CHAPTER 6— THE MEKONG PROJECT: OPPORTUNITIES
AND PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM
I. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the concept and the out-
come to date of the Mekong proposal contained in President Lyndon B.
Johnson's peace initiative, April 7, 1965, expressed in a speech at
Johns Hopkins University and to a national radio and television
audience. The speech asserted U.S. willingness to negotiate an end to
the then-expanding conflict in Vietnam, defended U.S. policy of bomb-
ing in North Vietnam, and offered U.S. support for a large program of
regional development in Southeast Asia.
The President offered a general program of rehabilitation of Viet-
nam, but singled out for particular attention the Lower Mekong Basin
Project, an ambitious scheme of river-related development in the four
nations of Southeast Asia that had been gathering impetus for nearly
a decade.
Regionalism as a System for the Application of Science and Tech-
nology
The significance of this study in the present series on "Science, Tech-
nology, and American Diplomacy" is that the principal type of region-
alism here discussed is above all a technique for applying science and
technology 1 systematically to a multinational region.
Development of a country is inherently a process of technological
application toward an economic result, Regionalism — or more pre-
cisely, regional development — introduces the idea of a system within
which technology is applied more coherently to a geographic unit than
to a political unit. The technological system requires, first of all, an
intensive application of science. The scientific base of a regional de-
velopment scheme, of which the Mekong Lower Basin Project is here
the prototype, involves an enormous range of research disciplines:
meteorology, soil chemistry, biomedicine, forestry, plant genetics, so-
ciology, anthropology, marine biology, entomology, and geology, to
mention only a few. The technology and engineering base of such a re-
gional development scheme is similarly broad. It encompasses hydraul-
ics, electric power, flood control, electronic communications, computer
modeling, electrical industries, large demonstration farms, highway
and bridge construction, fish and agricultural food processing, and
many more fields of technological applications.
The leadership role of the United States had been demonstrated in
the first regional development project to command worldwide atten-
1 The broad implications of "Technology" in this context require explanation. The
term means more than tools, manufacturing processes, and advanced engineering. It
signifies the systematic, purposeful application of knowledge to modify an environment
toward predetermined goals. Regional application of technology means that the goals
are expressed in regional terms. The regional development scheme for the Lower Mekong
Basin started out as an ambitious, capital-intensive civil works program aimed at dams,
hydroelectric plants, flood control, and large-scale irrigation. Rut the application of
"knowledge" brought about important modification ; more modest, agriculturally-centered,
and labor-intensive activities received priority emphasis. The plan in 1972 remained
ambitious and far-reaching. Rut sophistication was more evident, and awareness was
sharpened as to the need for careful planning and study of the consequences of change.
Note : This chapter prepared in 1972 by Franklin P. Huddle.
(365)
366
tion — the Tennessee Valley Authority. President Johnson's expressed
hope was that by applying this same regional development concept in
Southeast Asia, the United States could (a) demonstrate a construc-
tive form of technological leadership congenial to the U.S. electorate,
(b) stimulate a concerted effort with the technological resources of
the United Nations system directed at regional development, (c) en-
list the interest and enthusiasm of the peoples of Southeast Asia in a
constructive, pacific, cooperative, technologically-oriented enterprise
as an alternative to war, and (d) attract support for this effort from
the other nations of the world, regardless of their ideological leanings.
The magnitude of the proposed task, moreover, would require — and,
it was hoped, receive — so large an effort as to diminish the resources
and energy diverted to conflict in the region. These were some of the
underlying purposes of the Johns Hopkins proposal of April 7, 1965.
The Timing of the Johns Hopkins Speech
The timing of the speech coincided with stepped-up bombing of
strategic targets in North Vietnam by U.S. military aircraft, begin-
ning with isolated strikes in mid-February, and broadening into a
more sustained air offensive in early March. It followed by a week the
President's decision, to be disclosed later on, to deploy U.S. troops and
undertake ground combat operations in South Vietnam (to an extent
that would number 184,314 military personnel in the area by the end
of 1965). This decision seems attributable to the threatened collapse
of military control in the South; both land and air operations were
intended to blunt the assault from the North, neutralize the operations
of the Vietcong, and shore up the disorganized government of South
Vietnam.2
Concern at this time over the enlargement in the conflict was evi-
denced by the major powers and by a number of "nonaligned" nations.
In the United States, sentiment against U.S. involvement in Vietnam
had not yet peaked but was rising rapidly. All of these developments
were germane to the several purposes of the President's speech. How-
ever, the present study is concerned essentially with that part of it
which proposed U.S. support for regional development in Southeast
Asia as an alternative to conflict in Vietnam. It was a proposal to
apply technology to the development of a multinational region as an
alternative to ideological or nationalistic uses of force.
The question is whether the Mekong proposal amounted to more
than a diplomatic maneuver toward a shortrange objective. What was
its significance then, and what is it today, as a more basic and evolu-
tionary concept of general strategy toward U.S. foreign policy ob-
jectives in Southeast Asia ? Does it offer a means toward a more accept-
able pattern of diplomatic relationships over the longrange future?
Regional Development Proposal in the Johns Hopkins Speech
Substantively, the speech consisted of three parts: (1) a declaration
that the United States proposed to continue the bombing raids on
North Vietnam with an explanation of why. (2) a definition of U.S.
•John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Internationa] Security Affairs),
cabled Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, April 15, t<> savin part :
Mij.'h<'st Authority [the President] believes the situation in Smith Vietnam lias
been deteriorating ami that, in addition t" actions against the North, something new
must he added in the South to achieve victory. (The document is quoted in Neil
Sheehan, ilrdrlck Smith. B. W. Kenworthy, Fox Butterfleld, The l'cntaqon Papers
(New York ; Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), p. 404.)
367
policy with respect to war purposes coupled with a declaration of U.S.
readiness to negotiate a peace settlement, and (3) an offer of $1 bil-
lion to the United Nations in support of cooperative regional develop-
ment in Southeast Asia.
Although the third point dealt generally with food, medical services,
education, and economic progress in Indochina, the specific references
emphasized development of the Lower Basin of the Mekong River.
The President declared that Vietnamese on both sides of the conflict
wanted the same things: "Food for their hunger — health for their
bodies and a chance to learn — progress for their country, and an end
to the bondage of material misery." These goals, he asserted, could be
more readily achieved in peaceful cooperation. He went on —
The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves
in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that
North Vietnam will take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful
cooperation is possible.
The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area.
I would hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use the
prestige of his great office — and his deep knowledge of Asia — to initiate, as soon
as possible, with the countries of the area, a plan for cooperation in increased
development.
For our part I will ask Congress to join in a billion-dollar American invest-
ment in this effort when it is underway.
And I hope all other industrialized countries — including the Soviet Union —
will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress.
The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than
a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.
The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to
dwarf even our own TVA.
The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where
thousands die for lack of care.
Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the
process of development.
To implement this "billion-dollar" development program, the Presi-
dent proposed to organize a special team, headed by Mr. Eugene Black,
former (1949-1962) president of the Bank for International Recon-
struction and Development, which he hoped would be able to work
in cooperation with the United Nations.
Diplomatic Environment of tlie Johns Hopkins Speech
The decision to begin sustained air war against North Vietnam
had been made by the President on February 13, 1965. On April 1 he
made the further decision to use American ground troops for offensive
action in South Vietnam. Both actions were taken primarily to stave
off collapse in the South.
In his own account of the speech, President Johnson, writing in
1971, recalled that his purpose had been threefold: "to explain our
policy as clearly as possible, to urge Hanoi once more to join us in
trying to reach a peaceful settlement, and to describe what peace and
cooperative effort could do for the economic development of all of
Southeast Asia." The President went on to refer to an "outside de-
velopment" in which leaders of 17 nonaligned nations meeting in mid-
March had sent an appeal to the belligerent nations and to the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations, asking for negotiations to end the
war. The appeal reached Washington April 1. The President's ac-
count continues —
Ambassador [Maxwell] Taylor was home from Vietnam at that time and we
had scheduled a National Security Council meeting on April 2 to hear his report
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1
25
368
ou Vietnamese developments. Rusk opened the NSC meeting by describing the
appeal of the seventeen nonaligned nations. He urged that our reply lie "serious,
restrained, and positive." 1 agreed and decided to incorporate the main elements
of our reply in the Johns Hopkins speech.3
Id sum. the speech was in response to foreign and domestic pressure
to negotiate an end to the conflict. It sought to present a constructive
alternative to conflict. It sought to reassure the people of the United
States that its leadership was seeking the peaceful alternative and
stood ready to negotiate to this end. It sought to encourage a '"coop-
erative effort for development" to increase the peaceful interaction
among the nations of Indochina. "It sought to involve the United Na-
tions more extensively in the theater, and also to stimulate participa-
tion of as many industrialized nations as possible (including the
Soviet Union) in the constructive effort in the region as an alternative
to conflict; conceivably, such Soviet participation would widen the
breach between mainland China and the USSR, as well as generating
a possible source of difference between the North Vietnamese and the
Vietcong. Possibly also it was intended to contribute further stability
to the government of South Vietnam, and offer an enticement to the
North Vietnamese to negotiate. It combined the goals of ending the
war and winning the war.
Diplomatic and Political Reactions to the Speech
It is not easy to characterize the immediate consequences of the
President's speech. There were too many objectives, too many ingredi-
ents, and too many concurrent developments, for any unequivocal
identification of the results. From Hanoi and Peking, the reaction was
one of strong rejection. In the American and British press, the com-
ments were generally favorable. On the floor of the Congress, re-
sponses were largely partisan, with the President's Democratic sup-
porters praising the statesmanlike balance of the speech and the Repub-
licans denouncing it as a futile effort to '"buy peace."
President Johnson has summed up the communist response to the
proposal in these words:
The Communists' answer came quickly. On April 9 Radio Peking said my offer
was "full of lies and deceptions." The following day Moscow called the proposal
"noisy propaganda." Two days after that Hanoi's Communist party newspaper
described the Johns Hopkins offer as "bait." On April L'<> North Vietnam de-
clared that the seventeen nations thai had signed the proposal for unconditional
talks "were not accurately informed."
The door to peace remained closed. As for economic cooperation and regional
improvement, Hanoi's spokesmen described our proposal as an attempt to "bribe"
them. They had no interest in cooperating with their neighbors in a peaceful
way; they preferred to take them over by force.'
In the Senate, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield praised the speech
;i- making clear thai '*. . . we are prepared to do our part with other
nat ions to convert t hat peace, once it is obtained, into a dynamic peace,
a peace of constructive benefit, not only to the people of Viel nam, 'North
'Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantagi Point: Perspectives o) ih> Presidency 196S i960
(New York : Roll, Rineharl I Winston, 1071), p 133 The uonallpned nations were
Afgnnlstan, Cyprus Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal,
Syria, Tuni in i ganda, The United Arnb Republic, Yugoslavia, and Zambia The texts of
the formal appeal from these nations, and the tl.S. response to it, appear in the Depart
ment of State Bulletin (April 26 1985), pp 610 612,
in, v he Vantage Point, p,
369
and South, but to Southeast Asia as a whole." :' Congressman Zablocki
declared himself "impressed by the dramatic and hold initiative s< ized
by the President in proposing a massive program of cooperative de-
velopment for Southeast Asia." He observed that its "principal object/1
had been insufficiently recognized:
"That is the bold move to stabilize Southeast Asia and assist the
peaceful progress of the people in that area through a multi-national
program of economic assistance, directed by the United Nations, in
which Communist nations would be invited to participate.'5 "
Senator McGovem concurred. Peace in Asia, he said. ". . . means
precisely the kind of imaginative effort the President proposed last
night, including regional development of water resources, including
use of our own farm products, including spread of cheap electric
power, including health programs, including expert and experienced
assistance from the best people available in the field of international
development." Senator Moss added that the speech "represents a major
.break-through in the international posture." 7
On the other hand, Senator Everett Dirksen, the Minority Leader,
questioned the feasibility of an attempt to ''buy peace with an Ameri-
can aid program" and Representative Gerald R. Ford declared that
". . . friendship, security, and solid international relationships can-
not be bought with dollars." 8
In the press, the immediate response emphasized the "carrot and
stick" theme. A typical statement in the New York Times observed
that the speech had been prompted by ". . . a personal desire to yield
to and appeal to opinion at home and abroad'' plus a move ;'. . . in
the complicated and subtle effort to bring North Vietnam to terms —
to suggest that Hanoi could profit from a settlement while emphasiz-
ing how Hanoi would suffer, largely alone, in further combat." 9 How-
ever, as time went on, and the responses from both the North Vietna-
mese authorities and the leadership in Mainland China were strongly
negative to the peace move, attention in the U.S. press turned more
and more to the regional development feature of the speech. On April
0, the Washington Post carried a follow-up story that began —
President Johnson's dramatic offer of $1 billion to help finance a Southeast
Asian development program is designed to harness regional resources in a vast
effort to raise Asian living standards and at the same time reduce Communist
pressures on the area.
The concept, the story went on, "could provide the spark necessary •
to set the region for the first time on a concentrated drive toward
development and prosperity." 1()
n Mike Mansfield, "President Johnson's Speech on Southeast Asia — Vietnam." Remarks
of Senator Mike Mansfield on the floor of the Senate, Congressional Record (April 8,
1965) : p. 7492.
"Clement Zablocki, "President Johnson's Address on Vietnam." Remarks of Repre-
sentative Clement Zablocki on the floor of the House, Congressional Record (Auril $,
1965) : p. 7459.
TGeorpe S. McGovem and Frank E. Moss, "President Johnson's Speech on Southeast
Asia — Vietnam." Remarks of Senators George S. McGovem and Frank !■". Moss on the Boor
of the Senate, Congressional Record (April 8, 1965) : p. 74(.tr,.
* '"Dirksen, Ford Rap Johnson on Bid to Buy Peace," Washington Star (A; ril 8, 1905) :
"Max Frankel, "President Makes Offer to Start Vietnam Talks Unconditionally; Pro
po^s -SI Billion Aid for Asia," New York Times (April 8, 1965) : p. 1.
10 Dan Kurzman, "Offer Envisions Harnessing of Mekong," Washington Post (April 9,
196o) : p. A22.
370
Similar reports appeared in many other journals. For example:
"Funds to Flood Mekong River Project?" {Christian Science Moni-
tor, April 10) ; ''Hopes for Harnessing the Mekong'' {Business
Week, April 17) ; "The Mekong, Work in Progress" {London Econ-
omist, April 17) ; "The Promise of the Mekong" ( Washington Star,
April 21) ; "On the Mekong, Mr. Johnson's Billion Dollar Offer"
{New Republic, April 24) ; "A Project to Harness the 'Sleeping
Giant'" {Life, May 3).
But, as the commitment of U.S. troops to the Vietnamese conflict
continued to enlarge throughout 1965 and following years, interest
in the Mekong development feature of President Johnson's proposal
dwindled. Opposition to all forms of intervention in Southeast Asia —
whether military or economic — intensified. The speech itself faded to
a brief episode in the eventful period that culminated in the Presi-
dent's decision not to seek reelection in 1968, the violent protests that
exploded on American college campuses, the disorderly events of the
Democratic presidential convention in Chicago, and the choice of
President Nixon to lead a new administration committed to U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam.
Thus, while in the United States the President's Mekong proposal
may have slowed the growth of opposition to the war, its longterm
domestic impact is open to question. Its diplomatic consequences
abroad are perhaps even more subject to speculation and debate. At
least in a broad and symbolic sense, however, it may have left an en-
during impression. Eugene E. Black, who served beginning in 1965 as
Advisor to President Johnson on Southeast Asia Economic and Social
Development, holds the following affirmative view :
While impossible to measure with any precision, there is little doubt in my
mind that the political impact [on indigenous leadership elements] of President
Johnson's offer of large-scale postwar assistance to Southeast Asia was sub-
stantial. ... I considered the $1 billion offer to be more symbolic than mathe-
matically precise. . . . Both an immediate and short-range political impact
of our offer was its positive role as a catalyst in stimulating the interest in
and moves toward regional cooperation. . . . Many of the regional organizations
and groupings in Southeast Asia owe their origin or vitality to the boost for
regional cooperation given by the United States in the period 1965-1969. Best
known is the formation in late 1965 of the Asian Development Bank. . . . Less
recognized but no less real was the large increase in inter-regional personal
contacts which occurred in Southeast Asia over these years at various levels
and in varied forums. I have in mind such developments as the initiation of
plans for a region-wide study of transportation infrastructure (the study was
completed in 1971 with help of the ADB) ; the coming together of Ministers of
Education of the region to plan development of training institutions of regional
significance and the mushrooming of specialized regional groups to consider
one topic or another of economic, social or political significance. . . . The Johns
Hopkins speech and the stepped-up interest in the development potential of the
Mekong which it generated certainly had a healthy political impact in the non-
communisl riparian states hy focussing attention < m the future. I know this
from my four trips to the areas for President Johnson and subsequent visits.
... I would, therefore . . . say both the short and long-term political impact
of the Johns Hopkins offer was substantial in the professional communities in
all the riparian states hy opening up new horizons. . . .10a
Some Possible Longer-Range Consequences of the Mekong Concept
The question remains as to whether regionalism as an international
strategy for peace offers opportunities to he exploited. In the United
10» Excerpt from a statement of Mnrcli 14, 11*72, prepared by Mr. Black in response to
questions by the author. The full statement Is reproduced In the appendix to this study.
371
States the concept of regional development has long been well under-
stood and generally accepted. Subsequent events in Southeast Asia
have demonstrated that there is a real and growing interest there in
the application of technology on a geographic rather than politically-
defined basis (the essence of ''regionalism"). It is at least possible that
the concept of regionalism might at some future time, and under more
favorable auspices, serve a useful purpose in support of U.S. diplo-
matic objectives. Accordingly, the rest of this study will undertake to
define and examine the concept, its application to the Lower Basin of
the Mekong, and the problems and issues surrounding this develop-
ment. Attention will be given to such questions as —
What durable consequences came from the President's Mekong
initiative?
Might the proposal have served a broader and more decisive
diplomatic purpose under more favorable circumstances and
timing ?
What potential diplomatic opportunities are offered by region-
alism— the concept of applying technology to geographic as dis-
tinguished from politically-defined areas ?
Under what circumstances might regional development involv-
ing multinational regions afford an alternative to conflict, and
can the factor of timeliness in adopting this alternative be deter-
mined and exploited?
Following the President's peace initiative, foreign aid from the
United States to Vietnam became inextricably merged with efforts to
mobilize Vietnamese manpower in support of the war or to strengthen
the government of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, throughout the seven
years from the time of the speech to the present, the international
effort to apply technology to the systematic development of the Lower
Mekong Basin has grown considerably. Undeniably, as Mr. Black
suggests, the speech and subsequent efforts to implement its proposal
stimulated progress in the regional project. Despite many strains, co-
operation among the four countries of the Basin (Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos, and South Vietnam) held steadfast. Outside support for the
project has come from many countries, many agencies within the
United Nations family, and many nongovernmental institutions. As a
multinational development effort it has demonstrated 14 years of con-
tinuity, stability, and growth. It has provided evidence to justify the
forecast made in 1963 :
. . . The best opportunities for encouraging regionalism in Southeast Asia
still exist in the economic and cultural fields. In many respects the development
of the Lower Mekong Basin ... is a beacon for the future. The success of the
scheme could be one of the most important steps in the development of regional-
ism in Southeast Asia.11
The chapter to follow presents a general discussion of the nature and
types of regionalism, both national and international. Then the evolu-
tion of the Mekong Project is chronicled, before and after the Presi-
dent's speech. Finally, the account concludes with a consideration of
possible roles and limitations of types of international developmental
regionalism as an instrument of U.S. diplomacy.
^C. Hart Schaaf and Russell H. Fifield, The Lower Mekong: Challenge to Cooperation
in Southeast Asia (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., l\)bS), p. t><.
II. Varieties of National axd International Regionalism
.Vn obstacle to clarity of discussion about the Mekong Project, or
about regionalism generally, is that it carries so mam' different mean-
ings. Jn the chapter to follow, some of the varieties of regionalism are
identified; these are all involved to some extent in one or another of
the spectrum of attitudes toward the Mekong Project. The term
"Region'' is itself a kind of omnibus word involving variously the
idea of. —
An area defined by "one or more physical characteristics, such as
rainfall, length of growing season, character of soil, vegetation,
contours, and similar features*':
An area characterized by the "prevalence of one or more cultural
characteristics — such as language or dialect, costume, form of
social organization, type of architecture, use of given tools, ac-
ceptance of a given religion, practice of certain social cus-
toms . . .";
An area set off from other areas "by barriers of various sorts
! tich as] mountains, deserts, rivers, lakes, and oceans . . .";
An area within which the component parts are in a condition of
interdependence in some important respect or respects; an ex-
ample is a trade area, "delineated by the network of economic
interconnections that holds it together . . ."; and
An ana in which some problem or collection of problems is shared,
and planning to deal with them comprehensively takes on a
"regional planning" or "regional administration'' character.
Accordingly, ". . . In the concept of region we are not dealing with
a single and unambiguous idea, but rather with a variety of notions
and approaches.'' Therefore. "To use the regional concept as if it were
one clear and univocal term is to make for misunderstandings and con-
fusion rather than clarity.*' '- The varieties of regionalism suggested
in this source are primarily intranational. They include the geophysi-
cal (e.g., the Rocky Mountain region), the cultural (e.g.. the "Old
Soul h."), the physiographically separate (e.g., Hawaii or Alaska), the
economically interdependent (e.g.. the Pittsburgh iron and steel
region), and the area whose components share a common problem or
opportunity (e.g.. the Tennessee Valley region, the St. Lawrence Sea-
way and its served area, Appalachia, Four Corners, etc.).
Regionalism in the United States has followed one or another of
these patterns. But when the effort was made to apply the general con-
cepl of "Regionalism" to groups of nations abroad, many other crite-
ria came into play. International regionalism involves the interaction
12 1 is Wlrth, "Limitations of Regionalism." In: Merrill Jensen ed., Regionalism in
Imeri </ • Papers of Symposium on American Regionalism (Madison, Wise: university of
In Press, 1965), pp. 381 386.
(372)
373
of sovereignties not only of nations within intended ''regions" but also
of such nations with various of the superpowers. Goals of such interna-
tional regions may be the same as (hose of U.S. developmental regions,
but alternatively may encompass shared interests in national security,
and these interests may also involve the superpowers. A further com-
plicating factor is the existence of innumerable international agencies
with different objectives, different scopes of interest, and different ap-
proaches to regionalism.
Regional Development in the United States
Regionalism became almost an ideology in the United States during
the depression years. Its advocate*- cited the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority as the idealization of the concept. Although admittedly a
capital-intensive development of dams, power plants, transmission
lines, Mood control works, and navigation improvements, TVA was
much more: a complex program of soil improvement, agricultural
processing, farm technology!, reforestation, and commercial develop-
ment of the entire basin of the Tennessee River and its tributaries.
The TVA concept was characterized by the following features:
Corporate organization
Exercise of the sovereign powers of the Federal Government
Right to hold and sell property, to sue and be sued
Authority to construct and operate power dams and distribution
lines — to sell power wholesale or retail
Domain over the entire watershed of the Tennessee River
A policy of contracting with State and local governments and
individuals for cooperative development arrangements
Maintenance of its own civil service and labor relations
Incorporation within its central organization of miniature de-
partments of commerce, agriculture, labor, health, mining, and
engineering technology, in addition to its more widely pub-
licized power activities.
Various criticisms have been expressed of alleged imperfections in
TVA — its tendency to yield to elitist elements locally, technical deci-
sions to flood extensive'areas of bottomland, the sharp bargaining for
coal that encouraged extensive strip mining without subsequent re-
pair, conflicts of jurisdiction with departments of the National Gov-
ernment, and charges of excessive claims of regional economic benefits.
Nevertheless. TVA must be accounted a technical success, and perhaps
more importantly a political success. Xotable bipartisan support has
arisen in the Valley whenever TVA lias been challenged, and its place
as an American institution appears to be firmly established.
Despite this acceptance, when the question arose as to whether the
TVA experiment should be repeated elsewhere in precisely — or essen-
tially— the same format, the decision was always in favor of some
other approach. There were many of these. Development of the Mis-
souri, the Columbia, the Colorado, and other of America's great rivers
was entrusted to departments of the National Government. Encour-
agement and support for cooperative joint organizations of the States
to develop such regions as Appalachia, Four Corners, the Great Lakes,
and elsewhere, were coordinated by an institution of the Department
of Commerce. Significantly, many of the lessons learned in the TVA
experiment were applied elsewhere: enlisting local support and par-
374
ticipation, broad scope of planning, the search for interactions and
coherence. These aspects of the particular brand of ad hoc regionalism
practiced in the TVA experiment permeated many of the other re-
gional development programs. Even in the national programs of the
Federal departments, a gesture was made in the direction of regional
coherence by a sustained attempt to rationalize the jurisdictional areas
of "regional" offices.
Early Proposals for International Regional Development
An analysis of TVA as a possible prototype for international appli-
cation to developing regions was conducted during the latter years of
World War II by Herman Finer under the sponsorship of the Inter-
national Labour Office. Dr. Finer concluded that while international
development projects might be of great assistance to developing coun-
tries, TVA as a model was "not transplantable without reservations
and qualifications." 13 On the basis of a thorough examination of the
organization, activities, and economic impacts of TVA, Finer con-
cluded that its cardinal feature was that "it was deliberately estab-
lished and given responsibility for the welfare of an under-developed
area." There wore many such areas throughout the world. To apply the
regional concepts of TVA to such regions would offer an outlet for
savings and for capital transfers from the affluent to the disadvan-
taged. Areas of development "need not be restricted to valleys,
although mention has been made of the Danube, Yangtze, and the
Jordan Valleys." What was important was that "existing political
divisions of the world and their frontiers, whether States or their
subdivisions, are not self-sufficient economic units."
Finer noted that regional development required comprehensive and
longrange planning. The relationship between those in charge of the
development and the political authorities of the region needed to be
explicit. Cooperation was imperative between them. Moreover, the
powers given to any international regional development authority,
"in order to calm any national sensitiveness," should be clear, defined,
soberly constructed, and modified with care as the need arose.
One example of a possible application of the regional development
principle appeared shortly after World War II ended. It was offered
in a short book by Walter C. Lowdermilk. an official of the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, and proposed a "Jordan Valley Authority —
A Counterpart of TVA in Palestine." 14 He observed that the valley
of the Jordan River "offers a combination of natural features and a
concentration of resources which set the stage for one of the greatest
and most far-reaching reclamation projects on earth, comparable to
our TVA in scope and importance." He proposed that the sweet water
of the valley be used for irrigation, and that salt water from the Medi-
terranean lie introduced into the Dead Sea. generating electric power
as it dropped the 1.200 feet from sea level to the level of the water
across the bottom of the Jordan rift. Other features of Lowdermilk's
plan included water conservation, flood control, soil erosion control.
w Herman Finer. The TVA, Lessons for International Application, studies and Reports,
Series B (Economic Conditions), no. ::7 (Montreal: International Labour Office, nun,
pp. 218 236.
14 Walter Clay Lowdermilk, Palestine, I. ami <>] Promise (New York : Harper and Krotliors,
1944). p.
375
range management, fertilization, reforestation, land reclamation, and
extraction of mineral values from the Dead Sea.
Another effort that has received less attention was the 1944 mission
to China of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. A team of engineers
visited Chungking to study the upper reaches of the Yangtze River to
explore the possibility of a national program of regional development.
The team sketched out a billion-dollar project to irrigate 60 million
acres, generate more than 10 million kilowatts of firm power, and open
navigation on the river from Shanghai to Chungking.15
By the close of World War II, regionalism had become the ortho-
dox philosophy of planning for large-scale public works. Water re-
source projects in the United States generally conformed to this
pattern, emphasized alike in reports of the Hoover Commission, the
plans of the Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of Engineers, and
congressional studies.16 An endless stream of foreign visitors to the
TVA took home with them the notion of comprehensive planning for
whole river drainage basins.17
However, TVA was a special case — a capital-intensive development
program in a lagging region of a nation affluent and technologically
advanced. The people of the region were culturally receptive to the
project and the opportunities it offered to them. Four questions
emerged: (1) What elements of the special case of TVA regionalism
were suitable for export? (2) What new elements needed to be added
to improve the acceptability and effectiveness of multinational region-
alism? (3) What should be the roles of the various United Nations
organizations? and (4) How would the superpowers relate to multi-
national regionalism ?
From the point of view of the United States in the period follow-
ing World War II, two primary objectives were to be sought in the
encouragement of regional association of foreign nations : economic
development as a counter to communist penetration, and mutual secu-
rity pacts to deter the application of overt military force in support of
communist penetration. However, as the image of monolithic world
communism faded, a more complex view of regionalism became possi-
ble, and a variety of alternative forms of international regionalism
could be identified.
One form of regional development to which the United States has
contributed substantially in the past, and to which it continues to con-
tribute, involves the direct construction of civil works. However, this
construction has been undertaken without careful consideration of
the social consequences, and without the precondition of a partnership
among the nations participating in the project. One example of this
kind of regional development is the economic development of the
Indus River Basin, centering on water project development in India
and West Pakistan. A purpose of U.S. aid in this instance was to
help build an economic basis for cooperation between two countries
16 Frank P. Huddle, "Development of China," Editorial Research Reports I (1945),
p. 137.
18 See, for example, "Congressional Decisions on Water Projects," Technical Information
for Congress (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 426-467.
"According to the Washington office of TVA, a total of 1,5.35 visitors from Southeast
Asia inspected the TVA operation from 1960 to 1965, and 1,327 more between 1966 and
1972.
376
perennially on the verge of hostilities. The project was successful to
the extent that both India and Pakistan met their commitments under
the terms of the project; it increased agricultural production, espe-
cially in West. Pakistan; it also cemented relations among districts in
"West Pakistan where some sentiment toward separatism existed. On
the other hand, the project did not lead to a resolution of the basic
issues in dispute between India and Pakistan, which resulted in open
hostilities between them in 1965 and again in 1971. Moreover, the in-
vestment in West Pakistan added to the already serious disparity in
income with East Pakistan, providing one of the motives for the
separatist movement in 1971 that culminated in the formation of
Bangladesh.
Forms of International Regionalism
In one important respect, international regions are similar to sub-
national regions: they are geographic areas rather than areas with
political boundaries. All components of either kind of region share
some particular interest in common. On the other hand, the differences
between subnational and international regions are vast. The primary
distinction is that of sovereignty, of competing national interests. The
nations comprising a region need to reconcile their own interests
with their participation in a joint enterprise. In addition, the Great
Powers have the problem of reconciling their own national interests
with their bilateral relations with the individual states of the region
and with the region as a whole.
Varieties of regional relationships of an international region are
numberless ami involve such variables as: purpose, geographic scope,
scope of participation, leadership, functional scope, relation of the
region to member nations, and funding arrangements.
International regionalism can have all the different variations of
subnational. Over and above these, depending on the variety of pur-
poses, possible combinations of different nations, and further com-
plexities of relations of states in the region — separately and collec
tively — with the Great Powers and with the United Nations, there is
literally no limit to possible kinds of regional activity. A tabulation of
some of the more obvious kinds might include :
Purpose
mutual seeuritj (NATO, SEATO)
technological development (Euratom, Mekong)
trade advantage (Common .Market i
economy of scale (Common Market i
shared information (OECD, ECAFE)
resource development (Mekong)
< teographic Scope
cm incut a 1 i EGA, ECLA, Org. of African t'liity i
river l>asin < Mekong i
sphere of interest of Great Power < Warsaw Tact i
Scope of Part icipation
nations of the region
(same) plus I nited Nations institutions
(same) plus a Great Power (or several)
i same i plus many ether nations
Leadership
supplied by Hi.- nations of the region
supplied by die I'uiied Nat ions
supplied Py a Greal Power
supplied by an ad hoc, self-starting institution in the region
377
Functional Scope
single purpose
multipurpose
planned expansion
incremental evolution
Relation of Region to Component States
confederation
treaty consortium
delegation of limited powers
consultative
pooled resources
trading bloc tariff union
Arrangements for Funding
internal (from revenues of states of the region)
external —
donations (bilateral, multilateral)
loans (private, U.N. lending agency, regional lending agency, bilateral
Great Power, bilateral other)
combined internal and external.
The United States lias actively supported some forms of interna-
tional regionalism, has been sympathetic to others, and has been neu-
tral to some. Active opposition was expressed in the late 1930s to the
effort by Japan to evolve the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere." This effort was viewed as a form of imperialism posing a
threat to both military and commercial interests of the United States.
The Soviet arrangements with Comecon countries do not appear to
have elicited any positive U.S. posture. On the other hand, NATO has
received vigorous U.S. support as wTell as initial U.S. sponsorship;
the same is true of a number of other regional security treaties. To-
ward the Common Market and OECD, the general U.S. posture has
been one of acceptance and encouragement ; here the risks of economic
competition were judged to be balanced by the gains in Atlantic
security.
Among the possible motivations behind the U.S. posture toward
various schemes are : to preserve national power and national security,
to reduce tensions among the Great Powers, to alleviate sources of con-
flict (which could escalate) in a region of lesser Powers, and generally
to raise the living standards in a region of less developed countries.
It may be useful to contrast the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages to the United States of three principal kinds of regionalism
representing extreme differences of purpose and organizational form.
Type One: Mutual security of the nations of a region, with U.S.
support. (Example: SEATO).
Advantages to the United States :
Demonstrated acceptability to U.S. Congress :
Explicit program toward a capability desired by the United States ;
Assured compatibility of military organization and equipment with U.S.
counterparts ;
Opportunity for U.S. military contacts through operational and maintenance
training ; and
Outlet for U.S. weapons and equipment which are becoming obsolescent.
Disadvantages to the United States :
Usefulness depends on existence of evident and overt threat to the receiving
nation ;
Tends to increase military costs to receiving nation, requiring either (a)
further U.S. aid, or (b) transfer of resources from development;
Increases substantially the level of U.S. commitments, with some question
as to whether there is a commensurate increase in U.S. security ;
378
High U.S. profile:
Competition stimulated for arms acquisition among states of a region with
intensified intraregional tensions ; and
Hostility invited on the part of the Great Powers against both the arms
supplier and the recipient.
Type Txoo : Natural resources and economic development of a region,
with direct bilateral support from the United States to the nations of
the region. (Example: postwar U.S. aid to Eastern Mediterranean
Region — Greece, Turkey, etc.)
Advantages to the United States :
Direct U.S. legislative control of aid policy and spending levels ;
Acceptability to U.S. Congress ;
Encouragement of U.S. exports; benefits to U.S. industry, both present and
future ; and
Assurance of positive U.S. leverage on policy formulation of recipient
nations.
Disadvantages to the United States :
High U.S. profile ;
Persistent reliance invited on particular kinds of U.S. assistance and
technicians ;
Progressive resentment and antagonism generated toward the United States
as progress is achieved ;
High costs to the United States in proportion to development results
achieved ;
Competition generated among regional states for U.S. donations ; and
Distortion of world trade patterns.
Type Three : A developmental region receiving aid primarily from
two sources — contributions from countries in the region, and multi-
national institutions (e.g., United Nations Development Program,
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, etc.), of which the United
States is one of many sponsors. (Example: Mekong Lower Basin
Project as meeting most of the criteria.)
Advantages to the United States :
Shared costs — larger developmental results per U.S. dollar outlay ;
Lower U.S. profile ;
International cooperation, fostered both within the region and between the
region and the supporting international institution (s) :
Strengthened responsibility and management skills of both the region
and the international institution (s) ; and
Exertion of pressure generally on donor nations to accept exports from the
developing region.
Disadvantages to the United States :
Reduct ion of U.S. control of disposition of aid funds :
Minimal acceptability to U.S. Congress :
Primary emphasis of development on economic priorities of the nations
Of the region, rather than on compatibility with U.S. economy:
Pressure on U.S. to ease trade harriers, and accept exports from the coun-
tries of the region.
Unlike the various examples of regional security arrangement
(NATO. ANZrS. SEATO, etc.), the Mekong Lower Basin Project
was directed explicitly at development <>f resources of a river ha sin. by
r rather close analogy with the TVA. Its leadership shifted early
from its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ( ECAFE)
sponsorship <<> an internal organization in which the representatives
<»!' i he Riparian Nations spoke for their respective sovereignties. Presi-
dent Johnson's proposal to support the project was welcomed by the
379
single-minded Coordination Committee in Bangkok. But as a strate-
gem to undermine popular sentiment in North Vietnam and to set in
train a course of events to bring an end to the war on terms favorable
to the United States, the proposal demonstrated scant success. It is
conceivable that the move may have generated an attitude of opposi-
tion on the part of the communist countries toward various kinds of
regional cooperation for the future.
III. Evolution of the Program to Develop the Region of the
Lower Mekong Basin
When President Johnson made the offer to contribute greatly to the
Mekong program in 1965, the Lower Basin development work had
already been underway for about eight years with some modest U.S.
participation. The basis for international cooperation on such projects
went back a decade earlier than that. In his 1946 study of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Herman Finer
wrote :
The Council will encourage or institute regional conferences on economic,
social, and humanitarian problems. The authority for this does not and need not
appear directly in the Charter, for this is a matter of instruments not principles.
It is always a little discomforting to suggest regional differentiation in economic,
social, and humanitarian matters, because it is difficult to define a region, and
unpleasant to think that separate areas might pursue competitive or hostile
policies. But what is meant is roughly this. Some countries by reason of their
proximity and certain common characteristics of geography and climate and lo-
cation or the chance of history, have some problems in common.
He added : "The word 'regional' is not used here, and certainly ought
never to be used, in the sense of a unified economic area marked off
from the rest of the world and properly pursuing its own self-suffi-
cient interests." 18 He recalled that in the International Labor Con-
ference of May 1933, representatives of China and India had proposed
that a Far Eastern Regional Conference should be called, and sug-
gested that "No doubt the Economic and Social Council could foster
such special regional bodies . . . .v Specifically. Article 68 of the charter
of ECOSOC authorized it to "set up commissions in economic and
social fields and for the promotion of human rights and such other
commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions."
Adoption of the Regionalism Principle into the United Nations System
Cinder its charter, ECOSOC created an Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) on March 28, 1947. Its headquarters
were located in Bangkok, Thailand. Its scope extended to trade, agri-
culture, transportation, industrial and technological development,
education, and data -gathering. Its membership included all members
of the United Nations in Asia, plus Australia, New Zealand, France.
England, The Netherlands, the United States and the Soviet Union.19
(Other regional commissions have been established by ECOSOC for
Europe | ECE), for Latin America | ECLA),and for Africa (ECA).)
An early action by ECAFE was the organization of a series of con-
ferences on water resources, a subject to which the Commission gave
priority attention. In support of this activity, and to provide consulta-
18 Herman Finer, Tin United Nations Economic and Social Council (Boston Mass :
World Peace F idatlon, 1940), pp. 107 108.
'•China (Taiwan) withdrew fron mbersliip In anticipation of expulsion from the
United Nations, and the People's Republic ol China lias indicated the Intention i<> join
both ECOSOC a ICAFE
(380)
381
tive services to member nations, ECAFE in 1949 established a small
stall' organization, the Bureau of Flood Control, whose title was later
enlarged to Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Develop-
ment. Under its charter, the Bureau was instructed to advise and assist
governments in dealing with flood control and river problems; it was
also to maintain contact with the Food and Agriculture Organisation
and other specialized U.N. agencies dealing with problems related to
water.
The next organizational step was the creation in 1957 by the four
Riparian Nations— in association with ECAFE — of a permanent
"Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong,"
to be referred to hereafter as the "Coordination Committee." The fol-
lowing year, the Committee agreed to the establishment by ECAFE
of a permanent Advisory Board of professional engineers, headed by
an Executive Agent. The four members of the Coordination Commit-
tee representing the Riparian Nations had plenipotentiary powers of
decision ; the Agent had authority for making decisions on a day-by-
day basis in the preparation of requests for technical and financial
assistance, program planning and supervision, and staff support of the
Coordination Committee. On this rather unusual and extemporized
foundation was erected the organization to plan and administer a re-
gional program covering three-quarters of the drainage basin of the
tenth largest river in the world, a region larger than France, wTith
a population of perhaps 30 million.-0 How much the total invest-
ment in the project will be is a matter of sheer guesswTork; under con-
ditions of political stability and soundly based economic growth in the
region, investment in reasonable cost/benefit terms could reach the tens
of billions of dollars. (The long range plan for the Basin currently
projects a level of investment of $12 billion over the next 30. years.)
What makes plausible the management of so large a program with so
miscellaneous an array of resources and authorities is that the project
has shown an adaptive capability for 15 years, has not committed itself
to an unmanageably large effort, has concentrated on laying a solid
data base for each effort, and appears willing to accept a deliberate
pace for the future.
The relationship of the Mekong project to the United Nations is
viewed as a healthy and constructive one for the future. One analysis
suggests that it could serve as a prototype for such programs else-
where—
International river basin development will undoubtedly be one of the major
means of accomplishing economic growth and social change in the next few
decades, especially in the developing countries. Most of the world's major rivers
are international rivers, and most flow through the developing countries. Ap-
20 Population figures for the countries of Indochina are notoriously suspect. According
to tiie United Nations Demographic Year Book (New York: United Nations. 195S), pp.
95-97. the total population for the four countries in 1957 was ahout 40 million (Thailand
21 million, Vietnam 12.3, Cambodia 4.6, and Laos 1.7). An ECAFE study that same year
estimated the population of tile Basin at ahout 17 million. Other estimates run very much
higher. The most recent estimate gives: Thailand 37.4, South Vietnam is..",, Cambodia 4.6,
and Laos, 3.1, for a total of 66.1 million. North Vietnam, not included in tiiis total, was
estimated at 21.6 million. ("World Population Data Sheet." Washington, D.C. : Population
Reference Bureau, Inc., June 1971). The rate of increase of population in the region is
estimated at from two to three percent annually. Concentration of persons of child-hearing
age in urban areas will have considerable effect on future population growth. So will
public health measures. One theme that is constantly repeated in all the many studies of
the Lower Basin of the Mekong is the need for better data — demographic, economic, geo-
graphical, meteorological, and the like.
382
proximately 150 river basins straddle international boundaries, and together they
cover almost one-half or the world's land surface, excluding Australia and
Antarctica. Some of these rivers could be utilized for the production of hydro-
electric power, the provision of water for irrigation or domestic and industrial
uses, the improvement of navigation, or the control of floods. Despite these
potential benefits, however, only a few of the world's international rivers have
been developed.21
Another study suggests that the United Nations has a "vested interest"
in regionalism as an alternative means of peacekeeping, instead of
the use of international military forces. The latter means, this study
notes, has not been signally successful. Alternatively, "The precedent-
forming Mekong project may thus establish the pattern for new instru-
mentalities intended to harmonize international relations through co-
ordinated economic development." 22
Before the judgment can be reached that regionalism offers a sig-
nificantly hopeful tool toward the ultimate purposes of the United
Nations, further evidence is required of the success of the Mekong
effort, and evidence also that the idea strikes a responsive chord else-
where in the world. A dedicated enthusiast declares: "The future of
Southeast Asia is bound up with the question whether regionalism
will develop sufficiently to become a major consideration in the policies
of local and foreign governments." Cooperation on a multinational
regional basis, he asserts, "better meets the needs of small countries." If
this is indeed the case, perhaps it follows that "The systematic
development of the Lower Mekong Basin under international aus-
pices can help to reduce barriers of misunderstanding and lay founda-
tions of goodwill among the four riparian states." 23 It remains to be
seen how durable and how extensive this goodwill can be.
Geography of the Lower Mekong Basin Region 24
Many engineering opportunities are offered by a huge undeveloped
river in a region suffering alternately from too much and too little
water, where the low incomes characteristic of subsistence agricul-
ture are almost universal. These opportunities have been persistently
sought by leaders in the nations of the Lower Basin, by the regional
organization of the United Nations serving the area, and by many
volunteer groups and individuals who have contributed their resources
for this purpose. It may serve a useful purpose to describe here the
physical and political setting, the geography of the Basin, and the
history of the nations that occupy it.
The region of concern embraces the countries of Laos, Cambodia,2"'
Thailand, and Vietnam, usually referred to as the "Riparian States."'
21 W. R. Derrick Sewell and Gilbert F. White, "The Lower Mekong," International Con-
ciliation 558 i May. 1966) : p. 1.
Victor J. Croizat, "The Mekong River Development Project: Some Geographical,
Historical, and Political Considerations," Paper P3616 (Santa Monica, Calif. : Hand Cor
poratlon, June 1967 i
» Russell n Infield, professor of political science, University of Michigan. C. Schaaf
Plfleld, The Loioei Mekong: Challenge to Cooperation in Southeast Isia, pp. '.•. 56,
-'A considerable literature lias been produced dealing with aspects of the Lower Mekong
Basin. Sources for information in this section were: Sewell and White. "The Lower
Mekong"; U.S. Corps "i Engineers ami the Tennessee Valley Authoritj under 'he direc-
tion of the U.S. Agency for International Development, The United Xations Atlas o]
ft i. Economic, mni Social Resources of the Lower Mekong Basin (New Vork : United
fati , September 1968), 157 pp.: Willard A. Hanna, "The Mekong Project," Southeast
Asia Efteldstaff Reports xvi, Numbers 10, 11, 1-. l".. 14, and 10 (New York: Amer-
ican i , vrsities Field Staf) Reports, .Inly September, 1968) ; Schaaf and Fi field, 77c Lower
Mekong: ami Victor Croizat, 77m- Mekong River Development Project.
lip- authorities of the former kingdom of Cambodia declared their nation the "Khmer
Republic" on October 9, 1970,
383
The Mekong River, which rises in the northern slope of the Himalayas
within China, flows some 2,600 miles east and south before emptying
into the South China Sea in the delta area south of Saigon. The river
from its source to Chiang Saen (where the borders of Burma, Thai-
land, and Laos meet) extends about 1,200 miles; from there to the sea
is about another 1,400 miles. This 1,400-mile stretch of the Mekong,
with its tributaries, drains the 236,000 square miles of the Lower Me-
kong Basin, inhabited by some 30 million people. (See map.)
*Uandj!?v
.Hsippw
BURMA
Tskaw.
.Tannggjft
CHINA
Cntang-ch'eng
'Ban Sotene'
Muong Sa
. Meng-t/u
Lao Cai
AMES AND BOL'NOAOV « t. P » E S t N T A T 1 O *
f»E NOT NECESSARILY A J I HOHIT A T i V t
Cao Bang.
.Kan -ning
CHINA
Yo Itn,
Saty f #0i\n 6ien
Muong\
Khoua
Samneua.
Chiang,
fang R„ *'
bAsttkel ,
(S[( .
Hot.
SdUng
MkW\
Chiang Mai. ^J \\
Lampang,
Uttaodil
.Tak
Ho«ei Sat ,,
,Muong Houn >
—'alt y^y *\
Beng y^louangphiabang ^*
Xiangkhoang, t >-
"flan Ungliang'
N3nJ
#Bac Kan 1 .Nmg-ming
NORTH
oH6N0l
Haiphong J
Mam Binl)
VIETN/
'SSY GULF
OF
TONKIN
Udon Thani
-Paksane
\t
»3je.S
If.
.PhilsanuloW I
Phetcbabufi
MakhJ..,
Phaoom*
Sakhsn*
Nakhon
1 Khofi Kaen*
I
1
THAILAND
I
• Ta Khli ,--'
.Lop Bun I — -'■"TTaktonn
LAOS
Sepont,
LSa»anft3khet
Jlong Hot
■wDema/carion line
Hje1
Uten
N»ir/<<J.» vJalchatkam,
-Pakse
Ratcbasima
* ) Tarty^V.KancfianabLri
*Sara)
'» Kabin
ANDAMAN
S£A I
MERGUI
v
ARCHIPELAGO
^'BANGKOK Kallhana
Nakbon
"Pbumi
Sanitating
pophon )/ lumpbat,
.Siemreab | Stoeng
(liambang. — T>C AMBODI A\Ir"9
i 1 . ro/uifV \ Kampong
„V I'PiHin »""W^ .'ti»"i
Pooltiisa! "
LKtacheti
>Kampong/
Cham.
fa Hang
t
-Hcrtlum
;
^pfiiku
\
\
Ban Me.
.Thuot -s
SOUT& ,
llbajlinj.'
•oa-nir"
im Ranh
GULF
OF
THAILAND
|S KampQng\Sppe*
1
"PHU
ouoc
/
VIETNAM
*
s;
,8ien Hot
t,S»IG0»
xta» !b«
?uin
. 5»g
'VwgTi" SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
X
Of",
STRAIT OF ,---~i$-
MALACCA
Mainland Southeast Asia
-Mekong Bosin Limit
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-26
384
The Mekong is already large (1.200 feet wide) at the point where
it leaves China. However, it is further swelled by some 34 major trib-
utaries and countless smaller streams, so that perhaps as much as two-
thirds of the water that discharges from the mouth is contributed by
the lower drainage basin. The minimum flow of the river 190 miles
upstream from the mouth is twice that of the Columbia River at its
mouth, and its maximum flow is 30 to 40 times as great.26
From China to the sea the river descends about 1.000 feet. The de-
scent is uneven, with falls and rapids obstructing river traffic at Krai ie.
Khone Falls, and Khemmarat Rapids. Variation in flow is extreme:
much of the annual rainfall, of about 60 inches, occurs during the rainy
season, from May to October, when the flow of the river in the lower
basin increases 15- or 20-fold from low water to flood season.
Although the flat lands of the Mekong Delta are intensively culti-
vated (mostly in rice), much of the rest of the region is predominantly
forest, with most of the farming along watercourses. River transpor-
tation is the principal form of freight movement, with few roads or
rail connections; in the Delta, a network of some 8,000 miles of canals
has been dredged. From the sea, ocean vessels can navigate upriver
190 miles from Phnom Penh; coastal vessels can reach another 80
miles. River vessels can also ply the river on the long stretches of
more placid water upstream.
Complex Social and ( 'ultural Patterns of the Basin
The four Riparian States present considerable racial, linguistic,
and religious complexity. Educational levels are low (typically, four
years of schooling). Standards of health and hygiene arc1 generally
poor, with a heavy incidence of malaria and waterborne infections.
Incomes are low, but despite the generally primitive level of subsist-
ence agriculture, food supplies appear to be adequate. Populations in
these countries have tripled in the past half-century; accordingly.
with high birth rates and short life expectancy, the populations are
extremely young (60 percent under 25 years of age). The very young
and old people live mostly in rural villages, while young adults and
the middle-aged, the most numerous segment, congregate in urban
areas.
The four nations have had a long and complicated history of politi-
cal and military interactions. There have been incessant and disjointed
conflicts of aggression, frequent internal power struggles, expansions
and contractions of territory, waves of invasion from the north, cul-
tural penet i at ion from India, and economic penet rat ion mainly by the
French. Colonial administration by the French lias left important ef-
fects in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. A sharp break in the continuity
of balkanization occurred, L941 L945, with the Japanese invasion.
Thailand bowed to the inevitable, allying itself with Japan, while the
other three states were overrun; with the end of World War II. all
four states were faced with the need for extensive political and eco
nomic adjustment. Following expulsion of the Japanese, these adjust-
ments began with expulsion of the French, followed by an interaction
of economic, ocial, political, and religious developments too com
;ures of water flow :it various points on Hip Mekong and at various seasons. 01
different years, varj widely from one source to nnother. It Is rleai from all of these
the river is i n * l I extremely large, but precisely how large Is hard to say.
385
plicated to trace but generally reflecting the desires of leadership in
the four countries to reconcile retention of political control with eco-
nomic and social advance. Relationships among the four countries
were conditioned by all these factors, as well as by the historical tradi-
tion of conflict and mistrust, and the growing awareness of the op-
portunities for the future from the application of western technology
and organization. To differing degrees, the centralizing influence of
national government ran up against the strong prior loyalties to ex-
tended family and community. In some cases, groups remote from the
capital would identify their own national capital as the foremost
threat to their own security. Urban localities quickly became west-
ernized while rural communities preserved much of their traditional
culture and local loyalties.
Injected into this situation was the long war, first against the
French, and then a revolution presenting a mixture of nationalistic
and ideological elements. As the power struggle went on, the tech-
nological level of the combat rose, with both sides receiving outside
equipment and training. As of mid-May 1972, the ultimate resolution
of this war remained an uncertainty, and none of the four national
governments was able to exercise complete sovereignty over all parts
of its domain.
Early Planning for Development of the Mekong, 1952-1957
A succession of three studies between early 1952 and the close of
1957 helped give tangible form to the concept of a regional develop-
ment program for the Lower Basin of the Mekong. Earlier planning
had been concerned almost exclusively with downstream navigation.27
The first general study, initiated in 1951 at the request of ECAFE, in-
structed the Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Develop-
ment to report on the problems and opportunities of international riv-
ers in Asia. The Bureau chose to focus on the Mekong. Its 18-page
study, published in May 1952 under the title "Preliminary Report on
Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water Resources,
Development of the Mekong — an International River," dealt optimisti-
cally with the engineering possibilities of the region but called atten-
tion to the lack of hard information needed for operational planning.
According to an active participant in the program, this brief report
attracted favorable interest by providing ammunition to ECAFE for
its own planning on a wider scope, because it was "international," and
because "it cited exciting specific possibilities such as the possible de-
velopment of firm power between Vientiane and Luang Prabang and
the diversion of the flow of the Mekong for irrigating the vast area in
North-Eastern Thailand." 28 However, the report also admitted that
"resources have not yet been explored" and until military activity in
the eastern portion of the basin had subsided, field surveys to secure the
necessary data were not feasible.
With the signing of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which had the
effect of separating North and South Vietnam, the political situation
27 In 1949, a Convention was signed by France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (redrafted
in 1954 to exclude France) concerning navigation on the Mekong. Under its terms the
contracting parties agreed, among other things, to take concerted action on "Programs for
improvement of waterways, their installations and equipment" as well as projects bene-
ficial to industry or agriculture to the extent that such projects might obstruct navigation.
28 Schaff and Fifield, The Lower Mekong.
386
in Indochina for a short time stabilized. The kingdoms resumed inter-
est in Mekong developments. The next Mekong study was undertaken
in this context. It was a brief reconnaissance by the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation under the sponsorship of the U.S. International Cooper-
ation Administration (later U.S.A.I.D.) at the request of the Riparian
States. Although the interest of the States themselves was undeniable,
it seems likely that the initiative for this effort traces ultimately to
France and the United States. It may well have been thought that
simulating a general interest in technological and economic develop-
ment of the region might help to stabilize the political regimes there.
At any event, a Special Project Agreement was signed between the Ri-
parian States and the United States in November 1955. Thereafter,
the representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation ranged the area, held
several meetings with representatives of the four countries, and re-
turned to the United States, where their "Reconnaissance Report —
Lower Mekong River Basin" was issued in March 1956. Perhaps be-
cause it was issued by representatives of the nation that had most to
offer in support of the project, as well as the broadest experience with
systematic river basin development, this 36-page report, with its five
detailed appendices, received close attention in Indochina. It was a col-
lection of the best data available about the region, and identified with
some care the kinds of data needed to get on with the project. Specifi-
cally, it called for hydrographic and sediment surveys of the main
river; surveys of such features of the entire basin as topography,
geology, transportation, communications, and agriculture; establish-
ment of water flow measuring stations on the main stem and tribu-
taries, weather stations, and a systematic search for preferred dam
sites ; studies of such special problems as the control of the water level
of the great lake (Tonle Sap) in central Cambodia, the salty soil in
the great Plaine des Jones of Vietnam, the technology of double-crop-
ping to increase agriculture production, and improved fish capture and
processing; and such action programs as improved sanitation in water
supply, and the training of local personnel in the technical skills that
would be required later on. The study emphasized the need for cooper-
ation among the four Riparian States in collecting, maintaining, and
disseminating data on a uniform, integrated basis.
In the year 1957 the pace of events quickened. When the Bureau of
Reclamation report was presented at the annual meeting of ECAFE
in Bangkok in March it was enthusiastically endorsed. Toward the
end of May a group of experts from the Riparian States convened in
Bangkok to implement the recommendations. This group proposed
that the Riparian States form a coordinating committee with ECAFE
guidance. A further meeting was held in mid-September 1957 which
produced an agreed-upon "Statute of the Committee for Coordina-
tion of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin."29
_ As approved by the participating governments, this charter as-
signed to I he ( loordination Committee the functions of overseeing the
28 At Its meeting in Bangkok, May 10-11, 1967, the Committee decided to change its
name to "Committee for the Development of the Lower Mekong Basin," abbreviated to
"Mekong Development Committee."
387
planning and investigation of water resources development projects
in the lower Mekong basin. It was to —
(a) prepare and submit to participating governments plans for carrying out
co-ordinated research, study, and investigation ;
(b) make requests on behalf of the participating governments for special
financial and technical assistance and receive and administer separately such
financial and technical assistance as may be offered unuer the technical assist-
ance programme of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and friendly
governments ;
(c) draw up and recommend to participating governments criteria for the use
of the water of the main river for the purpose of water resources development.
The chapter provided that each of the Riparian States would appoint
one member with "plenipotentiary authority" and that the participat-
ing governments were to act through this Committee. Reports would
be made to both the governments and ECAFE.
When the Preparatory Committee met to adopt this charter, it
took a number of other actions at the same time. One was to recom-
mend that priority should be given to the recommendations of the
Bureau of Reclamation for hydrologic and meteorologic stations and
stream profile studies. This action, however, brought out the fact
that equipment and resources had not been made available for such
measurements. Accordingly, the Committee expressed the hope that
help would be forthcoming from the United Nations or other sources,
and also asked the United Nations Technical Assistance Administra-
tion to help recruit a visiting team of water resources experts to review
the two previous studies.
By mid-November, the United Nations team had assembled in
Bangkok under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Raymond Wheeler (re-
tired) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In the Wheeler Report,
completed January 23, 1958, the recommendations were similar to
those of the previous Bureau of Reclamation report. However, it went
further in three particulars, recommending that:
(1) Priority in the collection of . . . basic data should be given to reaches
having promising sites for development. . . .
(2) Studies and investigations for the preparation of a comprehensive plan
of the Lower Mekong River Basin, including major tributaries, should follow
with the careful coordination and integration of the various specific site plans.
(3) Qualified, responsible firms of engineers should be employed to plan and
execute the proposed operations and to assist and train local personnel, under
the general direction of the Coordination Committee of the four countries, ad-
vised by an international technical board of engineers.
A five-year program of data collection was recommended, at a total
estimated cost of $9,200,000. Soon afterwards, the United Nations
Technical Assistance Administration (with approval of the Coordi-
nation Committee) appointed three members of the recommended
technical board (later increased to five). And at the close of 1958, the
Committee determined the need for an executive agent. When this
proved agreeable, C. Hart Schaaf, long active in the project, was
named Executive Agent.
It is remarkable that the problem of funding the work of the Co-
ordination Committee and its staff was solved so easily. The first
need — for hydrologic measuring instruments — was met by a donation
of some $120,000 (equivalent) by the Government of France, Octo-
388
ber 29, 1957. The support of the U.S. foreign aid program and of the
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration has already been
mentioned. Donations also came from New Zealand and other coun-
tries. Within a year, more than $4 million had been given or pledged,
and by the end of 1961 the figure came to almost $14 million. The prin-
cipal contributors were the United States, Japan, France, Australia,
( Janada, India, and Israel.
Mention should also be made of a separate study, undertaken shortly
after the Bureau of Reclamation had completed its work, under the
direction of ECAFE itself. The principal significance of this study is
that — in addition to endorsing the work of the Bureau — it called for a
broad river basin approach with close cooperation in planning and
development among the nations sharing the basin.
Socio- Economic Research Planning : The Ford Foundation Study
In 1961, a very different kind of study of the Mekong Basin was
undertaken. It was sponsored by a private foundation and addressed
the economic and social effects of the proposed development. Unlike
the previous investigations, it did not deal with the engineering feasi-
bility of construction projects nor with the technical exploitation of
their benefits. At the request of the Coordination Committee, the Ford
Foundation sent a mission headed by Gilbert F. White to advise on the
kinds of investigation needed in social science fields. The terms of
reference of the mission called for the identification of social data to
determine feasibility, benefits, impacts of specific constructions, ad-
ministrative management, design of studies, and priority of short-term
versus long-term projects.
The report of the Ford Foundation mission 30 was made in Bangkok
in July 1962. It recommended substantial strengthening of the staff of
the Coordination Committee in social science fields for the purpose of
generating and collecting social statistics. It called for joint studies
with intergovernmental agencies on problems of wide interest in the
ECAFE region. It proposed that the Bank for International Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank) be invited to participate
in a study of methods for determining economic feasibility, and pointed
out that the primitive economy of the Riparian States imposed inex-
orable limits on the rate of investment in regional development. It
emphasized the need for a systematic compilation of available data
concerning resources, resource use, and social characteristics. A power
market survey, land use inventory, and study of ways to optimize
agricultural use of water were all needed. Training of technicians was
again emphasized. The report suggested that flood control benefits
might lie overstated and the institution of a flood warning system
could reduce losses at moderate cost. Tt suggested that a large demon-
stration area he set up where the potential impacts of the Mekong
projecl upon rural life could be observed. It proposed an elaborate
program of demonstration projects in forest planting. In the intro-
duction to the report, the authors warned that heavy investment in
engineering works would not automatically lead to solid growth in
Iberl P. White. Egbert d<> Vrles, Harold B. Dunkerley, and John V. Krutilln. "Eco-
nomic and Social Aspects of Lower Mekong Develooments," Report to tlie Committee for
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, 1962,
389
social structure and economic gains. Choice of engineering tasks and
careful timing were essential :
Unlike countries with much larger income per capita, the Lower Mekong
countries cannot afford to build power and navigation projects yielding very
low returns or to carry out irrigation which has full effects upon agriculture
only two or three decades later. They cannot stand the luxury of monolithic con-
crete structures whose most immediate return is inflation of national ego. They
must husband available social resources so as to squeeze the maximum net
returns from their investment at the right time and the right place.
The shopping list of investigations and research projects blocked
out by the Ford Foundation study would cost an estimated $15 mil-
lion and would require a much closer degree of supervision than the
staff of the Coordination Committee had previously provided.
The specific limitations on rate of construction, according to the
report, were an increase in agricultural production of 3.5 to 4 percent
and an increase in industrial output of 6 to 7 percent. Savings avail-
able from the Riparian States to invest in construction projects and
related development would fall far short of the requirements en-
visioned in the engineering studies.
To illustrate what was meant by priority and timing, the report
suggested that ". . . the first construction should be initiated on one
or more of the tributaries : they can provide essential experience with
ways of reaping an adequate harvest of benefits from investment in
water management. " This recommendation directly conflicted with
the views of the Coordination Committee which, from 1957 on, had
given priority to three very large projects on the main stem of the
Mekong : at Pa Mong, Tonle Sap, and Sambor.
Action Programs on the Mekong, 1962-1965
Dating from about the time of the Ford Foundation (White)
Report, the tempo of activity on the Mekong Project appears to have
speeded up. The number of participating countries increased. Dona-
tions and pledges of contributions to support the planning studies
rose from $20 million in March 1962 to $45 million by the end of the
calendar year 1963 and to $68 million a year later. For the most part,
these contributions were made in kind rather than in cash or credits.
They included donations of cement, technical services, measuring in-
struments, boats, computer time, and aerial survey.
In 1964, a first geological map of the basin was completed. In
France, work was proceeding on a mathematical model of the river
while representatives from the Columbia River headquarters of the
U.S. Corps of Engineers were undertaking a system study of the
Mekong. Studies were underway by the World Health Organization
of the problems of malaria and schistosomiasis in the basin. Scores
of hydrologic and meteorologic stations had been set up and a radio
network linked them to headquarters in Bangkok, where their reports
were collected and tabulated. The Bureau of Reclamation was be-
ginning work on a feasibility study of the Pa Mong Dam. Stream
gradient measurements on the main stem had been completed in
1961 and measurement of the capacity of possible reservoirs was ac-
tively proceeding. In 1964 ECAFE completed an agricultural market
analysis. Resources for the Future, Inc., had begun a study of world
demand for products of electro-processing industries. A study of
390
manpower needs and resources was begun in 1962, with the Inter-
national Labor Office as lead agency. The Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and Israel, were studying agri-
cultural improvement methods; plans were underway for farm and
timber demonstration projects.
The foregoing sampling of activities illustrates the stepped-up
pace of the Mekong investigations. It also shows that the character of
the investigations had changed markedly since the inception of the
project. Xot only was the scope of pertinent data recognized as far
wider than it had been in the 1950s, but primary emphasis was shifting
to the economic and social consequences of proposed constructions and
development. In the United States, river basin development had
followed this trend, but the conversion to total system planning had
taken more than a century; benefitting from U.S. experience, the
Mekong planning activity had achieved it in less than a decade.
Status of the Mekong Project in the Spring of 1965
By the time of President Johnson's proposal for a billion dollar
aid program featuring the Mekong regional plan, an elaborate complex
of countries and United Nations agencies were actively pursuing proj-
ects under the rubric of the Mekong Lower Basin Scheme. The center
of the activity was the Coordination Committee, its staff and Execu-
tive Agent — whose technical and administrative resources were also
expanding. Twenty-one countries,31 12 U.N. agencies, and 7 private
institutions were contributors; donations and pledges by the end of
1965 were to reach $68 million.
On the Tonle Sap feature of the project, France, India, and New
Zealand were preparing preliminary plans. For the Sambor dam, a
Japanese team was at work. On the large construction at Pa Mong,
the United States was taking the lead ($2.5 million in feasibility
studies). Australia had a half-million-dollar program of geologic
studies underway at both Sambor and Pa Mong dam sites.
Significantly, construction was at last underway on some of the civil
works on tributary streams: dams at Prek Thnot (Cambodia), Lower
Se Done and Nam Dong (Laos), and Nam Pong and Nam Pung
(Thailand), plus channel marking and barges for river transporta-
tion. By the latter part of 1965, construction costs exceeded $40 mil-
lion, as against some $27 million for "pre-investment" studies. The
Nam Pong dam, a multipurpose structure (24,900 kw; $28.4 million)
and the Nam Pung (also multipurpose — 7,000 kw; $5 million) were
Hearing completion. Ground had been broken for the Nam Dong dam
(1,000 kw; $6 million) and the Prek Thnot dam (18,000 kw; $54 mil-
lion). The proposed Nam Ngum dam in Laos (120,000 kw ; $40 million ;
5,()oo In. tares of land irrigated) had been judged economically feasi-
ble. Work had started on the Lower Se Done dam (1,400 kw; $1.2
31 The following 21 countries were working In cooperation with the Mekong Committee
(which represented Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam) as of March 1965:
Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom and United States
(through the Colombo Plan) ; and Belgium, China, Denmark, Finland, France. Federal Re-
public m' Germany, Iran, Italy. Israel. Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Philippines. The
United Nations agencies "r units supporting the Mekong Committee were: ECAFE, UN
special Fund, in Technical Assistance Board, I'N Bureau of Technical Assistance opera-
tions, ILO, FAO. UNESCO, World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization,
International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, and World Food Program,
391
million) for electric power. (For a complete list of projects and con-
tributors, as of January 11, 1965, as listed in the 1964 annual report of
the Coordination Committee, see Table 1.)
Table 1. — Mekong project: Operational resources as of Jan. 11, 1965
[Total resources contributed or pledged to the Mekong scheme in approximate
U.S. dollar equivalent as of Jan. 11, 1965]
Preinvestment investigations and planning (dollar equivalent) :
Australia 12 (Pa Mong and Sambor damsite geology) 530, 000
Belgium (hydrographer) 30,000
Canada J 2 (aerial mapping) 1, 365, 000
China (Nationalist) (cement; experimental highlands rice seed;
study tour) 80,000
Denmark 3 (survey of large-scale pulp and paper industry) 10, 000
Finland3 (survey of large-scale pulp and paper industry) 10, 000
France2 (hydrology; Tonle Sap planning, including fisheries,
sedimentation, soil surveys and delta reclamation studies ;
flood prediction; bauxite and other minerals prospection;
geological mapping ; domestic power market survey ; and soil
surveys on selected tributaries) 1,286,329
India12 (Tonle Sap: barrage design and feasibility report, soil
laboratory; raingauges) 282, 000
Iran (petroleum products) 99,400
Italy2 (expert services) 24,300
Israel 2 (Prek Thnot project plan : irrigation planning, and plan-
ning of experimental farm and demonstration pilot farms,
comprehensive regional planning ; cement ; programwide con-
tingencies; fellowships) 346, 000
Japan x 2 (Tributaries reconnaissance ; Sambor project plan ; Nam
Pung project plan ; Prek Thnot project plan ; dams and hydro-
electric power ; Upper Sre Pok project investigations including
Darlac and Drayling; hydrology) 977,893
Netherlands (dredge ; map reproduction machine ; hydraulic
equipment; pilot training) 169,061
New Zealand1 (jet survey boats; Tonle Sap project: equipment;
programwide contingencies) ^ 220, 000
Norway3 (survey of large-scale pulp and paper industry) 10,000
Pakistan x ( Nam Pong project : irrigation construction plans and
specifications) 100,000
Philippines (mapping) 257, 250
Sweden3 (survey of large-scale pulp paper industry) 20,000
United Kingdom1 (hydrology; meteorology; hydrography; navi-
gation improvement ; geochemical mineral survey 249, 000
United States12 (hydrology, hydrography, leveling and ground
control surveys: $2,420,000; Pa Mong project plan estimated
cost $2,500,000;* hydrologic equipment $36,000; system anal-
ysis; natural and social resources inventories $375,000) 5,331,000.
UN/EC AFE5 (expert services and administrative support for
Committee and Executive Agent ; figure given is budget figure
for 1961-64) 484,752
UN/TAB 2 (coordinates expanded technical assistance program
through which most of the BTAO and specialized agencies par-
ticipation listed below is channeled)
UN/BTAO2 (Wheeler Mission; experts; Advisory Board; serves
jointly with ECAFE as Executing Agency for Special Fund
Mineral Surveys and Institutional Support projects listed
below; support to Office of Executive Agent) 362,799
ILO (manpower analysis) 12, 104
FAO2 (agriculture and forestry studies; executing agency for
agricultural stations in special fund tributaries project listed
below) 133, 930
UNESCO2 (executing Agency for U.N. Special Fund mathemati-
cal delta model; seismic survey) 16,800
See footnotes at end of table.
392
Table 1. — Mekong project: Operational resources of Jan. 11, 1965 — Continued
[Total resources contributed or pledged to the Mekong scheme in approximate
U.S. dollar equivalent as of Jan. 11, 1965] — Continued
Preinvestment investigations and planning (dollar equivalent) — Continued
WHO (schistosomiasis and malaria studies) 5,077
WMO (hvdrometeorologv) 45,300
IAEA (isotope studies of hydrology and sedimentation) 55, 650
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (has
provided member in Advisory Board ; desk study of Nam
Ngum feasibility study. )
United Nations Special Fund :
Tributaries survey including agriculture station 2 1, 698, 450
Experimental and demonstration farm in Laos (Vientiane
Plain) 2 345,885
Experimental and demonstration farm in Thailand (Kalasin) 2_ 293,900
Hydrographic survey2 380,500
Mineral survey2 422,300
Mathematical delta model survey2 920, 600
Institutional support 2 2, 451, 700
World Food Program : 6
Reserve 35, 000
Experimental and demonstration farm in Laos 91, 130
(Asia Foundation (travel grants) ; Ford Foundation (eco-
nomic and social study) ; Gestetner (Eastern) Ltd. (print-
ing services) ; Resources for the Future, Inc. (power mar-
ket analysis) ; Price Water house Co. (auditing of expendi-
ture under New Zealand contribution) ; Sycip, Gorres,
Valaya & Co. (auditing of expenditure under Philippine
contribution; and Shell Oil Co. (documentary motion pic-
ture of Mekong.7)
Local costs and contributions paid or pledged by the riparian
countries :
Under Canadian mapping program 105, 000
Under Indian Tonle Sap project 50, 000
Under United States hydrology program 400, 000
Under post-U.S. hydrology program 483,000
Under United Nations Special Fund Tributaries Project 471, 192
Under United Nations Special Fund hydrographical survey
for navigation improvement 266, 600
Under United Nations Special Fund Minerals Survey 233, 640
Under United Nations Special Fund UNESCO mathematical
delta model project 192, 143
French Mineral Survey to Cambodia 171,400
Under Israel/Japanese Prek Thnot project (Cambodia) 72,000
Under Japanese Sambor preliminary project (Cambodia)__ 21,457
Under Japanese Upper Sre Pok project (Viet-Nam) 22,843
Under Pakistan Nam Pong Irrigations planning 25, 000
For experimental and demonstration farm at Prek Thnot
(Cambodia) 1,000,000
For experimental and demonstration farm at Battambang
(Cambodia) 514,000
Under United Nations Special Fund experimental and dem-
onstration farm at Kalasin (Thailand) 307,104
Under United Nations Special Fund experimental and dem-
onstration farm at Vientiane Plain (Laos) 205,260
Under WFP food assistance project to Vientiane Plain fann__ 13, 07H
Under United Nations Special Fund Institutional Support
project (for 5 years) 3,413,000
For Belgium hydrographer 1, r><H>
Reserve for Laos local contribution 22,000
Revolving fund contributed by Thailand 500
Subtotal : preinvestment 27, 143, 814
See footnotes at end of table,
393
Table 1. — Mekong project: Operational resources of Jan. 11, 1965 — Continued
[Total resources contributed or pledged to the Mekong scheme in approximate
U.S. dollar equivalent as of Jan. 11, 1965] — Continued
Investment contributions :
Investment for construction Prek Thnot tributary project in
Cambodia :
(a) Australia1 for engineering service for construction (es-
timate) 800,000
(6) Cambodian appropriations for construction cost includ-
ing procurement of earthmoving and other equipment 3, 357, 000
(c.) WFP, food assistance6 760,510
(d) Local cost under WFP program to be borne by Cam-
bodia 54, 000
Subtotal 4, 971, 510
Lower Se Done tributary project in Laos :
(a) Loan to Laos by France 591,800
(6) Grant to Laos by France 163,200
(o) Eearmarkings by Laos 500, 000
(d) WFP food assistance 6 32,150
(e) Local cost under WFP program to be borne by Laos 8, 000
Subtotal 1, 295, 150
Nam Dong tributary project in Laos :
(a) Loan to Laos by France 326,500
(6) Grant to Laos by France 142,900
(c) Earmarkings by Laos 133,400
(d) WFP food assistance9 20,450
(e) Local cost under WFP program to be borne by Laos 5, 300
Subtotal 628, 550
Nam Pong tributary project in Thailand :
(a) Federal Republic of Germany: Infrustructure low-
interest loan to Thailand (20 years) 12,650,000
(6) Cement provided by China, 2,000 tons 40,000
(c) Earmarking by Thailand for power and multipurpose
items 9, 855, 769
(d) Earmarking by Thailand for irrigation works 3, 152, 000
(e) WFP food assistance6 270,350
(/) Local cost under WFP program by Thailand 49, 600
Subtotal 26, 017, 719
Nam Pung tributary project in Thailand :
(a) Earmarking by Thailand 5,000,000
(o) Cement provided by China, 250 tons 5,000
(c) Cement provided by Israel, 250 tons 5,000
(d) WFP food assistance9 106,250
(e) Local cost under WFP program by Thailand 23,600
Subtotal 5, 139, 850
Navigation improvement works — Channel marking and improve-
ment in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam :
(a) United States (tugs and barges)1 2,250,000
(6) United Kingdom1 190,000
(c) Riparian Governments (approximately) 90,000
Subtotal 2, 530, OOP
See footnotes at end of table.
394
Table 1. — Mekong project: Operational resources of Jan. 11, 1965 — Continued
[Total resources contributed or pledged to the Mekong scheme in approximate
U.S. dollar equivalent as of Jan. 11, 1965] — Continued
Investment contributions — Continued
Israel grant for Nam Ngum Tributary Project in Laos 50, 000
Subtotal; investment for construction 40,632,779
Total ; preinvestment and investment 67, 776, 593
1 Through its Colombo plan progra total participation to date of 8 countries In Colombo
plan equals approximately $12,294,803.
2 Includes fellowships the cost of which in most cases are not included in the cost figure
given above.
8 Joint contribution by Nordic group ; Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
* In 1961 the United States undertook to investigate the feasibility of the Pa Mong
project subject to the constitutional process of appropriation in the United States, and
equally on the understanding that, as in all comprehensive feasibility investigations, a
demonstration of nonfeasibility would terminate the investigations ; the broad estimate in
1961 of the total sum involved was $2,500,000 ; a subsequent estimate bv the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation was $5,000,000 ; the detailed firm estimate of U.S. expenditure for the first
phase of the work, now in process, is $690,000.
8 ECAFE also performs many of the functions of the United Nations as executing agency
for the United Nations Special Fund tributary hydrography and mineral surveys and In-
stitutional support projects listed above.
8 Total World Food Program pledge for both planning and construction: $1,315,840
equivalent.
7 No cost estimate given.
Note. — In addition to the 4 firms listed in the above table, principal engineering firms
engaged in the various programs include : Associated Consulting Engineers of Karachi ;
Certeza Surveying Co. ; Christian! & Nielson (Thai) Ltd. ; Japan Electric Power Develop-
ment Co. ; Harza Co. International ; Hunting Survey Corp. Ltd. ; Italconsult ; Nippon Koei
Co. Ltd. ; Rogers International ; Soclete Grenobloise d'Etudes et d'Appliactions Hydrau-
liques (SOGREAH) ; Societe Francalse d'Etudes et de Realisation d'Equipements Elec-
triques (SOFRELEF) ; Salgltter Industries Gesellschaft MPH ; and Philipp Holzman AG/
Siemens Bauunlon GmbH.
Perhaps the most notable events to be chronicled about the Mekong
Scheme from its inception to early 1965, a period of more than a
decade, were the events that did not happen. The rather imnrovised
Coordination Committee was able to maintain coherence and control,
as well as forward movement, The four Riparian States, despite sev-
eral serious diplomatic contretemps, continued their active participa-
tion and cooperation in the Committee. Communist factions in all four
States did not impede the field studies or construction, and a mini-
mum of guerrilla incidents were reported, even as the conflict in Viet-
nam worsened. Among donor nations also, competition for choice ac-
tivities or preferential arrangements does not appear to have surfaced.
A feature publication issued by the United Nations Office of Public
Information in March 1965 called attention to this uncommon amity :
The Mekong project ... is for the good of all the people of the Lower
Mekong Basin, without distinction as to nationality, race, or political creed. Be-
cause of this, the Mekong Committee has been able to convene its meetings with-
out interruption in all the four riparian countries in spite of the difficulties be-
setting their relations. It met in Laos when that country was under siege. In
October 1961, when Cambodia broke relations with Thailand, the late Prime
Minister of Thailand, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, expressly made an excep-
tion of the Mekong programme when he severed relations with Cambodin.
A similar note was struck by Prince Souvanna Phouma. He was asked in
Paris a few summers iigo about the chances of a neutral Laos to feed its people.
The Prince, who was a private citizen at the time, replied that the hope of
Laos was the Mekong project. Laos, he said, was poor, but in the Mekong it
had a tremendous resource which, he added, was being developed under the
auspices of the Nations, with the help of many countries, in a completely non-
politlcal manner.'12
■h Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, "Putting the Mekong to Work — An
International Undertaking. Power, Irrigation and Navigation Projects Progressine : Fishery,
Forestry and Mineral Studies Under Wav ; Experimental Farms Set Up" (New York:
United Nations, March 1965), p. 10,
IV. Accelerated Progress in 1965
The proposal by President Johnson to contribute a billion dollars
to regional development in Southeast Asia as an alternative to military
action seems to have been represented in the press as an unprecedented
innovation and a wholly new concept. It is evident, however, that a
number of persons familiar with the Mekong project had proposed
variants of this approach. Mention has been made of the views of
C. Hart Schaaf, who saw the Mekong project as contributing to the
"achievement of peace and well-being for all people of the Lower
Mekong Basin." Similarly, Gilbert F. White, principal author of the
report of the Ford Foundation, in an article published four months
before the Johns Hopkins speech, suggested that —
A peaceful and honorable resolution of the conflict in South Vietnam and Laos
may be found in a bold plan for land and water development which already unites
factions in four nations of Southeast Asia. For seven years, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and South Vietnam have been working with little publicity and without
disagreement on a huge development program. These four countries, which do
not cooperate in anything else, have reached accord on development of the Lower
Mekong Basin.
And then, near the conclusion of his exposition he asked —
Is it possible that the vision of a majestic river harnessed for the advance of
twenty million people by an unprecedented piece of international cooperation
would so command the imagination of the nations that the present grueling con-
flict could give way to a struggle for more abundant life? Could this mean to a
world increasingly aware of its network of mutual responsibilities what the
Tennessee Valley Authority meant, to proponents of national development thirty
years ago?*8
President Johnson's Contacts with Regionalism
President Johnson himself had had extensive exposure to the subject
of regionalism. Shortly after he first came to the Capitol as a con-
fressional secretary in 1932, the Congress with strong support from
'resident Roosevelt was deliberating on passage of the TVA Act of
1933. Issues involving TVA, or the question of extension of the region-
alism principle, periodically came before the Congress during his
service in the House of Representatives, 1937-1948. As Vice President,
Johnson was asked by President Kennedy "to undertake a special
fact-finding mission to Asia." 34
Of this trip, President Johnson, two days after his Johns Hopkins
speech, commented as follows :
I went to bed last night reading a transcript of a meeting I had out in Bangkok
in 1961 with a group of men of vision, and we were talking about the development
^Gilbert F White, "Lower Mekong, a Proposal for a Peaceful and Honorable Resolution
of the Conflict in South Vietnam," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December 1964)
+*. T7 ■■? President's News Conference of May 5, 1961," Public Papers of the President of
the United States (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p 354. The
mission was announced by the President at his new conference of May 5, 1961 ; the Vice
President returned May 24.
(395)
396
of the great Mekong Delta Valley — the construction of dams and the great evolu-
tion operation out there.86
Vice President Johnson visited the Bangkok headquarters of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE), May 17, 1961. He conferred with ECAFE Executive Sec-
retary U Nyun —
. . . On UN-aided economic development activities in the region, including
the Mekong River project — in which the Vice President expressed particular
interest — and work on an Asian highway.
In the course of the conversation U Nyun commented that ECAFE's main
objective was to promote economic progress and regional thinking, and he cited
the Mekong River project as an example of international cooperation of which
the United Nations could be truly proud.
Development of the Lower Mekong basin would benefit Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam, he said, and he noted that the project was receiving
assistance from 12 countries and several international agencies.
In response, the Vice President said he could "think of nothing that
would help Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam more than work-
ing together on a river since, if they could work together on a river,
they could work together on anything else." Doubtless, the project
would bring prosperity to millions in the region, but "he wanted to
know when the action stage would start." 3G Regionalism had been an
important element of President Johnson's domestic program from the
outset, and was a much intensified feature of it in 1965. Following the
lead of President Kennedy, he had encouraged the evolution of the
Appalachian Regional Development Commission from a presidential
advisory commission (established April 9, 1963) to a Federal Develop-
ment Planning Committee for Appalachia (created by Executive
Order 11186, signed October 25, 1964), to a statutory Commission
(under the terms of the Appalachian Regional Development Act,
approved March 9, 1965) .
Another strongly regional element of his program was embodied in
the State Technical Services Act, approved September 14, 1965, in
which the President proposed 250 colleges and technical schools to
serve as "economic planning centers for their areas" with the Depart-
ment of Commerce as a clearing-house to disseminate technical infor-
mation on a national basis. In signing the measure, the President said :
"This bill will do for American businessmen what the great Agri-
cultural Extension Service lias done for the American farmer. It will
put into their hands the latest ideas and methods, the fruits of research
and development." Such a bill, he commented, "might have prevented
the economic depression that today exists in Appalachia."
In liis agricultural message to the Congress of February 4. 1965, the
President was substantially concerned with regional economic balance
of rural areas. In particular, he cited the Area Redevelopment Act.
w "Remarks ;it the Swearing In of Members of the National Council on the Arts," April
L965, I'm, Hi- Pavers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Oovern-
menl PrintitiL- Office, 1966), p. 406. Friends of the President at this time recall that lie took
pride in liis own roll' in the creation of a state sponsored regional development authority
(the Lower Colorado River Anthorit\ LCRA) in Texas, financed witli Public Works Ad-
ministration money during the early New Deal da.VB, lie had also been interested In a
similar project in Xchraska Uotli projects were developed under guidance fro") officials of
TVA, which was tile center of regionalism philosophy and method at that time. On the
Ion of thi' President's vMt to the Tinted Nations, soon after the assassination of
President Kennedy, lie had Riven attention to these matters in discussions witli UN officials.
39 Press Release/88, United Nations Press Services, Office of Public Administration
(May 17, 1901 I.
397
various aspects of "rural economic development," and electrical serv-
ices to rural communities to "insure that the benefits of industrial
diversifiation are available in rural areas." 37
Perhaps the most comprehensive regional development measure in
the Johnson domestic program was the Public Works and Economic
Development Act of 1965. This too had its inception in a Kennedy pro-
gram, signalized by the Area Redevelopment Act of May 1, 1961. The
earlier act had included provisions for regional loans, public facility
loans and grants, technical assistance, and training programs. Expe-
rience gained with this measure led President Johnson, on March 25,
1965, to ask Congress for an enlarged authority to undertake extensive
application of the regionalism principle in the United States. He said :
A key feature of this new program is the proposal to group together dis-
tressed counties and communities in economically viable development districts.
Planning and assistance will concentrate on the needs of the area as a whole. . . .
It makes sense to work in terms of larger regions encompassing in some cases
parts of two or more states.
This is merely the recognition of a simple fact. Neither distress nor the poten-
tial for development respects state, county, or community boundaries.88
Out of this measure was developed an extensive system of regional de-
velopment commissions — coordinated by an Economic Development
Administration in the Department of Commerce. These were primarily
State-organized regional commissions dealing with mutual problems
in such regions as the Four Corners area, the Great Lakes, New Eng-
land, and the Ozarks. The Appalachian Commission maintained a
separate but parallel program.
On the same day as he submitted his Special Message on Regional
Development, the President also declared that the United States hoped
for a time when people and governments in Southeast Asia would need
not military support but only economic and social cooperation for
progress in peace.
Even now [he went on], in Vietnam and elsewhere, there are major programs
of development which have the cooperation and support of the United States.
Wider and bolder programs can be expected in the future from Asian leaders and
Asian councils — and in such programs we would want to help. This is the proper
business of our future cooperation.88
It should be recalled that the Johnson proposal of April 7, 1965, was
deliberately vague as to whether it addressed the U.S. posture toward
the entire Southeast Asian region after cessation of hostilities, or
whether it was a move to end the hostilities in Vietnam. One source of.
the uncertainty was the question as to how long the combined efforts
of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces could continue to exert
military pressure against South Vietnam as U.S. military assistance
was poured increasingly into the balance. Apparently White House
advisers foresaw a negotiated settlement soon, or a collapse of North
Vietnam in no more than four years or so. The President's Mekong
proposal, in short, was a concept of postwar reconstruction that he
87 "Special Message to the Congress on Agriculture, February 1965. Public Papers of the
President of the United States (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966),
p. 142.
38 "Special Message to the Congress on Area and Regional Economic Development."
March 1965, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C. : U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 323.
89 "Special Message to the Congress on Regional and Economic Development," Ibid., p. 319.
398
hoped would bring economic and political stability to the countries of
the region, satisfy the diplomatic objectives of the United States, and
prove acceptable to the other great powers of the world ("Including
the Soviet Union"), as well as undercutting immediate motivation of
the Vietnamese communists, and responding to the expressed anxieties
of the nonaligned powers. It is possible, in short, that it looked toward
a balanced world system of developing regions, benefiting themselves
from orderly advance ; ' such a system might perhaps have eased
world tension generally.
The relation of the speech to U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia is il-
luminated by remarks by Leonard Unger, an official of the Department
of State, shortly after the Johnson speech. There were four of these
objectives :
First, that the nations of Southeast Asia, as with other Asian states, should
develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and to-
ward increasingly democratic structures.
Second, that the nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside
nations.
Third, that no single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise
domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it.
And fourth, that the nations of the Far East should maintain and increase
their ties with the West in trade and culture, as a major means of knitting to-
gether a peaceful and stable world.40
Relationship of U .S .-Vietnamese War Goals to Regionalism
In an earlier study in this series, the consensus on American foreign
policy goals was discussed in the following words :
"These might be summarized as a world of peace and freedom, or a
peaceful world order in which justice and freedom prevail, or a world
in which the United States may exist in peace and security.
"Within these broad goals there are more specific objectives. The pro-
motion of mutual understanding and friendly relations, further prog-
ress toward a sound and expanding world economy, the wider appli-
cation of international law, the reduction and control of armaments,
or the building of collective security systems, for example, are objec-
tives through which the United States is seeking to attain a world of
peace and freedom. These objectives in turn may be broken down into
still more specific components such as, in the case of the reduction and
control of armaments, regulation of the military use of the ocean bed
or outer space." 41
In an age in which powerful nations possess nuclear weapons and
means for their delivery to a target thousands of miles away, a cate-
gorical imperative in support of the objective of security is that un-
limited or total war between nuclear-armed powers be avoided. A cor-
ollary of this proposition is that no overt conflict can be permitted to
occur between such powers, lest it escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.
This set of conditions is superimposed on more traditional objectives or
guidelines of U.S. foreign policy, such as self-determination by peoples
of their own forms of government ; peaceful resolution of international
disputes; free and unrestricted international commerce; unobstructed
transit of persons ; freedom of the seas ; and economic and technological
40 "Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia," Department of State
Bulletin (May 10, 1965), p. 712. The statement was In an address before the Detroit Eco-
nomic Club, Detroit, Michigan April 19, 19<;:>.
"U.S. Congress, House, Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age (Washington, D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1970. See vol. I, p. 22.
399
development of lagging regions of the world. Following World War
II, the general endorsement of self-determination was applied more
explicitly, in the face of Soviet expansionism, toward the goal of con-
taining "world communism." This goal was also rather explicitly re-
lated to the accepted U.S. practice of aiding the developing countries
of the world.
In a discussion before the American Foreign Service Association on
June 23, 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk discussed the Vietnamese
conflict in relation to these and other objectives of U.S. foreign policy.
In this conflict, he said, the traditional U.S. objective of encouraging
self-determination by peoples of their own forms of government was
combined with the more recent objective of containing the spread of
world communism. Said the Secretary :
In Vietnam today we face one more challenge in the long line of dangers we
have, unhappily, had to meet and master for a generation. We have had to show
both strength and restraint — courage and coolness — for Iran and for Greece, for
Berlin and for Korea, in the Formosa Strait, and in the Cuban missile crisis.*2
Another longstanding element of U.S. foreign policy is that one-
nation dominance of either Europe or Asia should be prevented.43
The logic of this position is that — apart from the obvious economic
and commercial consequences — the natural and human resources of
either continent, mobilized under a single competent and hostile man-
agement, could threaten U.S. security. The relation of this position to
the Vietnamese conflict was implied by Secretary Rusk as follows :
As I have said, Hanoi is presently adamant against negotiation or any avenue
to peace. Peiping [sic] is even more so, and one can plainly read the declared
doctrine and purpose of the Chinese Communists. They are looking beyond the
current conflict to the hope of domination in all of Southeast Asia — and indeed
beyond.44
The Secretary also rejected both the possibility of a nuclear conflict,
with all its awesome possibilities, and also U.S. abandonment of the
contest :
A few — a very few — may believe that unlimited war can take the place of the
sustained and steady effort in which we are engaged, just as there may be a
few — a very few — who think we should pull out and leave a friendly people to
their fate. But the American people want neither rashness nor surrender.45
The Secretary then introduced the theme of American support for
national self-determination by summarizing a statement of goals by
the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam, which included "Freedom for
South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny in con-
formity with democratic principles and without any foreign interfer-
.^Pean Rusk. "Viet -Nam: Four Steps to Peace," Department of State Bulletin (July 12
1965), pp. 50-55.
« On this point see : Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: a Strategy for
American Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1969). Gordon, Southeast
Asia Project Chairman, Research Analysis Corporation, writes, p. 13 : "The reason for
these repeated involvements [of the United States] In East Asian affairs [Japanese War
Korean War, and Vietnamese War] is to be found in principles nearly identical with those
on which the U.S. has operated in Europe. Washington has been unwilling, in other words,
to accept an East Asian structure under the main influence, or dominance, of any single
power. For this reason, the post-World War II period in East Asia has been characterized
by a continuation of the bipolar conflict that began in 1915. For China, under Mao has
appeared to aim for East Asian hegemony, and the United States — having successfully
opposed Japan's efforts of achieving that goal — has been unwilling to accept China in her
place."
** Rusk, "Vietnam : Four Steps to Peace," p. 52.
"Ibid., p. 54.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 27
400
ence from whatever sources." And finally, he referred to the U.S. goal
of supporting foreign economic and technological development —
And even while these hopes of peace are blocked for now by aggression, we
on our side and other nations have reaffirmed our deep commitment to the peace-
ful progress of Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole. In April the President
proposed to the nations of Asia and to the United Nations that there be con-
structed a new program of support for Asian efforts and called upon Mr. Eugene
Black to assist them. Now in June this work is underway. The Mekong River
project has been given new life. A new dam is ready to rise in Laos. A billion-
dollar bank is in the making for the development of Southeast Asia. And in
Vietnam itself new impetus has been given to programs of development and
education and health.48
Shortly after the President's April 1965 speech, Walt W. Rostow,
Counselor of the Department of State and chairman of the Policy
Planning Council, identified five ways Asian nations, cooperating as
a region, mignt "help one another in this next phase of the region's
economic evolution." They could intensify trade among themselves.
They could harmonize tlieir national development plans, with each
nation concentrating in fields of its own natural advantage, at the
same time reducing possibilities of overproduction and idle industrial
capacity. There could be multilateral planning and financing. (In this
connection, the proposed Asian Development Bank would be "an ex-
tremely useful instrument.") For his fourth and fifth points, Mr.
Rostow stressed the opportunities of regional development per se :
Certain of the countries within the region may wish to generate even more
intensive measures of economic cooperation than are possible on an all-regional
basis. This has always been the hope which lay behind, for example, the schemes
to uevelop the Mekong River basiu. [Anu in tliis context, also] 'mere would cer-
tainly be an enlarged role for intensified technical assistance on a regional basis,
notably in the fields of agriculture, marketing, and export promotion.'7
U.S. Measures to Raise the Tempo of Mekong Development
President Johnson moved vigorously to show that he intended his
proposal to take effect at once — without waiting for the war to end.48
He dramatized this intention by immediately ordering $500,000 of
U.S. surplus foods sent to Southeast Asia for use by workers on Me-
kong development projects; he also sent six U.S. experts to make a
90-day survey of rural electrification opportunities in Vietnam. He
named Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank, to head
a presidential mission to develop a plan of U.S. assistance to the
Mekong project.
The plan that evolved concentrated on four lines of attack : ( 1 ) An
immediate contact with the U.N. Secretary General, U Thant, to gather
resources to start work on the Nam Ngum Dam, to which the United
States would contribute substantially; (2) reversal of the U.S. posi-
tion from opposition to a proposed Asian Development Bank to one of
vigorous support; (3) resumption of a program of pre-engineering
st nil its by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation of a proposed huge dam at
Pa Mong on the main stem of the Mekong west of Vientiane in Laos,
tn Ibid., p. fiT).
"Wall w. Rostow, "Economic Development in Asia," address at Tokyo, Japan, April 23,
1965, Department of State Bulletin (May 31, 1965), pp. 850 851.
"Meeting In special session in Bangkok, May l<i 11, 1965, tin- Coordination Committee
qulrklv formulated a priority lisl of projects. First on the list was the Nam Ngum Dam.
The list was sent in a communique to the United Nations Secretary-General, noting with
interest That substantial additional resources may be made available" to the U.N. to
support the Mekong 1'roject.
401
and (4) a series of actions to strengthen the economies of the Riparian
States (without mentioning Cambodia) and to deal constructively
with "disease and hunger and illiteracy."
THE NAM NGTJM DAM
In a special message to Congress, June 1, 1965, requesting a supple-
mental $89 million of foreign aid "for expanded programs of economic
and social development in Southeast Asia," the President indicated
that —
Approximately $19 million will provide the first installment of our contribution
to the accelerated development of the Mekong River Basin. This is an important
part of the general program of regional development which I outlined at Johns
Hopkins University on April 7. This money will enable us to meet a request for
half the cost of building the Nam Ngum Dam. which the international Mekong
Committee has marked "Top Priority" if the Mekong River is to be put to work
for the people of the region. This will be the first Mekong power project to serve
two countries, promising power to small industry and lights for thousands of
homes in northeast Thailand and Laos. The funds will provide also for — power-
lines across the Mekong, linking Laos and Thailand ; extensive studies of further
hydroelectric, irrigation, and flood control projects on the Mekong main stream
and its tributaries ; and expansion of distribution lines in Laos.48
This dam was proposed for power and irrigation, across the Nam
N>um tributary of the Mekong some 50 miles north of Vientiane.
Amonqr the many actions taken by the Johnson administration at
mid-1965 was a request to the Edison Electric Institute to undertake a
power market survey in this part of the Mekong region. The pre-
engineering work on the unit, like the subsequent construction, was
characteristically performed in separate segments contributed by
various nations or the U.N. or other institutions. Thus, the original
site selection had resulted from an earlier survey of tributaries, con-
ducted by the Japanese Government. An experimental farm to serve
the nlain irrigated with water from the dam was being managed by a
combined Laos-Israel team, under a bilateral agreement. Feasibility
investigations for the dam were made bv the Nippon Koei Company,
financed partly from the U.N. Special Fund and partly by Japan
under a bilateral economic and technical cooperation agreement be-
tween Laos and Japan.
Although the U.S. Congress acted promptly to grant the Presi-
dent's request for funds for the project, it was not until May 4, 1966
that all the financial preliminaries were completed — culminating in
the Nam Ngum Development Fund Agreement. This agreement in-
volved the recipient nations, Laos and Thailand, and the donor na-
tions— Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Thailand, and the United States, plus the World Bank. Funds
were to be provided in the form of grants to the extent of $22.8 mil-
lion, to be administered by the World Bank. Principal contributors
were the United States ($12 million), Japan ($4 million), Nether-
lands ($3.3 million) and Canada ($2 million). Thailand donated $1
million in cement.
The Nam Ngum unit is of impressive size. The dam is 707 feet high,
and 1,541 feet in span. Its reservoir will impound 8 billion cubic meters
49 Lyndon B. Johnson. "Sneclal Message to the Congress on the Need for Additional
Foreign Aid Funds for Southeast Asia," June 1965. Public Pavers of the President of the
United States (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 607.
402
of water (an area of 230 square miles). Its power generation facili-
ties— power generators, transformer, and switchyard — will deliver
initially 30,000 kw and ultimately 120,000 kw over 115 kv transmission
lines to Vientiane and into Thailand. Laotian personnel are being
trained to operate the facility.
Reasons for the assigning by the Coordination Committee of "first
priority" to this unit are complex but persuasive. It was to be located
in Laos, the least developed of the Riparian States. Political and dip-
lomatic relations were favorable. (For example, although its location
was in an area under at least partial control by the communist Pathet
Lao, the communists had permitted site surveys in 1964 and were
agreeable to the scheme.) It would be the first unit in the Mekong
Project to serve more than one country, which would dramatize the
international character of the entire enterprise. It was the largest
tributary project then in prospect. It offered a good cost/benefit ratio.
One of the most important considerations was that while large, the
project was still of manageable size for completion in a reasonably
short time; and once completed it would demonstrate tangibly the
opportunities offered by the Mekong Project as a whole. As the 1966
annual report of the Coordination Committee noted : "A very signifi-
cant feature of the Mekong Development Project's gross resources is
thus not only the very substantial increase in these during 1965-1966
[up from $6Y.9 million as of 31 December 1964 to $105.1 million a year
later, although only to $110 million by 31 December 1966 of which the
U.S. contribution was $26 million] but the increased proportion [64
percent] of total resources now being used for construction." 50 Charac-
teristically, this development was of interest to President Johnson who
in 1961 had expressed impatience over the protracted planning phase
and asked when the "dirt would begin to fly." It was also considered
important that almost one-third of the resources had been contributed
by the Riparian States themselves.
A not wholly sympathetic account of the preliminary history of the
Nam Ngum Dam asserts that the United States negotiators had
"agreed to put up half of the money [for the dam] on the understand-
ing that Japan would, in turn, put up half the money for an equally
troublesome foundling in Cambodia: i.e., the Prek Thnot project,
whose paternity the United States had been willing to acknowledge
but Cambodia had denied." This account observes that Nam Ngum
constitutes "the first real test of the validity of the Mekong concept
that large-scale schemes in remote and backward regions will sustain
rather than strain newly developing social and economic systems." 51
THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Apparently there had long been a sentiment in favor of a regional
credit institution to specialize in the accumulation of capital resources
to support regional projects of ECAFE and its regional member states.
Apparently also this proposal was not favored by the White House or
the Department of State or Treasury, nor by the World Bank. Ob-
60 Committee for the Coordination of Investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin, Annual
Report, 1966 I New York : United Nations, 1967), D 99
81 Willard A. Hanna, "The Mekong Project," Part IV "The Test at Nam Ngum," Amer-
ican Universities Field Staff Reports, Southeast Asia Series xvl, no. 13 (July 1968), 4.
403
jections from these sources were based on the idea that standards in
the extension of credit in remote regional banks would be low so that
resources would accordingly be wasted. Writing in 1969, Eugene Black
observed that he had been persuaded to change his opinion of the
merits of the regional bank concept after he had been enlisted by Pres-
ident Johnson in the campaign to help the Mekong Project."
And Lyndon Johnson has recorded :
One of the first things I asked Black to do was to push hard to bring the pro-
posed Asian Development Bank to life. Almost all the nations of Asia and other
concerned and more prosperous nations joined in this effort, thirty-two coun-
tries in all. The charter of the new bank was signed at Manila on Decem-
ber 4, 1965.
The first year and a half was taken up with planning, recruiting able personnel
from many countries, and building a headquarters in Manila. By the end of 1967
the Asian Development Bank was in business. The Bank has two main functions :
to make loans for worthy projects and to provide technical assistance. In 1968,
its first year of operation, the Bank made seven major loans totaling $41.6 mil-
lion. Twenty additional loans amounting to $98.1 million were approved in
1969.53
Upon his return from his first visit to Southeast Asia for the Presi-
dent, Black reported that progress had been encouraging, and that the
Bank could be in business by early 1966.
Mr. Black [said a White House press release, July 10] told the President that
the consultative committee meetings went very well .... [He had told the
other delegates] that — subject to congressional approval — the United States
[was] prepared to provide 20 percent of the Bank's capital, up to $200 million,
and also to contribute — if other countries [would] join — up to $100 million to
the multilateral Southeast Asia Development Fund. The Fund would be admin-
istered by the Asian Bank and would finance regional projects in Southeast Asia.
The President [the press release continued] was happy to learn from Mr.
Black that the Japanese Government also intends to take a 20-percent share in
the Bank's capital."
Authority for U.S. participation in subscribing $200 million to the
capital of the Asian Development Bank Act was provided in Public
Law 89-369, 89th Congress, approved March 16, 1966. The Bank's
Articles of Agreement came into force on August 22, 1966. A recent
evaluation of this action, by the National Advisory Council on Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Policies, observed that "The forma-
tion of the Asian Development Bank is the most important single de-
velopment of the past several years in terms of Asian regional cooper-
ation [and that] the . . . decision of the United States to become a
member of a properly conceived Asian Development Bank was decisive
in assuring that the Bank would receive major support from outside
the region." 55
62 Eugene R. Black: Alternative in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praejrer.
1969), pp. 96-97. He notes :
As early as 1954, the member countries of ECAFE and the ECAFE secretariat began
talking about the formation of an Asian development bank. I was then President of the
World Bank, and, frankly, I was opposed to the establishment of regional banks, whether
in Asia or Africa or Latin America. I feared that they would become political institutions
which, while ostensibly charged with tasks very like those of the World Bank, would tend
to undermine the kind of lending standards we were trying to get accepted and the con-
fidence we were trying to build up in the bond markets of the world.* * *
A similar view prevailed in the U.S. Treasury as late as March 1965 * * *.
63 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 356.
54 "Mr. Black Reports on Southeast Asia Economic Development," Department of State
Bulletin (August 2, 1965), p. 215.
55 Secretary of the Treasury, Communication transmitting to the Committee on Banking
and Currency a "Special Report on the Proposed U.S. Contribution to the Consolidated
Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank," 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 13.
404
The principal subscribers to the Bank included both regional coun-
tries and non-regional countries. Of the regional countries the prin-
cipal subscribers and the amounts originally subscribed were as fol-
lows: Japan ($200 million), India ($93 million), and Australia ($85
million) ; of the non-regional, apart from the United States, the prin-
cipal subscribers were the Federal Republic of Germany ($34 million) ,
United Kingdom ($30 million), and Canada ($25 million). The total
subscription was $978 million.
It had been anticipated that the new Bank would be a major chan-
nel for the flow of capital to the various planned units of regional
development in the Lower Mekong Basin. However, the quest for a
sound financial reputation in its first years of operation apparently
moved the Bank to impose rather stringent credit terms so that Mekong
activities tended to Wk e^ewhere for <>rants or soft loans on easier
terms. An effort to establish a separate soft loan "window" at the Asian
Development Bank received little immediate support.
THE PA MONG DAM PROJECT 56
The largest engineering task on the agenda of the Coordination
Committee was a proposed dam some 12 miles upstream from Vien-
tiane, Laos, on the main stem of the Mekong. This dam site drew the
attention of engineers from the first because it offered on an enormous
scale opportunities for power, irrigation water storage, flood Control,
and flow stabilization to favor downstream navigation. The first sur-
vey of the Pa Mongsite was requested from the U.S. Bureau of Recla-
mation by the Coordination Committee shortly after Vice President
Johnson's visit to the Committee in May 1961. The request was for a
preliminary reconnaissance to prepare the design requirements for a
comprehensive feasibility study.
The Bureau of Reclamation preliminary report on Pa Mong was
made early in 1962. It proposed an 8-year, three-phase program of
investigation emphasizing land use studies. Each succeeding phase
would be contingent on positive findings in the phase preceding.
The Phase I investigations were begun by the Bureau under an
agreement (with U.S.A.I.D. as intermediary) with the Coordination
Committee on May 31, 1963. It continued the availability of abundant
land suitable for irrigation using water from the project, and recom-
mended that work begin on Phase II. A preliminary report anticipat-
ing these findings was issued by the Bureau in June 1965. less than two
months after the President's Johns Hopkins speech.
Phase II consisted of several interim reports to gather all the find-
ings together into a comprehensive plan for the project. The various
studies under this phase were merged in a '"Pa Mong Stage One Feasi-
bility Report" which the Bureau of Reclamation transmitted Decem-
ber 1!». L969, to I". S.A.I. I), for delivery to the Coordination Commit-
tee. This was an impressive 279-page report with many maps, draw-
ings, tables, and graphs. The project that emerged was heroir in si/.e
and scope. (See Table 2 for a L968 comparison of Pa Mong with some
M A concise history of tin- Pa Mong project, through 19B9, is presented as Chapter 1 of
the "Pa M * > 1 1 ir Stage One Feasibility Report," Bureau of Reclamation, Departmenl of the
Interior I December 19, 1969)
405
other great dams of the world.) The total cost of construction was
estimated at $1.16 billion. The reservoir behind the dam would contain
more than 100 billion cubic meters of water, to irrigate some 43,000
hectares of land. The accompanying power plant would be capable of
generating 4.8 million kw of power, with transmission lines distribut-
ing it to various market areas from Vientiane to Bangkok. Annual
revenues estimated in the report were $143 million (mainly from the
sale of power, which accounted for more than $120 million). Revenues
over and above operating costs, the report said, would be sufficient to
amortize costs of the project in 50 years at 6 percent interest, from
power revenues at 4.53 mills per kwh. A preliminary market survey
found that Thailand alone would be able to use all power generated
by the project within 10 years.
It is not evident that this report satisfied fully the requirement set
by USAID for the Stage I Report. The design sought was described
as follows :
The first stage is expected to be the smallest viable component that constitutes
a financeable construction start. It ought to be a package that can stand on its
own financially, yet be capable of later expansion — in stages — to ultimate project
size. . . . Basic requirements are that Stage I be economically feasible, capable of
sustained operation and maintenance, and that there be reasonable prospects
that it is financeable. Stage I should be small enough to be manageable in an
underdeveloped area.
TABLE 2.— COMPARISONS-LARGE DAMS AND HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS i
Grand Coulee
Glen Canyon
Akosombo
High Aswan
Pa Mong
(estimated)
Date completed..
Location
River..
1942
Washington
Columbia
1964
Arizona
Colorado
1965
Ghana
Volta
1967
Egypt
Nile
Thailand/Laos
Mekong
Average annual flow at dam site (millions
of acre-feet) 79. 1
Maximum annual flow (millions of acre-
feet).... 103.0
Minimum annual flow (millions of acre-
feet) 53.0
Peak flow (cubic feet/second (est.) 725,000
(1894)
Dam— Type. _ Gravity-
concrete
Volume (millions of cubic yards) _. 10.6
Structural height (feet). 550
Crest lengtn (feet) 4,173
Gross reservoir capacity (millions of acre-
feet) 9.6
Active reservoir capacity (millions of
acre-feet). 5.0
Area irrigated (potential) (million acres). 1. 0
Powerplant:
Maximum head (feet) 345
Installed capacity (millions of kilo-
watts). 2.0
Maximum annual generation (bil-
lions of kw-hr). 14.0
Costs— (indexed to 1967 prices) (millions
of U.S. dollars):
Dam 477
Powerplant 338
Cost per kilowatt of capacity (plant). 169
13.3
27.9
68.1
109.4
23.3
52.9
346.0
157.5
5.6
220, 000
(1921)
10.2
550, 000
(1917)
34.0
476, 000
(1878)
68.5
950,000
(1966)
Arch-
concrete
Rockfill Sand/rockfill
Gravity-
concrete
4.9
710
,560
10.5
370
2,100
56.3
364
12,790
5.2
394
3,900
28.0
130.0
127.0
61.0
21.5
(?)
50.0
(?)
103.0
1.4
51.0
2. 0-5. 0
560
(213 design)
242
279
.9
.9
2.1
2. 8-4. 0
4.1
4.3
8.4
20. 0
144 1
96 }
106 .
112.0 |
230
184
88
228
248-416
104
1 Source: U.S. Agency for International Development and Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of Interior. "To
Tame a River." (Wasnington, U.S. Gsvern/nant Printing Office, 19S8), p. 24.
406
Undoubtedly, construction of the Pa Mong dam would be a turning
point in regionalism in Southeast Asia. It would confer on the partici-
pating countries a considerable prestige. It would provide economic
stimulus for further technological development. It would afford many
kinds of economic opportunity. It would significantly mitigate the
threat of massive floods in the lower Mekong basin. Moreover, success
in this task would break the ice for at least two other grand under-
takings on the main stem: at Sambor and Tonle Sap. However, as
the undertaking at Pa Mong progressed through the planning phase,
more and more attention was directed to the matter of infrastructure.
What social adaptations would be necessary to make proper use of
the dam as a new resource ? What amenity capital investments would
be needed in the form of schools, hospitals, terminals, and other social
overhead items? What would be the problems of resettling people
from the inundated reservoir? How would the power generated at
the dam be distributed and how should it be utilized?
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE MEKONG PROJECT
President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech was the signal for an
accelerated staff effort in U.S.A.I.D., working in cooperation with an
improvised White House office set up to support Eugene Black in his
role as the President's Advisor on Southeast Asia Economic and Social
Development. A program of increased assistance to the countries of
Southeast Asia was quickly drafted, and was presented to the Con-
gress June 1. Hearings were held promptly, and the Congress speedily
acted on the President's request for a supplemental $89 million "to
help in the peaceful economic and social development" of that region.
The bulk of the request was for import assistance : $45 million to buy
iron and steel, cement, chemicals and pesticides, drugs, trucks, and
other essential goods. Another $19 million was earmarked for use by
the Coordination Committee to start the Nam Ngum dam construction
work, associated power lines, and some further studies. The remaining
$25 million would be used to help the three countries (Cambodia being
at that time unrecognized 57) to develop a supporting infrastructure.
According to the President's message to Congress:
$5 million would be used to support electrification cooperatives as a pioneer
project in Vietnam ;
$7 million would be used to provide improved medical services in the three
countries ;
$3 million would be used to "train people for the construction of roads, dams,
and other small-scale village projects in Thailand and Laos ;" and
$7 million to "supplement the present program of agricultural development
and support additional government services in all three countries, and [to] help
in the planning of further industrial expansion in the secure areas of Vietnam."
In hearings before (he Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 3,
L965, Secretary Rusk explained thai the requested funds had two pur-
poses: (i) to implement the President's April 7 proposal ("an inter-
tiational campaign to stimulate Southeasl Asian economic and social
progress and promote closer regional economic cooperation'') and
'7 i-'or an account "f the complicated diplomacy of Prince Sihanouk toward the I'nited
stains and the Mekong Project in this period, Bee William A, Hanna, "The Mekong Project,"
Part VII "The Enigma <>f Cambodia," American Universities Field staff Report*, Southeast
Asia Series xvl, no. 17, (September, 1968).
407
(2) to enable South Vietnam to further its own development of in-
dustry, housing, and public works "while carrying out an expanded
defense effort." Emphasis was to be placed on public health programs
in Thailand and Laos, rural electrification cooperatives in South
Vietnam, training and equipping of local engineering and public
works agencies for rural development work in Laos, and Thailand,
and expanded technical assistance to Lao agricultural development
("particularly agricultural credit and marketing, and the introduc-
tion on a wider scale of improved livestock and seeds").58
The various studies of the Lower Mekong Basin had all agreed that
a good deal of preparatory planning and training should take place
before actual construction of dams and power plants. Much of this
work was already underway in mid-1965. Thus, ECAFE reported in
March that 54 different teams were at work in the basin on such tasks
as fishery and forestry studies, mineral surveys, demonstration farms,
irrigation experiments, and river navigation surveys and channel
marking.59
At the conclusion of the calendar year 1965, the annual report of
the Coordination Committee to ECAFE listed, in addition to various
dams and other construction projects and progress in organization
and staffing, the following "highlights" which illustrate the kind of
supporting developmental program then judged necessary for the
Mekong engineering tasks — in view of the relatively primitive econ-
omy and technology of the region ; analysis of 200 samples of Cambo-
dian bauxite; soil study of the Laotian resettlement area; mineral
survey of northeast Thailand ; exploratory development of a rock salt
deposit in Thailand ; construction of tug boats for river navigation ;
study of feasibility of pulpwood industry; training of river pilots,
hydrologists, and systems analysts ; and development of a network of
demonstration farms. The Coordination Committee itself had as-
sembled a substantial organization (See organization chart in annual
report for 1965, page 210) .60
It was evident, of course, that electricity and irrigation water would
be useless without capital, labor skills, agricultural knowledge of the
specialized procedures appropriate for irrigated crops, marketing and
transportation of produce, and a more highly developed economic
system. In the absence of fertilizer, for example, perhaps the silt-
laden floods of the Mekong served a useful function to enrich the soil
of the delta. Health of the population was an important factor in
development.61
It was significant that as late as 1970. the Bureau of Reclamation in
its Stage One Feasibility Report was to report that: "Under the
Mekong Basin Development Project AID is presently (FY 1970)
supporting the following ecological and social studies which will pro-
vide new information for future Pa Mong investigations :
1. Water-borne Disease Study — With emphasis on snails as vector ;
2. Aquatic Weeds Study ;
68 Department of State Bulletin (June 28, 1965) , pp. 1056-1060.
68 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, "Putting the Mekong to Work — an
International Undertaking," feature no. 14, (March, 1965).
80 Committee for Coordination of Investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin, Annual
Report, 1965 (New York : United Nations, 1966).
41 See U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Beyond Malthus : the Food/
People Equation," (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 92nd
Cong., 1st sess., 1971.
408
3. Ecological Bench Mark Study ;
4. Cadastral [land ownership] Survey of Vientiane Plain;
5. Social Studies for Resettlement from Reservoir Area and for Irriga-
tion Farmer Organizations ; and
6. Rural Electrification Feasibility Studies for Northeast Thailand and
Vientiane Plain in Laos." 62
Statics of the Mekong Project at the Close of 1965
Under the stimulus of the President's representative. Mr. Eugene
Black, the United Nations by the end of the calendar year 1965 was
giving increased attention to the Mekong as a priority project on its
agenda. At headquarters of the Coordination Committee, in Bangkok,
the program was substantially accelerated : an increase by $37.2 million
(to a total at year's end of $105 million) in grants to the project had
been achieved; 64 percent of the funds at hand were for construction,
with the rest for studies and "pre-investment" purposes. Prospects
were at last favorable for the early establishment of the Asian De-
velopment Bank.
The Mekong project itself was also beginning to move. The first hy-
droelectric project in the S}'stem, the Xam Pung tributary dam in
Thailand, had been completed. Construction was under way in Laos
on two smaller dams, the Lower Se Done and the Nam Dong. The
World Bank had agreed to administer financing and construction of
the large Nam Ngum tributary dam in Laos and funding arrange-
ments had almost been completed dining the year. Design work had
been completed for a dam at Prek Thnot in Cambodia. The U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation was at work on cost/benefit studies and
analyses of the proposed main stem at Pa Mono-. A Japanese team was
at work on a feasibility study of another proposed main stem dam at
Sambor. And a complicated water project was under study by an In-
dian team at Toule Sap. (These last three had earlier been identified
by the Coordination Committee as the priority projects — although
also the most ambitious — in the entire Mekong Project.)
An assessment of the state of the project in early 1966. with particu-
lar reference to the impact of the Johnson initiative, observed :
The [Johns Hopkins] proposal immediately gave rise to a flurry of interest
throughout the Mekong Basin. Within two or three days, the Executive Agent
of the Mekong Committee [Mr. Hart Schaaf] had received calls and communi-
cations from representatives of the fonr governments and from representatives of
other governments that might participate in the proposed program. As a direct
result, a special meeting of the Mekong Committee was held in May 196H to
discuss ways and means of implementing the Mekong scheme. The meeting was
especially significant since it was attended, for the first time, by the Cambodian
I >i rector of External Finance.
It is still unclear what would he the best type of mechanism for administering
the billion dollar program of aid. .Much can he done through the Mekong Com-
mittee, tint the program is intended to serve countries outside the .Mekong region
as well. Perhaps a solution to this problem can be provided by the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, which is expected to become operational in the autumn of 1966.
Meanwhile it is still uncertain what the long-run effects of the military opera-
tions in Vietnam will be on the Committee and its work. So far none of the
countries has withdrawn support, and the Committee has been able to continue its
coordinative role.93
"2 "Pa Moim Stage line Feasibility Report." Bureau of Reclamation, 1-fi.
93 W. R. Derrick Sewell and Gilbert 1". White, "The Lower Mekong," \<. 63.
V. Slump and Recovery: The Mekong Project, 1966-1971
The considerable impetus to the Mekong Project that followed the
Johnson initiative in 1965 was not sustained in the year that fol-
lowed. The coffers of the Coordination Committee received only $4.9
million (bringing the total to some $110 million) compared with re-
ceipts and pledge^ in 1965 of $37.2 million. There were a few signs
of progress in 1966 : the small Nam Pong dam in Thailand had been
completed in mid-March; the large Nam Ngum dam in Laos was
finally funded on May 4, although the bulk of pledges had been made
the year before; the U.S. Congress, on March 16, had authorized a
$200 million subscription to the capital of the Asian Development
Bank (matched by a Japanese subscription of the same amount) ;
field reconnaissances continued at Pa Mong and Sambor; studies went
on of resources, and organization and training in preparation for
operational phases; and there was slow growth of the staff support-
ing the Committee and its Executive.
On the negative side, there was the continued refusal of North Viet-
nam to settle diplomatically for less than continued military action was
judged likely to achieve; the insistence of Cambodia on aloofness from
the United States, even where the Mekong was involved (which con-
tributed to delay on an important dam at Prek Thnot) ; the continued
expansion of the Vietnamese War; and the erosion of U.S. effort for
development not directly contributing to U.S. presence in South Viet-
nam. Troop strength of the United States military services in Vietnam
increased rapidly in 1965 and thereafter, reaching a peak in April
1969. (See Table 3.)
TABLE 3.— U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN VIETNAM '
[In thousands]
Date Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Totals 2
Dec. 31, 1964
Dec. 31,1965
Dec. 31, 1966
Apr. 30,1969
Feb. 10,1972
May 11, 1972
1 Source: U.S. Department of Defense.
'Totals include small contingents of Coast Guard.
Not only was the rate of construction and new starts on Mekong
work unimpressive, but a record-breaking flood on the Mekong in Sep-
tember 1966 had caused enormous damage in the delta, wiped out a
large demonstration farm complex in Laos, and caused diversion of
supplies to aid flood-stricken refugees.
Right up to the present day, the uneven progress of the Mekong
project has continued to reflect the political and military turmoil in the
region. The project does not appear to be regarded as an ideological
(409)
14.7
1.1
6.6
0.9
23.3
116.8
8.4
20.6
38.2
184.3
239.4
23.3
5L.9
69.2
385.3
363.3
36.5
61.4
81.8
543.3
99.7
6.8
26.6
.5
133.7
43.6
2.8
17.1
1.4
65.0
410
issue — for example, the Pathet Lao has been agreeable to the Nam
Ngum construction, and interferences with the various working groups
and construction projects have been few and apparently inadvertent.
However, sustained commitment of resources and manpower to long-
range development projects is difficult to reconcile with the fact of the
spreading conflict in Southeast Asia. The expectations in 1965 that the
war would wind down in perhaps another four years had been a factor
in President Johnson's calculation ; he had apparently judged the time
ripe in April of 1965 to encourage thought about planning for postwar
development, if only as a self-fulfilling prophecy in hastening the end-
ing of the war. A similar outlook, at the end of 1966, appears to have
motivated his appointment of the Lilienthal mission.
Postwar Planning in Vietnam : the Thuc-Lilienthal Report
As an evidence of President Johnson's continuing interest in region-
alism as applicable to Southeast Asia was his action of December 16,
1966 in appointing David E. Lilienthal to head a regional planning
mission to Vietnam. Lilienthal had come into national attention in the
mid-1980s as general manager and then chairman of TVA, and subse-
quently chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. After re-
tiring from public service in 1950, he had organized the Development
and Resources Corporation, a private venture to aid developing coun-
tries in their regional planning. The Lilienthal mission to Vietnam
was originally conceived as a postwar planning venture.64 After his
appointment to the task, Lilienthal went to South Vietnam on a short
reconnaissance visit, accompanied by Robert W. Komer, special as-
sistant to President .Johnson. Upon their return they held a joint press
conference at the White House with President Johnson on Febru-
ary 27, 1967. In describing his views of their mission, the President
explained :
From the early stage of the TVA I have . . . admired the novel, constructive,
and farreaching thoughts and programs which (Lilienthal) has inaugurated on
behalf of people in a democratic way and in a democratic society.
We finally prevailed on him to go out and do some studying (in Vietnam). . . .
He has given us his help. I think it will have farreaching results and effects/
It is going to be essential to our success in that area.
This goes back to what was said in Baltimore in April of 1965. . . .
Later in the interview, the President again interjected —
Some of this thinking is reflected in the Baltimore speech of April of 1965.
That will be brought up to date. We have worked some with some of the United
Nations people and some of our own economic people since that time. Of course.
we talked to Mr. (Eugene) Black about the agreed deal with the Asian Devel-
opment Hunk and the economic development of that whole part of the world.
Mr. Komer stressed the postwar development theme —
Everywhere I traveled in the country there was a feeling that the outcome of
this conflict w;is no Longer in doubt. . . . There is a growing mood of confidence in
South Vietnam.
Mr. Lilienthal's contribution to the conference was centered on the
"lAt the Manila Conference, October 1966, a statement was Issued In a Joint Com-
munique (State Department Bulletin, November i!>. 1966, p. 732) that read: "Looking to
the long-term future of their richly endowed country, the Vietnamese representatives de
scribed their views and plans for the building of an expanded postwar economy." This
led to the action by President Johnson, announced December 1G, that the United States
Oovernmenl and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam would sponsor a joint plan-
nine effort on the "long run development of the Vietnamese economy." at the request of
Prime Minister Kv (This was reported in Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1967,
p. 69).
411
terms of reference of his projected mission. It would be nongovern-
mental because, as Prime Minister Nguyen Ky had told him, the long-
term development of his country "would not be possible unless this
group of planners and developers were not to be interrupted from
time to time by possible changes in the government." The study would
be carried on over a three-year period, with projected funding of $1.5
million. He would have a partner in the study, Professor Nguyen Dang
Thuc, heading a nongovernmental group of Vietnamese. Asked what
the priority elements of the study would be, Mr. Lilienthal said that
there were some "fantastically productive resources of that country
that could change the whole complexion."
One of them is the Delta, so-called, the Delta of the Mekong River. That may
well be the first, to look at the long-term future of that area which is producing
enormous amounts of rice. . . .
This river has water resources that are almost unmanageable. I thought I
knew rivers, but I have never seen a river with such fertile land stretching
out as far as the eye can see.96
At a second White House news conference, almost a year later,
Lilienthal explained that circumstances had changed the terms of
reference of his mission :
At the time we undertook this [job], it was thought of as a postwar economic
long-range development program ; namely, that this would begin after hostilities
had ceased. This soon turned out to be unrealistic, this postwar emphasis.
The war itself, being informal with territories undefined and sover-
eign authorities not well established, seemed to promise no definite
termination point. Moreover, "It also became clear that it would be
nothing less than a disaster if economic development by the Viet-
namese were to await a conclusion of the war — disaster because infla-
tion would take over, disaster because the needs of the country are
great and the opportunities are great."
His outlook was optimistic, full of praise for the initiative of the
Vietnamese people, and hopeful for the spread of small, local industry.
Small-scale industry depends upon people, first of all, who have some entre-
preneurial sense. These people have it. You don't have to teach profit motive
to these peasants ; they invented it. They are very adept at machinery ; prac-
tically anywhere you go, there is a fellow who sets up a business to take a Honda
apart and put it together. If he doesn't have the part, he will take an old Bud-
weiser beer can and cut out the part. I have never seen people as adaptable.
The test of success, Lilienthal concluded, was whether the new gov-
ernment of South Vietnam would sustain its interest in economic devel-
opment, or whether it would be consumed by political questions or
quarrels. "The way to tell about that," he said, "is when the first bill
for the Mekong Delta Authority, which is one of the things we want,
is introduced into the Legislature . . ." 66
A Rand Corporation analysis67 of the Thuc-Lilienthal mission
report 68 called attention to the difficulty encountered by the report's
66 "Economic Situation in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin (March 20, 1967),
pp. 467-471.
88 "Mr. Lilienthal Discusses Viet-Nam's Economic Development Program," Department of
State Bulletin ' December 25, 1967), pp. 864-867.
87 Albert P. Williams, Jr., "South Vietnam's Develonment Prospects in a Postwar Era :
A Review of the Thuc-Lilienthal Report," report No. P-4563 (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand
Corporation, January 1971).
68 Joint Development Group, "The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam :
Policies and Programs," 3 vols. (Saigon, New York : Postwar Planning Group, Development
and Resources Corporation, 1969). The report was transmitted to Nguyen Van Thieu,
President. Republic of Vietnam, from Vu Quoc Thuc, Chairman, Postwar Planning Group,
and David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, Development and Resources Corporation, March 1969.
412
authors in resolving the issue of a postwar versus a more broadly de-
fined "futures" study. The Rand analysis concluded :
The whole environment in Vietnam is in a state of transition. There are
numerous important current trends: Americans are leaving; Vietnamese are
assuming more of the defense burden ; security is improving ; and the economy
is growing. These trends do not lead directly to peace. All are favorable, though
some may be reversible. Their continuity will not be assured by favorable eco-
nomic performance, but such performance will be reinforcing.
The Thuc-Lilienthal report had recommended a large-scale, capital-
intensive water project which, said the Rand analysis, "seems precisely
the kind of project that is unlikely to be undertaken until the national
budget is relieved of some of the burdens of the national security and
until the GVN (Government of Vietnam) top managers become less
preoccupied with the war." Earlier, the Rand analysis, in discussing
the report's suggestions for a large public investment program,
commented :
The discussion of sectoral investment priorities argues against favoring the
industrial sector at the expense of agriculture. This is doubtless good advice to
a country with the resource endowments of South Vietnam, no matter what
investment environment, but the case seems particularly strong in the environ-
ment postulated here. In the first place, the success of Vietnamization almost
surely hinges on the continuation of the favorable security developments in the
Mekong Delta, the richest agricultural region. Thus agricultural investment will
be the safest kind — security-wise — during the next five years. Secondly, agricul-
tural capital formation in Vietnam is largely comprised of widespread mecha-
nization of relatively small enterprises. Thus the capital goods are spread out and
are less suitable as hostages for enemy objectives. Finally, small scale agricul-
tural investment is very conserving of GVN management . . . ."
The Thuc-Lilienthal study also, by implication, posed the question
as to how planning for the Lower Mekong Basin as a geographic and
developmental entity was to be reconciled with planning in the sep-
arate Riparian States. Parts of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, and
most of South Vietnam, lay outside the Basin. The complications of
planning a coherent and balanced program of development of the
Basin, with active military conflict in three of the countries, seem
formidable. Logically, most of the active construction was in single
nations and on tributaries. It was important that each of the four
Riparian States should be assigned some equitable share of these, as
well as contributing some equitable share of the total costs.
The Thuc-Lilienthal study apparently recognized— as did the Rand
Corporation analysis of it— that the form taken by the conflict and
the manner of its termination would be an important determinant of
the appropriateness of any development plan. The primary value of
the Thuc-Lilienthal survey lay in its description of the Mekong Delta
as a populous and potentially rich region, and their analysis of the
economic problems and opportunities in other parts of Vietnam. How-
ever, as the war continued to expand into Laos and Cambodia .(i.e.,
Khmer Republic), the problems of planning for future economic de-
velopment in these countries might be expected to resemble those of
South Vietnam.
In fact, as the war spread, more and more of the total activity on
the Mekong— as distinguished from planning and "pre-investment"
work— tended to take place in Thailand. Although attention had
* Williams, "South Vietnam's Development Prospects," p. 19.
413
earlier been called repeatedly to the remarkable freedom from inter-
ference enjoyed by those working on the Mekong Project, the report
of the Coordination Committee for 1971 makes numerous men-
tion of projects retarded by the "security" problems and the unsettled
conditions.70
The piling up of studies in the face of compelled inaction on con-
struction may help to ensure more thorough examination of the total
system before it turns into a reality. However, the delay must also be a
source of frustration not only in Bangkok but also in the three other
national capitals, and at the long-promised construction sites.
Action on the Large Main Stem Projects
Early in its history, and particularly from 1957 onward, the Co-
ordination Committee repeatedly characterized the three main stem
dam projects — at Pa Mong, Sambor, and Tonle Sap — as its "priority"
items of construction. The Pa Mong unit in particular was favored
because of its enormous potential for alleviating downstream floods,
as well as its irrigation and power features. Responsibility for plan-
ning the Pa Mong dam, by agreement between the Committee and
U.S.A.I.D., was assigned to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. An
elaborate series of studies followed. In the most recent of these, the
"Pa Mong Stage One Feasibility Report, 1970," the Bureau concluded
with the following passage :
One of the most frequently asked questions during the course of the investiga-
tions leading to this report is : When will Pa Mong Project be built?
Pa Mong Project will probably be built when the Riparian countries, especially
Laos and Thailand, decide that they need the project and that it fits their na-
tional development requirements as well as or better than any alternative. When
and how the project fits into their development plans will presumably be based
on decisions as to the best use of development resources including funds and
manpower, and a determination of how to best meet their development needs.
One of the first questions to be resolved insofar as Pa Mong is concerned is :
Are the products of Pa Mong, i.e., power, increased agricultural production,
corollary effects, and the human benefits, needed in the development scheme and
if so, what are the orders of priority?
The conclusion was suggested that the project might be activated at a
"much earlier date" if it could be set up on a self-liquidating basis
"with a management organization having authority to (1) negotiate
loans, (2) monitor expenditures, (3) control operation and mainte-
nance so as to produce maximum sustained revenues, and (4) control
revenues for most expeditious debt service. . . ."
A separate examination of the question as to the timing of main stem
projects was undertaken in 1970 by Resources for the Future, Inc.,
at the request of the World Bank. Specifically, RFF was asked to ex-
amine the Amplified Basin Plan Report of the Coordination Commit-
tee, completed in 1970, with respect to development strategy and pri-
orities in the region as they might affect agriculture.
The findings of the RFF report 71 were that despite the substantial
effort in research and "impact studies," there were still many serious
gaps. These included : the role of electric power, the ecological conse-
70 In the draft report, references to this problem appear on pases 21, 22, 23. 36-37, 40, 42,
59, and 74. On the subject of war disruption in the Republic of Viet Nam see U.S. Congress.'
Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, "Impact of the Vietnam War," (Washington D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office. 1971), 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1971.
71 Resources for the Future, Agricultural Development in the Mekong Basin: Goals, Pri-
orities, and Strategies (Baltimore, Md. : Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
414
quences of creating a great lake behind the Pa Mong dam, the threat
of costly interruption of work on a very large project, political and
international considerations of equity, and alternative uses of water.
The report identified three essential preconditions for main stem
projects :
(1) That substantial results — physical, managerial, and social — have been
reached in the tributary projects ;
(2) That markets are clearly opening up in a sustained way for absorbing the
increased output that would come from the development of mainstem projects ;
and
(3) That associated power production is carefully channeled so as to minimize
the chance of its accentuating social and economic inequities both between rural
and urban areas and within urban areas.72
Undoubtedly, the engineering achievement represented by the Pa
Mong dam would have many beneficial effects — for the morale of the
Coordination Committee and all associated sponsors, for the Riparian
States — especially Laos and Thailand, for the United Nations, and for
the United States. Even though exploitation of the benefits in irriga-
tion and power might have to be spread over many future years, the
dam would be a magnificent billion-dollar symbol of global interest in
the Mekong Region. On the other hand, as the RFF report concludes :
. . . International organizations no less than donor countries must beware lest
their desire to see economic development proceed along certain lines lead them
into assuming a primary responsibility which really is not theirs. At times it may
even be better to see development falter than to see primary responsibility pass
out of the hands of the riparian countries. By the same token any line of action
that spells increased understanding and participation of people in the region, of
local groups and organizations, and of governmental units should receive high
priority in assistance. For only to the degree that the people in the Basin make
the plans for development theirs will they succeed in bringing development
worthy of the name.
Status of the Mekong Project, Beginning of 1972
As the Mekong Project has unfolded, the scope and complexity of
its totality becomes progressively more difficult to characterize. The
spread of the Vietnamese War has impacted at many points. National
planning — particularly with respect to the part of the Delta lying in
South Vietnam — has interacted with river basin planning. Circum-
stances in Cambodia (Khmer Republic) have been altered by the
change in that country's government. Uncertainties surrounding U.S.
foreign aid policy are an important complication. The apparent suc-
cess of initial moves toward detente between the People's Republic of
China and the United States invite speculation as to whether Main-
land China may in time agree to a comprehensive scheme to combine
planning and development of the Upper Mekong Basin with the
Lower. Question is also raised as to the possible interest of the Soviet
Union in contributing its support to the Project; the USSR has not
yet contributed to the activity but does not appear to disfavor it.
According to the draft report of the Coordination Committee for
1971, allocation of expenditures for the Mekong Project has con-
™Ibid., pp. 106-107.
415
tinued to emphasize construction over planning and "pre-investment."
Nevertheless, the scope of the latter has expanded enormously in re-
spect to range of subject-matter and fineness of detail. Technical train-
ing and large-scale agricultural experiment stations have assumed
much greater importance, and appear to be laying the groundwork for
progressive evolution of an infrastructure to exploit the resources de-
veloped in the civil engineering phase of the Project.
Progress has been achieved, of course, in the dam-building work. On
tributaries of the Mekong, three small and two larger dams have been
completed in Thailand and Laos, along with associated power plants
and irrigation works. Three other tributary dams are funded and
under construction, although the largest, a $27 million facility on the
Prek Thnot tributary in the Khmer Republic, has been interrupted by
war. The total resources available to the Coordination Committee were
divided between construction ($144 million or 68 percent) and pre-
investment work ($69 million or 32 percent) . The four Riparian States
contributed $93 million or 44 percent if the total. As between loans
and outright grants, the latter accounted for $162.5 million or 76
percent. (For a listing of Operational Resources as of December 31,
1971, see Table 4. For a report of the status of construction and de-
velopment activities in 1972, see Table 5.)
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-28
416
TABLE 4.1— MEKONG PROJECT. OPERATIONAL RESOURCES AS OF DEC. 31, 1971
Preinvestment
investigations
Investment for
and planning
construction
(dollar
(dollar
Total (dollar
equivalent)
equivalent)
equivalent)
1,011,000
2, 733, 458
3,744,458
75,000 .
75,000
171,000 .
171,000
1,365,000
5,000,000
6,365,000
10,000
1,280,000
1,290,000
10,000 .
10,000
1,774,049
4,977,311
6,751,360
2,500
17,000,000
17,002,500
20,000 .
20. 000
312,805
200, 000
512.805
20, 000 .
20, 000
243,500 .
243,500
1,121,480
5,000
1,126,480
49, 700
1,000,000
1,049,700
1,555,430
13, 907, 000
15,462,430
1,727,942
4, 770, 000
6, 497, 942
366, 327
432, 860
799, 187
10, 000 .
10, 000
100,000
150,000
250, 000
339, 957
80, 000
419,957
20,000 .
20, 000
475,000 .
475, 000
5,000 .
5,000
896, 453
1,554,247
2, 450, 700
21,163,022
16, 645, 000
37,808,022
Australia .
Austria
Eelgium
Canada
Denmark
Fhland
France -.
Federal Republic of Germany.
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan.
Philippines...
Sweden
Switzerland
United Arab Republic
United Kingdom...
United States
Subtotal.
Khrre" Republic.
Laos
Thailand.
Vietnam
Subtotal.
ECAFE
UNOTC(BTAO).
ILO
FAO
UNESCO
UNICEF
UNIDO
WHO
WMO
IAEA
UNDP/SF
WFP.
Subtotal.
Magsaysay Foundation.
Others...
32, 845, 165
3,491,583
3,030,121
10, 369, 786
2,663,842
19,555,332
790, 582
452, 799
13,104
140,050
17, 800
50, 000
14,820
8,277
45,300
55,650
15,121,288
36, 508
16,746,178
10, 000
455, 443
69, 734, 876
9, 328, 100
934, 500
52, 330, 969
11,020,000
73,613,569
810, 900
136,575
947,475
67, 850
102,580,041
12,819,683
964,621
62,700,755
13,683,842
90,168,901
790, 582
452, 799
13, 104
140, 050
17,800
50, 000
14,820
8,277
45, 300
55.650
15, 932, 188
173,083
17,693,653
10,000
523, 293
Grand total.
69,612,118 144,363,770
210,975,888
Supplied by U.S. AID.
417
TABLE 5.— MEKONG TRIBUTARY PROJECTS: JANUARY 1972'
Project and status
Installed
capacity
(kilowatts)
Irrigation
(hectares)
Other benefits
Co-operating countries
LAOS
Nam Ngun: Completed 1971
Nam Dong: Completed 1971
Lower Se Done: Completed 1970
30, 000
1,250
2,500
18, 000
31,500
4,500
6,300
25, 000
24, 000
(36, 000)
(135,000)
Power for down-
stream pump
irrigation, fish-
eries, flood
control.
Australia, Canada, Denmark
France, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Thailand,
United States.
France.
Do.
KHMER REPUBLIC
Prek Thnot: Under construction
Battambang: Under Investigation
Stung Chi nit : Feasibility report
completed.
THAILAND
Nam Pung: Completed 1965
Nam Pong: Completed 1966. _.
Lam Dom Noi: Completed 1971
Lam Takong: Completed 1971
(5,000)
70, 000
68,000
25, 000
53, 000
38, 000
9,000
54, 000
32,000
78, 000
Flood control, Australia, Canada, Denmark
fisheries. France, Federal Republic of
Germany, India, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Pakistan,
Philippines, United Kingdom.
Do. Switzerland.
Flood control Japan.
Power for pump
irrigation.
Flood control, Federal Republic of Germany,
fisheries.
Pump irrigation for Japan.
33,000 hectares fish-
eries, flood control,
water supply.
Lam Phra Phloeng: Completed 1971..
Flood control,
fisheries.
Flood control
Flood control,
fisheries.
United States
Nam Phrom: Under construction
Lam Pao: Under construction.
Nam Oon: Under construction
Nam Mae Kok: Under investigation. .
40,000
(80,000)
80, 000
108, 000
Japan.
United States.
Federal Republic of Germany,
Pak Mun: Feasibility report com-
Power for pump
irrigation,
fisheries.
Flood control,
fisheries.
do
do
Switzerland.
France.
pleted.
Mun & Chi: Feasibility report
50, 000
75, 000
21, 150
United States
completed.
VIETNAM
Upper Sre Pok: Reconnaissance
report completed.
Upper Se San: Reconnaissance
report completed.
Yali Falls: Feasibility report
2 200
2 300
100, 000
Japan.
Japan, UNDP.
•
completed.
i Source: "The Mekong Project 1972," unpaginated brochure issued by the Coordination Committee in early 1972.
3 Megawatts.
418
Apart from civil works construction, one of the most important ac-
tivities under the Mekong Project is the network of experimental and
demonstration farms and "Pioneer Agricultural Projects." The farms
have been under development for some years, and include : Vientiane
Plain Farm (Laos), Kalasin Farm (Thailand), Prek Thnot Farm
(Khmer Republic), Battambang Farm (Khmer Republic), and Eak
Mat Farm (Republic of Vietnam). The Pioneer Agricultural Projects
are a more recent development, dating from 1971. They are larger in
area than the farms, roughly 5,000 to 10,000 hectares, to enable detailed
study of economic, social, and institutional problems, as well as mat-
ters of credit, marketing, and processing. The plan of the Coordination
Committee calls for pioneer projects to be instituted in each of the four
Riparian States. According to the draft report of the Coordination
Committee for 1971 : "In September-October a plan of operation was
signed by the Mekong Committee, the UNDP (United Nations De-
velopment Program), and the IBRD (World Bank) for the execution
of this program by the World Bank on behalf of the Mekong Commit-
tee and for the UNDP and the contributing countries. Subsequently,
arrangements were made for the collaboration of the FAO (Food and
Agriculture Organization) and the Asian Development Bank with the
IBRD in this undertaking."
Difficulties with field surveys under the conditions of war instability
have led to an interesting development : the proposed use of Earth Re-
sources Satellites to perform agricultural land use surveys, reservoir
resettlement studies, and surveys of floods and flood damage.
The ramifications of the Mekong Project are beginning to appear al-
most limitless — encompassing river navigation and channel marking,
flood warning and control, weather stations, hydroelectric power pro-
duction-distribution-use, irrigation, mineral resource exploitation, pri-
mary manufacturing, fertilizer production and use, power market
surveys, agricultural experiment and demonstration, public health,
education and training, bridges, roads, resettlement problems, and even
archeological considerations. Were it not for the coherence inherent in
the plan for a river basin in its entirety, the diffusion of effort would
almost certainly be unmanageable.
An effort to heighten this coherence is the preparation by the Co-
ordination Committee of an "Indicative Basin Plan Report." This
comprehensive document Avas made public in Bangkok on March 10.
1972. The 700-page report outlined a $12 billion 30-year program of
"integrated" regional development.
Environmental Quality and Regional Development of the Mekong
For more than a decade of planning and development in the Lower
Mekong Basin the question of adverse ecological consequences re-
ceived little attention. Mostly it was dismissed as of minor significance
relative to the great economic opportunities in prospect, especially in
view of the depressed condition of those about to be benefited. How-
ever, the rising anxieties in the United States over environmental
consequences of applied technology compelled increasing attention to
these same consequences for the inhabitants of the Mekong Basin.
One evidence of this trend was presented in the renort of a field
study of the Pa Mong dam, financed by U.S.A.I.D., which predicted
extensive disadvantages along with the merits: bilharzia and malaria
419
from the penned-up slack water, the consequences of heavy reliance
(foreseen as necessary) on chemical pesticides, resettlement of hun-
dreds of thousands of families from the reservoir area, need for large
amounts of chemical fertilizer as farmers were displaced from fertile
river flood plains to less fertile uplands, flooding of prime timber
lands, and diminished fish population.73 An additional catalog of
possible disadvantages was offered by Claire Sterling in a series of
newspaper articles on the Mekong Project.74 Reservoirs choked with
water hyacinths, leaching of great salt deposits into the main stem of
the river rendering the water unsuitable for irrigation, the threat of
an epidemic of liver fluke to a nation of raw fish eaters, and the loss
of fertilizing silt downstream as a result of upstream flood control.
However, the author concluded this catalog with the observation that
"For once, developers and planners are giving some study to this sort
of thing before the event." But even that assurance carried an accom-
panying danger: "Whether or not they may end by studying the
scheme to death is another thing."
An analysis of this problem of adverse environmental effects, with
particular reference to the Aswan High Dam, suggests that there
are some reasonably objective guidelines to determine good from
bad environmental management. The analysis recommended (1) that
qualitative requirements for the environment be quantitatively ex-
pressed and brought into the equation of good and bad products of
the development, (2) that the options be preserved — including plant
and animal species — to enable readaptation of the environment to
future changes in policy, (3) that the environment itself be diversi-
fied as much as possible, and (4) that the planners take into account
the limited tolerance of any environment to change.75
Perhaps the most serious of these criticisms concerns the health
and medical consequences of civil works. Even without manipulation
of the Mekong, the health problems of the region are serious. One pro-
posal (with specific reference to such problems in Africa) calls for
a "series of strong medico-biological research centers" and also "col-
laborative efforts or programs involving as full a local participation
as possible." Each of the proposed centers would have a set of par-
ticular objectives related to local needs, but aimed at anticipating and
correcting for adverse ecological effects of technological applications.
This means evaluation of health needs in the fullest sense, and it requires com-
bined contributions from as many disciplines as can effectively be focused on the
problem. The effort must be regional, cooperative, sympathetic — but scientifically
rigorous. It must build a bank of reliable information, continually cross-checked
from the standpoint of different disciplines. This material, re-evaluated and
restudied as opportunity and need require, assembled and available to all, should
provide an invaluable source for aid at any level. Major programs without such
prior study are unthinkable in view of past experience. From each study area
an even more valuable resource would emerge : experts with firsthand field
experience, both theoretically and pragmatically knowledgeable, available for
consultation.™
73 "Eeologlsts in the Mekong," The New Republic (March 28, 1970) : pp. 6-7.
74 Claire Sterling, "Thai-Laos Dam Plan Is Perfect One — Except for Why? Washington
Post (May 1, 1971), p. A14, and Claire Sterling, "40-Odd Dams Hold Promise for Great
Mekong Basin," Washington Post (April 24, 1971), p. A18.
76 Gerardo Budowski, "The Quantity-Quality Relationship in Environmental Manage-
ment." Impact of Science on Society XX, no. 3 (1970), pp. 245-246.
78 Donald Heyneman, "Why We Must Prevent Foreign Aid From Becoming an l|cological
Nightmare," Science Forum (October 1971), p. 9.
/
420
It is of interest that attention to these matters of regional health,
in the management of TVA, resulted in the development of a protocol
for reservoir control and other measures that virtually eliminated
malaria — formerly endemic — from the region. It is also of interest
that medical research is an active and promising part of the program
of regional development of the Mekong. For example, progress in
research into the etiology of schistosomiasis was reported by a medical
research team, October 11, 1971, that identified a transmitting snail
on Khong Island, in Laos.77
These episodes suggest that a concerted regional approach associated
with civil works can stimulate positive medical gains that go well
beyond the negative goal of ameliorating adverse impacts of new
construction.
In a broader sense, the policy of the Coordination Committee and
its staff appears to be adaptive to the concerns expressed both as to the
sociological and the environmental impacts of the Mekong Project.
Mohamed Shoaib, an official of the World Bank, has described three
of these adaptations (paraphrase) :
First, the policy now evolving is one of deliberate inerementalism. The largest
works are perhaps a decade away, some much further. By raising issues on a
smaller scale, on tributary works, a learning process is set in motion for ways
to deal with similar problems on larger projects.
Second, the approach is increasingly pragmatic. An example is the introduction
of irrigated farming to farmers unfamiliar with it. Rather than trying to resolve
the uncertainties by theoretical speculation or analysis, the Committee is solv-
ing them by "learning while doing." This approach lies at the heart of the
concept of "Pioneer Projects" which the Committee and the World Bank are
promoting.
Third, "the Committee is giving increasing attention to the problems created
by intervening in depth in the subtle equilibria of established eco-systems." Such
major problems as water-borne diseases, uncontrolled use of potentially dan-
gerous chemicals in fertilizers and pesticides, aquatic weeds, and impact of a
"changed river regime on flood-dependent agriculture and fish and salt water
fisheries" are all under study.
Shoaib observed that it could always be shown that the effects of
any development would be in part adverse, but that the consequences
of economic stagnation were also — demonstrably — adverse. He called
for a "meaningful balance between the urgency of development and
the demands for conservation . . . through a timely interdisciplinary
approach to development planning." 7S
The Nixon Doctrine and Asian Regionalism : Security Plus Develop-
ment
President Nixon does not appear to have differentiated between eco-
nomic regionalism and national security regionalism objectives any
more than did President Johnson. The diplomatic goals of an accept-
able end to the Vietnamese War, political and economic consolidation
of Southeast Asia as a counterbalance to the People's Republic of
China, and development of multilateral aid arrangements to reduce
U.S. costs, all appear in the Nixon policy as in President Johnson's.
"Chamlonp Harlnasuta, Santaslrl Sornmani, Viroj Kitlkoon, Curt R. Schneider, Onnhuan
Pathamniavong, "Experimental Infection of Aquatic Hydroblid Snails and Laboratory
Animals with Schistosoma J<iponicum]\ko Parasites from Khonp Island. Southern Laos,"
mimeograph from U.S. Agency for International Development (October 11. 1971)
78 Mohamed Shoaib, "The Development of the Mekong Basin: Problems and Prospects."
an address to the Center for International Relations ana Ana Studies of the University of
Minnesota, mimeograph from the World Bank (April 29, 1973 I
421
However, unlike his predecessor, President Nixon stressed the de-
sirability of a low U.S. "profile" in Asian affairs.
Before Mr. Nixon acceded to the Presidency, he offered a strategy
of U.S. diplomacy toward Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia, after
the conclusion of the war in Vietnam. The war, he said, had com-
manded too great a share of U.S. attention. Meanwhile —
Sometimes dramatically, but more often quietly, the rest of Asia has been
undergoing a profound, an exciting and on balance an extraordinarily promising
transformation. One key to this transformation is the emergence of Asian re-
gionalism . . . .*"
He continued :
The developing coherence of Asian regional thinking is reflected in a disposi-
tion to consider problems and loyalties in regional terms, and to evolve regional
approaches to development needs and to the evolution of a new world order. This
is not excessively chauvinistic, but rather in the nature of a coalescing con-
fidence, a recognition that Asia can become a counterbalance to the West, and an
increasing disposition to seek Asian solutions to Asian problems through coopera-
tive action.80
There was also a sense of common danger, the source of which was
Communist China. Regionalism was a means of repelling this danger.
It was also a means to avert direct confrontations between the nuclear
powers by minimizing the number of "occasions on which the great
powers have to decide whether or not to commit their forces." These,
he said, "can be reduced by the development of regional defense pacts,
in which nations undertake, among themselves, to attempt to contain
aggression in their own areas." 81
At the same time, the nations of Asia — through their governments —
were "consciously, deliberately, and programmatically developing in
the direction of greater liberty, greater abundance, broader choice, and
increased popular involvement in the processes of government." This,
too, was a regional process but it was one in which the Asian nations
themselves had to take the lead. The diplomatic role of the United
States, in encouraging this development, needed to be low in profile.
In a design for Asia's future, there is no room for heavy-handed American
pressures ; there is need for subtle encouragement of the kind of Asian initia-
tives that help bring the design to reality. The distinction may seem superficial,
but in fact it is central both to the kind of Asia we want and to the effectiveness
of the means of achieving it. The central pattern of the future U.S.-Asian rela-
tions must be American support for Asian initiatives.82
Regionalism for National Security and Economic Development
Upon coming to the Presidency, Richard Nixon developed further
his concept of regionalism as a means of economic development and
national security. In supporting a "soft-loan" capability for the Asian
Development Bank — after an extended study of the subject — he urged
that the United States "should join with other donor countries in es-
tablishing this Special Fund, and strengthen the Bank so that it can
better deal with Asia's current development problems and future
needs." 83
78 Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, 46, no. 1 (October 1967),
p. 111.
80 Ibid., p. 113.
81 JMtf., p. 114-115.
82 Ibid., pp. 117-118, 124.
83 "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid," May 1969, Public Papers of the
President of the United States (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969),
pp. 411-417.
422
One candidate envisioned for such soft loan funding was the Mekong
Project:
The Bank may also be expected to cooperate with interested countries and
international agencies in financing projects which may emerge over the years
in the development of the lower Mekong River Basin. The Bank's involvement in
Mekong River development is expected to be through financial participation on
a project by project basis, where such projects are of priority in the development
programs of the riparian countries and appropriate for Special Funds financing.
By the nature of the potential projects, as well as the general economic condition
of the Mekong riparian countries, such projects may be expected to qualify for
Special Funding financing.84
Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the Nixon doctrine of
regionalism was presented in his message to Congress of February 25,
1971, transmitting his Second Annual Review of United States For-
eign Policy. In this report, he developed the general theme that a new
partnership among nations was needed to share the responsibilities
and the tangible burdens of global leadership and underdevelopment.
Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam was one manifestation of
this new concept. Another was a —
. . . more restrained American approach, designed to encourage and sustain
Asian regionalism, Asian self-reliance, anu Asian initiatives. For those character-
istics are essential to the construction of a stable international order in the
region.85
For the future, said the President :
Asian regionalism has an essential role to play in the future structure of Asia.
It is already a source of growing strength to the individual Asian nations.
Through joint action, their potential influence on the future of the region far ex-
ceeds that which they can exert acting individually.80
The President went on to cite specific elements of Asian regionalism,
such as the "Five Power Arrangement for the defense of Malaysia and
Singapore," the regional security organization of SEATO, the ANZUS
Pact, and the Djakarta eleven-nation meeting on the Cambodian crisis.
One important mechanism of regionalism, lie said, was the Asian De-
velopment Bank. The Bank,
... To which the U.S. has contributed only 20 percent of the capital, has
become an established and major source of capital and technical assistance to
meet Asian needs. In li)'<0 the Bank had its most active year to date, approving
fifty-three projects and increasing its lending by 150 percent. I hope that the
Congress will give early approval to the proposal for an additional $100 million
U.S. contribution to a Special Fund permitting the Bank to finance projects
which, while meritorious, require more generous terms than those now ex-
tended.87
With specific reference to the Mekong Project, the President de-
el a red —
Political difference notwithstanding, the effort continues to develop within a
regional framework Southeast Asia's single major resource — the Lower Mekong
"l T.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, To Authorize the United
States to Participate in Increases in the Resources of the Asian Development Hunk, the
International Monetary Fund, and the International Hank for Reconstruction and Dentop
ment Hearing on ll H 18891 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970),
91st Congress. 2nd Session, 16, April 17. 1970, p. 44.
86 U.S. Foreign Polieu for the 1970's: Building for Peace, Message from the President of
the United 81 itea Transmitting ids Second Annual Review of United states Foreign Policy,
February 25, 1971, 92d Congress, 1st Session, House Document 92 53 (Washington, D.C:
U.S. Government Printing Office 1971), p. 74.
M/bid., p. 77.
"Ibid., p. 79.
423
Basin. This project has an almost immeasurable potential for the well-being of
the countries of the Basin, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Along with
a large number of other non-Asian states, we continue to participate actively in
this massive scheme to harness the hydro-electric, irrigation, and transportation
potential of one of Asia's greatest rivers. Its promise for transforming the life
of the area is at least equal to the impact of TVA in our own country.88
The diplomatic implications of regionalism as "one of the new reali-
ties of Asia" were essentially threefold : it provided a focus for the ex-
tending of multilateral aid to development, it generated a spirit of
cooperation in overcoming the "divisions and enmities of the past,"
and "its vigor is one of the guarantees of the influence of Asia's smaller
states in the future political structure of the region." 89
Again in 1972, the President alluded to the theme of regionalism in
Asia in his Report to Congress on "United States Foreign Policy for
the 1970s, The Emerging Structure of Peace." 90
He spoke with approval of the "noteworthy advance of the spirit
of regionalism in Asia," citing the meeting of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at Kuala Lumpur, in November
1971, and the utility of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). Said
the President :
A central purpose of the new partnership we are building with Asian states is
to nurture a growing sense of regional identity and self-confidence. Without it,
a vital impetus for cooperation would be lost, and individual nations would be
obliged to choose between an inward-looking nationalism, and excessive reliance
on the initiative of others to bring coherence and stability to the area. Working
together, however, smaller powers can gain the influence needed to mold their
own futures, while their efforts provide a natural focus for assistance and co-
operation from others.
The President again stressed the need for support of the Asian De-
velopment Bank as "a major source of the area's development and
technical assistance." By the end of 1971, he reported, the ADB had
approved 85 loans to developing nations in Asia, totaling some $639
million. He added :
Though I attach great importance to our continued financial support for Asian
development — including Congressional approval of soft loan funds for the Asian
Development Bank — there are welcome signs that others recognize the limits of
our resources and the need for a broader effort. [He cited Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand as leaders in this movement.]
It was revealed on January 27, 1972, that President Nixon had ex-
tended in two secret sessions of the Paris peace talks with Hanoi, "last
summer," through his representatives in Paris an offer of $7.5 billion
in aid to Indochina, of which something like $2.5 billion would be
earmarked for postwar reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. The
offer was in response to demands from the Hanoi representatives for
reparations from the United States. Newspaper reports of this devel-
opment linked it to the offer by President Johnson in his Johns Hop-
kins speech, and called attention to the changed situation since then.
President Johnson had deplored the death, up to April 1965, of "400
young men," while William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, in 1972
88 Ibid.
89 TbM., p. 80.
90 Richard Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's : The Emerging Struc-
ture of Peace," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 8, No. 7 (February 14,
1972), pp. 304-307.
424
cited the toll of more than 45,000 Americans killed in the war, with
another 10,051 deaths from "non-hostile" causes.91
The Nixon offer had come after more than six years of conflict, with
large investment of manpower, hardware, and war-related foreign
assistance poured into South Vietnam. The intervening years had
demonstrated once again what had been shown in the Korean War —
that it was politically and technically difficult for the United States
to wage a limited war for limited objectives remote from its territory.
It is clear from the record that in regard to Southeast Asia, both
President Johnson and President Nixon used "regionalism" alterna-
tively as a vehicle of anticommunism through alliance and as a ve-
hicle of economic and technological development. Both Presidents
appear to have approached the second form of regionalism ambiva-
lently : as worthwhile to advance the regional economy, and as a pos-
sible* means of accelerating a favorable end of the war. Moreover,
both Presidents cited the essential role of multilateral aid programs
in developmental regionalism, while concentrating actual aid
bilaterally.
The response of the Hanoi authorities to the two offers, by the two
Presidents, for a program of regionalism supported by U.S. resources,
appears to have demonstrated also that "dollar diplomacy" does not
convince an adversary as long as there is any reasonable prospect that
he can outlast the United States without some form of capitulation.
The underlying meaning of that tenet of communist ideology which
Nikita Khrushchev expressed as "AVe will bury you" is that com-
munism as a form of political-social state will surpass and
hence outlast capitalistic-democratic forms in the Ioiuj: run. Accord-
ingly, it seems reasonable to infer that the kind of offer represented
by the Johns Hopkins speech, under the circumstances prevailing
at that time, was unlikely to be an effective tactical move toward end-
ing the war. The question remains, however, as to whether there could
be circumstances under which the concept of regionalism — that is to
say, developmental regionalism— with U.S. support for it on some in-
ternational basis, might serve a broader strategic purpose looking
toward the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives.
91 Garnett D. Horner and George Sherman, "U.S. Aid Offer is $7.5 Billion," Washington
Star (January 28, 1972), p. Al ; and Murrey Marder, "U.S. Reconstruction Proposal Offers
$2.5 Billion to Hanoi," Washington Post (January 28, 1972), p. Al.
VI. Issues, Problems, and Opportunities Offered by
World Regionalism
The whole history of the Mekong Project shows a trend from a
simple public works program to a program in which construction is
linked to the readiness of the region to accept and use rationally the
electricity, irrigation water, and accompanying economic stimulus the
Project would provide. Of progressively greater consequence is the
question of compatibility of new engineering structures with the cul-
ture, ecology, economy, technical expertise, management skills, and
political organization of the component units of the region. Origi-
nally, regionalism — as practiced in the Tennessee Valley — was seen as
a concept to accelerate development of resources on a coherent basis.
But as emphasis was intensified on coherence of comprehensive plan-
ning, the elements of speed and efficiency, while still present, assumed
a secondary importance.
U.S. policy toward the Mekong Project can be approached in a
number of ways. First, it can be regarded as an element of U.S. na-
tional security policy in the sense that it is a move toward building a
more unified regional complex of countries as a counterbalance to
Mainland China and the presence of the U.S.S.R. in Asia, as well as to
a revitalized Japan. Second, it can be regarded as a point of departure
toward a limitless variety of forms of economic assistance to a develop-
ing region ; also, as a mechanism for shifting the costly burden of aid-
ing developing countries to a less onerous multilateral arrangement
with more sharing of costs among the developed countries (and a
"lower profile" of each individual donor). Third, as a very longrange
diplomatic strategy, the concept of "world regionalism" perhaps offers
a way to restructure national political forces into economically bal-
anced regions, sharing interests and problems, but with lessened levels
of interregional conflict and tensions while building viable regional
systems of economic and technological development, interregional
t .ra.de, and mutual assistance.
Southeast Asia As a Regional Security Bloc
One analyst of U.S. policy in Asia observes that the "fifty-year
global behavior pattern of the United States indicates that it will
accept general war rather than tolerate [the achievement by any na-
tion of "final dominance on Europe and East Asia"]." 92
This observation is given support by the flat statement by President
Johnson, October 17, 1966, that "No single nation can or should be
permitted to dominate the Pacific region." 93
93 Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 14-15.
88 "Additional Documentation on President Johnson's Trip to Asia," Department of State
Bulletin (November 28, 1966), p. 815.
(425)
426
The rationale for a regional alliance is described by Bernard K.
Gordon, Southeast Asia Project Chairman, Research Analysis Cor-
poration, in these terms :
There is today in East Asia a convergence of factors highly favorable to both
the immediate objectives and long-term interests of the United States. Precisely
at a time when Americans are most anxious to reduce their unilateral role in
East Asian affairs, nations like Japan and Australia have begun to achieve the
economic output, and nations like Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have
Degun to adopt the political outlook, that for the first time makes the concept
of burden-sharing applicable in Asia. . . . There is an increasingly suitable poli-
tical environment for regional cooperation in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia
where the need is greatest.
Accordingly, he proposed a "posture of declining direct American
involvement in the defense and security of Southeast Asia, coupled
with an increase in U.S. support to the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations" (ASEAN).94
The concept of regional alliances to share among nations the re-
sponsibilities of mutual defense presents unusually thorny problems
of conflicting national interest, as has been demonstrated on several
occasions with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. "When
in addition — as in Southeast Asia — many of the countries concerned
have a long history of conflict and aggression, the problem of mutual
defense is compounded.
Another question has to do with the size of the region to be organ-
ized for mutual defense. Manifestly, the more countries encompassed
by an alliance, the larger the resource base that can be tapped. Con-
versely, the more different sovereignties embraced in the system, the
smaller the base of agreement in shared national interests. The pros-
pect of the admission of Communist China to ECAFE, for example,
poses an interesting problem for that regional grouping of states. It
is a widely held view 95 that the posture of Communist China was
largely responsible for the ASEAN alliance whose five members
(Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore) are all
also members of ECAFE.
Another problem concerns the changing governmental structure of
individual members, leading to instability of alliances. For example,
although the change that converted the kingdom of Cambodia into
the Khmer Republic did not interrupt the continuity of that coun-
try's participation in the Mekong Project, it brought a notable change
in diplomatic relations with neighboring states. Conceivably, at some
future, time. North and South Vietnam might find ways of" cooperat-
ing in regional economic projects, but a mutual defense alliance seems
less likely, even with a change in leadership.
An interesting question is posed by the presence of Russia. China,
and India in the Asian power system. On this subject. George Thomp-
son, formerly Director of the Political Study Centre. Singapore, has
written:
Russia, too, is inextricably involved as China becomes the focus of the prob-
lem of the Asian Balance of Power, for the U.S.S.R. owns more Asian real estate
than any purely Asian power and depends Increasingly on Asian seas for com-
munication between the parts of its own territory, for trading its surplus, for
w Gordon, Toward Ditengagement, p. Ifi2.
96 Sop. for example, Gordon, Toward Disengagement, p. nin.
427
widening the range of consumer purchases, and for the food from its two
oceans. As a great power it seeks to be wherever the Americans can be, and in
so doing it is learning that it is the greatness of power itself and not the declared
purpose of power which causes apprehension, that it is an expensive and haz-
ardous role to play, and that it cannot win universal friendship in a world of
national interests. And Soviet power in the world, especially the communist
world, requires the containment, voluntary or involuntary, of China. Thus,
Peking, having wished to expel one policeman from Southeast Asia, has suc-
ceeded in establishing two. If America has decided it cannot be the world's one
policeman, with the burden of cost and of criticism the role entails, there is now
a second policeman, if it can afford the cost and accept the criticism. And in the
mutual vigilance of the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the climate
of being assessed by the smaller power, may lie a temporary pattern of power,
till a cooperative, collective, regional, self-policing force emerges in Southeast
Asia.
In short, he concludes, "international, regional, and national prob-
lems overlap." 96
Clearly, an important aspect of the regional defense alliance is its
scope. If limited to strictly security considerations, a regional pact
would seem vulnerable to changes in national interest or control. Pre-
sumably, this view motivated President Johnson's attempt to couple
the concept with that of regional development. Said the President
(in part) :
We recognize that our strength, our size and our great wealth may impose a
very special obligation upon us in the transition to the new Asia. But we also
recognize that the cooperative tasks of assistance and defense will be assumed
more and more by others, and we hope by collective regional groupings as the
nations of Asia develop and build their own strength and their own abundance.87
It may be that the most durable regional alliances are those in which
the national interest of the participants is served by economic as well
as (or perhaps rather than) security benefits. It is noteworthy that the
Mekong Project did not constitute a regional defense alliance in any
formal sense, although disruption in one part of the Basin would be
likely to cause repercussions in other parts.
But the question arises as to what groupings of nations can provide
both shared interest in defense and shared interest in development.
Should the grouping encompass both developed and developing states,
for example, or does this invite the danger of a progressive economic
"neo-colonialism"? One possible answer would involve a regional core
of developing nations, with a multilateral tier of developed nations
lending economic support — with or without military support.
Regional Development as an Instrument of Foreign Aid
The natural advantages of a geographic approach to economic de-
velopment assistance abroad appear to be matched by the political ad-
vantages. From the geographic point of view, capital resources can be
focused and concentrated. From the political point of view, the effort
can be represented as functional rather than evolved out of the diplo-
matic calculus of competing preferential trade and investment,
Experience of the United States with domestic regionalism has been
mixed, but the outstanding: example of the TVA demonstrates what
can be accomplished by the systematic, planned development of a
coherent geographic region under the leadership of a well-supported
88 George Thompson, "The New World of Asia," Foreign Affairs 48, no. 1, (October 1969),
pp. 37-13,8.
97 "Additional Oocumentation on President Johnson's Trip," p. 816.
428
corporate instrumentality situated in the region. Officials of the U.S.
foreign assistance program tended at first to be skeptical that this
approach could be transplanted to a multinational region. Bilateral
aid problems were thought hard enough to deal with, without the
necessity of becoming involved in multinational plans and programs.
However, the "spirit of the Mekong has been shown to have exerted
a durable cooperative influence on the Riparian States for nearly
two decades. (jiven a forum for consultation, and a shared opportunity
for economic growth and development with many donor nations con-
tributing, the nations of a region can demonstrably work together, de-
spite a long history of conflict and instabilities.
When a regional development project involves both a plurality of
recipient nations and a plurality of donor nations (and perhaps also
an array of United Nations instrumentalities) the administrative com-
plications may grow but the political complications seem actually to
be reduced. One reason for this is the doubly '"lowered profile" of the
individual donors, even though their contributions may be of com-
manding importance on an individual program unit in some, one coun-
try. The various arrangements for task management by the World
Bank or some other institution, plus the coordinating organization for
the total regional program, tend to insulate the donor from the re-
cipient. In terms of imposing conditions on the recipient, this insula-
tion may limit the benefits of the arrangement to the donor, but in
terms of its general acceptability to all recipients and amity among
all participants it is highly beneficial. At the same time, as President
Nixon has said: "I am confident that our role can be kept in conso-
nance both with our interests and with those of the increasingly self-
reliant and independent Asian states." 98
Drawing upon his experience in helping to organize the Asian De-
velopment Bank and fund the Nam Ngum Dam, Engene Black in 1969
published a short study in which he proposed the Mekong Project as
a prototype for American diplomacy in the future. He offered "pro-
grammed development" as a substitute for the "doctrine of counter-
insurgency."
The diplomatic problem [wrote Black] is to reconcile with the short-term needs
and demands of the riparian countries the long-range interest that the rest of the
world has in restoring peace and stability in this area. Mekong development offers
the opportunity to protect this interest by building inhibitions in the form of
development projects among four fragmented countries that are likely to find
themselves beset with turmoil and threats for some time to come. Mekong de-
velopment is an invitation to North Vietnam to join in a vast program of regional
cooperation. It is just the sort of commitment needed to counteract the ill-effects
of the Vietnam war.
Black suir<rcsts that what is needed is to reduce the U.S. presence,
and to continue the building of a "strong multilateral f ramework." °9
As a development banker. Black is "frankly a partisan of multi-
lateral and regional organizations . . . ," because this arrangement
insulates development finance from political considerations. ("Or to
put it the other way around, it does not stand to reason that the U.S.
Government should undertake in the name of development to intervene
wholesale in the domestic all'airs of six dozen or so poor countries.")
,e U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970'8: Building for Peace, House Document 92,o3, p. 70.
00 Black, Alternative in Southeast Aniii, p. 145.
429
It also is able to draw on many sources of capital and skill, and pro-
motes international cooperation.100
The virtually limitless opportunities for capital investment in civil
works projects in developing countries are reduced when pre-in vest-
ment studies are undertaken of the economic and social consequences
of such investments. Further limitations derive from the generally
accepted necessity — of which Black spoke — that decisionmaking should
come from the region itself. Former colonies engaged in nation-build-
ing are likely to be wary of external interference, even with the best
of motives. And there are always differences among factions within
regions and countries. All these are limiting factors to rate of capital
transfer from outside. As one study observes :
. . . Diversities, antagonisms, and strong nationalism within the region and
the uncertainty of benefits from existing proposals for formal integration all
suggest that outside encouragement should be in the main through informal,
partial, politically-neutral measures of obvious joint benefit. Outside encourage-
ment of major integration projects should be limited ; more emphasis needs to
be placed on research and mutual education through discussion of problems and
possibilities. Until potential participants in Southeast Asian regionalism see
clearly that there is a problem, that the problem can best be met through regional
efforts, and that the net benefits to each participant will be significant with in-
cursions on national sovereignty minimal, pressures from outside the region are
unlikely to achieve a continuing effect.101
As a general principle, therefore, the cited study calls for avoidance
of political suspicions and antagonism in the face of political and
economic differences and sensitivities. "Regional cooperation measures
have the best chance of success when they achieve a net maximum of
two goals: the maximum of intraregional political neutrality and
colorlessness." 102
A plausible case can be made that precisely the virtues of regional
development as an efficient means of accelerating the economic progress
of blocs of poor countries (thereby reducing the "frustrated expecta-
tions" that encourage insurgency) would lead to automatic rejection of
such an approach by the large communist nations. In fact, the Soviet
Union has tended to be cool toward developmental regionalism, and
has tended to favor direct bilateral aid arrangements on a country-to-
country basis. However, the Soviet attitude toward developmental
regionalism has not been as strongly negative as that toward regional
security arrangements. It is at least conceivable that some forms of
regional development arrangement might be eligible for Soviet ac-
ceptance. While the Soviet Union has not yet actually contributed
as a donor country to the Mekong Project, at the Fifteenth Session of
ECAFE, meeting at Broadbeach, Queensland, Australia, in March
1959, the Soviet representative, Mr. Chernyshev, was reported as say-
ing "that the Soviet Union was prepared to provide technical assist-
ance in the planning and construction of hydrotechnical projects on
the Mekong. The terms and details of such assistance could be agreed
upon with the countries concerned either directly or through the
ECAFE secretariat." 103
100 Ibid., pp. 166-168.
101 Theodore Morgan and Myle Spoelstra, Eds., Economic Interdependence in Southeast
Asia (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 416.
102 Ibid., p. 11.
103 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Summary Records, (May 11, 1959),
p. 195.
430
It is also possible that the various brands of communism in China
and Southeast Asia might learn to accept some of the features of the
Mekong Project. Attention has been called by Mekong Project en-
thusiasts on numerous occasions to the fact that local communist fac-
tions (explicitly the Pathet Lao, and by implication others) have at
least tolerated Mekong development activities. The Mekong arrange-
ment does not do violence to the communist solicitude for national
sovereignty. No "supranational" authority is involved. The general
thrust of current Mekong Committee studies is toward accommodation
of physical works to the broadest possible base of social need and
utility. Possible sources of disaffection will always be likely to arise,
but in general the Mekong style has been toward goals to provide for
widely distributed economic advances in the region, balanced against
maximum political neutrality and colorlessness.
Global Regionalism as a Long-Range Means Toward U.S. Diplomatic
Goals
Nearly seven years have elapsed since President Johnson made his
billion-dollar offer to support regional development in Southeast Asia.
The work on the Mekong, at first stimulated by the offer and accom-
panying measures of support, has settled back to a more deliberate
pace. Hampered by spreading conflict, the work has been unable to
achieve the balanced benefits among countries the Coordination Com-
mittee sees as its guiding principle. The prospect is that until the polit-
ical unrest in Laos, Khmer Republic, and Vietnam has subsided there
will continue to be delays, postponements, and unbalance. To some ex-
tent, however, this may be a blessing in disguise: it compels postpone-
ment of engineering works not only on the main stem but also the tribu-
taries of the Mekong, compels more intensive examination of poten-
tially socially disruptive consequences, and affords opportunity for
recruitment and training of Riparian personnel in the countless skills
needed for the action phase of development.
Manifestly, the contribution of the Mekong Project to an easing
of the Vietnamese conflict has not been significant or even measurable.
The determined nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict
has remained obdurately aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an
alternative to a prospective ultimate victory. Notably also, Prince
Sihanouk of Cambodia adopted a not dissimilar stance, apparently
fearing that any U.S. -led or sponsored regional aid scheme might
entail dangerous compromises and reduced freedom of self-determina-
tion. Accordingly, as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of
cooperation in a regional development scheme does not present a con-
vincing opportunity.
It is interesting to speculate on what different course events in
Southeast Asia might have followed had the Johnson offer been made
at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 that partitioned Vietnam.
Willard Hanna's comment about the Mekong Project is appropriate in
this context :
In a region in which discontinuity, it outright sabotage, of international en-
deavor has heretofore prevailed, the Mekong Project may provide the long-
sought-for new formula for sustained, constructive development. Here, in the
431
past — at least in Laos and Vietnam — the familiar contemporary panacea of aid
had provided no answers. What seems absolutely basic is a massive, well-inte-
grated, area-wide, peacetime program in which the riparian nations themselves
can swiftly build up experience and competence in modern development and ad-
ministration. Whether the Mekong Project is really appropriate or adequate to the
need remains to be proved, but it is certainly the most promising scheme which
has yet been proposed. The $10 billion project — to which two years ago President
Johnson pledged $1 billion, once peaceful regional development became possible —
would seem from almost any point of view a much better investment than $1 bil-
lion per annum in an endless Vietnam War.104
It is sheer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development
of the Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus for
peaceful economic progress, served as an educational process, and es-
tablished a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted region. How-
ever, the question seems legitimate as to whether the consequences of
a slowly and deliberately encouraged regional development — region
by region — in lagging parts of the world might serve U.S. foreign
policy objectives in the long run. The concept of dealing with multi-
national geographic regions rather than with nations, and extending
aid from a multinational base instead of bilaterally, has been credited
in the literature with a number of attractive characteristics :
Emphasis is on local participation in development and planning ;
Subregions in greatest need and offering greatest opportunity for advance-
ment tend to receive priority by local consent ;
Nationalistic preoccupations appear to be moderated ;
Self-help is encouraged and stimulated by being made more effective in
combined actions with mutual support ;
National sensitivities that bilateral aid would exacerbate are less abraded
by multinational arrangements ;
Regional cohesiveness — the tendency for people of different countries work-
ing together on a shared problem to lay aside their national differences —
can result from attention to geographic regional goals rather than formal
national boundaries ;
Burdens of foreign aid tend to be more widely distributed ; and
The process of applying technological means to social and economic objec-
tives can be made coherent and understandable to those who expect to enjoy
the benefits.
The resultant alignment of nations and international structures
from a deliberate program of world regionalism acceptable to de-
veloped and developing countries might warrant further study and
analysis. What actions could help to encourage a world system of eco-
nomically and technologically better balanced regions? Would there
be any effect on the levels of international tensions, either in the re-
gions or in the relations among the major powers? Might regional vot-
ing in the United Nations General Assembly and the associated U.N.
agencies provide a better or more representative arrangement than the
present, admittedly awkward system of one-country-one-vote?
The implication of the Hanna observation, and other like writings,
is that the cost-effectiveness of regional development projects is not
fully measurable in economic terms alone. If an economically marginal
project advances a diplomatic goal — stabilizes a region, inspires inter-
national cooperation, ameliorates tensions, provides a peaceful alterna-
101 Willard A. Hanna, "The Mekong Project." Part I, "The River and the Region," Amer-
ican Universities Field Staff Reports (July 1968), p. 10.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-29
432
tive to insurgency, offers an ideological bridge, and teaches different
ethnic groups how to work together — it might well be more useful
than a project yielding high economic return but without these in-
tangible benefits. There is, of course, no hard evidence that all these
favorable outcomes are a likely product of a global policy of regional-
ism. However, the bare possibility — as evidenced in what has been
called "the Mekong Spirit" — that the concept might serve as an instru-
ment of long-range diplomacy seems worth further examination and
putting to the test.
APPENDIX
Comments by Eugene R. Black on Topics Related to this Study —
March 14, 1972
An assessment of the political impact, short- and long-range, of the Johns Hopkins
speech on the leadership and professional community in the ''Riparian
States"*
While impossible to measure with any precision, there is little doubt in my
mind that the political impact of President Johnson's offer of large-scale post-
war assistance to Southeast Asia was substantial. I say Southeast Asia rather
than the "riparian States" because the offer of assistance was not confined to
them. I believe the President intended and I acted as though Southeast Asia
covered the five Mekong countries — Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and both Viet-
nams — and Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. And I
considered the $1 billion offer to be more symbolic than mathematically precise.
My visits and contacts included all of these countries except North Vietnam.
Both an immediate and short-range political impact of our offer was its positive
role as a catalyst in stimulating the interest in and moves toward regional co-
operation. While nationalism is, of course, the dominant political force in the
region, this is now tempered by a fairly widely accepted view that the states of
Southeast Asia have a common interest in working together for political, eco-
nomic and even cultural reasons. Many of the regional organizations and group-
ings in Southeast Asia owe their origin or vitality to the boost for regional coop-
eration given by the United States in the period 1965-1969. Best known is the for-
mation in late 1965 of the Asian Development Bank. While the idea for such a
bank had been around for several years and ECAFE circles favored it, its forma-
tion in 1965 resulted directly from President Johnson's April 7 general offer to
Southeast Asia and his July offer to propose the U.S. join such a bank, if formed,
which I was able to convey to a special meeting of Asian bankers in Bangkok.
Less recognized but no less real was the large increase in inter-regional personal
contacts which occurred in Southeast Asia over these years at various levels and
in varied forums. I have in mind such developments as the initiation of plans for
a regionwide study of transportation infrastructure ( the study was completed in
1971 with help of the ADB) ; the coming together of Ministers of Education of the
region to plan development of training institutions of regional significance and
the mushrooming of specialized regional groups to consider one topic or an-
other of economic, social or political significance. As for the Mekong "riparian
States," they have participated in most of this region-wide activity plus, of course,
made progress in further developing plans for harnessing the resources from the
river itself. The Johns Hopkins speech and the stepped-up interest in the de-
velopment potential of the Mekong which it generated certainly had a healthy,
political impact in the non-communist riparian states by focussing attention on
the future. I know this from my four trips to the area for President Johnson
and subsequent visits. While I did not visit North Vietnam, I understand from
C. L. Sulzberger's trip to Hanoi and other accounts that some political figures
there were quite interested in the possibility of sharing in the proposed major de-
velopment effort. At the same time it was as unrealistic in 1905 as it is today
to believe that leaders in North Vietnam [bent] on conquest of the South would
abandon their goals simply in response to offers of aid. I would, therefor, rephrase
your question a little and say both the short and long-term political impact of the
*The headings in italics define the topics, relating to the present study, on which the
author asked Mr. Black to comment. See vol. I, p. 370 for context.
(433)
434
Johns Hopkins offer was substantial in the professional communities in all the
riparian states by opening up new horizons; that it was a morale boost to non-
communist states by promise of a better future in spite of present difficulties ;
and that it was an incentive to North Vietnam to consider the alternative to war
by assuring them their foe could be generous.
The effectiveness and limitations of large-scale proposals for technological de-
velopment as a means of diverting attention and energies from military
conflict
As I indicated above, there is little reason to believe that a carrot approach
alone will force totalitarian leaders to change their policies. And I am con-
vinced President Johnson shared this view even when he made his offer to in-
clude North Vietnam in postwar development plans. Yet there is evidence, as
first reported by C. L. Sulzberger from Hanoi, that at least some North Viet-
namese leaders were interested in President Johnson's offer. And while I have
no knowledge whatsoever of the background of President Nixon's more recent
offer of a $7.5 billion reconstruction program with $2.5 billion earmarked for
Hanoi, I am satisfied it was made in the belief it would help Hanoi to alter its
course. When, and if, these offers or other circumstances persuade North Viet-
nam to turn to peaceful pursuits, then I remain persuaded that it will be enor-
mously helpful to package reconstruction efforts around the Mekong River
development scheme. I believe this will strengthen support in the United States to
provide the funds and if negotiated carefully in the field can be a strong in-
centive for regional cooperation among the riparian states.
Steps that might have been taken in the United States to make the President's
proposal more attractive to the leadership in North Vietnam
I did, of course, think often in 1965 and 1966 about what else could be done in
the United States to make the Johns Hopkins offer more acceptable to the leader-
ship in North Vietnam. We did most of them — principally launch, together with
United Nations agencies, a whole series of studies and plans for the Mekong
program calculated to show the sincerity of our postwar intentions. I believe
that via UN and other channels leaders in North Vietnam were kept well abreast
of the good prospects of their participating in these plans. My own extensive
contacts in the United States persuaded me that the American public would
support development and reconstruction-type aid to North Vietnam once the war
was over. Therefore) I did not see the problem as primarily one of further action
in the United States to confirm the President's offer. Our postwar record in
Germany and Japan is no doubt fully appreciated in Hanoi.
A broader view of the possible role of technology in contributing toward a tcorld
of peaceable, and economically healthy States, and what the United States
program might be toward this contribution
There are many others more competent than I to speak to the role of technology
In international development. What I can do is underscore from my experience
with the World Bank, and subsequently, that all developing countries, and espe-
cially the newly trained elite rapidly assuming power, are intrigued with the
prospects of leapfrogging along the hard road to development by making use of
all the new technology available. This is possible as some of our businessmen
know who must compete with the very latest machinery and equipment some-
times found in the least developed countries. Also significant, and frequently
overlooked, is the fact that new technology is regularly introduced, particularly
by governments, in advance of the administrative reforms and training programs
needed to make the new technology more efficient and economical than the old.
Chapter 7 — Exploiting the Resources of the
Seabed
CONTENTS
Page
I. Ocean Space 439
An Overview of the Geography of the Seabed 439
Scope and Limitations of the Study 439
II. Geography and Legal Concepts of the Continental Shelf 440
Continental Shelf of the United States 441
Continental Shelf of the Soviet Union 443
Differing Doctrines of the "Legal Shelf" 444
The Truman Proclamation 445
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 447
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 448
Geneva Conventions of 1958 450
Deficiencies of the Geneva Conventions 451
III. Seabed Resources 453
Deposits on the Seabed Surface:
Building Materials 453
Heavy Minerals 454
Phosphorite 454
Manganese Nodules 456
Red Sea Geothermal Deposits 457
Other Surface Deposits 458
Deposits Below the Seabed Surface 458
Petroleum 459
Other Subsurface Deposits 462
Resources of the Oceans 463
Food From the Sea 463
Fish Protein Concentrate 464
Aquaculture 464
Drugs From the Sea 464
Sea Water and Its Minerals 465
IV. Technology and Economics 466
Harvesting Hard Minerals From the Seabed 466
Phosphorite 468
Manganese Nodules 471
Commercial Recovery of Offshore Petroleum 472
Exploration 472
Drilling 473
Production 474
Future Trends 475
Supply and Demand 478
V. Policy for Seabed Resources 481
Policy for Submarine Mining 481
Policy for Offshore Petroleum 482
General Policy for Seabed Resources 484
VI. International Concern 484
Organizations for Marine Activities 485
Non- Governmental Organizations 486
Intergovernmental Organizations 486
VII. U.N. Activities Concerning Seabed Resources 488
Emergence of the Malta Proposal 489
Organization of the U.N. Seabed Committee 491
Legal Subcommittee 493
Economic and Technical Subcommittee 493
International Machinery 494
(437)
438
Page
VIII. U.S. Participation in International Ocean Activities 495
U.S. Policy Apparatus for Seabed Issues 495
Congressional Committees 496
Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment 496
Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and
Resources 497
Committee on International Policy in the Marine Environ-
ment 497
Interagency Law-of-the-Sea Task Force 498
The National Academies 499
Formulation of U. S. Policy for the Seabed 499
Legislative Concern in the 90th Congress 499
House Support for the Malta Proposal 500
Proposal for a U.N. Marine Resources Agency 500
Support and Opposition in the Senate 501
Reasons for Opposition 501
Legislative Concern in the 91st Congress 502
Senator Pell's Proposals 503
Position of the Subcommittee on Outer Continental
Shelf 504
Position of the Executive Branch 506
Seabed Disarmament Treaty 508
Seabed Regime 509
IX. Role of Science and Technology in Seabed Diplomacy 511
Military Technology and Ocean Strategy , 511
Scientists in the Diplomatic Process 514
Role of the Marine Council Staff 514
Role of Scientists in Others Agencies 516
Scientific Advice, Policy, and Diplomacy 517
X. Summary 519
FIGURES
1. Sketch profile showing the components and average depths of the con-
tinental margin 441
2. Diagrammatic sketch showing typical oil and gas types of traps 461
3. Conceptual design of an underwater petroleum production system 476
4. Service capsule (Top sphere) being lowered to couple with wellhead
cellar (Bottom sphere) encapsulating production equipment 477
5. Artist's impression of offshore oilfield development showing underwater
production, separation, and storage systems 478
6. United Nations bodies with responsibilities in the marine sciences 487
7. Organizational chart showing the relationships within the Federal Gov-
ernment for decisionmaking in marine affairs (1967) 498
TABLES
I. Depth Zones of the Oceans 442
II. Countries With Extensive Ocean Area at Depths Less Than 1,000
fathoms 443
III. Inland Waters Areas of the United States, by Regions 449
IV. Area of the United States Continental Shelf, by Coastal Regions. __ 450
V. Ocean Mining Technology Time Table 467
VI. Population Projections: World, United States, etc. 1965-2000 469
VII. Per Capita Consumption (Apparent) of Phosphate Rock 469
VIII. Projected Total Consumption of Phosphate Rock, 1966 Through
2000 A.D ---- 469
IX. Reserves and Potential Resources of Phosphate Rock in the United
States 470
X. Reserves of Metals in Manganese Nodules of the Pacific Ocean 471
CHAPTER 7— EXPLOITING THE RESOURCES OF
THE SEABED
I. Ocean Space
The purpose of this study is to describe the seabed, its configuration
and resources, and to show how technological advances to exploit the
resources under the oceans have impacted on national policy and inter-
national diplomacy.
An Overview of the Geography of the Seabed
The world oceans occupy more than 70 per cent of the surface of
the Earth. Although the oceans have been divided into Arctic, Atlantic,
Indian, Pacific, and Antarctic, this division reflects only the point of
view of humans inhabiting the land of the planet Earth. Viewed from
the Moon, Earth is essentially a water planet — one large ocean inter-
spersed with continental land masses.
Geologically, the picture is even more radical. The world oceans are
merely a film of water covering a major portion of the Earth's crust.
Other portions of the crust protrude above this film of water and are
called land ; what is below the water is the seabed.
By virtue of its global characteristics, therefore, ocean space is a
common link among land masses, shared by the nations touching this
ocean space. Its waters wash indiscriminately the shores of these na-
tions, and its marine life forms journey freely through their grazing
grounds heedless of national boundaries. Despite these natural char-
acteristics, ocean space has been zoned off, and national boundaries and
jurisdictions established by the coastal states.
Until recently, man's needs for the ocean were for the most part con-
fined to food and commerce, followed by military uses. The main con-
cern of nations was the protection of their near-shore areas for their
food supply, and their commercial fleets. The ocean floor and the sea-
bed were virtually unknown, and their potential resources unheard of.
Progress in marine technology and the widening horizons of scien-
tific inquiry enlarged the sphere of man's knowledge and revealed the
presence of natural resources, not only in sea water itself, but also on
the ocean floor and in the underlying layers. Today, the sea floor is no
longer a bottomless basin but an underwater world with a "landscape"
not very unlike man's own world on land. It has valleys and mountain
ranges, seamounts and volcanoes, canyons and deep trenches, and a con-
tinental margin extending from land to the abyss, all complete with
plant and animal life. It is a whole new world, heretofore alien and
hostile to man, yet virtually at his doorstep.
Into this underwater realm man has begun to direct his energy — his
quest for knowledge, for profit, and for his ultimate survival.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
This study defines the area under consideration, the resources of
the seabed, and the international activities toward an orderly exploita-
Note : This chapter was prepared in 1971 by George A. Doumani.
(439)
440
tion of these resources. It presents the geographical and legal defini-
tions of the continental shelf and the sea floor beyond, and the histori-
cal background leading to the international concern and the Geneva
Conventions of 1958. An inventory is taken of all the resources of the
seabed, which are the object of concern among the nations of the world.
The development in the techniques of exploiting the seabed are re-
viewed, showing the present state of the art and what the future holds
for underwater exploitation. The economic factors are added to the
technological capabilities to assess the parameters interacting in the
formulation of policy for exploiting seabed resources.
On the international scene, the United Nations activities are re-
viewed, particularly following the Malta proposal for an international
regime for the seabed. The participation of the United States in these
activities is discussed, including the U.S. policy apparatus and the
evolution of U.S. policy in international ocean affairs. The role of
science and technology is analyzed, showing the effect of technological
development on ocean strategy, and the role played by scientists in
the diplomatic and policymaking processes.
The study is mainly addressed to the seabed portion of ocean space
beyond national jurisdiction. It includes only cursory mention of
fisheries and other ocean resources, and the issues of territorial limits.
II. Geography and Legal Concepts of the Continental Shelf
The crust of the Earth as a whole has two major features — the con-
tinental platforms and the ocean basins. The physiographic features
of the oceans are not merely expressions of the Earth's surface but,
more significantly, they are reflections of fundamental geological and
geophysical provinces of the Earth's crust. These provinces differ in
shape, mass, structure, physical and chemical properties, and the
composition of their rock constituents.
Where water meets land is not exactly where the ocean basins meet
the continental platforms. A relatively narrow margin of each plat-
form is under water, belonging geologically to the continent and not
to the ocean basin. This feature is called the continental margin.
The continental margin has three physiographic features: The
shelf, the slope, and the ripe (Figure 1). The shelf is the extension of
the laud mass; the slope is its frontal edge ; and the rise is that vaguely
definable area where the bottom of the slope meets the deep ocean
basin.
As its name implies, the continental shelf is topographically :i gently
sloping terrace, ranging in depth from the mean water line at the
.shore to a maximum of 300 fathoms1 where the sharp slope begins.
1 The International Committee on the Nomenclature of Ocean Rottom Features proposed
the following definition. Continental shrif, shelf edpe and borderland: The zone around
the continent, extending from the low water line to the depth ;it which there Is a marked
Increase of slope in greater depth. Where this Increase occurs the term "shelf edge" is
appropriate. Conventionally, the edge Is taken nl 100 fathoms (or 200 meters) hut in-
stances are known where the Increase of slope occurs at more than 200 or less than 65
fathom- Where the /one below the low water line is highly irregular and includes depths
well In excess of those typical of continental shelves, the term "continental borderland"
Is appropriate.
The same definition was used by a group of marine geologists who chose the depth of
300 fathoms arhitrarllv (Andre Gnllcher and others) In preparing a report for the T'nited
Nations Kdurntlonnl, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 1057. 13/2.
One fathom equals 6 feet or 1.83 meters.
441
I Conti-
I nental I
I Slope I
k 1
I
Continental Terrace Continental Rise ' Deep sea bed
-I-
Continental Margin
Figure 1. — Sketch profile showing the components and average depths of the
continental margin. Not to scale.
Where this break occurs, the average depth throughout the world is
about 72 fathoms, though for convenience the 100-fathom depth has
been adopted.
The width of the continental shelf varies widely from a very narrow
shelf off the west coasts of North and South America, to hundreds of
miles along Arctic Europe and the Far East. It ranges from a mini-
mum of less than one mile to a maximum of 800 miles. Although the
depth of the shelf has been used as an international limit, it is the
width that determines the area of the shelf and, hence, its significance
for the exploitation of its resources.
Continental Shelf of the United States
The United States of America has a coastline approximately 12,000
miles long, with a continental shelf of 650,000 square miles at the
100-fathom depth, including the East Coast, West Coast, and Alaska.
Off Newfoundland, the shelf width increases greatly, averaging
over 200 miles. To the south and east are the Grand Banks, which aver-
age only about 30 fathoms in depth and stretch eastward for more
than 450 miles. If the shelf were limited to 100 fathoms, the width
would be only about 200 miles.
Between Newfoundland and Cape Hatteras, the shelf decreases in
depth from 80 to 30 fathoms. The channel into the Gulf of St. Law-
rence is more than 30 miles wide, and the shelf width varies from
about 120 miles off Nova Scotia to less than 20 miles off Cape Hatteras.
From Cape Hatteras south, the shelf gradually widens from less
than 20 miles to a maximum of 70 miles off Georgia, then virtually
disappears off south Florida. If the Blake Plateau is considered as
a portion of the shelf, the maximum width would increase to about
442
TABLE l.-DEPTH ZONES OF THE OCEANS
[Areas in millions of square miles]
Under 200 meters 200 to 1,000 meters 1,000 to 2,000 meters
Total
area Area Percent Area Percent Area Percent
All oceans and seas 105.569 7.909 7.49 4.669 4.42 4.630 4.38
Pacific Ocean plus seas 52. 880
Pacific Ocean alone ' 48.476
Asiatic Mediterranean 2 2. 648
Bering Sea .659
Sea of Okhotsk _. .406
Yellow and East China Seas 351
Sea of Japan 295
Gulf of California 045
Atlantic Ocean plus seas 27. 502
Atlantic Ocean alone 3 25.240
American Mediterranean * 1. 271
Mediterranean Sea 5 . 732
Black Sea .148
BalticSea 11
Indian Ocean plus seas 21
Indian Ocean alone .' 21.411
Red Sea
Persian Gulf.
2.954
5.59
1.791
3.39
2.084
3.96
.791
1.63
1.252
2.58
1.576
3.25
1.375
51.91
.245
9.26
.276
10.43
.306
46.44
.039
5.98
.050
7.72
.107
26.48
.160
39.48
.091
22.38
.285
81.31
.040
11.43
.021
5.97
.069
23.50
.045
15.18
.058
19.65
.021
47.71
.009
20.85
.012
25.89
2.383
8.69
1.624
5.92
1.418
5.16
1.773
7.03
1.305
5.17
1.084
4.30
.298
23.44
.136
10.67
.172
13.52
.150
20.44
.165
22.48
.127
17.41
.052
34.97
.019
12.59
.034
23.08
.111
99.83
.003
.17 ..
21.613
21.411
.132
.889
.765
.055
.069
4.10
3.57
41.45
All ..
.632
.575
.057
2.92
2.69
43.06
.786
.766
.020
3.64
3.58
14 92
.069
Arctic Ocean plus seas.. 3.574 1.683 47.10 .623 17.45 .333 9.34
Arctic Ocean alone « 2.766 1.125 40.67 .458 16.54 2.82 10.21
Arctic Mediterranean > 808 .558 69.01 .165 20.45 .051 6.27
1 Pacific Ocean includes Bass Strait.
2 Asiatic Mediterranean includes Andaman Sea, South China Sea, Java Sea, Celebes Sea and Arafura Sea.
' Atlantic Ocean includes North Sea, Greenland Sea, Norwegian Sea, Kattegat and Gulf of St. Lawrence.
* American Mediterranean includes Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea.
5 Mediterranean Sea includes Sea of Marmara.
" Arctic Ocean includes only North Polar Basin and Barents Sea.
7 Arctic Mediterranean includes Hudson Bay, Baffin Bay and Canadian Straits Sea.
Source: L. R. Heselton, Jr., "The Continental Shelf." (Institute of Naval Studies, CNA research contribution No. 106
December 1968), page 8.
300 miles. This would increase the area by about 50,000 square miles,
most of which is at depths of between 300 and 500 fathoms.
In the Gulf of Mexico, the shelf rarely exceeds 100 fathoms in
depth. To the west of the Mississippi River the edge of the shelf
is about 100 fathoms up to 120 miles offshore. The overall U.S.
portion of the Gulf contains about 135,000 square miles of shelf of
less than 100 fathoms, of which only 8,000 miles is within territorial
waters.
On the West Coast, the apparent shelf off Southern California is
about 10 miles wide with an edge at about 50 fathoms. However,
the bottom is irregular, and there are shoals and rises beyond 100
miles offshore which geologically should be considered as part
of the continental shelf. The true shelf — as opposed to the legal
shelf— appears to terminate beyond 500 fathoms in many instances
off Southern California, and in the southern portion is as much as
150 miles offshore.
For the remainder of North America, there would be little effec-
tive change in shelf area by assigning an outer shelf limit greater
than 100 fathoms. The shelf of the Bering Sea is very flat and has
a pronounced edge at around TO fathoms, attaining a maximum width
of 400 miles.
443
TABLE M— COUNTRIES WITH EXTENSIVE OCEAN AREA AT DEPTHS LESS THAN 1,000 FATHOMS
Country
Approximate
coastline
(nautical miles)1
Approximate area (square nautical miles)
at less than—
100 fathoms
100 to 500
fathoms
500 to 1.000
fathoms
7,000
Argentina 2,100 250,000 25,000 15,000
Australia (including New Guinea) 17,500 625,000 170,000 250,000
(Indian Ocean islands) 2,000 20,000 65,000
Bahamas(U.K.) ____ 1,400 37,000 5,000 14,000
Brazil 3,700 200,000 33,000 35,000
Burma 1,230 63,000 10,000 10,000
Canada 11,000 >700,000 >200,000 >100,000
China 3,500 200,000 20,000 10,000
Faeroe Island (Denmark) 155 6,000 30,000 ■ 15,000
France 1,375 41,000 5,000 4,500
(Indian Ocean islands) 18,000 43,000 63,000
(Pacific Ocean islands) 29,000 40,000 75,000
Greenland (Denmark) 5,000 60,000 200,000 50,000
Iceland... 1,080 22,000 40,000 >75,000
India 2,750 80,000 20,000 30,000
Indonesia 20,000 380,000
Ireland 660 36,000 15,000
Malaysia 1,850 125,000
Mexico 5,000 100,000 25,000 25,000
New Zealand 2,770 60,000 225,000 175,000
Norway. 1,650 30,000 80,000 35,000
Portugal dependencies.... _ 60,000 45,000 95,000
South Africa.... 1,430 46,000 44,000 33,000
(South West Africa) 780 20,000 35,000 10,000
South Vietnam. 865 84,000 17,000 25,000
Spain 1,500 20,000 23,000 23,000
(Atlantic dependencies) 24,000 11,000 15,000
Thailand.... 1,300 75,000 15,000
U.S.S.R .... 23,000 >1, 000, 000 >400, 000 >300, 000
United Kingdom 2,800 40,000 25,000 50,000
(Falkland Island and dependencies) 30,000 65,000 40,000
(Indian Ocean islands) 48,000 20,000 35,000
(Pacific Ocean islands) 17,000 17,000 35,000
United States ._ _ 11.650 650,000 >150,000 >150,000
Venezuela 1,000 27,000 10,000 20,000
i Coastlines from U.S. Department of State Geographic Bulletin No. 3, April 1965.
Source: Adapted from: Ibid., page 9.
f
Continental Shelf of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has a coastline approximately 23,000 miles long,
with a continental shelf exceeding 1 million square miles up to the
100-fathom depth. The coastline stretches along the Arctic Ocean,
from Norway to Alaska, and southward along the Pacific Ocean from
the Bering Sea to the Sea of Japan.
The shelf bordering the Arctic is not of uniform extent, being sev-
eral miles wider off the Eurasian coast than off that of North America.
North of Norway and adjacent to Russia, the Barents Sea forms one
of the widest shelves in the world and also one of the deepest. Off Nor-
way, the 100-fathom line is reached almost immediately offshore while
to the east, toward Russian waters, it is as much as 150 miles from
land.
The Kara Sea, 250,000 square miles in area, is entirely on the con-
tinental shelf. It is mostly of depths less than 100 fathoms, with
isolated troughs of about 200 fathoms.
To the east, off Siberia, the shelf edge is generally at about 40
fathoms, and reaches a maximum width of about 400 miles. A combina-
tion of the Chukchi shelf and the Bering shelf is often considered as the
world's widest shelf, extending over 1000 miles north and south. The
shelf narrows to less than 50 miles in width north of Alaska, with the
444
edge still at about 40 fathoms and with depths increasing rapidly
beyond.
In the Sea of Okhotsk, the 100-fathom line varies from 20 to 100
miles offshore, and encompasses about one fourth of the whole area.
Except for a deep basin near the Kuriles, all of the sea is less than
1,000 fathoms, an area of some 400,000 square miles.
Differing Doctrines of the "Legal Shelf''
The historical and conventional territorial limits of. the coastal
nations have long been a subject of international controversy. Even
in the United States, controversy and litigation were carried on, par-
ticularly between the individual States and the Federal Government.
Since this paper is concerned mainly with the continental shelf, the
near-shore boundaries will l>e discussed only as they pertain to the
subject. Most of the maritime nations of the world recognize and claim
three nautical miles as the territorial sea, with a nine-mile contiguous
zone beyond that.2 The rest of the 109 sovereign states that border the
sea claim a wider territorial sea which may be as much as 200 miles
offshore, as is the case with Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador. El Salvador.
Korea. Nicaragua, Panama. Peru, and Uruguay.
Where the 200-mile figure originated is not very clear. But during
a Senate floor debate on the "Unlawful Seizure of U.S. Fishing Ves-
sels" off the South American shores, the late Senator Bartlett asked
if those countries had in fact established a 200-mile territorial sea limit.
Senator Warren Magnuson answered :
Yes. Now I have a strange anecdote to relate about the 200-mile limit. In
Peru, I held talks with the highest officials of the government about the 200-mile
limit. They looked mo squarely in the eye and said, "We did not establish the
200 miles. You did" — meaning we, the United States.
I said, "How is that?" They pulled out a musty old order that had been in a
drawer — I guess they kept it handy — issued during World War II by President
Roosevelt, establishing a 200-mile neutrality zone around the western part <>f
South America as protection. They picked that up and said it should be 200
miles off their coast for fishing and other territorial matters.3
The physical dimensions of the continental shelf have not been used
to delineate the extent of jurisdiction of the coastal states for the sea-
bed. One obstacle was the lack of complete and accurate data which
could be used by the coastal states throughout the world. A more com-
pelling reason was the absence of uniformity in the widths of the
continental shelves. Some nations have hardly any shelf to speak of:
the conveniently adopted 100-fathom ( 200-meter) isobath is within
e\ en their territorial seas and contiguous /ones.
As the importance of the continental shelf began to increase, some
nations undertook, by unilateral action, to establish policy and juris-
diction over t hen- continent:!! shelves. In the United States this action
•Com irted a law in me,.; establishing this fisheries contiguous zone. This is the
■ /one establish!, i in the l m the Territorial Ren nnd the Con-
tiguous Zone, in I0!)S. wnlch "mn.\ nol extend bevond twelve miles * • *." (Article 24.2).
fPnllj ed. Apr :: i:m;si p, S3818. Three Smith American coun-
tries (Chile. Ecuador, Peru) arrived at the 200-mile figure by taking the western limit of
whal tiny termed "bioma". The delegates of the.se countries at the Santiago negotiations
prvntion problems defl 1 the "bioma" .-is "the whole of the living com-
munities ni a region which, under the Influence of the climate and in the course of cen-
lies constantly more homogeneous, until. In Its final phase, it becomes a
definite type, • * • The western limit of these "bioma" are variable, and they are wider
opposite the Chi ■ opposite Ecundor, hut the mean width ma\ be
" i" !"• about 200 in CEP Doc No. '-'. Sept. 2::. 1955, contained in: "Santiago
itiations on fishery conservation problems," U.S. Department of state. Public Service
Division, 1955, pages
445
was accomplished through an official proclamation of policy by Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman in 1945, subsequently referred to as the Truman
Proclamation. This proclamation had the effect of opening a "Pan-
dora's Box" for other nations bordering; the seas, regardless of whether
they possessed the technological capabilities to utilize the seabed as
did the United States.
The decade of the fifties witnessed several attempts to define the
continental shelf and the coastal boundaries. The United States Con-
trress passed the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. followed a few months
later by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In 1958, representa-
tives of the world's maritime nations at Geneva produced a multi-
lateral agreement on the law of the sea in what are referred to as the
Geneva Conventions.
These events leading to the legal delineations of the continental shelf
are discussed below in chronological order.
THE TRUMAN PROCLAMATION
On September 28, 1945, two policy proclamations on ocean affairs
were issued by President Harry S. Truman. The first established a
national policy with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil
and seabed of the continental shelf ; the second proclaimed U.S. policy
with respect to coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas.
In the first proclamation, the Government regarded as "reasonable
and just" the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf by the contiguous nation. It
recognized that the continental shelf was to be regarded as an extension
of the land mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally "appurtenant"
to it*
* * * the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous
to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to
its jurisdiction and control.
The Proclamation did not specifically delineate any boundary lines
or numerical extent of the continental shelf. However, a news release
issued on the same day by the White House explained that this proc-
lamation did not prejudge the question of Federal versus State con-
trol, and that it was intended to enable —
* * * the orderly development of an underwater area 750,000 square miles in
extent. Generally, submerged land which is contiguous to the continent and which
is covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered as the
continental shelf.
In order to differentiate between the seabed and the subsoil on the
one hand, and the superjacent water on the other, the second proclama-
tion was issued, declaring that —
* * * the Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish
conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the
United States wherein fishing activties have been or in the future may be de-
veloped and maintained on a substantial scale. * * * The United States regards
it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing
activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United States.
The declaration went further in conceding similar prerogatives to all
other nations, concerning the "right of any state to establish conserva-
446
tion zones off its shores in accordance with the above principles, * * *
provided that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing in-
terests of nationals of the United States which may exist in such areas.''
The Proclamation emphasized that the " * * character as high seas of
the areas in* which such conservation zones are established and the
right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus
affected."
These two assertions seemed to imply that all nations should come
to an understanding, negotiate fisheries treaties, and respect agree-
ments concerning fisheries regulation and conservation on the high seas.
Furthermore, in context with the events of the time and despite the
disclaimer in the "White House press release, the continental shelf proc-
lamation might have been ai> expression of "White House strategy for
the claims of the Federal Government to the right over offshore oil
reserves, the so-called "tidelancl" disputes. Unfortunately, the two
Presidential proclamations led to widely varied interpretations, inter-
nationally and domestically, despite the fact that the proclamations
did not legally alter the 3-mile territorial limits of the United States.
Within a few years of these, presidential actions, numerous coastal
nations issued similar proclamations, but without distinguishing sys-
tematicallv among fishing zones, the seabed and subsoil of the con-
tinental shelf, and the concept of the high seas. Although these
proclamations varied in scope, they included rights which were not
then considered within the acceptable regulations of the international
community. For example, Mexico and Argentina claimed jurisdiction
over their respective continental shelves, including fisheries, but with-
out interference with free navigation on the high seas. Other South
American nations went even further, claiming rights over the shelf,
the water above it. and the air space above/ Nations having very nar-
row shelves simply extended their claims of exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction 200 miles offshore, to include the seabed and the subsoil
and fishing rijrhts.
In the United States, the legal principle of multiple use of a resource
exists on public lands and in the navigable waters of streams. The Tru-
man Proclamation in essence extended this legal principle into the sea.
Imparting to it another dimension, the Proclamation established a
distinction between the use of the seabed and that of the overlying
water. It asserted the basic premise that each nation possessed sovereign
rights over the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of
its continental shelves.
Some analysts view the Proclamation as detrimental to international
relations and the interests of the United States. They contend that
those not acquainted with the national interests of the United States in
the proper context of international relations as a whole tend to consider
it in the U.S. interest to establish boundaries as far out into the ocean
as possible and establish exclusive jurisdiction over everything within
them. For example :
The trouble with this parochial View is that whatever the United States can do
in this respect it has t<» agree that other countries can do the same thine The
reaction we got from the blunder of issuing the Truman Proclamation on
'Frnrirls T. Christ v. Jr and Anthony Scott "The Common Wealth In Orenn Fisheries :
V°m/ 1 r"Mcms of Growtb and Economic Allocation." (Unltimore, Johns Hopkins Press
196u), page 163. v
447
Fisheries in September, 1045. is that other countries will claim more than any
new claim the United States makes, deliberately interpret the new claim the
United States makes in their favor, and use our new claim, their new claim, and
their misinterpretation of our new claim, as substantiation for any action they
wish to take over and above what the United States wants to do. The parochial
view noted * * * above pushed us into this invidious position in 1945, and we
should guard carefully against repeating that mistake.5
Regardless of the diverse reactions and interpretations, the Truman
Proclamation remained de facto policy for many years to come. In the
ensuing years, the lack of definitive boundaries and agreement on such
boundaries resulted in a series of spectacular cases between the Federal
Government and the States, particularly California, Texas, and Loui-
siana. These litigations concerned the coastal zone, but included areas
within the boundaries of the continental shelf.
THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT OF 195 3
In an effort to resolve the issue of State boundaries, the Federal
Government instituted an action in the United States Supreme Court
against the States of California, Texas and Louisiana. These States
were chosen because they were then the only States in the Union which
had offshore areas with promising oil and gas deposits.8
Between 1947 and 1950. the Court had decided that these States had
no title to, or property interest in, the submerged lands off their respec-
tive coasts outside the inland waters. The Federal Government claimed
all rights over the lands, minerals and other things underlying the
offshore waters.
These Supreme Court decisions were reversed by the Congress in
the Submerged Lands Act of May 22, 1953.7
The Submerged Lands Act attempted to define certain terms and
solve some of the problems, providing definitions of "coast line," "land
beneath navigable waters," and the seaward boundaries of the states.
It set the seaward limit as three marine miles from the coast, or as
these boundaries "existed at the time such State became a member of
the Union, * * * but in no event shall the term 'boundaries' or the
term 'lands beneath navigable waters' be interpreted as extending
from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the At-
lantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues
into the Gulf of Mexico." 8
The Act left undefined the term "inland waters" and introduced a
new element of uncertainty as to the historical boundaries of the
States. It did, however, render considerable statutory weight for the
first time to the Truman Proclamation by providing that the natural
resources of the continental shelf seaward of the areas granted the
States "appertain to the United States, and the jurisdiction and con-
5 Wilbert. M. Chapman. "A Symposium on National Interest* In Coastal Waters." In "The
Law of the Sea," edited by Lewis M. Alexander. (Ohio State University Press, 1967),
pape 125.
• California claimed three marine miles. Louisiana 27 marine miles, and Texas to the
outer edpe of the continental shelf. This litigation was referred to as the "tidelands con-
troversy," although in the technical sense neither the tidelands nor the inland waters was
at Issue. The Federal Government had alreadv conceded the ownership of these areas by
the States.
T Article IV, s. 3, of the Constitution of the United States vests In Conpress the power
to dispose of property belonging to the I'nited States. The power of Conpress to grant
submerped lands to the States as it did in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 was challenged
the year after, but the Act was sustained. Alabama is. Texas (1954), 347 U.S. 272.
•One marine leapue equals 2.4-4.6 miles. Three marine leagues in the sense above equal
approximately 10.5 miles.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 30
448
trol of which by the United States is hereby confirmed.'' Despite this
confirmation, the lack of definition and the uncertainty about the his-
torical boundaries of the States once again led to litigation.
Relative to the continental shelf beyond the undefined inland waters,
that is, beyond the seaward boundaries, the Submerged Lands Act also
omitted any provision for the administration of the seabed and the
subsoil and the natural resources thereof.
On the same day of the issuance of the Truman Proclamation
(September •!£. 1945). the President issued an Executive Order
reserving and placing certain resources of the continental shelf under
the control and jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior. A few
months before passage of the Submerged Lands Act, on January 16,
1953, President Truman issued another Executive Order setting aside
submerged lands of the continental shelf as a naval petroleum reserve.
This action concerned particularly oil and gas, and revoked the former
Executive Order by transferring the jurisdiction from the Secretary
of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy. The main thrust of the
Order provided that —
* * * the lands of the continental shelf of the United States and Alaska
lying seaward of the line of mean low tide and outside the inland waters and
extending to the furthermost limits of the paramount rights, full dominion,
and power of the United States over lands of the continental shelf are hereby
set aside as a naval petroleum reserve and shall be administered by the Secre-
tary of the Navy.
This Executive Order prevailed until revoked a few months later by
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT OF 1953
The Truman Proclamation asserted the rights of the United States
on the basis of the geologic unity of the continental shelf with the ad-
jacent continent. Although the Proclamation did not establish an
official width for the shelf, the accompanying news release set the
limit at 100 fathoms (600 feet). These rights were given statutory
weight by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, but the continental
shelf as a whole remained vague and undefined.
The Submerged Lands Act defined the width of the shelf to be be-
tween the base line at low water and the three-mile seaward limit of the
territorial sea. This zone was therefore considered to be the inner
continental shelf. The rest of the continental shelf, seaward of the
territorial waters, was then referred to as the outer continental shelf.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was signed as Public Law
212 on August 7. L953. The main thrust of the Act was to provide for
the administration of the resources of this area. It vested this author-
ity in the Secretary <>f the Interior, revoking the previous Executive
( )rder which had set this area aside as a naval petroleum reserve under
t he administ ration of the Secretary of the Navy.
In its declaration of policy the Act provided "that the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition
449
as provided in this Act." But it made it clear that the Act shall not
affect "the character as high seas of the waters above the outer Con-
tinental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing therein."
This represented a radical and significant departure from the juris-
dictions asserted under the Truman Proclamation and the Submerged
Lands Act. in which reference was made only to the "natural re-
sources" of the seabed and subsoil. In the final version of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act this phrase was omitted. But despite
this omission, the character of the rights claimed remained limited
to "jurisdiction, control, and po\\ er of disposition".
The Act did not define the extent of the outer continental shelf,
seaward of the territorial limits. However, in the publication "De-
scription of Outer Continental Shelf," which was part of the legisla-
tive history of the statute, the Senate Committee on Interior and In-
sular Affairs defined the shelf as —
* * * the extension of the land mass of the continents out under the waters
of the ocean to the point where the continental slope leading to the true ocean
bottom begins. This point is generally regarded as a depth of approximately 100
fathoms, or 600 feet, more or less. In countries using the metric system, the
outer limit of the shelf is generally regarded as a depth of 200 meters, which
is approximately the same as the 100-fathom mark adopted by England and
America.0
In describing the area comprised within these limits, the Committee
concluded that "the outer shelf can be estimated to contain 261,000
square miles." 1() Computations bv the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey
of inland water areas of the United States, the territorial waters,
and the continental shelf are shown below in Tables III and IV.
These descriptions, being only part of the Senate Report accom-
panying the bill, cannot be considered as having the full stature of
the law. They only indicate that the Congress was aware of the geo-
logical concept of the continental shelf. Despite this awareness, how-
TABLE III. — INLAND WATER AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES, BY REGIONS'
[In square miles]
Locality
Area
Costal States:
New England..
Middle Atlantic
Chesapeake
South Atlantic and Gulf.
Pacific.
Total, coastal
Inland States: 2
East North Central
West North Central
3,149
6,719
1,688
18, 296
19,680
49, 532
57,653
9,789
Locality
Area
Inland States 2— Continued
EastSouth Central 1,116
WestSouth Central 1,637
Mountain 6, 936
Total, inland 77,127'
Total, United States 126, 659
Great Lakes 60,306
Other 66,353
1 Source: National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. "Marine Science Affairs— A Year of
Transition " The first report of the President to the Congress on marine resources and engineering development. (Wash-
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1967), p. 141.
- In general, includes lakes, reservoirs, and ponds having 40 acres or more of area and streams and estuaries, canals,
etc., V% of a statute-mile or more in width. Does not include water surface of the oceans, bays, Gulf of Mexico, Long Island
Sound, Puget Sound, and the Straits of Juan de Fuca and Georgia.
9 U.S. Congress. Senate. "Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act." Report of the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs. Senate Report No. 411. June 15, 1953. 83d Congress, 1st
session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), page 4.
10 Ibid., page 5.
3-nautical-
100-fathom »
1,000-fathom »
mile band
contour
contour
6
140
240
5
135
210
4
25
60
20
550
755
2
10
30
2
2
7
450
TABLE IV.-AREA OF THE UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL SHELF, BY COASTAL REGIONS
[Thousands of square statute miles]
Area ' measured from coastline bounded by-
Atlantic coast. -
Gulf coast
Pacific coast
Alaska coast
Hawaii
Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands
Total 39 862 1,302
1 That part of the sea floor extending from the low water line at the coast seaward to the indicated distance or depth.
2 Fathom is a unit of length equal to 6 feet.
ever, Congress did not adopt that concept when it defined the boun-
daries of the continental shelf in the letter of the Act. Absence of such
a definition left flexible the seaward reach of the outer continental
shelf; it remained subject to further expansion of United States juris-
diction, either unilaterally or by agreement with other nations.
This flexibility and the absence of any precise definition were ex-
ploited in later years in the administration of leases by the Secretary
of the Interior. There were occasions when leases far exceeded the 100-
fathom depth previously believed to be the intended limit. Accord-
ingly, up to, and after the passage of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953, the continental shelf remained undefined.
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 19 58
Discussion of the territorial sea among the nations of the world
dates back to the Hague Codification Conference of 1930, sponsored
by the League of Nations.11 The Preparatory Committee for the Con-
ference devoted considerable attention to the limits of base lines and
the widths of territorial waters, but failed to produce the desired con-
vention. Nevertheless, the Committee can be credited with the concept
of a contiguous zone, and with focusing attention on the continental
shelf and the prospect of squabbles among the nations over the proper
delineation of zones and assertion of rights and jurisdiction.
Following the world's reaction to the Truman Proclamation of
1945, the United Nations made another attempt at codifying the law
of the sea. In 1949, the U.N. International Law Commission began a
long study across the total spectrum of maritime problems, including
the territorial sea, the continental shelf, the high seas, fisheries, con-
servation, and piracy. These efforts resulted in several draft reports
and a final report published in 1956."
The Commission considered that international law did not permit
an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles. It also noted
that "many States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and
[that] many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their
11 League of Nations Docs. C.74.M.39.1929.V and 19.30. V.
13 "International Law Commission," Report, United Nations General Assembly, Official
Record, 11th sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/3159), (1956).
« Ibid., Article 3.
451
own territorial sea is less." 13 The implication of this observation is
that the three-mile limit is the acceptable conventional breadth,
that a "contiguous zone" to twelve miles was within the confines of
international law. Although this implication does not constitute a
precise definition, the guidelines provided in the Commission Report
are generally considered the primary basis for recognizing any given
breadth of the territorial sea as an international norm.
In 1958, representatives of 86 nations convened in Geneva to partici-
pate in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. They
used the reports drafted previously by the International Law Commis-
sion as a basis for their deliberations, and the Conference resulted in
four conventions approved by the U.X. General Assembly:
(1) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone;
(2) Convention on the Continental Shelf;
(3) Convention on the High Seas; and
(4) Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Sea.
This study deals with only those conventions that reflect upon the
zonation and the definition of the continental shelf limits.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
established criteria for a baseline at the low-water line, the landward
side of which is the "inland waters" and the seaward side the terri-
torial sea. The outer limit of the territorial sea was defined descrip-
tively relative to the baseline, but no figures were given to establish its
breadth. The contiguous zone Avas defined as a zone of the high seas
contiguous to the territorial sea of a coastal state, where the state may
exercise control in such functions as customs, immigration, and sani-
tary regulation. "The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of a territorial sea is
measured." (Article 24.2)
The Convention on the Continental Shelf (Article 1) defined the
shelf as referring " (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the said areas * * *.14
Deficiencies of the Geneva Conventions
The 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea was followed by another
one in 1960. Both failed to delineate the outer limits of the continental
shelf. The Convention on the Continental Shelf went into effect in 1964,
subject to review and revision in five years after that date. It served
to crystallize international law after a fashion, but had three major
shortcomings :
First, the Convention failed to delineate the territorial sea, which
left the matter to the discretion of the individual states and resulted in
u The natural resources of the continental shelf were defined In Article 2 to Include
"the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living
organisms belonging to sedentary species, that Is to say, organisms which, at the harvest-
able stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in
constant physical contact with the seabed or subsoil." The problems caused bv this defini-
tion will be discussed further in the section on the resources of the continental shelf.
452
a few outlandish extensions, hundreds of miles into the sea floor, with
exclusive jurisdictions over what is below it, in it. on it, and above it.
Second, the Convention ignored the physical characteristics of the
continental shelf so that its definition amounted to a legal fiction. The
exclusive use of the 100-fathom (200-meter) isobath is arbitrary, sci-
entifically unfounded, and inequitable in the allocation of resource's
from the sea floor. It was wise to divorce the superjacent waters from
the considerations of seabed jurisdiction, but it was unwise to ignore
the water surface completely. The nations having a narrow shelf ar-
rive at the 100-fathom isobath almost within eye view from their
shorelines. The addition of a lateral extent on the water surface, a
specified distance in miles from shore, would have been a fair alterna-
tive to the 100-fathom isobath. But the Convention left seaward limits
undefined, and provided no compensation for countries without con-
tinental shelves. Conversely, nations with very shallow continental
shelves were given jurisdiction that extended hundred of miles off-
shore before reaching the 100-fathom isobath. The Persian Gulf, for
example, is in its entirety one continental shelf, according to the defini-
tion of the Convention, and the Arctic shelf off Siberia is close to 700
miles in width.
Third, the Convention contained a delinquent ambiguity inherent
in the clause appended to the definition of the continental shelf. Arti-
cle 1 (a) defined the shelf as reaching to a depth of 200 meters "* * * or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters ad-
mits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas * * *."
The timing of the Truman Proclamation coincided with the increas-
ing development in technological capabilities and the feasibility of ex-
ploiting the sea floor. It served to point up a significant aspect in the
development of national and international law for the sea — the direct
and inevitable correlation between the evolution of law and the devel-
opment in technology in response to the need for exploitation.
In an early draft of the report of the International Law Commis-
sion, a similar correlation between the legal definition and tech-
nological feasibility was attempted. The principle of depth-by-ex-
ploitability, however, would have permitted countries to claim, as
continental shelf, lands far beyond the geological shelf. In 1053 the
International Law Commission rejected this concept and adopted the
200-meter limit and the exploitability clause, whence evolved the defi-
nition adopted by the Geneva Convention. Even then, the state of the
art in offshore drilling had exceeded twice the depth of 200 meters.
The exploitability clause can be interpreted in numerous ways, the.
simplest of which is that the extent of the continental shelf limit is
determined by the capability of exploiting its seabed and subsoil. In
other words, one can claim what one can reach.
In the United States, for example, the exploitability clause was
construed as authorization under the language of the Convention. It
has facilitated the leasing of offshore areas far in excess of the 200-
meter depth off California, and a.s far from shore as 115 miles off
Louisiana. Together with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
of 1953, the Geneva Convention also permitted the United States to
453
claim jurisdiction and control over Cortes Bank.15 By ignoring the
ocean depths in all these cases exceeding 200 meters, and by relying
exclusively on the technological capabilities and the feasibility of ex-
ploitation, the United States is, in essence, asserting rights to further
expansion into adjacent areas as its technology permits. But how far
is "adjacent"?
It is not inconceivable that the lack of limits to the continental shelf
as defined in both the Geneva Convention and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act has left the door open for a possible future claim
that the continental shelf of the United States extends all the way to
Hawaii.
It is evident, therefore, that the dependence of the delineation of
the continental shelf on the technological feasibility of exploiting it
can be used as license for encroachment. It has already led to confusion
and may well lead to grievances among the nations of the world. Con-
tinued encroachment would weaken the effectiveness of international
law.
These are major shortcomings in the state of the art in the legal
definition of the continental shelf. There remains the most important
question of all: What is the fate of the deep sea beyond the shelf?
The outer limit of the shelf itself being non-existent, it is not sur-
prising that the Geneva Conventions have not addressed themselves
to what lies beyond. The legal literature is replete with numerous
papers and theses on these issues. They point up the need for revision
of the Geneva Conventions and for a fresh look at the oceans as a
world entity to be shared by the nations of the world in an orderly
and equitable manner.
III. Seabed Resources
The focus of world attention, and the main object of international
concern in ocean affairs, has been the seabed and the subsoil of the
ocean floor, particularly their mineral content. The seabed contains a
variety of mineral resources ranging from beach sand and gravel,
through heavy minerals associated with beach deposits, to surface
deposits of manganese and phosphorite, and subsurface petroleum
resources.
Deposits on the Seabed Surface
BUILDING MATERIALS
The most obvious and readily apparent hard deposits are sand and
gravel. In terms of tonnage, this important commodity is by far the
15 A group of San Diego businessmen intended to build an artificial island by filling on
tOD of Cortes Bank which lies under two fathoms of water. This was to become a nation
called "Abalonia." Cortes Bank lies about 110 miles off San Diego and 50 miles off San
Clemente Island, and is separated from the Island's territorial sea by waters reaching a
depth of 1400 meters.
Here, the Bank "admits of the exploitation of natural resources" and is adjacent to
the United States of America and, therefore, can be considered part of the United States
juridical continental shelf. Furthermore, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act defines
the legal shelf as all submerged lands seaward of the lands granted to the States and
"of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its
jurisdiction and control." The Act further authorizes the Secretary of the Army to "pre-
vent obstruction to navigation [as to] artificial islands and fixed structures located on
the outer Continental Shelf."
Accordingly, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Army formally ad-
vised the proposed island builders that their work could not be undertaken without the
consent of the United States. [43 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(f) (1964).]
454
most extensively mined throughout the world.16 It forms the back-
bone of the construction industry as aggregate and filler material.
Smaller percentages go into glassmaking and other relatively minor
industries.
Although most of the sand and gravel is mined at or near the
beaches, the ever-increasing populations and their concentration in
coastal areas create demands that are expected to push this industry
into the offshore areas.17 Construction being essential to accommodate
these demands, the seabed will increase in value for providing the
necessary sand and gravel aggregate for the future.
Calcium carbonate shells and sands fragmented from them are also
mined for use in the production of port land cement and lime. Oyster
shells and other calcareous shell deposits are mined from several
coastal locations in the United States and elsewhere in the world.18
HEAVY MINERALS
Several minerals occur in association with, or under, the beach sands
overlying the bedrock. These minerals, referred to as heavy minerals,19
are now mainly derived from sources on land. As the rocks on land
undergo the relentless battering of wind, rain, ice, and other destruc-
tive agents, the rocks yield to the processes of chemical and mechanical
weathering. The weathered fragments are transported by streams and
wind to their final destination in the sea. There, the winnowing action
of the waves serves to concentrate the heavier minerals and metals into
profitably minable deposits.
As would be expected, the heavier the mineral the closer to shore it
is deposited. Consequently, these placer deposits are expected to be
located on present beaches, on submerged beaches, and a few miles
offshore, near their source rocks on land. They usually include the
heavier metals like gold, tin, and platinum, and the relatively lighter
minerals like diamond, the titanium minerals ilmenite and rutile, the
tungsten minerals scheelite and wolframite, the iron ore magnetite,
chromite, and zircon.
Although seabed placer deposits are normally not as abundant nor as
valuable as their counterparts on land, several exceptions are found
around the world such as the tin deposits off the coast of Cornwall in
England and off the coast of Indochina, the diamond deposits off
the coast of southwest Africa, and the zircon sands of New South
Wales, Australia.
PHOSPHORITE
Among the mineral deposits on the seabed, phosphorite has been
found in extensive areas of the continental margin, and appears to
have a promising potential for the mining industry. Phosphate
'•Current production In the United States exceeds .r>0 million cubic yards.
"John Schlee of tin- U.S. Geological Survey estimates thai 50,000 square miles of the
continental shelf off New England, Long Island, and New Jersey are blanketed with sand
and gravel. A large deposit <>fT the New Jersey coast lies in 66 to 132 feet Of water and
may ontalu several hillloii tons of gravel.
1H Offshore production of oyster shells exceeds 20 million tons annually.
'" Minerals are separated from a mixture of crushed rock In a liquid called "bromoform."
Bromoform has a specific gravity of 2.S.r> ; minerals with specific gravity greater than that
of bromoform are referred to as heavy minerals.
455
rock is composed mainly of calcium phosphate, and more than half of
what is mined on land goes primarily for the manufacture of agricul-
tural fertilizers. A smaller percentage is used in the manufacture of
organic and inorganic chemical compounds of phosphorus.
Phosphorite is formed by the precipitation of phosphates from
sea water. These dissolved phosphates have probably come from de-
cayed phosphatic matter in regions where sudden and extreme en-
vironmental changes result in massive kills of marine organisms. In
its circulation through the oceanic domain, the phosphate-rich water
passes through regions where little or no detrital sedimentation is
taking place. In these regions of depositional quiescence the dissolved
phosphates begin to precipitate from sea water and accumulate on
the ocean floor.20
Submarine phosphates are deposited in the form of irregular accre-
tionary noduies, flat slabs, and coatings on sand grains and rock frag-
ments. They vary in shape and size, some weighing between 150 and
250 pounds. Large areas of the ocean floor are blanketed with modular
phosphorite. Occurrences are known from closely near shore to more
than 200 miles offshore, in depths ranging from 60 feet to more than
11,000 feet.21 Sampling and preliminary exploration around the world
indicate the presence of phosphate rock on the east and west coasts of
North and South America, off South Africa, northwest Africa, and
Equatorial West Africa. In places where oceanographic data were suc-
cessful in locating seawater upwelling and detecting phosphate- rich
waters, the prospects are considered good that phosphate rock is pres-
ent. Examples of such upweiling areas include northwestern Aus-
tralia, the Timor Sea, the eastern Araf ura Sea, the Coral Sea, and the
Tasman Sea.
Although there has been no production of submarine phosphate rock
on a commercial scale, some deposits have been surveyed and current
investigations reflect the increasing interest of mining companies
in these offshore minerals. The most extensive of these investigations
have been offshore southern California, U.S.A., and Baja California,
Mexico. Phosphorite nodules were first discovered off the coast of
southern California in 1937. Extensive sampling and exploration has
been conducted since, the most recent being the investigations of the
sand deposits offshore Baja California, Mexico, by Bruno d'Anglejan
(Ph. D. Thesis, 1964) and by the Global Marine Company in 1966.
John L. Mero (1965) estimated that the California deposits cover
about 10 per cent of the potentially workable area of 36,000 square
miles. The concentration averages about 22 pounds of phosphorite
nodules for every square foot of sea floor, and the deposits available for
mining exceed one billion tons.22 More recently, the California deposits
were estimated at 100 million tons classed as known "marginal' re-
20 The phenomenon of upwelling of ocean waters appears to be the most accepted theory
for the origin of submarine phosphates. The knowledge of the processes forming phosphate
rock and its depositional environment is essential to the successful exploration for, and
locating, these deposits.
21 During the oceanographic expedition of the British corvette H.M.S. Challenger (1872-
1876) phosphorite nodules wrere recovered from a depth of 11,400 feet on the Agulhas
Bank off South Africa.
22 John L. Mero, "The Mineral Resources of the Sea." (New York, Elsevier, 1965), page 71.
456
sources, more than 1 billion tons as known "submarginal," and nearly
2 billion tons of inferred but undiscovered resources.23
Considering the continental shelves of the world as occupying 10
million square miles, and assuming a 10 per cent deposit similar to that
of the California shelf, Mero concluded that the continental shelves of
the world should contain 300 billion tons of phosphorite. If 10 per
cent of this amount was economical to mine, the reserves of sea-floor
phosphorite would be 30 billion tons. At the rate of present world con-
sumption, this supply would last 1,000 years.24
Depending on its grade and phosphate content, phosphate rock cur-
rently mined on land ranges in price from $6 to $12 per ton at the mine
site. The value of submarine phosphorite relative to land deposits will
be considered later in context with technology and economics.
MANGANESE NODULES
Undersea deposits of manganese and iron oxides precipitate from
sea water in much the same way as do phosphorite nodules — the col-
loidal particles adhering to any grain or rock fragments and growing
by accretion, layer over concentric layer, to form an onion-like struc-
ture. Each form assumes the shape of its nucleus, sometimes forming
crusts on surfaces of submarine rock outcrops or coatings on animal or
plant remains. They range in size from half an inch to more than six
inches, with an overall average of two inches.
Manganese nodules vary greatly in composition, from region to re-
gion as well as from nodule to nodule. The chemical constituents are
mostly oxides of manganese, iron, silicon, and aluminum, with calcium
and magnesium salts. Nodules sampled since the Challenger expedition
have been analyzed extensively, and numerous other elements have been
found. Most of the recent investigations, however, have focused the
attention of the mining industry on such constituents as cobalt, nickel,
and copper, rather than manganese alone.
Although present knowledge of the distribution and extent of man-
ganese nodules in the world ocean is rudimentary, the nodules appear
to be almost ubiquitous. Some oceanographic expeditions have dredged
mananese nodules at practically every station in the Pacific, Atlantic,
and Indian Oceans. Manganese nodules have been found even in Lake
Michigan. They are known to occur particularly beyond the continental
shelf, in the abyssal plains and oceanic deeps such as the Mariana
Trench in the Pacific, deeper than 22,000 feet. Extensive research and
analyses have been done on nodules from numerous localities, par-
ticularly on their growth rates and concentrations. Accretion rates
in the order of 0.01 to 1 millimeter per 1,000 years are considered
normal growth in deep waters. In shallower waters, some samples
showed accretion rates close to 1 millimeter per year.
** Vincent B. McKelvey. "Mineral potential of the submerged parts of the continents."
in "Mineral Resources of the World ocean." Proceedings <>f a Symposium Mold at the
Naval War College Newport. R.I., July 11 12 1968. Edited by Elizabeth Keiffer. (Uul
v.Tsit- of Rhode island, Occasional Publ. No. », 1968), page ■"■ i
McKelvey defined marginal resources as material that might bo produced at prices not
more than fifty percent higher than those prevailing now, or with comparable ail van es
In technology. Over the longer period and with technological advances, resources recover-
able at custs two ur three times more than those produced now may have some foreseeable
use and prospective value. These were termed submarginal resources.
21 Mero. op. dt., page 73.
457
Underwater photographs of blankets of manganese nodules have
been studied, and concentrations in pounds per square foot have been
computed, mainly for the Pacific Ocean. An American expert has
estimated that the Pacific Ocean may contain more than 1,600 billion
tons of manganese nodules which are being formed at the rate of
about 10 million tons per year. Russian specialists, on the other hand,
estimate a total Pacific Ocean surficial tonnage at about one-twentieth
of this.-"'
RED SEA GEOTHERMAL DEPOSITS
Perhaps one of the most significant of recent oceanographic dis-
coveries is that of the bizarre pools of hot brine on the floor of the Red
Sea. Unusually saline water in the Red Sea has been known since the
Russian expedition of the Vitiaz in the 1880's. In the mid 1960s, how-
ever, more startling data were obtained by the British RRS Discovery,
followed by the U.S. (Woods Hole) vessel Atlantis II, and several
others. The Discovery sampled water with a temperature of 111 degrees
Fahrenheit and a salinity of 256 parts per 1,000.26 Atlantis II measured
a brine temperature of 133 degrees F. and obtained bottom sediment
samples having a temperature of 144 degrees F. and containing a mix-
ture of metal compounds, principally oxides and sulfides of iron, man-
ganese, zinc, and copper.
Geothermal heat from the molten interior of the Earth is trans-
mitted to the Red Sea water through the fissures along the rift of the
Red Sea floor. The heated waters dissolve salts from sedimentary rock
formations and leach heavy metals out of crustal volcanic rocks, creat-
ing metal-saturated brine. As this metalliferous brine cools it releases
the sulfides of lead and zinc, and the carbonates of iron contained in the
water.
This has been the theory generally accepted by oceanographers.
The Russian scientist D. D. Kvasov, of the Leningrad Academy of
Science, has proposed another theory suggesting that the brine pools
may be ancient, lakes.27 Whatever the explanation, the total brine-
free sediments at one location only, the Atlantis II Deep, is estimated
to be over 50 million tons. It contains appreciable amounts of zinc,
copper, lead, silver, and gold which, at current smelter prices, would
be worth about $2.5 billion.28
The significance of the Red Sea discoveries lies in the inter-
related factors of scientific knowledge, exploitation, and legal control.
Scientific knowledge will lead to discoveries of similar deposits in
submarine environments having analogous geological character-
istics. This development, in turn, will have its special economic con-
notations and present, ultimately, the legal and international prob-
lems of exploiting these resources.
25 Mero, op. cit., page 174, estimated the total Pacific Ocean nodules to be 1,656 billion
metric tons. N. Zenkeviteh and N.S. Skornyakova, In Natura (3, 1961), pages 47-50,
obtained an estimate of 90 billion metric tons.
16 Average ocean salinity is 35 o/oo, which means 35 grams of solid material contained
in 1,000 grams (1 kilogram) of sea water. Normal Red Sea salinity is 40 o/oo.
21 D. I). Kvasov. "Limnological hypothesis of the origin of hot brines in the Red Sea."
Nature (Vol. 221. March 1, 1969), pages 850-851.
28 J. L. Bischoff and F. T. Manheim, "Economic potential of the Red Sea heavy metal
deposits." In E. T. Degens and D. A. Ross, eds. "Hot Brines and Recent Heavy Metal
Deposits in the Red Sea, A Geochemical and Geophysical Account." (New York, Springer-
Verlag, 1969), page 535.
458
OTHER SURFACE DEPOSITS
The unconsolidated surface sediments of the ocean floor include
several known deposits which could become potentially economical.
The pelagic sediments of deep, offshore waters are classified as red
clays if their organic content is less than 30 percent, and as oozes
if their organic content is more than 30 percent. Their widest distri-
bution is in the Pacific Ocean, usually at depths averaging between
6,000 and 17,000 feet.
Although now uneconomical, these clays and oozes contain some
potentially useful constituents such as calcium carbonate, alumina,
iron oxide, and silica. They literally cover the ocean floor, and are
estimated to be in the order of thousands of billions of tons.
Nearer to shore, and in shallower water, unconsolidated green sands
(glauconite) are found abundantly in areas of slow detrital deposi-
tion. Glauconite sand is a hydrous potassium iron-silicate with a
small amount of potash content. It has been sampled off the coasts of
Africa, the Americas, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philip-
pines, Portugal, and Britain. Green sand mined from land has been
used as a water softener and soil conditioner.
Barite, a barium sulphate mineral, is another surface deposit
which occurs in nodular form like phosphorite and manganese.
Barite concretions have been dredged from the continental margin off
the coasts of Ceylon, southern California, and the Kai Islands in Indo-
nesia. The concretions range up to two pounds in weight and assay
around 75 per cent barium sulphate.
Large deposits of barite are known on land, which makes the ocean
barite unimportant at this time. However, barite is being mined off-
shore Barite Island in Alaskan waters 20 to 80 feet deep, with known
reserves in 120 feet of water. Current production from this operation
alone is 1,000 tons per day m; daily production of primary barite in the
United States averaged about 2,600 tons for 1970.30
Deposits Below the /Seabed Surface
The subsurface deposits of the seabed are those contained within the
structures of consolidated sedimentary and basement rocks. They can
be viewed in two groups, related primarily to the methods of their
extraction. On the one hand, petroleum, natural gas, and sulphur are
extracted through holes drilled into the sea floor. On the other hand,
coal, iron ore, and vein deposits are extracted in conventional mining
manner by driving shafts and drifts into the seabed from adjacent
land areas.
Undersea mines operated from land entries, either from shore or
from artificial islands, have been in use for centuries. Magnetite veins
are mined near Jussaro Island, Finland, and an extensive undersea
iron ore is mined from Bell Island in Newfoundland. Land-entry coal
mines are also operated in England, Japan, and Nova Scotia. How-
ever, these operations are closely tied to land and do not figure promi-
nently in the I'nt lire of the seabed.
20 Joseph F. Stevens, "Mining tbe Alaskan sons," Ocean Industry (November 1970),
pageo 47 -49.
30 U.S. Bureau of Mines. Commodity Data Summaries (January 1971), pages 10-11.
459
PETROLEUM
By far, the most important of all marine resources is petroleum.
Although land exploration opportunities for petroleum have not been
exhausted, petroleum exploration and exploitation has invaded the
continental shelves at a rapid pace. Potentially important oil fields are
being discovered every year, and the nations of the world are investing
considerable capital in offshore ventures.31 More than 85 countries are
engaged in offshore activities, and discoveries have been reported from
the shelves of North and South America, Australia, Japan, the Medi-
terranean countries, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and, most recently, in the North Sea and
the South China Sea. Thirty-two of these countries are already pro-
ducing petroleum from their continental shelves, which accounts for
16 per cent of the world's oil and 6 per cent of the world's natural gas.
It is expected that by 1980 this percentage will double or quadruple.32
The extent of petroleum deposits offshore cannot be determined, and
numerous estimates have been advanced. Proved reserves in the "free
world" are estimated to exceed 500 billion barrels of oil and nearly 1.5
million billion (quadrillion) cubic feet of gas.33 It is believed that out
31 A single lease sale of offshore tracts In the Santa Barbara Channel of California
brought the Department of the Interior over $600 million In February 1968, and In March
a similar amount was obtained from tracts off the' Gulf of Mexico shores. Altogether the
revenues for that fiscal year amounted to more than $1.5 billion. On December 15, 1970,
the Department of the Interior received some $850 million from oil companies in bids
for 127 underwater tracts off the Louisiana coast. A single tract brought a bid of more
than $38 million.
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF RECEIPTS FISCAL YEARS 1955 THROUGH 1967;
UPDATED THROUGH JAN. 31, 1968
Bonuses rents
141820 Royalties 142020 Escrow Total
1955 $142,404,630.48 0 $12,217,134.37 $154,621,764.85
1956 111,171,041.53 $52,814.63 26,518,518.78 137,742,374.94
■(57,434,228.69) ' (1,656.94) 57,435,885.63
1957 1,976,361.00 232,342.31 10,969,890.58 13,178,593.89
1958 2,630,090.41 830,760.69 12,208,496.48 15,669,347.58
1959 1,145,720.00 2,266,484.40 20,418,121.35 23,830,325.75
1960 _■ 226,616,838.22 2,839,980.97 172,265,367.50 401,722,186.69
1961 1,716,161.23 5,588,525.60 43,762,875.15 51,067,561.98
1962_ 6,006.921.00 5,605,230.15 498,586,287.97 510,198.439.12
1963 359,370,525.43 7,443,921.55 (229,540,465.57) 137,273,981.41
1964 5,870,970.00 10,620,439.52 135,904,544.80 152,395,954.32
1965. 42,223,700.64 11,246,201.92 89,032,099.84 142,502,002.40
1966 161,893,155.47 86,424,061.11 (39,552,372.76) 208,764,843.82
1967 596,202,951.97 41,107,770.26 148,129,983.44 785,440,705.67
Through Jan. 31. 1968 204,629,546.95 30,372,670.78 69,539,020.62 304,541,238.35
Total 1,807,807,657.66 204,629,546.95 1,027,895,388.18 3,038,949,320.77
1 GAO adjustment taken from general fund and placed in escrow.
Note: Does not include California sale of Feb. 6, 1968, of $602,719,621.60 bonus and 1st year rental of $1,089,543
32 Industry experts predict that world production of offshore petroleum will exceed 20
million barrels per day, compared with today's 6.5 million. The present USSR offshore pro-
duction exceeds 90 million barrels a year, less than 4 percent of that country's total
output. In Moody's September 21, 1970, "Stock Survey" oil and gas produced from offshore
wells are predicted to quadruple by 1980.
33 Oil and Gas Journal (December 29, 1969), page 95. Proved crude reserves for the
"free world" for the year 1967 were shown to exceed 525 billion barrels. (Oil and Gas
Journal (May 6, 1968), page 77.)
460
to a depth of 1,000 feet, nearly two million square miles of the shelf
areas are geologically favorable for petroleum occurrence. It could
be safely assumed that nearly every coastal nation has offshore areas
that are favorable for petroleum accumulation. The imprecision in the
estimates is largely due to the lack of adequate data, and the lack of
knowledge necessary for projecting and predicting these estimates.
This knowledge depends basically on understanding the origin of
petroleum and the factors required for its accumulation. Several the-
ories exist on the origin of petroleum, but the one that has been most
widely accepted holds that the origin of hydrocarbons is organic. The
hydrogen and carbon originated from the remains of plant and animal
life that existed millions of years ago in former seas or swampy
environments. Such life forms were presumed to have been very small,
probably microscopic. Support for this theory is derived from inter-
pretation of the geological records, and studies of oil fields and oil-
bearing formations that have already been explored and developed
throughout the world.
After having been formed, oil accumulates in reservoirs formed by
sedimentary layers called "formations." The mountains and the sur-
face of the earth are slowly broken down into smaller fragments
and particles. These eroded sediments are carried by the rivers
and deposited into the seas. As the millions of years pass, bodies
of sand, silt, and mud gradually build up in the coastal areas border-
ing the continents. The weight of these sediments forces the ocean
floor downward, warping it into a trough in which more sediments are
deposited.
This pressure results in two distinct processes : One is deformation of
these layers; the other is their transformation into hard rock.
As the layers are compressed, the oil accumulated in the sediments is
forced to migrate into pervious sand bodies with pore spaces between
the particles that facilitate the mobility of the oil. Meanwhile, com-
paction and particle cementation have turned the loose sediments into
rocks, the sand becoming sandstone, the silt siltstone, and the mud
mudstone or shale. While sandstone is the ideal medium to contain the
oil, limestone, and other porous rocks also are often oil-bearing. The
shale or mudstone is the ideal rock to seat it. So, in order for the oil to
stay in the pervious sandstone to which it has migrated, it has to have
an impervious layer over it to check its migration.
The earth's crust is mobile and dynamic, forever on the move. These
movements result in deformation which manifests itself in the form
of uplifted mountains, dovvnwarped valleys, and twisted and contorted
sedimentary strata. The beneficial part of this upheaval is the creation
of structural forms which provide the traps and reservoirs necessary
for the containment of oil. The types of t raps where oil has l>een found
are numerous; however, the most ideal structure is a dome called "anti-
cline" (see sketch A. Fig. 2) .
In an ideal situation, a reservoir would be a closed sequence, of
sedimentary rocks, including a layer of oil-bearing sandstone capped
with a layer of shale or mudstone. The contents of this reservoir in-
clude some water left over from the former seas, the oil body floating
461
Figure 2. — Diagrammatic sketch showing typical oil and gas types of traps. (A)
Anticlinal trap showing gas accumulating in the crest of the structure with
oil and water occurring successively lower on the flanks of the anticline ; this
diagram also shows the gradational relationship usually present at the oil
and gas contact and at the oil and water contact. (B) Simple fault trap
showing gas and oil arrested in its migration up-dip by the presence of a fault
which has brought impervious shale opposite the porous and pervious sand-
stone which now forms the reservoir. (C) Stratigra phic traps where migration
of oil and gas is arrested in the left-hand pool by impervious shale uncon-
formably overlaying the porous reservoir sand, and in the right-hand pool by
porous sandstone gradually changing up-dip to an impervious shale facies.
(D) Oil and gas accumulating against impervious crystalline rock ; the crystal-
line rock may be an intrusive such as a volcanic plug or it may be an erosional
remnant around which later sediments have been deposited.
[Figure adapted from "Oil, Gas and Helium in Arizona : Its Occurrence and Potential,"
(Arizona Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, c. 1966).]
462
over the water, and the natural gas at the very top, all in the pores and
cavities of the host rock.
The salt domes of the Gulf of Mexico are cylindrical bodies of salt
that have been squeezed from their parent formations, piercing upward
through a succession of overlying sedimentary layers (see sketch B,
Fig. 2). Against the walls of a salt dome the oil-bearing layers are
closed off, providing a reservoir and a seal for trapping the oil. Such
diapiric structures have been known to occur farther offshore and in
deeper waters in the Sigsbee Abyssal Plain beneath the floor of the
Gulf of Mexico. Some structures have protruded above the flat surface
of the Plain and are termed "knolls." Those without surface expres-
sion are "domes." Recent seismic discoveries have revealed the pres-
ence of diapiric structures in numerous offshore locations around the
world.34 The Sigsbee Knolls were discovered in 1954 by the Vema, the
research vessel of Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Geological
Observatory. In 1968, Lamont scientists on board the Glomar Chal-
lenger drilled through the cap rock of the Challenger Knoll in 11,720
feet of water and recovered a core 472 feet long. The sediments in the
core contained oil and were similar in composition to other salt domes
on shore and offshore.35
Except for this type of reservoir, almost all production areas off-
shore are geologically related to fields on shore. Since the continental
margins are essentially submerged edges of the continents, knowledge
of petroleum habitats on land can be applied offshore with considerable
certainty.
Beyond these near-shore areas, the petroleum potential of the outer
continental shelf and slope has been little investigated. But there are
indications that the presence of petroleum source beds is very likely in
the continental slope, and progressively less beyond the slope into' the
abyssal plains and oceanic deeps. Exceptions of course can be found
in depositional ocean basins with great sedimentary accumulations and
salt-dome structures like those described above. However, as with
other ocean resources, the exploration and exploitation of petroleum
resources of the seabed depends on to the technological capability
and economic feasibility for future development.
OTHER SUBSURFACE DEPOSITS
Deposits of sulphur, coal, salt, potash, and oil shale are known to
occur on the continental shelves of many seas. Sulphur has been mined
from salt-dome structures in the Gulf of Mexico, and similar structures
are known in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Caspian Sea.
In the Gulf of Mexico, sulphur occurs in considerable quantities in
the rock formations capping the salt domes. Several of these domes
are now being mined on land, and an elaborate mining operation is
3* E. D. Schneider and G. L. Johnson. "Deep-ocean dlapir occurrences." American Asso-
ciation of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin (November 1!)70), pages 2151. 2169. See also:
H. K. Wong, et al. "Newly discovered group of diapiric Structures In Western Medlter-
^"^nn'' American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin (November 1970), pages
88 M. Ewing, et al. Site 2." In "Initial Reports of the Deep Sea Drilling Project," Vol. I.
i;Iulieo„1!)(59)l IjaKes 84-111. (Lamont Doherty Geological Observatory Contribution
No. 1364.)
463
being conducted off the coast of Louisiana.36 Present reserves are
estimated at nearly 40 million tons, and more sulphur is expected to
occur in similar domes offshore.
In the bedrock below the sedimentary cover of the ocean floor, the
crystalline rocks, like granite, may contain metallic minerals. Farther
offshore into the abyssal plains, the crystalline bedrock is mostly
basaltic rather than granitic, where chromite, nickel, and platinum may
be found. Unlike the dredging techniques for mining surface deposits,
and the conventional land-based mining methods, the extraction of
deep-ocean minerals presents formidable problems. Given the present
availability of such minerals from land ore deposits, the consideration
of deep-ocean minerals becomes a highly academic one of potential
rather than actual resource. Nevertheless, the onrush of technology
makes it hard to predict whether or when deep submarine deposits
may become "ores." They should not be ignored in the formulation
of policy for the long-range future.
Resources of the Oceans
Although attention in this report is focused on the seabed, it is
appropriate to give some consideration to the resources of the sea
itself, to their exploitation by man, and to the potential they offer for
the future. They include the living organisms of the marine environ-
ment for products like food, food derivatives, and pharmaceuti-
cals ; potable water from the sea ; the salts and other minerals contained
in the water; the minerals on and under the ocean floor; and such
related activities as shipping and aquatic recreation.
FOOD FROM THE SEA
Since his emergence on Earth and his first encounter with the sea,
man has utilized it as a source of food and a means of transportation.
Life on Earth emerged from its primordial ocean, and the life-giv-
ing characteristics of the ocean have always played their role in the
maintenance of the food chain of living organisms. Man's quest for
food from the sea went through the hunting stage for most of historic
time, and is now extending to the domestication and farming stages
analogous to those known on land. Methods of utilizing the food re-
sources of the sea have also progressed. They vary among the nations
of the world from primitive techniques to ultra-modern electrical, elec-
tronic, and acoustical fishing methods. The immediate results of these
technological developments are the obvious overfishing and exter-
mination of a number of species, and the diversification into other
types of living organisms that have been heretofore neglected. The
world harvest is estimated at 60 million tons of fish annually from
conventional species. Species now unused could provide an additional
amount close to 200 million tons.
38 In 1968, more than $35 million worth of sulphur came from two mines, one located
7 miles seaward of Grand Isle and the other at the Caminada Pass. The sulphur is ex-
tracted by the Frasch method in liquid form through a drill hole similar to an oil well.
The most important single sulphur market in the world is the fertilizer industry in
Florida, where sulphuric acid is used in processing local phosphate rock into fertilizer.
Consumption of elemental sulphur until the early 1960's has increased at an average of
5 per cent annually, and jumped to an average of 12 per cent annually since then.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-31
464
FISH PROTEIN CONCENTRATE
Technological progress has resulted in methods of utilizing that part
of the fish catch that is not considered at this time to have the qualities
preferred for the dinner table. So-called "trash" fish can now be proc-
essed into a tasteless, odorless powder called Fish Protein Concentrate.
FPC powder is 75 per cent protein, one pound of which is equivalent
to 5i/> pounds of beef or 2p2 pounds of non-fat powdered milk. At
about" 40 cents a pound, it is a cheap source of protein that can be added
to staple foods such as bread, pasta, soup, and other foods, to supply
the minimum daily requirement of protein. The potential of this
product in alleviating protein deficiencies and combatting worldwide
disease and hunger offers one answer to the problem of feeding the
multiplying numbers of the human population.
AQUACULTURE
The change in man's techniques from hunting the ocean to farm-
ing it has progressed in great strides. Although domesticat-
ing and herding marine animals, and planting and harvesting
marine plants, are not nearly on a scale comparable with such prac-
tices on land, aquaculture techniques have been known and practiced
for hundreds of years. Recent developments, however, have been
evident throughout the world, and aquaculture farms for the produc-
tion of sea food are being established according to scientific specifica-
tions which control the organisms from the breeding stages through
marketing and distribution. Aquafarms are not confined totally to
estuaries and sea shores, and many of them are found farther inland.37
Acquaculture is by no means confined to finfish. It includes also shell-
fish like ovsters and clams, crustaceans like lobsters and shrimp, and
such oddities as turtles and bloodworms. Throughout the world, the
volume of the products of aquaculture has grown to a total of 4 mil-
lion tons. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
estimates that by 1985 world aquaculture could expand to 20 million
tons.
DRUGS FROM THE SEA
In utilizing the living resources of the sea, the extraction of medic-
inal and pharmaceutical products is often little known and unpub-
licized. However, the use of ocean organisms for medicinal purposes
has been known since the early civilization of the Chinese and in Bibli-
cal times. Nowadays, thousands of marine organisms are known to
contain biotoxic substances and yet fewer than 1 percent have been
closely examined or thoroughly evaluated for their medicinal charac-
teristics. Marine biomedieinc lias been gaining prominence, and more
attention is being focused on the potential of the ocean environment as
a source of new medical discoveries and new drugs.
•■"A good example in the United states Is to be found in Arkansas where gross sales
from aquaculture exceeded $15 million in 1969. Elsewhere, during a recent visit to
Lebanon, the author was surprised to learn thnt the trout served in the restaurants of
Beirut is supplied locally from an Inland aquafarm. In a most unlikely place near the
Inland town of Jezzlne, he visited a trout farm hardly noticeable to the unsuspecting
visitor The concrete ponds were huilt on terraces, clinging precariously to the steep slope
typical of the rugged Lebanese mountains. The ponds were teeming with healthy trout in
all stages of growth, and the whole venture appeared to be a viable and lucrative business.
465
SEA WATER AND ITS MINERALS
The most abundant and most essential of world resources is the water
of the ocean. The accelerating increase in human population, and the
soaring demands for industrial and agricultural use of fresh water,
have created acute water shortages around the world. The worsening
pollution of the fresh-water supply and the demands of arid areas
where normal water supplies are nonexistent highlight the need for
turning to sea water.
Desalination — the production of potable water from sea water —
is now an active concern, and many countries suffering from water
shortages are erecting and utilizing desalting plants for their
domestic needs. More than 600 desalting plants of 25,000 gallons
per day capacity or greater are in operation or under construction in
the world. Their total production of potable water exceeds 200 million
gallons per day. It is estimated that by 1975 worldwide utilization
of desalting plants will result in the production of 1 billion gallons
of fresh water per day.38
The sea holds about 330 million cubic miles of water, which contain
an average of Sy2 percent of various elements in solution. Each cubic
mile weighs some 4.7 billion tons and holds about 166 million tons
of solids.39 The most abundant of these is common salt — sodium chlo-
ride. Its two main elements, sodium and chlorine, constitute more than
85 per cent of all the solids dissolved in sea water. Salt has been ex-
tracted from sea water since time immemorial and, although some of
the machines and tools used today are modern, the basic techniques
of salt mining by solar evaporation is still prevalent around the world.
Besides common salt, sea water contains commercially extractable
amounts of magnesium metal and compounds, and smaller amounts of
bromine, iodine, calcium, and potassium compounds. There are at pres-
ent some 300 near-shore operations in 60 countries engaged in the
production of these minerals.40 Quantitative chemical analyses reveal
the presence in sea water of all but about a dozen of the stable ele-
ments; advanced analytical techniques may eventually reveal the pres-
ence of virtually all known elements in sea water.
One of the latest milestones in mineral extraction from sea water
was the invention of a process for extracting uranium oxide. Developed
by N. J. Keen at Britain's Atomic Energy Research Establishment at
Harwell, the process promises a final product at $20 per pound.
Of the more appealing constituents of sea water, precious metals
have been the object of unrewarding research and experimentation for
some time. Silver is the most abundant precious metal in sea water, but
most attempts have concentrated on the extraction of gold.41
38 Milton S. Sachs. "Desalting Plants. Inventorv Report No. 1." Report of Office of
Saline Water, U.S. Department of the Interior. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office, January 1, 1968.)
30 Mero., op. cit., page 4.
40 Frank Wane. "Mineral Resources of the Sea." (U.N. Department of Economic and
Social Affairs. ST/EPA /125. April 1970. page 4.) This is an updated version of an identi-
cal report of the Secretary-General dated February 19, 1968.
41 Numerous gold extraction processes have be^n patented, but none has yet been found
that could be classified as economical. Gold concentration in sea water has been found to
vary from 0.001 milligrams per ton to almost 60 mg/ton, with an average about 0.04 mg/
ton. Of all these attempts, only one case is known where anv measurable amount of gold
was actuallv obtained. This was done by the Dow Company in their bromine extraction
facilitv in North Carolina. Fifteen tons of sea water were processed, producing 0.09 milli-
grams of gold, worth about $0.0001. [See John L. Mero. op. cit, page 42.]
466
Regardless of the number of elements and compounds present in sea
water, their extraction depends on a technology that would make the
effort economically profitable. At the present level of technological ca-
pability, and taking into consideration such factors as operating costs
and cheaper, competitive sources, distribution costs, and consumption
rate, it has been shown that only six minerals can be profitably ex-
tracted. These are : salt, magnesium, sulphur, potassium, bromine, and
boron. Any mineral with concentration below that of boron is con-
sidered economically unprofitable to extract.42
IV. Technology and Economics
The discussions thus far have dealt with "deposits" on, in, and
under the ocean floor. Under the proper circumstances such deposits
are converted by man into "ore l>odies'\ To a geologist, an ore is dp-fined
as a deposit that can he mined at a profit. In order to accomplish this
conversion, a venture requires the quantitative presence of a deposit in
a certain environment, and the technology to extract the mineral,
process it, and market it for a profit.
A close relationship thus exists between technology and economics,
in which the recovery of resources is a business venture primarily
economic and only secondarily technologic. The economic factors, how-
ever, interact in a complex manner sometimes reflecting the immediate
impact of technological development.
In the case of the ocean resources, mining of hard mineral deposits
depends mainlv on economics. The extraction of subsurface deposits,
chiefly petroleum, is in a closed sequence in which economic demands
spur technology and technologv subsequently pushes the market to
demand further technology. This section examines the economics and
technology for the extraction of hard minerals, oil, and gas. The most
significant of the hard minerals are the phosphorites and the man-
ganese nodules, both of which will need to be harvested by mining
techniques. Oil and gas resources are extracted through holes drilled
in the seabed — a technique already in practice, within water-depth
limitations.
Harvesting Hard Minerals from the Seabed
Mining hard mineral deposits from the sea floor resembles more
closely the harvesting of fish than mining as practiced on land. The
equipment used for undersea mining operations is simple and un-
sophisticated, adapted for the most part from similar land mining
equipment. Table V shows the types of mining techniques and the time-
table projections for the year 2000 to a depth of 1.000 feet.43 For the
immediate future, however, the most promising of these techniques is
essentially the principle of dredging. Some of the dredges have the
capability to dig and scoop consolidated sediments. Other types employ
hydraulic pumping and air lifting actions, strictly for surface uncon-
solidated sediments.
42 W. F. Mellhenny and ]>. A. llallard. "The sod as a source of dissolved chemicals." In
"Symposia on Economic Importance of Chemicals from the Sea." (Washington, Division
of Chemical Marketing F.conomlcs, American Chemical Society. 1963).
'» Oor^on O. Pheroon. "Mining Industry's role in development of undersea minlnc." In
"Exp'oltlng the Ocean." Transactions of the 2d Annual Marine Technology Conference
and Exhibit, June 27-29, 1966. (19«6), page 195.
467
TABLE V.-OCEAN MINING TECHNOLOGY TIME TABLE
Depth of water
50 feet
300 feet
600 feet
1000 feet
Mining using air lift device.." 1960
Mobile miner (ocean floor) 1970
Barge dredge lift 1900
Stationary mining platform 1960
Buoyant submersible system
Underwater open pit hardrock mining 1975
Underwater "aerial" photographic reconnaisance 1960
Exploration submarine (corer)
Underwater site development station 1970
Solution mining (sulfur, potash).. 1961
Hardiock mining (below shelf) 1900
Mining shaft 1970
1970
1975
1980
1972
1975
1980
1970 ....
1970
1975
1980
1975
1977
1980
1985
1995
2005
1964
1970
1975
1968
1968
1968
1972
1975
1980
1980
1985
2000
1985
2000
2000
1980
2000
2000
Conventional dredging is done by four main types of dredges :
1. Bucket-ladder dredge, limited to 150 feet.
2. Surface pump hydraulic dredge, limited to 200 feet.
3. Wire line dredges (grab bucket, clamshell, orange peel, etc.),
limited to 500 feet.
4. Air lift dredge, limited to 1,000 feet.
Although these dredge types have functioned successfully at much
greater depths, the depth limits given above are those for practical
operations.
For deep-sea areas, the deep-sea drag dredge and the deep-sea
hydraulic dredge have been envisioned, which might prove practical
for mining phosphorite and manganese nodules. The cost of mining a
ton of nodules by deep-sea drag dredge was estimated by Mero 44 to
range from about $12 at a depth of 1,000 feet to more than $40 at 10,-
000, provided the nodule concentration is one pound per square foot.
The use of deep-sea hydraulic dredging, on the other hand, lowers
these figures to an acceptable range of $2.29 per ton at 1,000 feet and
roughly $5 at 20,000 feet.
The most recent breakthrough in sea floor dredging is an elaborate
system of air-lift dredge successfully tested in July 1970 on the Blake
Plateau, approximately 170 miles oft the cost of Georgia and Florida.
From depths between 2,400 and 3,000 feet, the dredge succeeded in
extracting a continuous flow of nodules from the ocean floor. The sys-
tem on board the Deepsea Miner was operated by Deepsea Ventures,
Inc., a subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc. It represents approximately a decade
of research and an investment of nearly $18 million. The objective
following this initial success is the capability to operate at greater
depths between 18,000 and 20,000 feet, probably in the Pacific ocean
where nodules are plentiful. With a processing plant planned for the
mid-seventies, the operators hope to attract an investment of $150 to
$200 million to finance full-scale production before the end of this
decade. The Japanese ship No. 2 Chiyoda Maru has succeeded in re-
covering nodules from comparable depths in the vicinity of Tahiti by
using a continuous bucket trawling system.
While this manuscript was being readied for the press, a break-
through was achieved in processing manganese nodules. After investi-
41 Mero, op. cit., page 257.
468
gating more than 100 processes, Deepsea Ventures, Inc., reported in
the June issue of Ocean Industry magazine that it has developed a
chemical hydro-metallurgical process to extract economically manga-
nese, copper, cobalt, and nickel from seabed nodules. The expected
yield from full-scale processing will be 260,000 tons of manganese;
12,600 tons of nickel; 10,000 tons of copper; and 2,400 tons of cobalt.
. Such technological developments point up the fact that technology
is a product of incentive and time. It is within present knowledge to
acquire the desired technological capability to exploit the seabed
more fully, but the time factor and the speed of development are
dependent on the incentive to invest the required capital. This incen-
tive is a combination of economic, social, and political factors.
PHOSPHORITE
Phosphate rock on the seabed, to justify the operational costs of its
recovery, has to compete with present land deposits in purity and
grade of the ore body, abundance, cost of transportation, processing
and bene fie i at ion, and cost of exploration at sea versus on land.
Although most of the phosphate deposits on land are of marine
origin, their exposure to weathering processes through geologic time
results in an enriched final product with a higher content of phosphate
than the marine deposits. Submarine pellets and nodules seldom con-
tain more than 30 percent P205 whereas the cutoff grade for fertilizer
production is about 31.5 percent, and land deposits now being worked
contain around 35 per cent.
World demand for phosphate products (industry 20 per cent,
fertilizer 80 per cent) has been increasing at an annual rate of
i) per cent; In 1965 world consumption totaled 63 million metric tons ;
in 1975 a minimum of 120 million tons would be needed, and in the
next decade the world demand is expected to double.45 Earlier cal-
culations which show the expected increase in world population, and
the per capita consumption projected to the year 2000 A.D., are
shown in Tables VI-IX.46 As indicated in Table VIII, by the year
2000, the total world consumption of phosphate rock is forecast to
reach 7.6 billion long tons, containing about 2.28 billion long tons of
phosphate, and total U.S consumption is forecast to reach 1.23 billion
long tons, containing about 380 million long tons of phosphate. The
world reserve and potential resources of phosphate rock and apatite
were reported by the U.S. Bureau of Mines to contain nearly 50 billion
long tons of phosphate.47 This supply is believed more than adequate
for projected demands. Furthermore, new land deposits are being dis-
covered,48 and new processing and more efficient beneficiation are
being applied in developing known reserves.
"• M P. Overall. "Mining phosphorite from the sea. Part 2: Economics of mining and
beneficiation." Ocean Industry (October 1968), page 60.
40 Chester 0. Ensign, Jr., "Economic barriers delay undersea mining." Mining Engineer-
ing (September 11)06), page 60.
'■' ibid., page 61.
<s A new discovery in Saudi Arabia was made by geologists of the U.S. Geological Survey
near the Jordanian border. The Turayf Area I covers 1,300 square miles and is estimated
i" hold about 1.1 billion tons. Thaniyat Turayf Phosphate Area II covers 1,500 square
miles and contains almost 100 million tons of high grade ore. (Charles K. MeiSsner. Jr.,
IS. Geological Survey). "Phosphate Deposits in Sirhan Turayf Basin." In "Mineral Ke-
B0Urce8 Research 1967-8." (Directorate General of Mineral Resources, Saudi Arabia),
pages 52-3.
469
TABLE VI.— POPULATION PROJECTIONS: WORLD, UNITED STATES, ETC. 1965-2000
Population in Millions
United States; South Asia; Africa and Latin
America; World
Mid-1965
1970
1980
2000
Estimated
Continued
Continued
Continued
Population
Trends
Trends
Trends
3,308
3,626
4,487
7,410
194
211
252
362
(5.8)
(5.8)
(5.6)
(4.9)
4,214
1,534
1,724
2,263
(46. 4)
(47.5)
(50. 5)
(56. 8)
1,580
1,691
1,972
2,834
(47.8)
(46.7)
(43.9)
(38. 3)
World...;
United States..
Percent
Africa, South Asia, and Latin America
Percent
Remainder of world
Percent
Note: Percentage in ( ) is percentage of total world population.
Source: Population Bulletin, vol. XXI, No. 4, October 1965, by Population Reference Bureau, Inc. Although the U.S.
population figures and projections are weakened somewhat by more recent census data, the overall trend remains
essentially valid.
TABLE VII.— PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION (APPARENT) OF PHOSPHATE ROCK
United States
Year
Apparent
consumption '
(long tons)
Pounds
phosphate
rock per
capita
World
Production *
(long tons)
Pounds
phosphate
rock per
capita
1960.
1961.
1962.
1963.
1964.
13,337,000 166.0 41,170,000
14,058,000 44,780,000
15,260,000 J 47,320,000
15,474,000 50,590,000
16,546,000 192.0 57,910,000
31.0
40.0
1 Apparent consumption is measured by phosphate rock sold or used plus imports minus exports.
2 Production is used as no consumption figures were available in the sources of information. It is assumed that world
production and consumption are nearly equal.
Source of consumption and production figures: Minerals Yearbook, vol. I (1964 edition).
TABLE VIII.— PROJECTED TOTAL CONSUMPTION OF PHOSPHATE ROCK, 1966 THROUGH 2000 A.D.
[In tons of 2,240 pounds]
Total long tons consumed based on
Continued trends in
population >
Medium trends in
population >
United States:
192 pounds per capita _ 804, 500, 000
(249, 000, 000 P20J)
300 pounds per capita _ 1,225,000,000
(380, 000, 000 P20J)
World:
40 pounds per capita , 3,225,000,000
(967, 000, 000 P205)
100 pounds per capita 7, 600, 000, 000
(2J80, 000, 000 P2Q5)
770, 000, 000
- (238, 000, 000 P200
1, 220, 000, 000
(378, 000, 000 P2Os)
2, 895, 000, 000
(869, 000, 000 P2O5)
7, 100, 000, 000
(2, 130, 000, 000 P2Oj)
1 Based on population trends shown on table VI.
c
Total reserves
Potential
resources
Marketable
product
P2O5 content
Marketable
product
PsOs content
20
23, 350
"I
5,398
20, 000
5
2,040
' 2, 000
660
•600
4,932
O)
2
80
3,000
12
870
1,129
5,800
470
TABLE IX.-RESERVES AND POTENTIAL RESOURCES OF PHOSPHATE ROCK IN THE UNITED STATES
[In millions of long tons]
Source
Arkansas
Florida
North Carolina - . - -
South Carolina
Tennessee -
Western field'
Total (rounded) 7,100 2,100 49,000 12,000
Note: A largs tonnage of lower grade phosphatic material in the western field is not included in resources. The Florida
and Tennessee potential resources include the low-grade mineable material.
1 Estimate.
> Data not available.
3 Includes Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.
Source: Mineral Facts and Problems (1965 edition), page 704.
Transportation costs play a major role in the economics of phos-
phates. Shipping phosphate rock from Florida to California, for ex-
ample, costs $4.50 a ton; rail transportation from Idaho is much
higher. With transportation costs added to production costs, the price
of Florida phosphate rock in California approaches $12 a ton, and in
Japan about $14 per ton. For this reason, submarine phosphorite de-
posits in certain areas like the Thirty- and Forty-Mile Banks off San
Diego and the phosphorite sand deposit in Santo Domingo Bay, Baja
California, even if mined at costs higher than those on land, can have
promising and important potential advantage. These deposits can com-
pete with Florida land deposits for Mexican, Japanese, Australian,
and Pacific markets, if they can be mined at recovery and primary
beneficiation costs less than $8.50 per ton.49 The price of phosphate
rock at Florida mines is about $7 per ton. Aside from this advantage
for special localities, transportation cost is considered a disadvantage
for worldwide marketing of submarine phosphorite. On the other
hand, logistics are sometimes outweighed by efficient mining practices
and particularly marketing. A case in point is that Florida producers
are able to sell large tonnages of phosphate rock to West Germany
and Italy despite the large nearby reserves of North Africa, particu-
larly Morocco (21 billion tons of P205).5° The Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan also possesses an excellent grade of phosphate but the in-
dustry suffers from logistics and marketing problems.51
The most serious deterrent to offshore phosphorite mining is a lack
of knowledge of the marine environment. The lack of experience and a
preference for land exploration and exploitation deter the decision
makers. This is particularly true of small entrepreneurs whose finan-
cial resources are too limited to permit risk-taking* Nevertheless, re-
gardless of the arguments and conflicting opinions, the submarine
phosphorite deposits seem to have potential economic value, the eco-
nomic exploitation of which is only a matter of time.
40 Overall, op. clt, page 61.
M Ibid., page 60.
51 Political reasons also plagued the Jordanian phosphate indu°trv in its China market.
When Jordan voted with the West against seating the People's Republic of China at the
U N. China retaliated Immediately by closing its market for Jordan's phosphates.
471
MANGANESE NODULES
Manganese is used as an additive metal in the manufacture of steel
to reduce its brittleness. It seldom costs more than 5 cents per pound
and is, therefore, much cheaper than other additives that can perform
its functions. Steelmaking accounts for more than 95 per cent of manga-
nese consumption. Although the United States is the major world con-
sumer, world consumption is expected to rise with the development
of steel plants in the emerging nations. The United States consumes
approximately one-seventh of the world's ore, importing 99 per cent
of its needs (35 per cent or more manganese content), with domestic
stocks enough for about six months. Domestic supplies are inadequate,
and low-grade recoverable ores are too expensive to process. Using
the cheapest of the tested processes, and allowing for further techno-
logical progress, it would cost the United States about $1 extra per ton
of steel to turn either to domestic deposits or to slags for manganese.62
The extent of world manganese reserves is not known; however,
they are so large and high-grade that at the present rate of consumption
they can be considered virtually unlimited. This is the reason for the
assertion that submarine manganese nodules can be mined profitably
for their minor constituents, particularly copper, nickel, and cobalt.
The average high-grade nodules contain 35 per cent manganese, 2.3
per cent copper, 1.9 per cent nickel, and 0.2 per cent cobalt (see Table
X). Brooks used the percentages 35, 2, 2, and 0.5, respectively.53 One
ton of such nodules, he estimated, contains 700 pounds of manganese,
10 pounds of cobalt, 40 pounds of nickel, and 40 pounds of copper. The
average 1970 market prices of these components were:54 manga-
nese, 2.5 cents per pound ; cobalt, $2.20 ; nickel, $1.30 ; and copper, 60
TABLE X.— RESERVES OF METALS IN MANGANESE NODULES OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN
U.S. rate of
Rate of
consumption
accumulation
Ratio of
Amount
Reserves in ,
Approximate
Ratio of
of element
of element
rate of
Ratio of
of element
nodules at
world land
reserves
in 1960
in nodules
accumula-
world
in nodules
consumption
rate of 1960
reserves
in nodules/
(millions of
(millions of
tion rate/ of consumption/
(billions
of element
reserves
tons per
tons per
U.S.
U.S.
Element
of tons)'
(years)2
(years) 3
on land
year) «
year) consumption
consumption
Magnesium.
. 25.0
600, 000
JL .
0.04
0.18
4.5
2.5
Aluminum...
. 43.0
20, 000
100
200
2.0
.30
.15
2.0
Titanium
9.9
2, 000, 000
L .
.30
.069
.23
4.0
Vanadium...
.8
400, 000
L .
.002
.0056
2.8
4.0
Manganese. .
. 358.0
400, 000
100
4,000
.8
2.5
3.0
8.0
Iron
. 207.0
2,000
8 500
4
100.0
1.4
.01
2.5
Cobalt
5.2
200, 000
40
5,000
.008
.036
4.5
2.0
Nickel
. 14.7
150, 000
100
1,500
.11
.102
1.0
3.0
Copper
. 7.9
6,000
40
150
1.2
.055
.05
4.0
Zinc
.7
1,000
100
10
.9
.0048
.005
3.5
Gallium
.015
150 000
.0001
.0001
1.0
93
100, 000
30, 000
100
1 000
.0013
.0065
5.0
Molybdenum
.77
500
60
.025
.0054
.2
2.0
Silver
.001
100
100
1
.006
.00003
.005
Lead
1.3
1,000
40
50
1.0
.009
.0009
2.5
1 All tonnages in metric units.
1 Amount available in the noduhs divided by the consumption rate.
3 Calculated as the element in metric tons. I "
< Calculated as the element in metric tons.
3 Calculated as the element in metric tons. (U.S. Bureau of Mines, Staff, 1956.)
by th
.(U.S
s Present reserves so large as to be essentially unlimited at present rates of consumption.
1 Including deposits of iron that are at present considered marginal.
Source: From Mero, op. cit., page 278.
52 David B. Brooks. "Low-Grade and Nonconventlonal Sources of Manganese." (Balti-
more, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
68 Ibid., page 103.
» Commodity Data Summaries (January 1971), pages 38, 42, 88, and 102.
472
cents per pound. Thus the gross value of one ton of manganese nodules
is $115 (at 1963 prices, Brooks estimated $83 per ton. with a range
bet ween $45 and $100, depending on variation in composition) .
The amount to be mined will have an immediate effect on the cur-
rent prices. Mero 55 estimated that if an operation were designed to
mine an average grade of the nodules to produce 100 per cent of the
U.S. consumption of nickel, that operation would also produce about
300 per cent of its annual consumption of manganese, 200 per cent of
that of cobalt, 100 per cent of that of titanium, 300 per cent of that of
vanadium, and about 500 per cent of that of zirconium. This sort of
calculation has been repeated by Francis L. LeQue who assumed a
nodule composition of 30 per cent manganese, 1 per cent nickel, 0.75
per cent copper, and 0.25 per cent cobalt. If 100 per cent of the world's
copper needs were filled from such a source, there would also be pro-
duced 133 times the world consumption of cobalt and 15 times the
world consumption of nickel.56
These calculations, however, did not take into consideration the
gross returns and the effects of massive mining on current prices.
Brooks, using his 3S/2/2/.5 percentages again,57 estimated that 2,000 to
5,000 tons of nodules mined per day would drop manganese prices
from 90 cents to 50 cents per unit. At this price several of the large
African and South American producers could continue to operate,
but Indian mines and most smaller producers would probably be
forced out of the market. The ton of rich ore that was valued at $83
drops below $64. There would follow an annual decrease in profits from
$26 million to $14 million (production rate 2,000 tons per day), and
from $65 million to $36 (at 5,000 tons per day ) .
Regardless of the arguments for or against mining submarine man-
ganese nodules, there is general agreement that these nodules are a
tremendous potential resource. Brooks concluded that :
Though the claims for the returns from deep sea raining of manganese nodules
have been exaggerated, this by no means eliminates them as possible manganese
sources. To the contrary, it is my conclusion that they are the only alternative
source that is likely to be developed in the middle-terra future.68
Commercial Reco rery of Offnliore Petroleum
The origin and occurrence of petroleum and the reservoir para-
meters requisite to its accumulation were described in an earlier sec-
tion. In the pursuit of oil and gas, the first step is to search for it.
Geological exploration is followed by exploratory drilling to see if
the structures discovered actually contain commercially producible
oil. If they do, the next stage is the development or exploitation.
EXPLORATION
In the search for oil, exploration techniques employ a variety
of sophisticated equipment necessary for geophysical investigations.
Modern echo sounding and seismic equipment are capable of recording
the profile of the sea floor and the shapes of the underlying sedimen-
tary strata. These devices vary with the type of work to he performed
•"■'• Mero, op. cit., page 279,
P« Quoted by Ocean Science News (June \-. 1!»7<>> from a presentation by LeQue al the
Marine Technology Society meeting, similar calculations were submitted by LeQue at the
Conference at Dltchley Park, September 26 '-'it, 1969. (See: K. R. Simmonds. "The He-
. lL. i\ i,..i ■• , ,«..•«.. i r. 1 «7 *
sources <»f the Ocean Bed," (1969), pages i:>-17.)
rT Hrooks, op. cit., pane 106.
"•Ibid., pages 100-107.
473
and the desired resolution, accuracy, depth, and areal extent. Data
are interpreted with the aid of computers, and computerized oper-
ations are becoming routine.
The geophysical survey is of no practical use if the structure dis-
covered under water cannot be returned to, located, and occupied for
drilling and development. The location of potential and actual drill-
ing sites is becoming progressively more dependent on geodetic posi-
tioning techniques as the oil industry moves farther offshore. The
fluid nature of the surface element — the superjacent water — com-
pounds this difficulty. To solve this problem, several methods have
been developed to use satellites directly as control for surveys at sea.59
DRILLING
A major element in the exploration for petroleum is the exploratory
drilling that follows the geophysical work. This drilling determines
the economic value of the discovery. A structure that has all the ele-
ments requisite for the accumulation of hydrocarbons may, when
drilled, produce a dry hole; hence the old saying among oilmen that
"oil is where you rind it."
Offshore drilling equipment is a direct descendent of equipment
for land drilling, with adaptation to the marine environment. The
basic rig (including derrick, kelley, rotary table, blowout preventor,
drill pipe, bit, and casing) is used from several types of platforms.
There are fixed platforms constructed on piles driven securely into
the ocean floor. Most fixed platforms have a maximum efficiency in
waters less than 300 feet deep, with more recent designs reaching
600 feet. A second stage of evolution is the semi-fixed platform
designed to rest on the sea floor while drilling; when drilling is
finished, the platform is refloated and moved to another site. The
design that employs the jack-up concept is the most versatile and
most common among offshore platforms. The third type is the floating
platform. Floating platforms are far less costly for exploratory drill-
ing than the fixed or semi-fixed platforms. They also have the added
advantage of capability in much deeper water. The basic concept is
that of a conventional rig in the center of a ship or barge modified to
perform the task. Recent drill vessels can operate without being
anchored, by dynamic positioning over the drill site.
Although exploratory drilling has been conducted mostly in depths
less than 1,000 feet, and completion of producing wells in less than
300 feet, further advances in both technologies are imminent. A
wildcat for a commercial well was recently drilled from a drill barge
off Santa Barbara, California, for Humble Oil Company (Tract 322)
59 Alton B. Moody. "Geodesy and oil exploration.'' In "Papers from the Technical Con-
ference of the American Society of Photbgrammetry — American Congress on Surveying
and Mapping, October 7-10, 1970." (Denver, Colorado), pages 301-312. Moody states that
as operations extended seaward beyond the range of visual observations, shore-based radio
systems were pressed into service, such as shoran, Raydist, lorac, and Decca, which are
still widely used. These, however, suffer from a number of limitations, including propaga-
tion problems, geometry, limited range, logistics, and political difficulties. Errors vary from
500 meters to 100 meters (roughly 1,700 to 330 feet) in locating a position. The most
sophisticated system thus far developed is now in operational use by the Western Geo-
physical Company of America. It consists of a satellite receiver, Doppler sonar equip-
ment, an inertial navigator, and various ancillary equipment. Post analysis of data Per-
mits determination of the position of the vessel during the survey to an accuracy of about
150 feet on the continental shelf, and with an error about 10 per cent larger in deeper
water. Thus, the system exceeds the accuracy requirements specified for oil exploration
at sea.
(See also: Alton B. Moody and W. A. Knox. "Geodetic position-finding at sea and the
search for oil." Surveying and Mapping (December 1970), pages 581-591.)
474
in 1,500 feet of water, in the vicinity of a prolific strike (Humble/Stan-
cal Tract 325) in 1,050 feet of water. Humble Oil has also announced
plans to install a 60-well platform for drilling and production in TOO
feet of water in the Santa Barbara Channel. With exploratory drill-
ing it is easier to achieve added depth capability than with pro-
duction drilling, because once the hole is drilled no more equipment is
needed as in the production wells. Reentry is a basic requirement in
drilling for petroleum. At certain intervals, when the bit wears out,
a new bit has to replace the old bit. In order to accomplish this, the
whole pipe length in the hole has to be withdrawn, the old bit is
replaced, and the drill string is reintroduced into the hole. Guidance
back into the hole is hard to achieve in deep waters.
In research drilling, no reentry into the hole is required. This is
why the Glomar Challenger was able to drill and core in 11,720 feet
of water on Sigsbee Knolls, and later set a record in the North Atlantic,
drilling 2,759 feet below the ocean floor in 16,316 feet of water. Power-
ing about 4 miles of drillpipe from a floating vessel is no small feat!
However, as evidence of the rapid development in drilling technology,
a breakthrough was achieved by the Glomar Challenger when, on
June 14, 1970, a deep-water hole was successfully reentered. The crew
changed the worn-out bit and succeeded in finding and reentering the
hole in 10,000 feet of water. Several months later, a similar operation
was successfully completed in 13,000 feet of water; the bit wore out
after drilling 2,300 feet into the sea floor, was changed and reentered
into the same hole to drill 200 additional feet. Reentry was accom-
plished with the aid of a high-resolution scanning sonar system looking
through the drill bit and guiding it into a funnel-shaped receiving
cone mounted on the ocean floor, and a system for steering the drill pipe
toward the cone. This achievement heralded a new era in offshore
technology, but only for* drilling, not for production. The aim, how-
ever, is production— a challenge more formidable though not insur-
mountable.
PRODUCTION
Following successful and promising exploratory drilling, a well is
completed and equipped for production. Production requires the
installation of a well head, a valve complex often called the "christmas
tree," flow lines to move the oil to the separators, separators to separate
the gas from the oil, and pipelines to transfer the products to storage
tanks and refineries.
Some of this equipment is installed on platforms above water at
shallow depths to about 300 feet, and on the ocean floor in deeper
waters. There are problems of installation, production, and servicing.
The last is a major activity which is performed periodically through-
out the life of the well. Oil well ancillary services involve a number
of complicated activities often critically limited by water depth. One
such activity includes the services of divers, underwater submersibles,
and the attending support vessels and equipment.
The majority of above-water production facilities is effective for
wells in waters no deeper than 340 feet, although new designs have
pushed this limit to twice the depth. As water depth increases, how-
ever, drilling costs increase drastically. In the Gulf of .Mexico, for
example, the cost tor exist ing plat forms rises from $1.5 million in 100
475
feet of water to $4 million in 350 feet, and an expected $12 million in
600 feet.00
The cost of drilling and completing a platform well rises from
$200,000 in 100 feet of water to $425,000 in 350 feet. Adding a share
of the platform cost, the cost of drilling and completing a 12,000-foot
underwater exploratory well is $550,000 in 100 feet of water. When
projected to 600 and 1,000 feet of water the cost rises to $990,000 and
$1.10(1.000, respectively.
As petroleum operations are conducted in progressively deeper
water, they require more and more sophisticated equipment. Remote
control devices are an emerging necessity. Such refinements add sig-
nificantly to the cost of recovery. One very important factor in under-
water operations is the mobility and overall efficiency of divers. The
deepest working dive on record was to 700 feet, and laboratory simu-
lated dives have exceeded 1,700 feet. In April 1970, divers from the
British Royal Navy succeeded in making a "dry dive" to 1,500 feet.
Later in 1970, two French divers participating in project Physalie 5
made a record dive to more than 1,700 feet. The project is aiming
at depths close to 2,000 feet.
Saturation diving capabilities have been extended at a rate of
approximately 125 feet per year during the past six or seven years,
but diver capability will probably be limited for the foreseeable future
to less than 1,500 feet. Furthermore, new drilling and completion sys-
tems have been developed to minimize the need for divers.
FUTURE TRENDS
It is hard to keep up with the speed at which the offshore oil tech-
nology is advancing; what is postulated as an artist's conception
today may become a working model by the time these words appear
in print. As water depth increases, it becomes necessary to abandon
above- water platform equipment and resort to bottom installation and
production systems.
Underwater wellheads to control the flow of oil or gas from a well
have been installed in numerous locations around the world, some
connected directly to shore facilities. An interesting concept in pro-
ducing oil and gas in deep water is represented by WODECO's under-
water sphere for drilling and production.61 This sphere includes a
shirt-sleeve environment at a submerged depth of 150 feet (25-pound
pressure per square inch), wellheads, separating, metering, and pump-
ing equipment. It is designed to be effective in water depths exceed-
ing the 1,300 feet which is the oil industry's immediate target for
operating depths.62
40 John L. Kennedy. "Offshore-rig construction costs will continue to climb." The Oil
and Gas Journal (March 16, 1970), pages 136-140. Recent Federal changes in offshore
regulations (expanded OCS Order No. 8) require safety and anti-pollution equipment
which is believed by the oil industry to increase production costs about $150 million.
Annual pollution control expenditures by petroleum companies in the United States
totalled $271.4 million for 1966, $357.9 million for 1967, and $381.6 for 1968. ("An
interim report on current key issues relating to environmental conservation — the oil
and gas industries." Prepared by the National Petroleum Council's Committee on Environ-
mental Conservation — The Oil and Gas Industries. ( Jun^ 22, 1970), page 5.)
61 Western Offshore Drilling and Exploration Co. (Fluor Drilling Services, Inc.). The
company's project manager indicated that the concept is still under development, and
has undergone changes in design. Its use depends on favorable conditions other than
technology.
92 This target depth is directly related to known resources in the California offshore
fields, which illustrates the influence of discovery on the push for technological develop-
ment.
476
A similar spherical habitat has been tested as part of a proto-
type seabed oil production system designed by Lockheed Offshore
Petroleum Systems (Fig. 3). The manned capsule (Fig. 4) is designed
for a one-atmosphere environment at depths of 1,200 feet, and the
whole system can be extended to 2,000 feet. The system includes well-
head cell a re, pipeline assembly, manifold center on the sea floor, and
gathering lines that carry the petroleum either to subsea storage or
directly to surface separators.
Figure 3. — Conceptual design of an underwater petroleum production system. The
system involves construction and emplacement on the ocean floor of man-rated
pressure hulls containing normal oilfield components. Components are serviced
by manned capsule (see Fig. 4). Adapted from material supplied by Lockheed
Petroleum Services, Ltd., British Columbia, Canada.
Separators are systems that separate the gas from the oil to facili-
tate pumping the oil to storage facilities ashore or to mooring tankers.
The most recent application of a subsea production system was under-
taken by the Dubai Petroleum Company in the Arabian Gulf (Fig.
5).63 In 1960 the storage-tank. Khazzan Dubai No. 1, was placed on the
sea floor 58 miles from shore, and in 1970 the first self-setting oil/gas
83 The need for this subsea production system arose following the discovery in June 19C>fi
of the Pateh Field about GO miles off the shore of Dubai. To develop this field, the com-
pany would have had to lay pipeline .ill the way to shore for storage then lay more pipe
lines back from shore storage facilities to reach water 10 miles offshore lieep enough to
accommodate tankers for loading. The whole production system was exhibited at the
oeennoiogv International 1969 exh'b'l Th« storage tank vas emnlaeed in August of thai
year. It was hullt al 0 COSt of about $7 million by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company.
In April ior.9, British Petroleum Company Ltd. r personal communication] was planning to
tevt n limited subsea product ion scheme Involving an oil and gas separation unit on the
-. abed elsewhere In the Arabian Gulf. This separator was emplaced in August 1970 on well
No. .■'.i'. with all processing equipment resting on the sea floor. The separator started proc-
essing crude oil initially at 5,000 barrels per day, separating oil and gas. measuring them,
and discharging t'e oil Into a pinpllne to shore. This development illustrates further the
speed with which petroleum technology is advancing from the conceptual stage to the
operational stage.
477
Figure 4. — Service capsule (Top sphere) being lowered to couple with well-
head cellar (Bottom sphere) encapsulating production equipment. The service
capsule provides transportation from the surface to the ocean floor, and con-
tains life support and oilfield equipment. The one-atmosphere, shirt-sleeve en-
vironment eliminates the need for highly specialized diving personnel and
support facilities. Photo courtesy of Lockheed Petroleum Services, Ltd., British
Columbia, Canada.
separator was successfully emplaced on the sea floor in the Zakum
Field near Das Island, under 75 feet of water.
These are only a few of the many approaches to the development of
technology for the recovery of offshore petroleum. To minimize re-
liance on divers added emphasis is being given to the design and use
of submersibles. Submersibles have been used in underwater oilfield
478
Figure 5. — Artist's impression of offshore oilfield development showing under-
water production, separation, and storage systems. Photo courtesy of British
Petroleum Company, Ltd. (1969).
operations, and offer a potential to perform at virtually unlimited
depths. It is estimated that technological capabilities for production
will be achieved within five years to the same depths of 1,300 or 1,500
feet already within the capabilities of exploration drilling. Even before
the middle of this decade it is expected that the Glomar Challenger will
be able to obtain a seabed core 5,000 feet long in 30,000 of water.
Beyond the mid-seventies and toward the end of this decade, a total
of 500 offshore drilling rigs are expected to be in operation around the
world. Technology will have reached the point at which the water
depth is no longer the determining factor. Factors of economic and
political feasibility will then play the decisive role in formulating
policy for offshore exploration and exploitation.
SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The "free world" consumption of liquid petroleum for 1069 totaled
37,192,(MM) barrels per day (b/d), representing an increase in demand
by 8.4 per cent over the previous year.0' During the first nine months
of 1070 it exceeded 40 million barrels per day (mb/d). a growth of
more than !» per cent. For the United States the demand for oil re-
corded a 5 pci- cent increase ; toe t he rest of the ''free world" the demand
growth was almost 12 per cent.68 Projections for the 1980s indicate
that, at an average rate of growth of 7 per cent annually, world eon-
•» Richard C. Sparlinp. Norma J. Anderson, and John G. Winger, "Capital Investment
of the World Petroleum Industry — 1969," (The Chase Manhattan Bank, December 1970),
pages 2, 19.
"John D. Kmerson. "The Petro'enm Situation In October 1970," Energy Division, The
Chase Manhattan Bank (November 30, 1970), pages 2-3.
479
sumption of oil will be nearly four times that of today, and the use
of petroleum gas will increase as much as five times in the same
period.66
Against this demand, world production is variously estimated at
between 34.4 mb/d and 41.3 mb/d.67 Offshore production accounts
for 16-18 per cent of the world's total. Weeks has predicted that by
1978 an offshore daily yield of 23 mb/d is expected, representing 33
per cent of a world total of 70 mb/d. He also estimated that proved
world oil reserves total 425 billion barrels, which would last at least
through this century. Moreover, the ultimate world potential of all
resources offshore totals 1,600 billion barrels. For comparison, ultimate
world potential of comparable resources on land was estimated at
4,000 biH ion barrels.
Despite this enormous land potential, the oil industry is vigorously
delving into the offshore fields. Current investments in offshore opera-
tions were reported by the Department of the Interior to be nearly
$20 billion. Investment is expected to increase at the rate of $3 billion
annually, reaching a total of $50 billion by 1980. Estimates given by
L. G. Weeks show a "probable total upward of $25 billion" up to
1968, expected to reach $50 billion by 1978.
Operations on land are generally less costly than those offshore.
More costs are added to offshore operations as the new consciousness
of environmental concern gains momentum. Hazards of offshore oper-
ations include those encountered in land operations, aggravated fur-
ther by the marine environment, plus a new breed of hazards peculiar
to the underwater world. Safety and anti-pollution requirements have
already added a heavy burden on the industry's outlays, and more
stringent regulations will add further to the spiralling costs of pene-
tration into deeper water.08
Although exploration expenditures offshore are less than those for
land, drilling and production make up for this margin. Technological
innovations often tend to be glamorous, and their novelty tends to
overshadow and supersede older and more reliable technology. In the
words of Eduardo J. Guzman:
There are many examples in the world of these premature adventurous off-
shore campaigns involving the use of costly geophysical methods where less ex-
pensive exploration approaches still could yield considerable success in the
discovery of new reserves. This worldwide trend is not new in the history of
exploration. It has happened repeatedly even within the United States, where
every new method or tool has tended to displace all other previous ones, and
usually at higher operating costs. * * * Marine or offshore exploration, particu-
larly involving seismic work, is easier, faster, and cheaper than almost any
98 Lewis G. Weeks, "The gas, oil and sulfur potentials of the sea," Ocean Industry (June
1968), page 43. Of this world consumption, the communist countries take 16—17 per
cent. In the first quarter of 1971 (as reported in the Oil & Gas Journal, May 31, 1971,
page 18). the communist production averaged 7,874 mb/d.
87 Weeks, op. cit., put current (1968) production at 35.3 mb/d ; The Oil and Gas Journal
(December 29, 1969), page 95, estimated the 1969 production at 41,266,100 b/d ; and
The Chase Manhattan Bank (Sparling, et al., op. cit., page 95), gave the figure of
34,390,000 b/d for crude oil production for the "free world." J. D. Moody gives a "best
guess" for 1990 as 9S mb/d. ("Petroleum demands of future decades." American Associa-
tion of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin (December 1970), pages 2239-2249.) Figures as
of June 1970. More recently (June 14, 1971), Weeks was reported to have revised his
estimates to a world production of 43 mb/d, of which the offshore production represented
17 per cent (Ocean Weekly Report), while Larry Auldrldge (Oil & Gas Journal, May 31,
1971) forecasts world production to average 50 mb/d for 1971.
88 See footnote 59.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 32
480
method on land, but we tend to forget that offshore drilling and production-are
several times more expensive."0*
Besides exploration, one is further faced with the following factors:
— Skyrocketing costs of lease sales and bonuses, particularly in
the Tinted States ($000 million each in Santa Barbara Channel
and Gulf of Mexico in 1968, and the December 1970 sale of $S50
million in the Gulf of Mexico) ;
— Higher overall costs for offshore operations;
— Projected increase in future expenditures toward deeper
water;
— Higher costs eventually passed on to the consumer; and
— Offshore hazards like blowouts, fires, and oil spills increasing
in frequency and magnitude.
The question is: Has the industry exhausted land resources? The an-
swer of course is No. The land potential of 4,000 billion barrels of oil
estimated by Weeks does not include the vast amounts of synthetic
petroleum in bituminous rocks such as oil shales and tar sands. The
U.S. Bureau of Mines (Information Circular 8425) estimates that the
Green River Formation oil shales contain '2 trillion barrels of oil : 800
billion barrels at 15 gallons of oil for a ton of shale, and about 50C
billion barrels at 25 gallons of oil per ton of shale are considered prac-
tically exploitable. The proved recoverable reserves alone are about
four times the total proved U.S. petroleum reserves.70 The develop-
ment of these deposits, as Weeks put it, has been caught in ''the polit-
ical jungle that has invaded the outlook, and which is partly respon-
sible for the lack of progress in this field."' He also adds: "Perhaps
the petroleum industry on its part has not supplied the kind of ener-
getic and particularly united leadership required in dealing with gov-
ernment." 71
Other than oil shale, there are still greater amounts of potential
synthetic oil and gas in coal. It is estimated that the world has enough
coal to last 1,500 years. Then there are tar sands, nuclear power sup-
plemented in time* by the virtually inexhaustible fast breeder reactor,
and other land sources of energy (possibly even fusion) which will be
eventually developed and become competitive with oil and gas. There
are also those regions on land that have not been explored, and new
discoveries like the Alaska North Slope are not to be ruled out. Some
scientists believe that a very high percentage of the land surface is stili
unexplored and is considered potentially promising.
The oil industry contends that despite higher initial investment, the
development of an offshore field eventually reduces offshore costs. Off-
shore platforms can drill 50-60 wells from one location; oil accumula-
tions in younger strata offshore provide greater yields and higher sue-
m Kduardo J. Guzman. "Are sophisticated exploration methods the awwer?" In Vir-
ginia S. Cameron. ed. "Exnloratlon and Economies of tlie Petroleum Industry: New Ideas,
New Methods, Sew Developments." (10C>9). papes 21-22.
70 Several countries are already exploiting Mieir oil shale deposits. At the 1970 Inter-
national Gns Conference in Moscow the USSR revealed that improved minlnp and
mechanized handling methods hive pushed Soviet oil shale output beyond 22 million tony
per ve-r (Oil -ml Gns International (September 1070). p>pe 117). Australia also has
announced a new project to begin production in 1074 from its vast oil shale reserves: the
reserves Indicate a field life of 50 years. In the L'nited States, about 80 billion barrels of
oil from the more accessible hlcll grade deposits Of the Central Rocky Mountains can be
considered available with demonstrated methods of extraction, and at costs approaching
the present-day costs of petroleum of comparable quality.
71 Weeks op. eit. pipe 46. See also: Chris Welles. "The Elusive Bonnnza : The Story
of Oil Shale." (Dut'ton, 1970), 236 pages.
481
cess ratios. When distributed over the entire operation, these costs are
expected to be eventually lowered to reasonable and acceptable levels.
V. Policy for Seabed Resources
Given the abundant resources of the seabed and the challenges they
present, especially to the dynamic petroleum industry, what are the
implications of tliis situation for national policy and international di-
plomacy ? Before entering the complex issues of global agreements for
apportionment of the ocean's resources, some considerations of U.S.
national interests and policy should be reviewed.
Policy For Submarine Mining
A foremost consideration, present in all mining operations, is the
necessity for maintaining an approximate balance of supply against
demand. A prime economic characteristic of all minerals, except those
that are scarce and precious, is their price sensitivity. Although sup-
ply may be elastic, demand is not. The housewife does not buy an
extra tank of oil, and the steel mill does not double its order for man-
ganese merely because the supply is plentiful. This characteristic is of
particular signilicance for projects to mine the seabed or drill into it
for oil. The Ingher initial cost of such operations needs to be evaluated
against the possibility of a fall in prices such as would make the entire
operation uneconomical after heavy capital investments have been
poured into it.
Moreover, the disruptive effect of severe price fluctuations would
extend far beyond the extractive industry directly involved. On the
other hand, if it turned out that submarine mining was a lower-cost
operation, the impact would be no less severe on conventional mining
operations. The problem of over production, even of one component,
would be analogous to a free import policy without safeguarding the lo-
cal industry. Prices would go down, mining centers on land would
close down, and whole communities might have to migrate in quest
of livelihood elsewhere. As submarine mining wyould immediately re-
late to coastal areas, populations from inland would seek the already
overpopulated coastal areas. Land, housing, equipment, business, and
all such related activities left behind wrould feel the impact.
The fact that seabed deposits are being researched and seriously con-
sidered is enough to influence business decisions and put a firm ceiling
on the long-run price of manganese, cobalt and nickel. If deep-sea
mining becomes a reality, future prices could well be lower than to-
day's, and certainly would not exceed production costs.
The many unknowns surrounding offshore mining are a source of
uncertainty causing decision-makers to prefer land operations. Re-
search dollars are directed by generally conservative mining com-
panies toward more familiar and less risky land applications. Several
mining economists believe that the high investment in the research
and development of deep-sea mining will exclude most mining com-
panies. They maintain that such development will come from larger,
non-mining companies such as the oil and aerospace industries, or
from consortia of several small companies- This is also the thinking
behind the future production envisioned by Deepsea Ventures, Inc.,
following its successful mining operation in 1970. The risk, the high
482
capital investment, the unknowns, and the lack of experience in the
marine environment will deter the small entrepreneur from ventur-
ing into the deep-sea operations.
Another deterrent stems from a source totally non-technical and
non-economic; that is the legal uncertainties. Most essential and
fundamental to efficient mining practice is the exclusive right of the
discoverer to exploit the minerals discovered and the security of
tenure while he does so. The deep-sea operations of the future are in
off-shore areas undefined and undecided in proprietary and jurisdic-
tional terms. Who owns the ore body that has been found far out in
the middle of the ocean? Many companies have suffered from legal
problems on land, and the failure of the world community to agree
to an ocean regime is a serious deterrent to ocean mining ventures.
In the final analysis, it is the consensus that deep-sea mineral de-
posits are substantial and that they form a great potential resource.
Once a substantially rich deposit is found, the technology to exploit
it is likely to be developed promptly — much sooner than anticipated.
A rich deposit and successful and profitable operation are enough to
dissipate the doubts and overcome the deterrents now gripping the
industry. The outlook is one of cautious optimism, but a legal regime
must be established and international agreements effected before the
mining industry ventures into the ocean deeps.
Policy for Offshore Petroleum
All considerations of present and future technological develop-
ments indicate that penetration into the deep-sea basins is only a
matter of time. The capabilities that are not available today are cer-
tainly a short distance away. The question that is asked then is:
Does technology justify expansion ? Tn other words, just because the
industry has the capability to do something, must it do it?
Certain inescapable and uncontestable facts cannot be ignored :
(1) Petroleum is the basis of numerous activities, products, and needs
throughout the world. (2) An increasing demand for petroleum prod-
ucts follows the increase in population, trends toward urbanization,
and the rapid industrialization of developing nations. (3) The nu-
merous organizations engaged in petroleum activities and their an-
cillary services are organizations that, in the process of making profit,
invest, generate, and circulate vast amounts of money which may
shaoe the economies and politics of communities and even nations.
Regardless of the policies and arguments for or against, the rapid
expansion into the seabed, a few facts are clear: (1) Offshore opera-
tions are likely to continue at an ever-increasing pace. (2) Hazards of
offshore operations are inevitable but not unavoidable, and damage
to the environment may be long-lasting or irreversible. (3) Present
and future technology is capable of providing the needed petroleum
and at the same time, preserving the environment. (4) Numerous other
enterprises besides the oil industry are engaged in activities using
coastal waters.
On the international scene, many countries are plunging head-
long into offshore exploitation with inadequate understanding of
the disastrous hazards to their waters and shores, and often
disregarding principles of safety and pollution abatement. Most of
these nations have only one aim : The immediate returns and revenues
483
for industrialization. This is understandable. But whether such rapid
industrialization is a sound policy for the management of the re-
sources of "Spaceship Earth," or whether, instead, the developing
nations should carefully evaluate it and beware of the fate to which
it might lead, should be a matter of meticulous international assess-
ment and decision-making. The developing nations have the op-
portunity to witness the results of experiments already performed
for them by the developed nations, and lessons they can learn before
the fact. Nevertheless, it is also understandable that petroleum com-
panies operating for these nations should find the lack of restraints
less costly, more profitable, less restrictive, and the cause of fewer
headaches than similar operations off the shores of developed states.
The question must be raised about the responsibility of those organ-
izations for adopting their own self-policing methods and educating
the developing nations in the necessity of preserving the environment
for their own good and for the ultimate benefit of all mankind.
There is no reason to believe that technologically the industry
cannot conduct its business and preserve the ocean ecology in a system
of mutual benefit. The ocean has become the focus of man's attention
and hope, not merely for its mineral and petroleum resources, but
more so for its increasing importance as a source of food, a possible
future habitat, and a major source of the Earth's weather systems and
their life-giving processes. There are other tenants using the con-
tinental shelf, and their joint activities need to be mutually com-
patible.72
One point of view is that land resource exploitation deserves first
priority; it may be in the ultimate interest of all mankind to pursue
the land areas and explore their subsurface thoroughly, leaving the
ocean as clean as possible for as long as possible. Until the continents
7J In a publication entitled "Petroleum, Drilling and Leasing on the Outer Continental
Shelf — A Summary," (May 1966, page 20), the Department of the Interior describes the
other tenants of the continental shelf regions as follows :
"One of the singular aspects of the Offshore Louisiana situation is that the oil industry
has enjoyed extensive and largely undisturbed use of the area for over a decade, during
which time it has put up over a thousand permanent structures which would in varying
degrees interfere with other uses of the shelf, the overlying sea, and the air above it. This
was possible to do because by and large, and almost fortuitously, no other prospective
tenants asserted a significant need to use the area for their own purposes.
"This is not to say that operators have not had trouble with merchantmen and fishing
boats bumping into their platforms, (the frequency is increasing) or by having ships'
anchors dragged over their pipelines. These difficulties are of a historic nature and a large
body of navigational law and practice has been evolved to enable the traditional users of
the sea to share its benefits with the least amount of damage to everyone.
"What Is unique about the present situation is that of the 200,000-plus square miles of
Continental Shelf and sea area adjacent to the United States, that portion off the coast
of Louisiana is the only part that has experienced significant drilling activity, and it is
also the on.y part that is not almost completely claim-staked by other users. Around the
entire length of the remaining coastline, there is scarcely a square mile that is not
being used for some purpose and usually for more than one purpose. The chief tenant
is the Department of Defense, but not in every case. There are bombing and gunnery
ranges, test and calibration ranges, carrier operating areas, submarine operating
areas, torpedo firing ranges, transit lanes, and vast and complicated underwater sound
surveillance systems tied to each other and to the shore by a network of cables. On the
Atlantic and Pacific Coasts there are also a great many more commercial shipping routes
than in the Gulf, and the number of clear days is measurably less. There are commercial
cables, oyster beds, and fishing shoals to be considered and a growing number of privately
owned submersible craft operating in the relatively shallow waters above the shelf. More-
over, beauty-conscious dwellers along the shore are acutely sensitive to the spectacle of
oil rigs working offshore at any point within their range of sight. And because the entire
area is already in use, the entry of a new tenant cannot be easily accommodated because
of the "domino effect" produced upon adjacent areas. Therefore, as oil activity on the
Continental Shelf expands into these areas, oil men and their government lessors are likely
to be faced with problems of a kind and dimension they have never really encountered
before. Their resolution will take much patient negotiating, and a large measure of
tolerance by all parties. The Continental Shelf and the sea and air above it may give the
appearance of being spacious and emDty, when in fact they are not. Far from being empty,
the Shelf deserves to be called our Crowded Frontier."
484
are thoroughly explored and their resources exhausted, according to
this view, there seems little justification for stampeding to invade
the ocean domain, perhaps to cause irreparable damage to its ecology.
In the balance of compatible uses of this environment, the demand
and the profits have to be carefully and conscientiously weighed
against the damage to ecology and the ultimate cost to reclaim it.
General Policy for Seabed ResoiLrces
The previous section on the technology and economics of offshore
exploitation reveals two distinct situations, one involving the hard
minerals and the other involving offshore petroleum. For hard min-
erals there is cautious optimism which calls for a policy of encourage-
ment toward the ocean domain, although the technology and eco-
nomics may not justify deep-sea mining in the near future, and certain
other deterrents may hinder the process of decision-making by the
mining industry.
In the case of the petroleum industry, the present abundance of its
product is reassuring. Underwater technology is advancing at a very
rapid pace, pushing the industry into offshore development at increas-
ing costs in most phases of operation. Land resources are still plentiful
and relatively less costly; American national security appears in no
grave danger, now or in the foreseeable future; and the hazards of
offshore operations are becoming a major cause for concern on the
national and international levels. There are also numerous other ten-
ants who utilize the ocean domain and demand equity and compat-
ibility in the diverse uses of this environment. All these factors seem
to call for a deliberate and cautious program of offshore exploitation,
encompassing a carefully protracted advance within an established
sequence of priorities and an acceptable framework of jurisdiction on
the national and international levels.
This go-slow policy is particularly crucial for the continental shelf
because technological development there is progressing at a speed that
has already rendered obsolete the definition of jurisdictional limits, le-
gal or otherwise. It is conceded that development will be confined, for
some time to come, to the continental shelf areas, and that progress into
the deep sea is not imminent. However, the confusion created by the
Geneva Conventions, particularly the exploitability clause, invites
review; definitive political boundaries are needed for the seaward
limit of national jurisdictions. Beyond this limit, the deep sea areas
would then l>e confirmed as the common domain of the community of
nations. Whatever regime is suggested for this international deep-sea
domain is subject to legal considerations and international approval,
but the issue is not as urgent as is the delineation of national jurisdic-
tions at this time.
VI. International Concern
The rapid advances in the acquisition of scientific data, and the
spectacular development of technological capabilities to exploit the
ocean domain, commercially and militarily, have compelled a general
awareness of the potential of the oceans in living and non-living
resources. Countries throughout the world have come to recognize the
importance of this domain, and there is at least some indication of a
trend toward a policy of leaving it free from national domination.
485
More than two-thirds of the planet Earth is at stake, and the theme
is to explore and exploit its resources for the benefit of all mankind.
The basic attitude is sound and desirable. How to implement it to
the satisfaction of all nations is, however, a complex issue of legal,
technical, economic, and political problems.
In October 1965, before the U.N. Economic and Financial Commit-
tee, Ambassador James Roosevelt urged cooperation for undersea ex-
ploration. "It is not too early for this Committee," said Ambassador
Roosevelt, "to start dreaming and thinking exciting thoughts about
the role the U.N. can take. In saying this, I am not unaware that this
organization has already demonstrated a sensitivity to the fact that
no one nation can hope to attack the many problems posed by the
ocean and that a large enough attack can be launched only if all the
nations cooperate."
In 1066, President Johnson said :
Under no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the prospect of rich
harvest and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among
the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold
the lands under the high seas. We must insure that the deep seas and the ocean
bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings.'3
Senator Frank Church carried this reasoning further in 1967 by
urging an international agreement to confer title on the United Na-
tions to mineral resources on the ocean floor beyond the continental
shelf. The agreement he envisioned would regulate the development
of these resources and "might not only remove a coming cause of inter-
national friction, but also endow the United Nations with a source for
substantial revenue in the future." 74
The World Peace Through Law Conference, held on July 13, 1967,
by 2,500 lawyers from 100 countries, adopted a resolution urging a
proclamation declaring that the resources of the high seas beyond the
continental shelf appertain to the United Nations. The Conference
had two broad objectives : The efficient exploitation of the sea for the
benefit of all, including private entrepreneurs, and improvement of
the lot of mankind as a whole.
The United Nations, however, had already become involved in
ocean affairs, although the main impetus toward internationaliza-
tion of the seabed began in earnest in 1967, following a proposal by
the Malta delegation (discussed under a separate heading) to reserve
the seabed for peaceful uses and use its resources for the benefit of all
mankind.
Organizations for Marine Activities
International bodies and mechanisms for promoting and coordi-
nating marine activities among the participating nations are divided
into two major groups: Non-governmental and intergovernmental.
In 1968, the United Nations Economic and Social Council submitted
a report, to the Secretary General which contained a detailed survey
of existing mechanisms for the promotion and coordination of marine
73 Speech given at the commissioning of the research ship Oceanographer, at the Wash-
ington Navy Yard on July 13, 1966.
74 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "The United Nations at
Twenty-one." Report by Senator Frank Church, 90th Congress, 1st session. (Washington,
Government Printing Office, February 1967), page 25.
486
activities at the international level.75 The principal non-governmental
organizations were contained within the framework of the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). The intergovernmental
organizations were for the most part within the United Nations sys-
tem, although some tended to maintain considerable independence. A
third category included bodies to coordinate the work of international
organizations within each of the two groups.
Non-Governmental Organizations
The non-governmental organizations engaged in marine activities
can be grouped into two groups, the largest of which is the Inter-
national Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) ; the others are more
or less informal bodies such as associations of regional extent.
ICSU consists of a number of unions classified according to scien-
tific disciplines, and of several special and scientific committees con-
cerned with interdisciplinary problems. The unions having major in-
terests in marine sciences are :
1. International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG)
2. International Union of Biological Sciences (TUBS)
3. International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS)
ICSU committees concerned witli marine sciences are :
1. Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR)
2. Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR)
3. Special Committee for the International Biological Pro-
gram (SCIBP)
4. Federation of Astronomical and Geophysical Services
(FAGS)
5. Comite international de geophysique (CIG)
The other non-governmental international organizations are :
1. International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natu-
ral Resources (IUCN)
2. Nordic Council for Marine Biology
3. Congress of Baltic Oceanographers
4. Pacific Science Association (PSA)
5. Mediterranean Association for Marine Biologv and Ocean -
ology (MAMBO)
In tergovernmental Organizations
Organizations that promote and coordinate marine-related activities
on the intergovernmental level are primarily within the United Nations
system. As with the non-go vernment a 1 bodies, the non-United Nations
intergovernmental bodies are confined mainly to specific regions, and
are generally concerned with fisheries and living resources.
The United Nations system and its specialized bodies have always
conducted activities in marine affairs, particularly in the scientific and
exploratory aspects of oceanography, and in the fisheries and living
resources of the oceans. Most of these activities are interrelated, and
the U.N. bodies concerned with international programs also receive
advice from non-governmental organizations, particularly ICSU.
At the present time, the issue of the seabed is the concern of the Com-
mitter on the Seabed, reporting directly to the General Assembly
(Fig. 6).
"United Nations Economic and Social Council. "Marine Science and Technology:
Survey and Proposals." (United Nations, New York, April 24, 1968), pages 50-59 and
Annex X (UNESC, E/4487).
487
United Nations Bodies with Responsibilities in the Marine Sciences r
SPECIALIZED
AGENCIES
WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION
UNION
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
MARITIME CONSULT
ATIVE ORGANIZATION
INTERNATIONAL BANK
-FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT
UNESCO
FOOD ANO
AGRICULTURAL
ORGANIZATION
ECONOMIC AXU
SOCIAL COINCII.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
U.N. DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM
U.N.
CHILDREN'S FUND
ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR ASIA
AND THE FAR EAST
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
OCEANOGRAPHIC
COMMISSION
FISHERIES
COMMITTEE
WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION
COMMISSION ON
MARITIME METEOROLOGY
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
U.N. CONFERENCE
ON TRADE
ANO DEVELOPMENT
SHIPPING
COMMITTEE
INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION
U.N SECRETARIAT
RESOURCE AND
TRANSPORT OIV.
COMMITTEE
ON THE SEABED
•From: Marine Science Affairs — A year of Plans and Progress. The second report of the President to the Congress on marine resources
and engineering development. March 1968. p. 24.
Figure 6. — United Nations bodies with responsibilities in the marine sciences.
One of the more active arms of the United Nations is the UN Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The UN-
ESCO program is concerned with stimulating and coordinating basic
oceanic research and associated scientific work throughout the world,
and with providing technical assistance in oceanography to the de-
veloping countries. The work involves large numbers of scientists and
experts in the diverse fields of oceanography on an international scale.
Marine science programs are conducted by UNESCO's Office of
Oceanography, which also serves as secretariat for the Intergovern-
mental Oceanographic Commission (IOC).
The desire of the participating scientists and the oceanographic com-
munity at large in involving the support of governments for world-
wide cooperation resulted in the establishment of the IOC in 1960.
This occurred as a direct outcome of experiences gained during the In-
ternational Geophysical Year. Since then, the IOC has been actively
coordinating major oceanographic expeditions on a global basis, such
as the International Indian Ocean Expedition, the Cooperative In-
vestigations of the Mediterranean, and the International Decade of
Ocean Exploration.
The Food and Agriculture Organization established in 1961 an Ad-
visory Committee on Marine Resources Research manned by another
group of scientists and experts concerned with all aspects of ocean
fisheries. The sea /air interface is the target of extensive research and
observation networks coordinated by the World Meteorological Orga-
nization on a global basis. The International Atomic Energy Agency
has an acknowledged competence in the field related to discharge or
release of radioactive materials in the sea, and the Inter-go vernmen-
488
tal Maritime Consultative Organization has an international responsi-
bility to prevent and control oil pollution in the sea through the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil. IMCO is also concerned with the safety aspects of ships, drill
rigs, buoys, and other such platforms at sea.
All United Nations organizations coordinate their programs through
the Subcommittee on Marine Science and its Applications, of the Ad-
ministrative Committee on Coordination, which reports to the Eco-
nomic and Social Council.
Although intergovernmental organizations other than those within
the United Nations system are mainly regional in their extent, one
exception, The International Hydrographic Organization, has world-
wide interests in (and limited to) hydrography and associated prob-
lems of tides and sea level. Its interest in the sea floor is also restricted
to its relation to bathymetry. Regional organizations include the In-
ternational Council for the Exploration of the Sea, which is concerned
with the North Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas, and the International
Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea.
Both of these organizations cooperate with IOC in coordinating re-
search in their respective areas.
VII. U.N. Activities Concerning Seabed Resources
The decade of the 1960's marked a worldwide recognition of the
potential of seabed resources. The United Nations was the obvious
forum for expressing concern over these resources. The General
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council came to recognize
that exploration and exploitation of seabed resources should be carried
out for the benefit of mankind, particularly toward satisfying the needs
of the developing nations. Several resolutions were adopted and de-
cisions made in matters related to seabed resources, with the aim of
promoting and facilitating their effective development through co-
ordinated international cooperation.
United Nations activities prior to the 1960's were described earlier,
in the discussion on the 1958 Geneva Conventions, particularly con-
cerning the continental shelf. Concerning ocean resources beyond the
continental shelf, the Economic and Social Council passed a resolution
[1112(XL) on non-agricultural resources. March 7, 1966] requesting
the Secretary General —
(a) To make a survey of the present state of knowledge of these
resources of the sea, beyond the continental shelf, and of the tech-
niques for exploiting these resources, in co-ordination with those
already made by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization and other specialized agencies and those
being prepared;
(b) As part of that survey, to attempt to identify those re-
sources now considered to be capable of economic exploitation,
especially for the benefit of developing countries ;
(<?) To identify any gaps in available knowledge which merit
early attention by virtue of their importance to the development
of ocean resources, and of the praCf icality of their early exploita-
tion.
489
The General Assembly endorsed Resolution 1112 (XL) in a new
resolution [2172 (XXI) : Resources of the sea. Dec. 6, 1966], and fur-
ther requested the Secretary General —
1. To undertake, in addition to the survey requested by the
Economic and Social Council, a comprehensive survey of activi-
ties in marine science and technology, including that relating to
mineral resources development, undertaken by members of the
United Nations family of organizations, various Member States
and intergovernmental organizations concerned, and by universi-
ties, scientific and technological institutions and other interested
organizations;
2. * * * in the light of the above-mentioned survey, to formulate
proposals for —
(a) Ensuring the most effective arrangements for an ex-
panded programme of international co-operation to assist in
a better understanding of the marine environment through
science and in the exploitation and development of marine
resources, with due regard to the conservation of fish stocks;
(b) Initiating and strengthening marine education and
training programmes, bearing in mind the close interrelation-
ship between marine and other sciences ;
3. To set up a small group of experts to be selected, as far
as possible, from the specialized agencies and intergovernmental
organizations concerned, to assist him in the preparation of the
comprehensive survey called for in paragraph [1] above and in
the formulation of the proposals referred to in paragraph [2]
above.
The survey and proposals were to be submitted to the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development
for its comments, and then, together with the comments, to the General
Assembly at its twenty-third session (1968), through the Economic
and Social Council.
Emergence of the Malta Proposal
While those two reports were being prepared, the Permanent Mis-
sion of Malta to the United Nations submitted a note verbale, dated
August 17, 1967, to the Secretary General, proposing the inclusion in
the agenda of the twenty-second session (1967) of the General Assem-
bly an item entitled "Declaration and treaty concerning the reserva-
tion exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea -bed and of the ocean
floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national juris-
diction, and the use of their resources in the interest of mankind." 76
In the memorandum which accompanied the note verbale, the Malta
proposal pointed out that the seabed and ocean floor beyond the ter-
ritorial waters and the continental shelves had not yet been appro-
priated for national use because of their inaccessibility, and because
their use for defense purposes or economic development had not been
technologically feasible. However, the memorandum recognized the
rapid progress in technological developments, particularly by the ad-
vanced countries. This progress, it was felt, would cause the seabed to
79 "Malta : request for the Inclusion of a supplementary Item In the agenda of the
twenty -second session." (New York, United Nations. August 18, 1967). (U.N. Document
A/6695.)
490
become progressively and competitively subject to national appropria-
tion. National appropriation would, in turn, result in the militariza-
tion of the accessible ocean floor through the establishment of fixed
military installations and in the exploitation and depletion of re-
sources of immense potential benefit to the world, for the national ad-
vantage of the technologically developed countries.
It was, therefore, considered timely — the memorandum continued —
to declare the seabed and the ocean floor a "common heritage of man-
kind." Accordingly, immediate steps should be taken to draft a treaty
embodying the following principles :
(a) The sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas be-
yond the limits of present national jurisdiction, are not subject
to national appropriation in any manner whatsoever :
(b) The exploration of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, under-
lying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction,
shall be undertaken in a manner consistent with the Principles
and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) The use of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor, * * * and their
economic exploitation shall be undertaken with the aim of safe-
guarding the interests of mankind. The net financial benefits de-
rived from the use and exploitation of the sea-bed and of the
ocean floor shall be used primarily to promote the development of
poor countries ;
(d) The sea-bed and the ocean floor, * * * shall be reserved ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes in perpetuity.
The proposed treaty was envisaged to include the creation of an in-
ternational agency which would assume jurisdiction over the seabed;
regulate., supervise and control all activities thereon; and enforce the
principles and provisions of the treaty.
Item 92 of the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General
Assembly was entitled "Examination of the question of the reserva-
tion exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean
floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying t}le hio:]1 seas beyond the
limits of present national jurisdiction", and the use of their resources
in the interests of mankind."
On October 31, 1967, the Secretary General delivered a note (Docu-
ment A/C.l/952) in connection with this agenda item. He pointed
out that the consideration of this item might be facilitated and even
sharpened by distinguishing between (a) the question of peaceful use,
(b) the scientific activities, and (c) those of resources exploitation. He
referred to the studies called for by resolutions 111-2 (XL) and 2172
(XXI) and the progress that had been made in that direction. The
Secretary General explained that he had set up a small group of ex-
perts to assist him in carrying out the provisions of the resolutions.
The group was composed of representatives of the specialized agencies
concerned, and of private experts; it held its first meeting in June 1967
at Geneva. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic ( Jommission ( IOC)
of UNESCO adopted on October 27. 1967. a resolution establishing an
IOC working group on the legal questions related to scientific investi-
gations of the ocean.
In connection with these studies, the Secretary General's preliminary
work on the tasks outlined in the resolutions led him to the conclusion
491
that there were two major gaps in (a) the legal status of the deep sea
resources and (b) ways and means of ensuring that the exploitation
of these resources would benefit the developing countries. Those gaps
had been judged to cause possible delay in the progress of the studies.
As to item (b) , the Secretary General suggested the possibility of pre-
paring a more comprehensive report which would include "a study
of the legal framework which might be established for the deep sea
resources, the administrative machinery which may be necessary for
effective management and control, the possible system of licensing
and various possible arrangements for redistributing and/or utilizing
the funds which would be derived therefrom, including those ear-
marked for the benefit of the developing countries."
Organization of the U.N. Seabed Committee
An immediate outcome of the Malta proposal was resolution
2340 (XXII), dated Dec. 18, 1967, by which the General Assembly
created an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peace fid Uses of the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jwrisdiction.
The resolution recognized the extent and speed of developing tech-
nology, and that this technology was making the seabed and the ocean
floor accessible and exploitable for scientific, economic, military, and
other purposes. The Ad Hoc Committee was requested to prepare for
the twenty-third session of the General Assembly a study which would
include :
(a) A survey of the past and present activities of the United
Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy
Agency and other intergovernmental bodies with regard to the
sea-bed and the ocean floor, and of existing international agree-
ments concerning these areas ;
(b) An account of the scientific, technical, economic, legal, and
other aspects of this item ;
(c) An indication regarding practical means of promoting in-
ternational co-operation in the exploration, conservation and use
of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, as con-
templated in the title of the item, and of their resources, having
regard to the views expressed and the suggestions put forward
by Member States during the consideration of this item at the
twenty-second session of the General Assembly.
The Ad Hoc Committee was composed of 35 members and officers
were divided into two major groups to consider the requests of the
resolution. One was the Economic and Technical Working Group ; the
other the Legal Working Group. Numerous meetings were held during
1968 in three sessions ; it examined the scientific, economic, technical,
and legal aspects of the peaceful uses of the sea.
In February 1968, the report Resources of the Sea, requested by the
Economic and Social Council's resolution 1112 (XL), was submitted
for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee.77 Part One of the report
dealt with the mineral resources of the sea beyond the continental
77 "Resources of the Sea (Beyond the continental shelf)." Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral. (New York. United Nations. February 21, 1968.) (U.N. Economic and Social Council,
Document E/4449.) Part One: Mineral resources of the sea beyond the continental shelf,
E/4449 /Add. 1 ; Part Two : Food resources of the sea beyond the continental shelf ex-
cluding fish, E/4449/Add.2.
Part One was prepared jointly by Frank Wang, marine geologist of the U.S. Geological
Survey, and the United Nations Secretariat. Part Two was prepared by C. B. Idyll of the
Institute of Marine Sciences, University of Miami, Florida.
492
shelf, and Part Two dealt with food resources, excluding fish. The Ad
Hoc Committee also considered background papers prepared for it
by the Secretariat, the IOC, and other U.N. specialized agencies, and
the report on marine science and technology.78 Its final report reflected
emerging conflicts of interest and a heightened awareness of the tech-
nical and legal problems associated with exploiting the deep ocean
floor. Earlier anxieties over the seabed resources and expectations
of early and large returns from the riches of the seabed became tem-
pered with realism.
When the General Assembly convened in the fall of 1968, it re-
viewed the Committee report and decided to give the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee permanent status. In a series of resolutions, 2467 A-D (XXIII)
adopted Dec. 21, 1968, the General Assemblv established a standing
committee— the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, composed
of 42 member states. The Committee was instructed to —
(a) Study the elaboration of the legal principles and norms
which would promote international co-operation in the explora-
tion and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and to ensure
the exploitation of their resources for the benefit of mankind,
and the economic and other requirements which such a regime
should satisfy in order to meet the interests of humanity as a
whole ;
(b) Study the ways and means of promoting the exploitation
and use of the resources of this area, and of international co-
operation to that end, taking into account the foreseeable de-
velopment of technology and the economic implications of such
exploitation and bearing in mind the fact that such exploitation
should benefit mankind as a whole ;
(c) Review the studies carried out in the field of exploration
and research in this area and aimed at intensifying international
co-operation and stimulating the exchange and widest possible
dissemination of scientific knowledge on the subject ;
(d) Examine proposed measures of co-operation to be adopted
by the international community in order to prevent the marine
pollution which may result from the exploration and exploitation
of the resources of this area.
The rest of this series of resolutions dealt with each of the requests
individually: (B) Prevention of Pollution, (C) Study of Interna-
tional Machinery, and (D) Expanded Cooperation and an Interna-
tional Decade of Ocean Exploration, respectively. These resolutions
had been ©©sponsored by the United States, and the International
Decade of Ocean Exploration was originally proposed by the United
States. However, on the question of establishing international ma-
chinery to promote exploration and exploitation of seabed resources
and their use, the United States considered the Committee proposal
premature and < here fore abstained.
Since the establishment of the standing Committee on the Seabed,
the United Nations has been actively pursuing ocean affairs in the area
of scientific and technological research, disarmament, and the establish-
~H "Marino Science and Technnlocy : Survey and Proposals." (New York, United Nations,
April 24, 1968). (Document UNESC E/4487.)
493
ment of an international regime for the resources of the seabed. This
intensified effort has been matched by activities of the IOC to enable
it to serve as focal point for coordinating international marine science
activities, in cooperation with other international organizations, and
with U.S. participation.
In 1969, the Seabed Committee established a Legal Subcommittee
and an Economic and Technical Subcommittee, which met several
times and reported their deliberations and findings to the Committee.
LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE
The Legal Subcommittee was assigned the task of studying the
elaboration of legal principles and norms (as described in operative
paragraph 2(a) of resolution 2467 A (XXIII) ) which would promote
international cooperation in the exploration and use of the seabed and
the ocean floor, and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and ensure the exploitation of resources for the benefit
of mankind, having regard to the economic and other requirements
which such a regime should satisfy in order to meet the interests of
humanity as a whole. It was also asked to examine the legal impli-
cations of all other questions mentioned in the terms of the resolution,
and the reports submitted by the Secretary General pursuant to reso-
lution 2467 B, C, & D (XXIII) and 2414 (XXIII).
The Subcommittee's deliberations centered around the drafting of a
declaration of principles, taking into consideration principles of the
Antarctic Treaty, and the concept of "common heritage of mankind."
The delegations argued these points at length, but owing to the insuffi-
ciency of time the Subcommittee decided to postpone consideration of
other items until future sessions.
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEE
The Economic and Technical Subcommittee was asked to consider
the following topics :
1. Economic and technical requirements which such a regime
as is referred to in operative paragraph 2(a) of resolution 2467 A
(XXIII) should satisfy in order to meet the interest of humanity
as a whole.
2. Operative paragraph 2(b) of the resolution — to study the
ways and means of promoting the exploitation and use of the
resources of this area, and of international cooperation to that
end, taking into account the foreseeable development of tech-
nology and the economic implications of such exploitation should
benefit mankind as a whole.
3. Economic and technical implications of —
(a) all other questions mentioned in the terms of reference
of the Committee as contained in resolution 2467A (XXIII) ;
and
(b) the reports submitted by the Secretary General pur-
suant to resolutions 2467B,C,&D( XXIII) and 2414 (XXIII).
The Subcommittee found that little change had taken place in tech-
nological development since the submission of the report on the
Resources of the Sea particularly in the mining techniques. Explora-
494
tion and exploitation of petroleum, on the other hand, were progress-
ing at an increasing pace. Industry was becoming increasingly aware
of the vast mineral deposits contained in the ocean floor, which could
in the future become technically and economically exploitable.
The report of the Subcommittee recognized the lack of basic docu-
ments— geological, topographical and geophysical, etc. — which were
needed to identify areas favorable for the occurrence of various min-
erals and to appraise their potential. The report urged international
cooperation in collecting these data and recommended that the devel-
oping countries should become more involved in their participation in
such projects.
INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY
The Subcommittee considered extensively the report of the Secre-
tary General, which suggested possible functions and forms of inter-
national machinery.79 The functions and powers would include regis-
tration, licensing, operation by an international agency, and the settle-
ment of disputes.
One function which international machinery could fulfill would be
to provide a system of registration whereby States or other applicants
could notify an international body of the activities undertaken or
proposed, and of the area in which they would be conducted. The
committee found that the main feature of the numerous proposals put
forward by governments for licensing was that title or control of sea-
bed resources would be held by the international community, repre-
sented by the international authority, which would issue licenses to
individual operators. For operations on the seabed, an international
body would be established which would exercise its functions in one or
a combination of ways: The agency itself might carry out direct ex-
ploration and exploitation operations, with its own staff and facilities;
it might arrange for others to perform these operations on its behalf
by a system of service contracts or possibly by issuing licenses ; or joint
ventures could be undertaken with other bodies, such as government
enterprises or international consortia. It was also suggested that inter-
national machinery could be established to provide a means for the
settlement of disputes arising out of the development of seabed re-
sources.
The proposed functions might be carried out by various forms of
international machinery. Possible forms identified in the report in-
cluded:
1. A secretariat center or unit which might be established within
an existing organization, such as the Center for Development
Planning, Projections and Policies; the Center for Housing,
Building and Planning; and the Center for Industrial Develop-
ment.
2. A United Nations subsidiary organ, such as the U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development (TNCTAD) ; the U.N. Chil-
dren's Fund (UNICEF) ; and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near Fast (UNRWA).
70 United Nations. Secretary General. "Study on the question of establishing in due
time appropriate International machinery for the promotion of the exploration and ex-
ploitation of the resources of the Beabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and the use of these resources In the interests of mankind." (United Nations,
New York). (A/AC.138/12.)
495
3. A United Nations subsidiary organ performing functions
under treaties such as the bodies concerned with narcotic drugs
and the Office of the U.N. Higli Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR).
4. An international organization established by treaty, enjoy-
ing an independent legal status, such as the United Nations itself
and the specialized agencies.
The Economic and Technical Subcommittee found the report of the
Secretary General a useful basis for deliberation, and concluded that
of the three functions considered (licensing, registry, and operational
agency) the first two had been covered in an overall comprehensive
manner. The question of an organization to perform these functions
was discussed extensively, but the consensus was that the whole sub-
ject of international machinery needed to be considered simultane-
ously with the legal regime, and that such problems as definitions of
the limits of the area and the authority of the agency should be con-
sidered further.
The General Assembly then passed resolutions for the continuation
of the activities of the Seabed Committee, concentrating on three
major issues:
1. Ascertaining member views on convening Law of the Sea
Conference to update the Geneva Conventions — resolution 2574A
(XXIV);
2. Requesting the U.N. Seabed Committee to prepare seabed
principles and rules for exploitation of seabed resources — reso-
lution 2574B (XXIV) ;
3. Requesting a further study on international machinery —
resolution 2574C (XXIV).
Another resolution was passed (2574D (XXIV)) calling for a
moratorium on exploitation of seabed resources pending establish-
ment of an international regime.
VIII. U.S. Participation in International Ocean Activities
The formulation of ocean policy in the United States is a complex
process which involves Federal agencies in the Executive Branch,
congressional committees, and other non-Federal and academic orga-
nizations. Each one of these bodies contributes a share toward the
evolution of U.S. policy, and their individual positions on major
issues are not necessarily similar. In order to understand these com-
plexities, it is necessary to indentify the organizational structure of the
policymaking apparatus and to review the positions taken by the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the U.S. Government. "
U.S. Policy Apparatus for Seabed Issues
The building of a consensus on marine affairs through studies, ex-
pert testimony, and expressions of opinion is a function of several con-
gressional committees. This is usually the formative stage in the
process of establishing facts and formulating policy guidelines to
assist the Executive Branch in its tasks. In the Executive Branch, the
policy apparatus includes the National Council on Marine Resources
and Engineering Development ; the Commission on Marine Science,
Engineering, and Resources; the Committee on International Policy in
the Marine Environment; and the existing Interagency Law-of-the-
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 33
496
Sea Task Force under the Department of State. Outside the Federal
Government, assistance is also provided by the National Academy
of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
In the Legislative Branch, numerous committees and subcommittees
are involved, either directly or indirectly, with ocean-related activities.
Committees directly concerned with the outer continental shelf and
the international aspects of ocean affairs are the following :
In the House of Representatives :
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Move-
ments
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments
Subcommittee on State Department Organization and For-
eign Operations
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine
Subcommittee on Oceanography
In the Senate:
Committee on Commerce
Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere
Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf
The Senate Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere, chaired by
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, was formerly the Subcommittee on Ocean-
ography which was created as the Special Study on United Nations
Suboceanic Land Policy. The Subcommittee on Oceans and Interna-
tional Environment was formerly the Subcommittee on Ocean Space,
created also in the 91st Congress to consider the major aspects of the
ocean space issue, including the military, economic, scientific, .and
legal, interacting to form the international issue before the United
Nations. It is chaired by Senator Claiborne Pell, and the Special Sub-
committee on Outer Continental Shelf was chaired by Senator Lee
Metcalf. All three Subcommittees were established in 1969 and held
hearings on issues related to the United Nations and the seabed.
In matters of scientific and technological nature, advice and assist-
ance for the formulation of policy are provided to the Committee staff
and Members by the staff of the Science Policy Research Division of
the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, which
wascreated forthat purpose in 1964.
COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT
In June of 1966, Congress passed the Marine Resources and Engi-
neering Development Act, which became Public Law 89 l.vi. estab-
lishing policies and objectives for the U.S. effort to develop the
Nation's marine resources. It also provided for the establishment of
a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment under the chairmanship of the Vice President.
497
The duties and responsibilities of the Council were outlined in detail
in the Act, and represented a wide-ranging mandate over the total
national program in oceanography. The Council advised and assisted
the President in carrying out his responsibilities under the Act, These
included evaluation of Federal marine sciences activities, the develop-
ment of a comprehensive program, the establishment of long-range
studies, coordination of a program of international cooperation, and
guidance for sea-grant-program policies.
The staff of the Council was composed of specialists in ocean
sciences, engineering, national security affairs, economics, foreign af-
fairs, and public administration. It maintained working relations
with the Congress, key officials of the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, Federal and State agencies, industry, the academic community,
and professional societies to insure that considerations affecting all
marine science interests were brought to the attention of the Council.
COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND RESOURCES
To complement the role of the Council, the Act provided for an
independent advisory Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering,
and Resources. The Commission was made up of 15 members from
Federal and State Governments, industry, laboratories and other
marine science institutions. Four members of Congress served as ad-
visors to the Commission.
The Commission was charged with the responsibility to "make a
comprehensive investigation and study of all aspects of marine science
in order to recommend an overall plan for an adequate national ocean-
ographic program that will meet the present and future national
needs." The findings of the Commission would then be submitted to
the President, and the Council would assist the President in evaluating
and reviewing the Commission's findings. Thereafter, the Commission
would disband, and the Council's authority would be terminated 120
days after the submission of the Commission's report.
The Commission's report, entitled "Our Nation and the Sea", was
submitted in January 1969. Some of its recommendations concerning
international affairs in the marine environment will be discussed later.
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY IN THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT
As the Marine Council began to coordinate the Federal marine af-
fairs, it created several committees and panels, one of which was the
Committee on International Policy in the Marine Environment (Fig.
7). This committee was responsible for U.S. foreign policy pertaining
to the marine environment ; international activities and initiatives per-
taining to the marine environment, including cooperation by the
United States with other nations and participation in international
organizations and meetings. The committee, chaired by the Deputy
Under Secretary of State, established a special working group
to handle the problem of the U.N. proposals and the U.S. position.
This working group consisted of representatives from the Depart-
ments of State, Interior, Commerce, Defense, and Transportation, and
the National Science Foundation.
498
MRINE SCIENCE AFFAIRS m the FEDERAL fflmMEHT
XtKMSiocur ] JQfcJ .--J
TOE CONGRESS
PANEL ON
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
PANEL ON
DOMESTIC
LAW
aWMUMEDMgMJlCHMWefMSKYIKTl QHM. THE VICE PBESIDEM
NATIONAL COUNCIL
ON MARJNE RESOURCES
$EN&IME£RING OEVEL'T
!U
(final e&ver)
r
COMM ON INTERNATIONAL
POLICY IN THE MARINE SCIENCES
UOIFtDHliB Kru/stcYsiAir
PANEL ON
NATIONAL SECURITY
PANEL ON
US RE6I0NAL
fUlCIESt PROGRAMS
PANEL ON
INTERNATL SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH* EIPLOR/
EXPLOITATION OF
MINERAL RESOURCES
COMM ON OCEAN EtfLORATlffl
£ ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
am k t v j.- :Tf unin essa
COMM ON MARINE RESEA-
RCH.EDUCATIOMJFACILmES
«< re e s toscu u\'ud)
PANEL ON
UVIH& RESOURCES
PANEL ON
OCEAN ENGINEERS
rl
PANEL ON
POLUTION IN THE
!0C£AN ENVIRONMENT
PANEL ON
EDUCATION
PANEL ON
COOPEEATION IN
TOE USE OF »)&'.',»
SIBliS t OTHER
AD'/A'ICEO WIPER-
WATER TECHNOLOGY
SUB PANEL ON
FACILITIES
I
COUll ON MULTIPLE
USES OF COAST! ME
T_
C0.VM ON TOO
FROM THE SEA
QUI u J w/gtB,AID
PANEL ON
RESEARCH
PANEL ON IHTERNATl
FEOSUMS* INTERNA!!
COOPERATIVE
0R6ANIZAT10NS
JOINT PANEL
CMREF/lCAS
ON AIR SEA
INTERACTION
SUS PAN EL ON
SCIENTIFIC RESEA'H
X
SUB PANELON
EXPIOR/EXPIOIT
PRESIDENTS COMMISSION
OH MAM SCIENCE.
INGNEW* SOURCES
INTERNATIO.VAL
ASPECTS OF MARINE
AFFAIRS
BASIC SCIENCE
i EESEARCH
MARINE ENGINEERING
i TECHN0LO6Y
■{MARINE RESOURCES |
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS
INDUSTRIAL i
PRIVATE DEVELDPWEXT
EDUCATION I
TEAMING
Figure 7. — Organizational chart showing the relationships within the
Federal Government for decisionmaking in marine affairs (1967).
INTERAGENCY LAW-OF-THE-SEA TASK FORCE
One of the major recommendations presented in the Marine Com-
mission's report called for the establishment of a Federal agency to
unify the national effort in marine affairs, and a non-Federal body
called the National Advisory Committee on the Oceans and Atmos-
phere (NACOA).
While the Executive Branch was weighing these recommendations,
the Congress extended the life of the Council to preserve its coordinat-
ing functions. In October 1970, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) was established in the Department of Com-
merce, but NOAA did not receive as wide a range of functions as the
Commission recommended. Still pending are bills in both the House
and the Senate to establish the other body — NACOA. And although
numerous ocean activities remained outside the NOAA which would
require coordination functions similar to those the Council had been
Serforming, the Council was not funded for 1971 and is considered
efunct. Its Committee on International Policy in the Marine Environ-
ment had not functioned during 1970, and a new body was formed to
take its place.
The new body is now the only policy apparatus responsible for form-
ulating the U.S. position regarding international marine affairs and
seabed resources. It is called the Interagency Law-of-the-Sea Task
Force, under the chairmanship of the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State (now John R. Stevenson). Its members include representa-
t ives from the Departments of Stat*', Commerce, Interior, Transporta-
tion, and Justice; and the National Science Foundation and the Na-
tional Security Council.
499
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Outside the Federal structure, the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) and the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), through
their committees on oceanography and ocean engineering, respectively,
have served as a source of scientific advice to Government agencies on
ocean affairs. Toward the end of 1970, the two Academies reorganized
their ocean policy structures, raising them to the board level. The
National Academy of Sciences' Ocean Affairs Board became admin-
istratively lodged in the National Research Council's Division of
Earth Sciences, replacing the Committee on Oceanography, and the
National Academy of Engineering redesignated its Committee on
Ocean Engineering as the NAE Marine Board. The NAS board is
concerned primarily with science-related ocean problems, and NAE
board with engineering-related problems. Appointees from both
boards make up a new ad hoc NAS-NAE ocean affairs planning group
to coordinate ocean studies and advisory services of both boards.
The NAS Ocean Science Affairs Board focuses on at least three
areas : Ocean sciences, ocean resources, and international marine sci-
ence affairs policy. In addition, the Board serves as the U.S. Com-
mittee for the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research of the Inter-
national Council of Scientific Unions.
The NAE Marine Board comprises panels which cover such func-
tional engineering areas as transportation, construction, resource de-
velopment, and instrumentation. It serves as the U.S. committee
for the Engineering Committee on Oceanic Resources, now affiliated
with the World Federation of Engineering Organizations.80
Formulation of U.S. Policy for the Seabed
LEGISLATIVE CONCERN IN THE 9 0TH CONGRESS
Reaction in the 90th Congress to the Malta proposal was immediate
in the face of imminent and possibly hasty action by the U.N. General
Assembly. About three dozen resolutions were introduced in the House
and the Senate, mostly in opposition to vesting control over the
deep ocean resources in the United Nations. House resolutions were
for the most part identical, expressing the sense of Congress that any
action at that time to vest control of deep ocean resources in an inter-
national body was premature and ill advised, and that the Congress
should memorialize the President to instruct the American represent-
atives to the United Nations to oppose any action to vest in the United
Nations control of the resources of the deep sea beyond the continental
shelves of the United States.
Hearings were held in the House by the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements,
in September and October 1967, and jointly with the Subcommittee on
Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries in June and July 1968.81 In the Senate, the Committee on
80News Report, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, National
Academy of Engineering. (Vol. XX, No. 9. November 1970.)
81 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. "The United Nations and the
Issue of Deep Ocean Resources ; interim report together with hearings." Held by the Sub-
committee on International Organizations and Movements of the * * * on H.J. Res. 816
and companion resolutions. Sept. 22, Oct. 10. 19, 25, and 31. 1967. 90th Cong., first sess.
H. Rept. No. 999. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 289 pages.
500
Foreign Relations held hearings on Senate resolutions submitted in
support of international control.82
House Support for the Malta Proposal
Witnesses testifying in the House included several Members of Con-
gress in support of their own resolutions, representatives of Federal
agencies directly involved with the U.N. issue, and several representa-
tives of private, legal, and industrial organizations.83 The Subcom-
mittee on International Organizations and Movements addressed itself
to the wording of the resolutions; the procedures used in arriving at
the U.S. Government's position on the pending legislation and the
Malta proposal; the operational marine programs of various U.S.
agencies; and to the complex legal, political, and economic considera-
tions involved in this legislation.
A number of witnesses who favored the Malta proposal identified
advantages that might be derived from international control, such
as : regulation of the depletion of mineral resources ; avoidance of an
anarchic rush to claim and exploit subsea reasources; reduced danger
of marine pollution (through proper international control) ; re-
duced threat of a military race to exploit strategic advantages of
submarine weapons placement; provision of an independent income
for the United Nations; and a general strengthening and maturity in
the U.N. itself, through the experience of administering the vast
area of the ocean floor.
Proposal for U.N. Marine Resources Agency
All the advantages mentioned above could be provided through a
specialized agency like a U.N. Marine Resources Agency. This agency
would "hold ownei-ship rights and grant, lease, or use these rights in
accordance with the principles of economic efficiency and the well-
being of mankind. It should distribute the returns from such exploita-
tion in accordance with the directives issued by the U.N. General
Assembly." 84
Concerning the establishment of an international or U.N. agency,
the Department of the Interior pointed out that the result would be
something comparable to what already exists in the Food and Agri-
culture Organization and to some extent in other organizations like
UNESCO (see Fig. 7). The agency would have responsibility for
coordinating exploration and research in the oceans along the same
lines as these other organizations; so that there would not be anything
new and different about it. By analogy with agricultural research, it
was suggested that multinational programs tend to disseminate useful
results more globally than do single-nation or bilateral research
programs.
U.N. agencies have primarily directed their attention to problems
of nations which have a low technical capacity of their own to carry
83 lis. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "Governing the Use of Ocean
Spar,.." Hearings on S.J. Res. in. S. Res. 172, and S. Res. 196. Held Nov. 29. I9f>7. 90th
Cong., first Bess. (Washington, U.S Government erinting Office, 1967), 71 pares.
MU.S, Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. "The Oceans: A Challenginc
New Frontier; a report together with hearings and additional documents and materials."
By Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. Hearings held June 12,
July '2~>. 1968. noth Cong, second Bess. H. Kept. No. 1957. (Washington, U.S. Government
rrintlng Office. 1968). 128 pages.
84 "The United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources • * *," op. cit., page 5.
501
on research. The agencies are also able to direct collective attention
to the acquisition of information which would help answTer interna-
tional problems of resources management. Those activities do not
lessen the need for any nation to carry on research activities in its
own interests.
Support and Opposition in the Senate
Although the majority of House resolutions opposed this approach,
the Senate resolutions introduced by Senator Claiborne Pell were
strongly in favor of international cooperation, including a "Declara-
tion of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Exploitation of Ocean Space." 85
Hearings were held before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations on S.J. Res. Ill, 172, and 186.86 S.J. Res. Ill was identical to the
House resolutions opposing the Malta proposal. It was described as
overstating the immediacy of the problem by addressing itself to a
danger which was not present. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Norris
Cotton, had no objection to the United Nations plowing the ground
and preparing the way in this matter of jurisdiction over the riches
of the sea. He said he wished Congress to become accessory before the
fact and not just after the fact :
As to the form of my resolution [he said], I would say very frankly to the
committee, that the first draft of this resolution was prepared for me by repre-
sentatives of the National Oceanographic Association. As far as I am concerned,
this matter in my resolution of directing the American representatives in the
United Nations to oppose action or to take any particular attitude, I think,
might well be deleted.67
Reasons for Opposition
The objections to any U.N. action stemmed primarily from fears that
the United States might be giving away some valuable assets and
rights the extent of which were not yet known. A hasty action to
relinquish these rights to the United Nations was deemed inadvisable.
Some Members of Congress considered the United Nations unquali-
fied to assume such broad responsibilities.88 Scientific exploration,
claimed some, could be seriously hampered by a premature definition
of political jurisdiction. The issue of national security was also in-
voked as an objection to any action that might not be compatible with
the military programs of the United States. One Member, Representa-
tive Paul Rogers of Florida, urged that for exploitation purposes the
United States should have the right to occupy the ocean floor to the
Mid-Atlantic Ridge and assume the responsibility to defend it.
The objections finally boiled down to the timing of a move to deter-
mine where sovereignty lay or to effect a transfer of sovereignty to the
United Nations. There were also certain misgivings expressed about
the validity of existing definitions of the continental shelf, and a desire
85 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. "Special Study on United Nations
Suboceanic Lands Policy." Hearings held Sept. 23, 24, Oct. 3, and Nov. 21, 1969 91st
Cong., first sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).
88 "Governing the Use of Ocean Space," hearings, op. cit.
87 "Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic Lands Policy," hearings, op. cit.
** Representative H. R. Gross stated : "Of course, I don't think the United Nations stands
for much of anything. It never has and probably never will, and that is one of the reasons
Yv. y £ d.on't want t0 sep anv authority in this matter vested in the United Nations." "In
the Lmted Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources.'' Op. cit, p 100
502
to clarify and review these definitions before any final actions were
contemplated.
Congressman Alton Lennon, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oceanography, reminded the Congress that studies were being con-
ducted by the Marine Council and the Commission on the best solu-
tion for controlling the exploitation of mineral resources from the
continental shelves. Consequently, he said, it was in the national inter-
est to wait for these studies to be completed "as keenest minds available
in international law and marine science study all aspects of this com-
plex problem in the hope that an equitable solution can be resolved for
all nations." 89
LEGISLATIVE CONCERN IN THE 9 1ST CONGRESS
As the 91st Congress convened, it had before it "Our Nation and the
Sea" — the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering,
and Resources presented to the President and to Congress on Janu-
ary 9, 1969.90 This report recognized the inadequacy of the present
framework for the continental shelf and the seabed beyond. It recom-
mended a precise definition of the continental shelf — a limit of each
coastal nation to be fixed at the 200-meter isobath, or 50 nautical miles
from the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea,
whichever alternative gave it the greater area. For the seabed beyond
these limits, the Commission proposed a new international legal-polit-
ical framework for exploration and exploitation of the mineral re-
sources underlying the deep seas. It proposed further the establish-
ment of an International Registry Authority, and an intermediate
zone between the limits of the continental shelf and the deep-sea area.
The intermediate zone would begin at the 200-meter isobath (or 50
nautical miles from the coast) seaward to the 2.500-meter isobath (or
100 nautical miles, whichever was farther from shore) . The report pro-
posed policy guidelines and goals for the United States to follow in
considering the needs to implement these recommendations.
The recommendations, the activities of nations on the U.N. Sea-
bed Committee, and an executive branch proposal concerning the sea-
bed submitted on August 3, 1970, raised a series of questions which
became the focus of attention by the 91st Congress. What were the
limits of the continental shelf? Should the limit be geological or legal?
Should it be. based on considerations of equity, security, or economic
advantage? How much did the United States stand to lose by the
creation of an international regime? Was a new Law of the Sea Con-
ference necessary? Should the states have a narrow or a wide conti-
nental shelf? For areas beyond the continental shelf, what sort of an
international regime would be best? What principles should be
adopted? What kind of international machinery should be estab-
lished? How did all these aspects affect the economy and national
security of t he I 'nited States?
A series of hearings in the Senate sought the answers to those ques-
tions. The. Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Ocean
Space, chaired by Senator Claiborne Pell, heard testimony on his S.
• "The United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocpnn Resources * * *." op. cit., page 08.
m Commission on Murine Science, Engineering, and Resources. "Our Nation and the So&."
Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. (Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1069.)
503
Res. 33, which proposed basic principles to govern the development
and utilization of the ocean space environment.91
The Committee on Commerce also held hearings through its Special
Study on United Nations Suboceanic Lands Policy, chaired by Sena-
tor Ernest F. Hollings. This study group was formed in July 1969 for
"* * * the purpose of considering the policy which the United States
should advocate within the United Nations when that organization
considers the ground rules which should apply to those nations which
desire to exploit the resources of the deep oceans." 92 The hearings were
intended to enable the Committee to make recommendations to Senator
Pell's Subcommittee and to the Senate. Senator Pell's Subcommittee
members and members of the newly formed Special Subcommittee on
Outer Continental Shelf, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
were invited to participate. Similar participation took place when the
Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf held its hearings,93
chaired by Senator Lee Metcalf .
The intent of the three sets of hearings was similar, and most of the
witnesses testified on the same subject before more than one subcom-
mittee. The Metcalf Subcommittee in particular compiled a volumi-
nous record of statements by representatives of the Departments of
State, Defense, Commerce, Interior, Transportation, the scientific and
industrial sectors, and numerous distinguished international lawyers.
The subject matter included legal and political aspects of the defini-
tion of the continental shelf boundaries, the economic and conserva-
tion aspects related to alternative boundary locations, comments on
the moratorium resolution and the interim policy for the seabed, and
the position of the Executive Branch regarding all these aspects. The
hearings were followed by a painstaking and thorough analysis of
findings in a subcommittee report which is discussed below. The hear-
ings of Senator Hollings' Special Study on United Nations Sub-
oceanic Lands Policy and those of Senator Pell's Subcommittee on
Ocean Space were less comprehensive and did not result in position
papers. Senator Pell took the same position as he had during the 90th
Congress and in testimony before the Metcalf Subcommittee.
Senator PelVs Proposals
In his Senate Resolution 33, Senator Pell submitted a "Declaration
of legal principles governing activities of states in the exploration
and exploitation of ocean space." These principles called for the use
of the seabed and subsoil for peaceful purposes only, under licenses
issued by a technically competent licensing authority to be designated
by the United Nations ; regulations on the disposal of radioactive waste
material in ocean space; the establishment of a Sea Guard^ under the
control of the U.N. Security Council ; and a definition of limits of
the continental shelves.
Although Senator Pell, in his testimony before the Metcalf Subcom-
mittee, upheld the recommendations made by the Marine Commission,
91 "Governing the Use of Ocean Space." hearings, op. cit.
92 "Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic Lands Policy," hearings, op. cit.
93 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. "Outer Continental
Shelf." Hearings by Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf. Parts 1, 2, and 3,
1969 and 1970. 91st Congress, first and second sessions. (Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970). (Part 3 contains the hearings continued by the Subcommittee on
Minerals, Materials, and Fuels on the same subject.)
504
the limits of the continental shelf proposed in his resolution differed
from those proposed by the Commission. He preferred the 550 meter
isobath or a distance of 50 nautical miles from the baselines used to
measure the breadth of the territorial sea, whichever gave the coastal
state a greater area offshore for purposes of mineral resources exploita-
tion. "I selected the 550-meter figure," he testified, "on the basis that
the edge of the Outer Continental Shelf is not known to occur at any
greater depth." 94 In effect this isobath encompasses the topographic
configuration of most of the world's shelves, to the greatest depth,
rather than to the average depth of 200 meters. Mr. Pell made a dis-
tinction between the "continental terrace" and the "continental shelf,"
that differed from the position of the oil industry of equating the two.
And here, Mr. Chairman, I mnst emphasize the shell game in which, I believe,
the oil industry has been engaged in the past few years : when you and I went to
school, continental shelf meant that portion of the submerged continental land
mass that is in relatively shallow water and terminates at the beginning of the
continental slope. The oil industry has thrown up a smoke screen by trying to
equate the continental shelf with the continental terrace concept, which includes
the slope.95
On how wide the national jurisdiction of a state should be offshore,
Mr. Pell favored the narrowest possible zone. If the United States
claimed a certain width, he argued, it should be assumed that other
nations would do likewise. "Thus the larger the offshore zone we con-
template bringing under our national jurisdiction means that on
balance we are closing off a much larger zone worldwide, assuming as
we must that other states would be entitled to claim a similar area." 96
Later in 1970, Senator Pell reiterated his support for the early
achievement of an international legal order in the ocean floor in his
comments on the President's proposal for a seabed regime :
I bring up this point, Mr. President, merely to show how an issue as important
as nuclear arms control can suffer because of the chaos nations have made of
the law of sea ; and here I should point out that in earlier years the United States
has been just as guilty in helping to create this sad state of affairs as Chile and
Ecuador or, more recently, Brazil and Canada.
But we now understand the error of our ways, and I am convinced that the
policy initiatives which this administration has taken in trying to bring about a
meaningful legal order of the oceans deserve the full support of everv Member of
this Chamber.07
Position of the Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf
A systematic analysis of the hearings was presented in the Metcalf
Subcommittee's report to the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs. o; The Subcommittee considered the 1958 Geneva Convention
validly operative, and saw no need to convene another Law of the Sea
Conference. It also considered the geological interpretation of the
continental margin as making that portion of the seabed essentially
property of the United States. The Subcommittee further indicated
its preference for the exploitability clause in the Convention which
B» Ibid., page 380.
03 Ibid., page 395.
"•Ibid., page 300.
97 Claiborne Pell. "Harrinp of nuclear weapons from the seabed and ocean floor." State-
ment of the Hon. Claiborne Pell on the floor of the Senate. Congressional Record (Septem-
ber 10. 1970), page S 15616.
m U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. "Outer Continental
Shelf." Report by the Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf. 91st Congress,
second session. December 21, 1970. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
505
expands the limits of the shelf depending on the technological capa-
bility to exploit in deeper waters — the principle of expanding
boundaries.
The Subcommittee first asserted its jurisdiction over policy issues
affecting the continental shelf of the United States. It cited the Interior
Committee's work on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, giving it the responsibility for legisla-
tive oversight of operations under that law and any subsequent amend-
ments of these Acts. Assuming that the shelf was an integral part of
the continental United States, and interpreting the Constitution (Art.
IV, sec. 3, cl. 2) concerning this issue, the Subcommittee declared that
any modification of the property rights of the United States created
by or reaffirmed in these Acts would require an Act of Congress.
The Subcommittee adopted the interpretation agreed upon by the
American Branch of the International Law Association that "right
[i.e., sovereignty] under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf [should] extend to the limit of exploitability existing
at any given time within an ultimate limit of adjacency which would
encompass the entire continental margin." " The Subcommittee sup-
ported the objectives calling for a stable system of law applying to the
deep seabed and assurance of the continued freedom for scientific
research ; however, it also held that —
* * * undisputed access to the vast energy resource [oil, in particular] located
on the U.S. continental margin is of paramount importance. Oil is a strategic mate-
rial which is absolutely essential to fuel our industrial machine and thereby sus-
tain a sound economy.100
As to the boundary limits of the shelf, the Subcommittee argued
against a narrow shelf and the premise of upholding the freedom of
the seas through larger internationally-controlled ocean space. It
upheld the Geneva Convention as "* * * sufficiently precise as to per-
mit a positive, reliable, and adequate interpretation of the breadth of
the legal shelf." It also interpreted the Convention to hold that "the
sovereign rights of coastal nations to explore and exploit their legal
Continental Shelf extend to the limit of exploitability existing at any
given time within an ultimate limit of adjacency which encompasses the
entire continental margin." 101 Furthermore, it contended that the
drafters of the Convention had limited the jurisdictional claims to the
natural resources of the submerged land in order to preclude any
abrogation of the high seas freedom. Hence, the expanding boundary
concept was "* * * consistent with the intent of the Convention's
drafters as it is an additional means of prohibiting jurisdictional
claims not related to the exploration and exploitation of the natural
resources of the submerged land continent." 102
On the new policy statement submitted by the President in May
1970, calling for a seabed treaty, an international authority, and the
renunciation of sovereign rights of all nations beyond the 200-meter
isobath, the Subcommittee endorsed the general features of the pro-
posal. However, it had objections to the renunciation of "the heart of
our sovereign rights," particularly relative to the continental margin.
89 Ibid., page 3.
100 Ibid., page 5.
101 Ibid., page 16.
103 Ibid., pages 16-17.
506
For the United States [asserted the Subcommittee], or any other law-abiding
naltion to offer to renounce its inherent sovereign rights to the mineral estate
of its continental margin in the hope that these few recalcitrant nations would
mend their ways and begin to adhere to the freedom of the seas doctrine is like
offering to pay ransom to bandits in order to encourage them to stop stealing.
When bandits* receive ransom, they only grab for more. Thus, to renounce what
constitutes the heart of our sovereign rights in response to illegal demands by
a handful of nations can only encourage greater violation of the freedom of the
seas doctrine.103
On resources of the seabed beyond the continental margin, the Sub-
committee shared with the President the desire that such ocean re-
sources be used rationally and equitably for the benefit of mankind.
However, prior to the adoption of a seabed treaty, cautioned the Sub-
committee, "the U.S. Government should provide measures designed
to insure protection of investors who desire to exercise present high
seas rights to explore and exploit the wealth of the deep seabed be-
yond the limits of the submerged land continent," 104
The Subcommittee concluded that the major tasks to be considered
in the 92d Congress were :
1. A continuing extensive review of the working paper intro-
duced by the U.S. delegation at the August [1970] session of the
United Nations Seabed Committee with a view toward seeking
modifications of it to conform to our interpretation of the Presi-
dent's intent and with our recommendations outl ined above.
2. An investigation of the special problem of an interim policy
which would insure continued exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources of our continental margin under present law ;
and would establish appropriate protection for investments re-
lated to mineral recovery by U.S. nationals in areas of the deep
seabed beyond the limits of exclusive national jurisdiction.105
POSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
In the section of this study that discussed the Continental Shelf,
it was shown that U.S. policy on ocean resources began in earnest with
the Truman Proclamation of 1945. The proclamation was designed
primarily to provide a policy and legal framework for regulating
offshore operations of the U.S. petroleum industry. When viewed
in the perspective of international legal concepts and the world's
technological capabilities at that time, the Truman Proclamation
might have been considered unnecessary. Ocean technology was then
almost exclusively possessed by the United States, and no other nation
had the technical capability to exploit the resources of the U.S.
continental shelf. The Proclamation had the effect of stimulating
proclamations by other countries, such as the Declaration of Santiago
in L952, whereby national sovereignty and jurisdiction were extended
out to 200 miles offshore. Thus, the'Truman Proclamation could be
taken as the beginning of legal chaos in international maritime
affairs, which has persisted to date despite the efforts made at the
19.r>s ( reneva Conventions.
Experience pointed to the conclusion that unilateral action — perhaps
accompanied by a scramble to stake out national claims to the "riches
•Mlbid., page 30.
1M Ibid., page 32.
'« Ibid., page 33.
507
of the sea" — have the effect of eroding the freedom of the seas and
prove a practical detriment to the world community at large. Presi-
dent Johnson, in his "Washington Navy Yard speech had warned of
precisely this consequence of the "race to grab and to hold" and had
called instead for their preservation as a "legacy of all human
beings." 106
This statement set the course for the position taken by the United
States during deliberations following the Malta proposal. Testifying
before the 90th Congress, spokesmen of the Departments of Interior
and State had generally affirmed that in dealing with areas beyond
the jurisdiction of national states, i.e., beyond the continental shelf,
regardless of its definition, the United Nations should, logically, be
concerned with the subject. The United States was in the process of
developing its own policy objectives through the Marine Resources
Act of 1966 ; consequently, no support was contemplated for tlie treaty
envisaged by Malta.
Fears of hasty action were allayed by the State Department's
expression of doubt that the General Assembly could get very far
with a proposal of this specificity on such short notice. It was pointed
out that there would have to be a process of study through commit-
tees and specialists, and the deliberative process in the United Nations
tends to be lengthy.
On September 21, 1967, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
supported the inscription of the Malta proposal on the agenda of the
U.N. General Assembly and asserted that the United Nations was in
a position to assume leadership in enlisting the peaceful cooperation
of all nations in developing the world's oceans and their resources.
Following establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in December
1967, the United States participated in its deliberations and on June
28, 1968. submitted a number of proposals including a draft resolution
containing («.) a declaration of principles on the use of the deep ocean
floor; (b) a draft resolution referring to the Eighteen-Nation Dis-
armament Committee (ENDC) the question of arms limitations on
the seabed and ocean floor with a view to defining these factors vital
to a workable, verifiable, and effective international agreement which
would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement
of weapons of mass destruction; and (c) a suggestion to establish in-
ternational marine preserves.
The United States also supported a less extensive declaration of
principles submitted by a number of delegations. These principles
differed from previous U.S. positions in that the United States came
to recognize the "interest of the international community in the devel-
opment of deep ocean resources," and the "dedication as feasible and
practicable of a portion of the value of the resources recovered from
the deep ocean floor to international community purposes." Draft res-
olution C proposed the International Decade of Ocean Exploration
(IDOE) for broadening and accelerating investigations of the oceans,
and for strengthening international cooperation. IDOE was adopted
by the General Assembly as part of the long-term and expanded pro-
gram of world-wide exploration of the oceans and their resources
under the direction of UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission.
106 Op. cit.
508
Seabed Disarmament Treaty
In its opening paragraph on ocean science and technology and na-
tional security, the President's Science Advisory Committee stated :
The most urgent aspect of Federal involvement in ocean science and technol-
ogy for the next 5 to 10 years relates to national security in the narrow, strictly
military sense. The U.S. Navy, which has responsibility for essentially all our
defense efforts involving the ocean environment, will have increasing need for
specialized oceanographic data for specific devices being developed or improved
and will continue to require better understanding of characteristics of the ocean
environment in which it operates.107
Although this statement referred to needs in support of specific
projects, it also reflected the need for the U.S. Navy to explore the
oceans throughout the world and not merely in the coastal areas of
the United States. This need, coupled with the military presence
required in numerous parts of the oceans, formed the basic justifica-
tion for freedom on the high seas, and for the privilege of approach-
ing as close as possible the coasts of other nations. The military view
has been, and continues to be, that any extension of territorial seas
should be kept to a minimum, that sovereignty over the continental
shelves, regardless of their boundaries, should be closely limited, and
that the air space above the high seas should remain free. In the
words of Dr. Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research and Development :
The security of the United States rests in part on the Navy's use of the high
seas, and we would like to see the use and legal coverage of the high seas develop
in such a way as not to impede this portion of our security unnecessarily.108
With this attitude and background, the United States began to
evaluate a draft treatv submitted by the USSR on March 18, 1969,
providing for prohibition of the emplacement on the seabed and the
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof of objects with nuclear weapons
or any other weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of
military bases, structures, installations, etc., beyond the twelve-mile
zone. The measure appeared to call for total disarmament of the
seabed, the Soviet Union having equated the uses of the seabed for
"peaceful uses" with "non-military purposes," by analogy with the
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.
The United States considered the proposed complete demilitariza-
tion "unworkable and probably harmful." The U.S. representative
pointed out that defense against submarines involved placing warn-
ing svstems on the seabed, and that military personnel participated
in scientific research in that environment. On May 22, 1969, the
United States countered with its own version of a seabed treaty,
prohibiting the emplacement of -fixed nuclear weapons or other weap-
ons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on,
within, or beneath the seabed and ocean floor.
In presenting the draft treaty, the U.S. representative pointed out
that the •"> mile territorial sea would leave a larger area subject to
107 U.S. Prosidrnt's Srionro Advisory Committee. "Effective Use of tln> Sea." Rpport of
tho PanH on Oceanography. (Washington, U.S. Govprnmpnt Printing Offipp. .Tunp 1900)
pace 30
ineRobprt A. Frosch. "Exploiting marine mineral tpsoutpps : Problems of national sp-
ruritv and inrisdiof ion." Speech delivered at the Naval War Collptrp Confprpnpp on Minpral
Kosources of the World Ocean, July 12, 196*. Vila] Speeches <>f tli«> Day, (Novpmbpr 15,
1968), page 71.
509
prohibition than the 12-mile zone proposed by the Soviet Union.
However, the minor disagreements were not unsurmountable. On
July 3 President Nixon sent a message to the Disarmament Commit-
tee stating that it should not be impossible to find common ground
between the United States and the Soviet Union in spite of these dif-
ferences, and that the goal should be to present a sound proposal to
the United Nations-
An acceptable proposal came after a full discussion of the two
drafts in the form of a joint draft treaty submitted by the United
States and the Soviet Union on October 7, 1969. The draft was a
compromise between the positions of the two major powers. It pro-
vided that :
The states parties to this treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the
seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the maximum
contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone any objects with nuclear weapons or any other
types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installa-
tions or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using
such weapons.
Later in October, an amended version was submitted at the Geneva
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD, formerly
known as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee — ENDC),
now having 26 member nations. This draft was referred by the Gen-
eral Assembly back to the CCD as the "Draft Treaty on the Prohibi-
tion of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and Subsoil
Thereof."
Except for minor changes, the definition of the scope of the prohi-
bition remained unaltered in the revised version submitted on April
23, 1970. Strong pressure was applied by the non-aligned nations,
which set out amendments resulting in the adoption in the Septem-
ber 1, 1970, revision of a separate article reading:
The parties to this treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith
concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of
an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof.
On December 7, 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations
finally recommended the treaty. On February 12, 1971, ceremonies
were held simultaneously in Washington, Moscow, and London, and
more than 60 nations signed the treaty. In the United States, by mid-
June, 1971, it was in the process of being submitted for Senate ap-
proval; if agreed to by that body, it will go to the President for
ratification.
Seabed Regime
On May 23, 1970, President Nixon released an important policy
statement on the seabed. He recognized the speed with which modern
underwater technology was advancing, and that the prevailing law of
the sea was in need of being reshaped and updated to meet the needs of
modern technology. He therefore proposed the convening of a new
conference on the law of the sea, and consideration of international
machinery for authorizing exploitation of seabed resources. The Pres-
ident proposed that "all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty
under which they would renounce all national claims over the natural
resources of the seabed beyond the point where the high seas reach a
510
depth of 200 meters (218.8 yards), and would agree to regard these
resources as the common heritage of mankind."' The regime proposed
for the exploitation of seabed resources would provide for the collec-
tion of substantial mineral royalties to be used for international com-
munity purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing
countries. It would also establish rules and regulations for protecting
the ocean environment, safeguarding the investments necessary for
exploitation, and a mechanism for the settlement of disputes.
To accomplish these goals, the President proposed two types of in-
ternational machinery :
First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the international com-
munity in an international trusteeship zone consisting of the continental margins
beyond a depth of 200 meters off their coasts. In return, each coastal state would
receive a share of the international revenues from the zone in which it acts
as trustee and could impose additional taxes if these were deemed desirable.
As a second step, agreed international machinery would authorize and regu-
late exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins.109
In the meantime, an interim policy was proposed for all nations
to join the United States in seeing to it that all permits for explora-
tion and exploitation of the seabed beyond 200 meters be issued subject
to approval under the international regime to be agreed upon.
In June 1970, the Committee on Oceanography of the National
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council recommended that
the United States consider opening ocean waters subject to U.S. juris-
diction to scientific research by foreign nations as a means of encourag-
ing other countries to ease their own restrictions. The resolution called
for maintaining appropriate and adequate safeguards for national
security, but without requiring researchers to obtain a permit, This
policy would not apply to internal waters.110
As indicated earlier, hearings were held in the Senate concerning
the provisions of the President's proposal, which was formally intro-
duced on August 3, 1970, as the draft United Nations Convention on
the International Seabed Area. On the final day (Aug. 28, 1970) of
the session of the Seabed Committee in Geneva, the U.S. Representa-
tive commented on the President's proposal :
When President Nixon made the difficult political decisions inherent in his
May 23 announcement and in our draft convention he placed great importance
on international community interests. We, as a party to the 1958 Geneva Conti-
nental Shelf Convention, could have relied on the exploitability test to extend
our boundary unilaterally. We felt, however, that in view of the uncertainties
surrounding seabed boundaries, and in light of the great opportunity the inter-
national community now has to rectify the inequities of the law of the sea. it
would l>e better for states to renounce under a treaty all national claims beyond
the 200 meter isobath, leaving the international seabed area as the widest area
possible. By this move we could wipe the slate clean and, in essence, re-think
the proper relationship of international community interests to those of coastal
states.111
The. working paper detailed the basic principles concerning mineral
resources, living resources, protection of the marine environment,
life, and property, and the establishment of an International Seabed
in Presidential announcement on I'.S ocean policy, May 23, 1970.
uo "Freedom of scientific research ami exploration of the sea and the seabed." By Com
mlttee on Oceanography, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, News-
release (June 1 1, l *. • 7 0 )
'" Ambassador Christopher II. Phillips, "Statement to the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of I lie Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic-
tion" (Palais des Nations, Geneva, August 28, 1970).
511
Resource Authority to manage the resources, safeguard the invest-
ments, and settle conflicts and disputes. During the 25th session of the
United Nations General Assembly, these principles were considered,
culminating in the passage on December 1, 1970, of two resolutions,
one establishing a time and calling for convening in 1973 a new
conference on the law of the sea. The other adopted a set of principles
in a declaration setting forth the ground rules for ocean resources
management and scientific research.
It is too early to predict what success the U.S. proposal will achieve.
Even if the United Nations succeeds in framing a generally ac-
ceptable treaty for the seabed, the final decision in the United States
will be subject to approval by the Senate. As mentioned earlier, con-
siderable opposition has been voiced in Congress, and some alternative
plan may be necessary in the event of an impasse between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of Government. What form this alterna-
tive might take is difficult to conjecture at this time.
What the proposal, resolutions, and discussions left unresolved was
the limit of national jurisdiction. The United States came to look fav-
orably on the 12-mile territorial limit as a probable goal, and several
nations appeared receptive to the idea. The Latin American nations
clung to their 200-mile limits, and agreements on these limits in future
debate may prove hard to reach.
IX. Role of Science and Technology in Seabed Diplomacy
As science and technology have reached and affected remote regions
of the world, scientists and engineers have begun to play an increas-
ingly significant role in diplomacy. Long the purview of international
lawyers and diplomats, ocean sovereignty has been discovered to
possess important technical aspects as well. In the field of ocean-
ography, the jurisdictional solutions to man's problems have been essen-
tially an attempt to reconcile man-made laws with the laws of
nature. Oftentimes, these two sets of laws have proved incompatible,
and the need for knowing and understanding the scientific aspects
of the ocean environment has become an obvious prerequisite for suc-
cessful jurisdiction among nations.
Understanding of all aspects of the marine environment has also
been a major requirement for the proper conduct of naval operations.
These operations figure prominently in matters of national security
and the formulation of foreign policy, particularly where global com-
mitments are concerned. Since World War II, the outlook toward the
use of the oceans for military purposes has assumed progressively
larger dimensions. Military strategy has evolved along lines deter-
mined largely by developments in technology, and by policy goals for
inter^l security and global politics. As one'analyst observed:
If asked, an oceanic strategist would tell the President that in order to pur-
sue his policy of nuclear sufficiency and at the same time deter World War III,
a blue water oceanic option is the only option for deterrence or defense during
the next six years and in the first decades of our Nation's third century.112
Military Technology and Ocean Strategy
The days of bombers and strategic air strikes followed the develop-
ment of nuclear fusion in 1954, coupled with the threat of communist
i" George E. Lowe, "The only option?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1971),
page 23.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-34
512
expansion. After 1957, missiles replaced bombers for strategic deter-
rence, resulting in the development of land-based systems of inter-
continental ballistic missiles, and submarine-based nuclear missiles.
Military technological breakthroughs continued to reshape military
strategy in the 1960's. Improved accuracy and longer range and
larger delivery systems permitted the production of large numbers of
sophisticated missiles such as the Minuteman and the Polaris sub-
marine-launched sj'stem. The development of reconnaissance satellites
permitted both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain
surveillance on each other's land-based systems.
Land-based systems (Minuteman and SS-9, for example), how-
ever, have their vulnerability : They can be detected by reconnaisanee
satellites and other means; accuracy of attacking missiles is advanc-
ing so fast that it can be measured in a fraction of a mile; MIRV
systems can deliver an overwhelming load of warheads, dispropor-
tionate to land-based missiles, rendering them increasingly vulnerable.
The shift in strategy toward the ocean environment, therefore, has
become obvious and necessary. Numerous analysts have expounded
the advantages of undersea weapons systems as being less targetable
than their land-based counterparts. The most obvious advantages are
their mobility, concealability, and survivability following a sudden
nuclear attack. Furthermore, their range throughout ocean space has
an added safety factor in deploying away from populated areas.
The absorption of water with respect to light, high-energy particles, electro-
magnetic radiation, heat and other known forms of energy is such that, except
for acoustic radiation, none of the mechanisms postulated has a detection range
potential which is significant when compared with the vast areas available
in the ocean. The ultimate test in this regard is the ability of the submersible to
blend with and be masked by the environment. At near zero speed this ought
to be quite modest, and if, for example, power is supplied by fuel cell, the ma-
chinery associated with it should be extremely quiet. Drifting in the current,
at great depth or at low speeds, the hydrodynamic wake would be insignificant.
A further aid would be the capability to move very close to the bottom, rendering
the submersible difficult to detect by long-range, active sonar. Ultimately, the
underseas weapons systems could develop into something akin to a manned, on-
the-bottom, slowly mobile mine.113
For the United States, ocean advantages are enhanced by worldwide
interests which have been conventionally served by land bases overseas.
These bases have, Ix^en dwindling; in number, and those left art' subject
to political uncertainties. The Second Fleet in the Atlantic, the Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific are
affected by basing problems. Floating support can be maintained simi-
lar to the system which largely aids the operation of the Sixth Fleet.
Objections to this type of support include its high cost and vulnerabil-
ity. Many alternatives have been envisaged for overeas bases, such as
floal ing platforms of large dimensions derived from the technology of
offshore exploration and exploitation.
Very great changes are expected in naval capabilities as a result of
technological developments in submarine warfare. Gordon J. F. Mac-
I >onald envisions for the L970's that —
u* John P. Craven. "Ocean technology and submarine warfare." /» "Implications of
Military Technology Into the 1970s." A del phi Paper No. 46, (London, institute for
Strategic Studies, March 1968), pages 38 16. Dr. Craven «:is for some years chief scientist
of the Special Projects Office of the Department of the Navy, that developed the Polaris
system.
513
A nation cou'd control the surface of the oceans without having a single ship.
The required system would involve satellites equipped with a variety of sensors
that would maintain coverage of the world's oceans. Satellites would relay the in-
formation to a central computer system which would then target the land-based
missiles on ships to be destroyed. The missiles would then be equipped with ter-
minal guidance or be under direct control of the satellite and land-based computer
systems. While it is most unlikely that any nation would adopt such a strategy,
this example illustrates the fact that naval posture may change radically in the
future.11'
MacDonald also postulates future placement of missiles as large as
the Polaris, or larger, on a relatively shallow shelf floor in a barge sys-
tem that could be moved occasionally to prevent its detection. Another
possibility would be mobile ocean bottom systems which crawl or creep
on the seabed. The technology and engineering requirements for man-
ning, maintaining, and servicing these installations would not differ
from those used in offshore mineral exploration and exploitation. In
fact, even if bottom installations were not militarily desirable (under-
water mobility being the key advantage), the thrust into deeper
waters of the continental shelf by the petroleum industry might
eventually require some kind of protection by the United States, and
the Navy might be called on to provide it.
In shaping U.S. policy for the disarmament of the seabed the effect
of technology was much in evidence. The banning of fixed bottom
installations did not pose any dangers, particularly when the United
States had come to realize the importance of mobility for its under-
water deterrent systems. In testimony before Senator Pell's Subcom-
mittee on Ocean Space, the following exchange took place :
Senator Pell. Do you have any concern about moving in terms of prohibiting
mobile weapons systems from operating on the seabed?
Dr. [Robert W.] Moese. No ; I do not really — otherwise I think we may end
up banning things that do not have any military use and certainly we can get
widespread agreement on that. One has to remember that the great advantage of
deploying a weapons system at sea is mobility, and that if one bans only fixed
nuclear weapons systems at sea he may well be banning something that doesn't
have any value anyway.115
Essentially, if the Polaris and Poseidon systems were to be anchored
at fixed points, they would not represent the threat they pose as mobile
systems. The United States had apparently abandoned interest in
fixed nuclear installations on the sea bottom, and there is evidence
to indicate that the decision to develop post-Polaris deterrent systems
rather than fixed nuclear installations had been reached long before
the denuclearization of the seabed was considered on the international
disarmament agenda.116 This does not mean, however, that the Navy
was not using the sea bottom. In testimony before Representative
Dante Fascell's Subcommittee on International Organizations and
Movements, Dr. Robert Frosch was asked to describe some of the
Navy undertakings which might be involved in the Malta proposal.
Dr. Frosch answered "* * * that the Navy has used the sea bottom
114 Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "An American Strategy for the Oceans." In American
Assembly. "Uses of the Seas." (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968), pages
183-4. •
115 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "Activities of Nations in
Ocean Space." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Ocean Space of the ... on S. Res. 33,
91st Congress, first session, July 24, 25, 28, and 30, 1969. (Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office. 1969). pages 45-6.
116 Jozef Goldblat. "The militarization of the deep ocean : the sea-bed treaty." In "SIPRI
Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/1970." (Stockholm, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, 1970), page 176.
514
for many purposes for many years, and it is incorrect to assume that
we are not using the sea bottom. Any attempt to deal in a radical legal
way with the sea bottom would interfere with some national security
enterprise.'' 117
Consequently, the factor of national security and the Navy's de-
mands were focal points in formulating the U.S. draft, treaty and
the final outcome. The technological gap between the United States
and the Soviet Union, the high costs of developing underwater sys-
tems, and the political developments on the international scene vis-a-
vis mainland China were among the other factors shaping the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. positions.
Although the time lag between Soviet and U.S. marine capabili-
ties has been considerable in recent years, the gap has been closing at
a fast rate. In his annual report on the U.S. military posture. Melvin
Laird, Secretary of Defense, indicated that the overall (land, sea, and
air) technological challenge from the Soviet Union was so strong as to
obliterate any U.S. technology lead over the U.S.S.R. by the mid-to-
late 1970's.118
Recent developments at the United Nations and the shift, in U.S.
policy suggest that the People's Republic of China will not remain
long out of the U.N. membership, and that sooner or later it will be
a member of the community of nations. In anticipation of this even-
tuality, it is conceivable that both the United States and the Soviet
Union could have a strong incentive to form an international regime
and a legal framework for the oceans so that when the People's Repub-
of China joins the United Nations it would be faced with a fait ac-
compli, to comply with the world community. This prospect may also
contribute to the urgency and pressure to resolve issues of terriorial
limits, continental shelf boundaries, and seabed resources, as well as
the banning of nuclear weapons from the ocean floor.
Scientists in the Diplomatic Process
In the section on seabed resources it was indicated how progress in
obtaining scientific data and the increasing knowledge of the marine
environment produced technological developments that pushed man
into progressively deeper waters offshore. Scientific manpower has also
been essential in formulating U.S. positions on issues of ocean policy.
A number of scientists have participated in advising both the legis-
lative and executive branches of Government. Scientists from aca-
demic, industrial, and Government institutions were instrumental in
assisting and contributing to the formulation of U.S. policy on the
seabed. Some have participated in the actual deliberations and draft-
ing of resolutions such as the Draft U.N. Convention on the Inter-
national Seabed Area.
ROLE OF THE MARINE COUNCIL STAFF
Prior to 1966, the Federal effort, in marine affairs was distributed
among more than -10 agencies, and was for the most part uncoordi-
nated. In the Legislative Branch, the Library of Congress' Congres-
sional Research Service (then the Legislative Reference Service) es-
tablished in L964 the Science Policy Research Division, with Dr. Ed-
,,T "The United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources * * *," op. cit., p. 192.
118 Ocean Science News (March 1-. l '»? l ) . page 3.
515
ward Wenk, Jr., as Chief. Dr. Wenk provided considerable ground-
work toward the passage of the Marine Resources Act of 1966, and
later became Executive Secretary of the Marine Council, created by
the Act, under the chairmanship of the Vice President.
Although world attention was focused on the seabed resources fol-
lowing the Malta proposal in 1967, in the United States the Marine
Council staff had already been active in laying the groundwork for
U.S. policy on this issue. Section 6 of the Marine Resources Act
assigned to the Council an explicit responsibility to coordinate a pro-
gram for international cooperation. Soon after its activation in August
1966, the Council staff guided a series of studies and actions to take
into account universally agreed upon goals to which the oceans could
contribute, such as to remedy the disparity between world population
and food supply. Inquiries were also begun as to threats to world order
arising out of conflicts over the extraction of marine resources, and
ways and means by which the common interest of all nations in gain-
ing greater knowledge about the marine environmen coutld be satis-
fied by intergovernmental cooperative programs of ocean research.
By late fall of 1966, the Council staff, working with representatives
of the State Department, helped draft a U.S. initiative at the 1966
U.N. General Assembly, calling for an examination of international
marine science activities. By December of the same year, the Council
staff understood from U.N. discussions in New York that there was
likely to be interest, particularly among the developing nations, in
clarifying uncertainties over ocean boundaries through the medium
of a new continental shelf convention.119
Again on the initiative of the Council staff, and after prior exchanges
with State Department staff as to agenda, the Vice President, as
Chairman of the Marine Council, met on February 10, 1967, with
Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler concerning these
issues, with the result that Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, appointed
an Ad Hoc Committee for International Policy in the Marine Environ-
ment to serve the interests of both the Marine Council and the Depart-
ment of State. Soon after its formation, this Committee began sub-
stantive inquiry into legal regime questions — building on a concept of
"revenue belts" or "buffer zones" that had been informally proposed by
representatives from the Department of State and the Council.
By that time also, the Council had begun to implement Section
4(a) 5 of the Marine Resources Act to undertake a comprehensive
study of the legal problems arising out of the management, use, devel-
opment, recovery, and control of the resources of the marine environ-
ment. Four contract studies were accordingly undertaken to provide
in-house policy guidance. The Vice President requested that the De-
partment of State provide guidelines for these studies, and the Secre-
tary of State appointed an interagency advisory committee chaired
by the legal adviser of the Department of State, Leonard Meeker.
When the Committee for International Policy in the Marine En-
vironment met for the first time in April 1967, all of the in-house in-
struments for the study of the legal regime for the seabed had been
u9 This information about the in-house activities of the Council staff was supplied
through personal communication by Dr. Edward Wenk, Jr., former Executive Secretary
of the Marine Council. Further details appear in Dr. Wenk's book, The Politics of the Ocean's
(Harvard University Press).
516
created, and some of the directions and alternatives laid out for study —
"in turn all goaded by an activist style of the Council itself.''120
During the early months of the Council, studies were also begun
on the International Decade of Ocean Exploration, and Seabed Dis-
armament. By late summer of 1967, concepts were beginning to
emerge regarding the legal regime, the Decade, and the disarmament
issue. These concepts emerged along with conflicts among different
Federal agencies as they generated their own independent positions
regarding each of the three issues.
ROLE OF SCIENTISTS IN OTHER AGENCIES
For the purpose of this study, inquiries were addressed to several
Federal agencies concerning their utilization of scientists in their in-
ternational policymaking. In arms control negotiations, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency ( ACDA) found the issues complex,
involving aspects of legal, scientific, economic, military, and political
disciplines. ACDA is organized along these disciplinary lines, and the
corresponding bureaus of the agency contributed to the evolutionary'
formulation of the U.S. position through comprehensive studies and
analyses, utilizing internal staff members and cooperating with their
counterparts in other agencies. They made extensive use of scientific
capabilities of the U.S. Navy, including contributions from their
Chief Scientist and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research
and Development, Dr. Robert Frosch.
The U.S. Geological Survey participated extensively in the activi-
ties at the United Nations, and several Survey geologists have con-
tributed to the work of the Secretariat as well as to that of the U.S.
Government. With respect to the United Nations, Frank H. Wang, a
geologist with the Survey's Office of Marine Geology, has been loaned
to the Resource and Transport Division of the United Nations Secre-
tariat for several periods, beginning in late 1967 and continuing to the
present, to prepare a background report on mineral resources of the
sea.121
In the late spring of 1968, David Popper, then Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State for International Organizations, asked the Geological
Survey to represent the United States at the Economic and Technical
Subcommittee of the newly formed Ad Hoc Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
The Director of the U.S. Geological Survey, Dr. William Pecora, was
able to attend some of the June meetings, while Vincent E. McKelvey,
his alternate, attended the remainder. Gilbert Corwin of the Survey
also attended this session as an adviser.
While Dr. Pecora continued to be listed as the U.S. representative
to the Economic and Technical Subcommittee during the following
year (hoping that by so doing he would encourage other delegations
to send high level scientists), he was unable to attend subsequent meet-
ings of the Subcommittee. Vincent McKelvey, therefore, represented
the United States on the Economic and Technical Subcommittee at
the second meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, and has continued to
do so at the meetings of the permanent Committee after its establish-
120 Ibid.
121 Wang, "Mineral Resources of the Sea," op. clt.
517
ment by the General Assembly in 1968. Joshua I. Tracey of the Survey
assisted McKel vey during the March and August i meetings of the
Committee in 1969, and Wang was also on the delegation for the
August 1969 meeting. /
McKelvey was also a member of the five-man drafting committee,
brought together by John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser of the De-
partment of State, in June 1970, to prepare the draft treaty imple-
menting the U.S. ocean policy announced by President Nixon on
May 23, 1970. McKelvey is the only scientist on that committee, and
has been primarily responsible not only for input on the geological
aspects of the problem, but also for the economic and technical aspects
of seabed exploration and exploitation.
During the first two years of the U.N. Seabed Committee's work,
the principal effort of the U.S. Geological Survey was directed toward
developing information that would assist other delegations, and the
Committee as a whole, in understanding the problems of the seabed.
As part of that effort, McKelvey and Wang prepared a set of
maps showing the distribution of potential subsea mineral resources,
the first edition of which was distributed to the Committee in August
1969.122 Another contribution to this effort was the Symposium on
Mineral Resources of the World Ocean, held at Newport, Rhode Is-
land in 1968, under the joint sponsorship of the U.S. Geological Survey,,
the University of Rhode Island, and the U.S. Navy.123
Besides the staffs of the Marine Council and the Geological Survey,
the Department of State had available the expertise of its own geog-
rapher, Dr. Robert Hodgson, who was intimately associated with
seabed activities on an official basis for over a decade, and its Bureau
of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, under the direc-
tion of Herman Pollack. Together with the National Science Founda-
tion, these sources have been represented on the U.S. Government's
Law of the Sea Task Force since its creation in 1970. The State De-
partment drew further on the following agencies and scientists, in
varying degrees, in the formulation of the Administration's ocean
policy : Dr. Bruce C. Heezen, Columbia University ; Hollis Hedberg,
Princeton University ; Howard R. Gould, Esso Corporation, Houston ;
K. L. Emery, Wood's Hole Oceanographic Institute, Massachusetts;
John Byrne, University of Rhode Island; John Knauss, University
of Rhode Island ; and the National Oceanography Association.
Scientific Advice, Policy, and Diplomacy
It is particularly true of a democratic society that conflicts arise
among parties engaging in the formulation of national and inter-
national policy. When the matter at issue involves diplomacy and
international negotiation, conflicts are particularly prone to impede
the formulation of a generally accepted position. National honor,
national security, sovereignty, and territorial claims all combine to
intensify feelings and delay the building of a consensus.
Despite the initiatives of the Marine Council staff and the participa-
tion of numerous scientists and scientific institutions toward the for-
mulation of U.S. seabed policy, the evolution of this policy was rela-
122 Vincent E. McKelvey and Frank F. H. Wang. Preliminary maps, world subsea
mineral resources ; miscellaneous geological investigations, Map 1-632. U.S. Geological
Survey, Department of the Interior (1969).
^McKelvey, op. cit.
518
tively slow. As late as July 1969, almost two years after the Malta
proposal, the Department of State had not yet formulated a policy,
or was not ready to divulge its position if it had one. Testifying before
Senator Pell's Subcommittee on Ocean Space, the Honorable U. Alexis
Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was asked
whether the issue of the outer continental shelf boundaries was a
question of language or modality.
* * * Frankly, Mr. Chairman [answered Mr. Johnson], the question of the
boundaries, the question of the international regime, are questions the answers
to which are not yet dear to me, nor am I c'ear if I may say, both personally and
officially, as to where the U.S. interests lie best in this. * * * "4
Senator Pell termed this a "no-policy policy" in the exchange that
ensued :
* * * In closing I would just make the point that I appreciate your frankness
and cooperation in coming here today, and I hope you will push ahead with the
policy paper for the United Nations meeting.
At the same time, I must stick to my guns, when it comes to the questions of
the continental shelf and the moratorium on claims and say that we have a "no-
policy" policy, but I am glad to know that you are pressing ahead to change that
to a more specific statement of policy. If you think I have overstated the situa-
tion, please tell me.
Mr. Johnson. No, frankly, I feel we have taken more of a leadership role in this
matter than you apparently feel, but nevertheless, I respect your point of view.
Senator Pell. You mean a leadership role for going ahead or a leadership role
for going backwards? By this I mean a leadership role for establishing a regime
or a leadership role in preventing the establishment of a regime.
Mr. Johnson. I would say a leadership role in keeping our options open until
we decide where our national interests lie best and where international agree-
ment may be reached.
Senator Pell. Right. Well, I do not want to be rude in any way, but basically,
to keep options open, means to my mind to have a "no-policy" policy.
Mr. Johnson. That is correct. We are keeping options open for that purpose
until we decide what our policy should be on this.
Senator Pell. I agree that this is probably a question of semantics and what
the executive branch would call keeping options open, from where I sit and the
work that I have been doing on this for the last several years, I would say that
it is a "no-policy" policy. I know we are both doing the best that we can to try
to arrive at a state of affairs of advantage not only to the United States, but to
the world as a whole.
Mr. Johnson. Yes.1"
A policy statement enunciated by the President is transmitted by
directive to the departments concerned for implementation. The de-
partments evaluate it relative to their statutory responsibilities, pol-
icies, and practices, then try to relate it to the overall national and
international perspective, at the same time accommodating their own
interests.
Congress, meanwhile, provides a forum where all sectors and indi-
viduals are afforded a chance to air their views on the subject. In the
case of oceanography, Congress has had the initiative for more than a
decade, and its efforts culminated in the passage of the Marine Re-
sources Act of 19GG, despite some opposition by the executive
branch. However, not all of the views expressed at hearings are thor-
oughly studied, or influence final national policy in any real way, un-
less such views are vigorously pursued and advocated by special in-
terest groups.
"* "Governing the Use of Ocean Space," hearings, op. dt., pp. 221-222.
^Ibid., page 232.
519
In ocean affairs, the "ocean industry" in general lacks a unified front,
or a spokesman or representative in Washington capable of present-
ing the industry's point of view. It remains as uncoordinated as were
the Federal agencies prior to the establishment of the National Coun-
cil on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, and the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Although
a NOAA had been recommended by the Commission on Marine Sci-
ence, Engineering, and Resources, the NOAA that came into existence
in October 1970 fell short of the Commission's recommendations, leav-
ing many ocean activities scattered among other Federal agencies.
The machinery of most governments does not provide adequately
for coordination between individuals qualified to judge in the real
world of politics and people, and those qualified to judge in the real
world of technical facts. Often, one world seems to be completely
oblivious or unaware of the existence of the other. It has been demon-
strated, however, that scientists can work very effectively in formu-'
lating policy and participating in the diplomatic process. Modern
diplomats are becoming increasingly aware of the effect of science and
technology on shaping their daily endeavors. Although most nations
have come to recognize the importance of scientists in conducting
their international affairs, no country seems to have included a sci-
entist as part of its diplomatic staff at the United Nations headquar-
ters in New York.
X. Summary
Planet Earth is essentially a water planet — one large ocean inter-
spersed with continental land masses. The global ocean is a common
link among these land masses, shared by the nations touching this
ocean space. Despite its inherent international characteristics, ocean
space has been zoned off, and national jurisdictions and boundaries
have been established by the coastal states.
Progress in marine technology and the widening horizons of scien-
tific inquiry have enlarged the sphere of man's knowledge and re-
vealed the presence of natural resources in sea water, on the ocean
floor, and in the underlying layers. Peace and equity require inter-
nationally acceptable boundaries and definitions of territorial limits,
fishing zones, the high seas, the continental shelf, and the sea floor be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction. It has become necessary to
survey the ocean space, to collect the scientific data on which these
definitions should be based, and to inventory the known and potential
resources of the seabed.
The crust of the Earth as a whole is composed of continental plat-
forms and ocean basins. Geologically, the continental land masses ex-
tend beyond the shoreline. A relatively narrow strip, the "continental
margin," of each platform, is under water, belonging geologically to
the adjacent continent and not to the ocean basin. The continental
margin has three components : The shelf, the slope, and the rise. The
width of the shelf varies throughout the world, but an average water
depth of 100 fathoms (600 feet) has been adopted as conveniently
marking the legal, rather than the geological, width of the continental
shelf.
520
Unilateral actions have been taken by coastal nations to assert juris-
diction, establish territorial boundaries, and claim exploration and ex-
ploitation rights in offshore areas. In the United States, these activi-
ties began with the Truman Proclamation of 1945 which claimed the
natural resources of the seabed of the continental shelf as appertain-
ing to the United States and subject to its jurisdiction and control.
In 1953, the Submerged Lands Act set the seaward limit of state bound-
aries as three miles, but did not define inland waters or continental
shelf lands beyond the three-mile limit. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953 claimed for the United States rights of jurisdiction,
control, and power of disposition of the natural resources of the con-
tinental shelf, but left the seaward limits of the shelf undefined, and
preserved the character of the overlying waters as high seas.
The Geneva Conventions of 1958 sought to resolve several problems
pertaining to the seabed and the overlying waters. The Conventions
established criteria for measuring the territorial sea and the con-
tiguous zone, but left undefined the outer limits of the continental
shelf. The Convention on the Continental Shelf aggravated the prob-
lem further by establishing the 200-meter depth as the recommended
limit, which could be expanded beyond that depth to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of that area. In other words, it proposed that the boundaries
of the continental shelf of a coastal state would be determined by
the technological capabilities of that state to exploit the resources in
deeper waters.
But What are these resources, and what exaetlv is their present and
prospective value? What is the present state of offshore technology,
and what lies ahead for future exploration and exploitation of the sea-
bed?
Ocean resources are classified broadly as living and non-living. The
living resources include the living orira,nisms of the marine environ-
ment for products such as food, food derivatives, and pharmaceuticals.
The non-living resources provide such varied opportunities for use as
the production of potable water from the sea. the salts and other min-
erals contained in the water, the minerals on and under the ocean floor,
and such related activities as shipping and aquatic recreation.
Although this studv encompasses the living resources of the sea, it
focuses on the seabed and the resources contained in, on, and under
it. The sealed contains a variety of mineral resources including beach
sands and gravel, heavy minerals associated with l>eaeh deposits, sur-
face deposits of manganese and phosphorite, and subsurface ]x>troleum
resources.
Building materials are the most extensively mined commodity
throughout the world, mostlv at or near the lurches. Current pro-
duction in the United States alone exceeds 50 million cubic vards of
sand and gravel, and 20 million tons of oyster shells annually. Asso-
ciated with beach sands are such heavy minerals as gold, tin, platinum,
diamonds, titanium, tungsten, iron, ehromite. and zircon. Surface
deposits of phosphorite and manganese nodules blanket v.he ocean floor.
The continental shelves of the world contain an estimated 300 billion
tons of phosphorite : i f 10 percent of this amount is economic to mine,
the 30 billion tons of reserves of sea-floor phosphorite (worth some-
thing like $300 billion) would last 1,000 years.
521
Equally extensive on the ocean floor are nodules containing man-
ganese and iron oxide, cobalt, nickel, and copper. The floor of the
Pacific Ocean alone contains some 90 billion to 1,600 billion tons of
nodules. Although submarine manganese ore is lower in grade than
manganese mined on land, its mining may become attractive for its
combination of useful elements. Gross value of the constituent minerals
in these nodules approaches $115 per ton. Although under the proper
circumstances the potential of these nodules might be promising, pres-
ent factors of supply, demand, and pricing suggest that the economic
exploitation of phosphorite and manganese nodules is not imminent.
Recently discovered deposits in the Red Sea indicate that volcanic
action in areas of rifts in the crust of the earth may have created eco-
nomically profitable opportunities. Sediments sampled in the Red
Sea contain appreciable amounts of zinc, copper, lead, silver, and gold
which at current smelter prices would be worth about $2.5 billion.
By far, the most important of all marine resources is petroleum.
More than 85 countries are engaged in offshore activities ; discoveries
have been reported from the shelves of North and South America,
Australia, Japan, the Mediterranean countries, the Red Sea, the
Arabian Gulf, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, most
recently, in the North Sea and the South China Sea. Thirty-two of
these countries are already producing petroleum from their continental
shelves, which accounts for 16 percent of the world's oil and 6 per-
cent of the world's natural gas; by 1980 this percentage is expected
to double or quadruple.
Proved petroleum reserves in the "free world" are estimated to
exceed 500 billion barrels of oil and nearly 1.5 million billion (quadril-
lion) cubic feet of gas. Ultimate world potential of all offshore
petroleum resources approaches 1,600 billion barrels. In comparison,
ultimate world potential of comparable resources on land is estimated
at 4,000 billion barrels.
Given the abundant resources of the seabed and the challenges they
present, especially to the dynamic petroleum industry, what are their
implications for national policy and international diplomacy? In
mining operations, a foremost consideration is the necessity for main-
taining an approximate balance of supply against demand. A prime
economic characteristic of all minerals, except those that are scarce
and precious, is their price sensitivity. The risk, the high capital
investment, the unknowns, and the lack of experience in the marine
environment are major deterrents which will keep the small entre-
preneur from venturing into the deep-sea operations. Another deter-
rent, non-technical and non-economic, is the legal question of exclusive
right of exploitation, or security of tenure of operation. Undoubtedly,
deep-sea mineral deposits are substantial and represent a great poten-
tial resource. Once a substantially rich deposit is found, the technol-
ogy to exploit it will be readily developed. The outlook is one of
cautious optimism, but a legal regime needs to be established and inter-
national agreements effected before the mining industry will venture
into the ocean deeps.
For offshore petroleum, the capabilities that are not available now
are certainly a short distance away. But does technology justify ex-
pansion ? As matters stand now, offshore operations seem likely to con-
tinue at an ever-increasing pace. While subject to some degree of tech-
522
nological control, hazards of offshore operations are inevitable, and
damage to the environment may be long-lasting or irreversible Nu-
merous other tenants besides the oil industry use coastal waters The
ocean has become the focus of man's attention and hope, not merely
for its mineral and petroleum resources, but as a source of food, a pos-
sible future habitat, and a major source of the Earth's weather systems
and their life-gi vmg processes. Other users of the continental shelf have
to recognize and conform with the compatibility of their various ac-
tivities It may be in the ultimate interest of all mankind to develop
the land areas and explore their subsurface thoroughly, leaving the
ocean as clean as possible for as long as possible.
This go-slow policy is particularly crucial for the continental shelf
in view of the fact that technological development is progressing at
a rate that has already rendered obsolete the definition of jurisdic-
tional limits, legal or otherwise. While this development will probably
be limited, for some time to come, to the continental shelf areas, and
progress into the deep sea is not alarmingly imminent, the confusion
created by the Geneva Conventions, particularly the exploitability
clause, might well be eliminated. Definitive political boundaries need
to be established for the seaward limit of national jurisdictions. Be-
yond this limit, the deep sea areas would then become the common
domain of the community of nations.
The rapid advances in the acquisition of scientific data about the
ocean domain, and the spectacular development of technological ca-
pabilities to exploit it, commercially and militarily, have directed
attention to the potential of ocean resources. As nations have moved
toward a policy of leaving ocean space free from national domination,
the aspiration has been repeatedly voiced of exploring and exploiting
ocean resources for the benefit of all mankind, rather than to benefit
the handful of technologically advanced nations.
The United Nations is the obvious forum to reconcile issues over
these resources. A specific plan was offered to the 1 Tnited Nations by the
delegation of Malta, which called for a declaration and treaty concern-
ing the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and
of the ocean floor underlying the seas, beyond the limits of present
national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interest of
mankind. An ad hoc committee to study this proposal was formed in
1967, which became in 1968 the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jiu*is-
diction.
By then the United States Congress had passed the Marine Re-
sou rces and Engineering Development Act of 1966 and established
the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment; the U.S. Government had begun to coordinate its ocean affairs
and formulate policy for participation in international activities. Be-
sides the Marine Council, the policy apparatus included committees
of Congress, the Committee on International Policy in the Murine
Environment, and the present Interagency Law-of-the-Sea Task-
Force. Outside the Federal struct lire, the United States sought advice
from the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy
of Engineering.
Congressional reaction in the 90th Congress to the Malta proposal
took the form of numerous bills and resolutions, some in support and
523
others in opposition to the proposal. Hearings were conducted in the
90th and 91st Congresses, and new subcommittees were established,
particularly in the Senate. The Subcommittee on Outer Continental
Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held
extensive hearings throughout the 91st Congress, and issued a report
based on these hearings. The Subcommittee took the position that the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was validly operative,
and saw no need to convene another Law of the Sea Conference. It
also concluded that the geological interpretation of the continental
margin made that portion of the seabed the property of the United
States. It endorsed the exploitability clause in the Convention, which
expanded the limits of the shelf depending on the technological capa-
bility of a state to exploit in deeper waters. It shared with the Presi-
dent the expressed desire that ocean resources beyond the continental
margin be used rationally and equitably for the benefit of mankind,
conditional on measures to protect investors exercising high seas rights
to explore and exploit the wealth of the deep seabed.
The Executive Branch leaned toward international cooperation and
the proper utilization of the diplomatic process. U.S. delegates
to the United Nations General Assembly took the initiative in intro-
ducing several draft resolutions toward international cooperation in
research, the exploitation of the seabed, and the limitations of military
uses of the sea floor. These efforts culminated in the signing of the
Seabed Disarmament Treaty on February 12, 1971, banning the em-
placement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, and paving the way
for wider measures toward disarmament.
As to an international seabed regime, President Nixon proposed on
May 23, 1970, that all nations adopt as soon as, possible a treaty re-
nouncing all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed
beyond the point where the high seas reach a depth of 200 meters, and
agree to regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind.
The regime proposed for the exploitation of seabed resources would
provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used
for international community purposes, particularly for economic as-
sistance to developing countries. It would also establish rules and reg-
ulations for protecting the ocean environment, and a mechanism for
the settlement of disputes, in the form of an International Seabed
Resource Authority. In the meantime, an interim policy was proposed
for all nations to join the United States to insure that all permits
for exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond the 200-meter
limit be issued subject to an international authority.
During the 25th session of the U.N. General Assembly, these princi-
ples were considered, and on December 18, 1970, two resolutions were
passed: One, establishing a timetable and calling for convening in
1973 of a new conference on the law of the sea ; the other promulgating
a set of principles in a declaration of ground rules for ocean resources
management and scientific research.
In its diplomatic participation, the United States developed policy
contingent on developments in science and technology. Since World
War II, the outlook toward the use of the oceans for military purposes
has been gaining progressively larger dimensions. Military strategy
has evolved along lines drawn by developments in technology, and
524
by policy goals for internal security and global politics. Recent de-
velopments at the United Nations suggest that the People's Republic
of China will not remain long out of the U.N. membership. In anti-
cipation of this eventuality, it is conceivable that both the United
States and the Soviet Union could have reason to form an international
regime and a legal framework for the oceans so that when the People's
Republic of China joins the United Nations she would encounter a fait
accompli, whose acceptance the community of nations desires. Com-
munist China's progress in diplomatic, economic, and nuclear status
may also explain the urgency and pressure to resolve issues of terri-
torial limits, continental shelf boundaries, and seabed resources, as
well as the banning of nuclear weapons from the ocean floor.
In formulating policy, the United States has had the benefit of
considerable scientific guidance. A number of scientists have par-
ticipated in advising both the legislative and executive branches of
Government. Scientists from academic, industrial, and Government
institutions were instrumental in assisting and contributing to the
formulation of U.S. policv on the seabed. Some scientists have par-
ticipated in the actual deliberation and drafting of resolutions such
as the Draft U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area.
Despite the initiatives of the Marine Council staff and the increased
participation of scientists in the formulation of U.S. seabed policv.
the evolution of this policy has been relativelv slow. Undoubtedly
the marine scientists and technologists would have preferred a
brisker pace than the diplomats were prepared to take. For its part,
the Congress was ready to move faster than was the Department of
State, although in what direction is still not evident. In the case of
oceanography, Congress has had the initiative for more than a
decade; its efforts culminated in passage of the Marine Resources
Act of 1966, despite some opposition by the executive branch.
It has been demonstrated that scientists can work effectively in
helping to formulate policy and in participating in the diplomatic
process. Modern diplomats are becoming increasingly aware of the
effect of science and technology in shaping their endeavors. The
diplomatic process is in some ways inherently ambiguous and in-
direct. Traditional diplomatic ambiguity is often difficult to reconcile
with scientific precision and explicitness, and few persons can com-
bine the subtleties and intuitive approach of the diplomat with the
straightforward factual approach of the scientist to perform ade-
quately across both fields. Nevertheless, the number of those who
can — the new breed of scientist-diplomat, or policymaking scientist —
is rising rapidly. It is to the advantage of a nation to capitalize on
the skills of such individuals in the pursuit of the national interest,
for they may represent mankind's hope for the effective conduct of
decisionmaking in a world society of nations increasingly interde-
pendent and influenced by scientific discovery and technological
change.
)
Chapter 8 — United States-Soviet Commercial
Relations: The Interplay of Economics,
Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy
■/
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction 529
A New Opportunity for U.S. -Soviet Relations 529
A Net Assessment of U.S. Interests in Expanding Commercial
Relations With the U.S.S.R 530
Trade and Technology 531
II. Setting 533
U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations After World War II 533
Soviet- American Trade Prospects Come of Age 535
The Disengagement of Congress From U.S.-Soviet Trade Ne-
gotiations 538
Trade and Diplomacy 539
III. The Soviet Rationale for Expanded Foreign Economic Relations 543
Technological Requirements of the Ninth Five- Year Plan 544
Modernization of Soviet Industry 544
Quality of Soviet Life 547
Transportation 549
Improvement in Planning and Management 550
Changing Priorities in Resource Allocation: Growth Versus
Defense 552
U.S.-Soviet Technology Transfers 557
U.S. Technology and Soviet Economic Development Prior
to 1946 558
Current Soviet Technological Requirements 559
Soviet Balance-of -Payments Potential 560
Soviet Export Potential 561
Soviet Earnings From Invisible Trade 565
Multilateral Relations 566
Coproduction Agreements 566
Potential Level of U.S.-Soviet Trade 567
IV. U.S. Interest in Expanded Economic Relations With the Soviet Union. 570
Economic Benefits for the United States 570
Stability of U.S. Trade Gains 570
Technological Export Policy _ . 572
High Technology Trade and a Pattern of Economic Involvement.. 573
V. Restrictions on Soviet Trade With the United States 576
U.S. Controls on Exports to the Soviet Union 576
U.S. Restrictions on Imports From the Soviet Union; the Issue
of Most-Favored Nation Treatment 580
U.S. Restrictions on Credit Transactions With the Soviet Union. . 583
Shipping Arrangements in U.S.-Soviet Trade 586
Soviet Institutions and Practices 587
Problems of Soviet Law and U.S.-Soviet Trade 588
Soviet State Trading 590
Prospects for Removal of Barriers to U.S.-Soviet Trade 592
VI. Issues in the Interplay of Technology, Trade, and Diplomacy 594
Benefits to the United States From Expanded Trade With the
Soviet Union 594
The 1972-73 Grain Sales 595
Joint Development of Siberian Natural Gas Resources 597
Political Benefits From Expanded U.S.-Soviet Commercial
Relations 600
(527)
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 35
528
Page
VI. Issues in the Interplay of Technology, Trade, and Diplomacy — Con.
Concluding Observations 601
Political Gains Likely to Outweigh Economic Benefits to
United States 001
Relative Increase in U.S.-Soviet Trade May Be Impressive
by 1980 602
Future U.S.-Soviet Economic Ties Dependent on Continued
Relaxation of Institutional and Legal Barriers 602
New Soviet Emphasis on Technological Change and Mate-
rial Incentives Stimulates Trade Prospects 603
Defense and Control Versus Economic Growth and Profes-
sional Performance Are Soviet Choices 603
Cost to Soviets of Supplying Raw Materials to Eastern
Europe Is High and Rising 603
State Trading Poses Problems for a Country With a Market
Economy Such as the United States 604
Improvements Are Needed in U.S. Procedures and Institu-
tions for Administration and Negotiation 605
The Current Opportunity for Improved Soviet-U.S. Rela-
tions Is Crucial 606
Risks and Uncertainties of the New Relationship Can Be
Reduced But Not Eliminated 606
TABLES
1. Soviet Energy Production, 1970 and 1975 546
2. Consumption of Selected Foods in the Soviet Union 547
3. Transportation in the Ninth Five- Year Plan 549
4. Soviet Trade With Selected Western Countries and Japan 560
5. Selected Soviet Commodities Traded With the Developed West 562
6. U.S. Imports From U.S.S.R 563
7. Estimates of Soviet Gold Output and Dispositions 565
8. Total Projected United States Exports to Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union 568
9. Soviet Exports and Imports of Grain 571
FIGURES
1. The Levels of Technological Development: The U.S.S.R. Compared
With Other Developed Countries 544
2. Primary Energy Consumption, United States and U.S.S.R 545
3. Proposed Joint Ventures in Natural Gas 598
CHAPTER 8— UNITED STATES-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RE-
LATIONS: THE INTERPLAY OF ECONOMICS, TECHNOL-
OGY TRANSFER, AND DIPLOMACY
I. Introduction
The general purpose of this study is to examine the interaction of
science and technology — including agricultural, commercial, man-
agerial, and industrial technology — with diplomacy, in the context of
the current and potential growth of U.S.-Soviet commercial relations.
A more specific purpose is to assess the prospects for future U.S.-
Soviet economic relations, primarily in terms of costs and benefits to
the United States, as a subject of importance and immediate concern
in itself.
The establishment of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R, Commercial Commis-
sion at the May 1972 Summit Conference and the signing of a compre-
hensive set of trade agreements on October 18, 1972 opened a promis-
ing new period of economic relations between the two nations. The
agreements provided a mechanism for removing many of the barriers
to normal economic interaction. More importantly, the agreements on
economic matters represented another step toward general rapproche-
ment between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the
agreements were limited to questions of foreign trade and payments,
officials of both countries asserted that they would influence the
broader spectrum of diplomatic relations.
A New Opportunity for U.S.-Soviet Relations
The creation of a new U.S.-Soviet commercial relationship was an
important event with historical parallels. In the 1920's and 1930's, a
number of U.S. companies established close commercial ties with
Soviet industries. After the two countries established diplomatic re-
lations in 1933, the U.S. Export- Import Bank was created to finance
U.S.-Soviet trade and a trade agreement was signed in order to ex-
pand commercial relations. During World War IT a key aspect of the
alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union was the de-
livery of U.S. military and civilian goods to the Soviet Union through
the Lend-Lease program. Again, at the end of World War II, steps
were taken to involve the Soviet Union in the world economic commu-
nity and to improve U.S.-Soviet economic relations.
None of these earlier attempts to normalize East-West economic
relations was successful. In each case, a change in the international
political environment destroyed the basis for long-term economic
cooperation.
Now, once more, a favorable political and economic climate exists
for progress in Soviet-U.S. relations. The new commercial relation-
ship is one vehicle for progress in relations between the two major
world powers. The October 1972 commercial agreement was but one
of a series of agreements, with others on science and technology, nu-
clear weapons, space cooperation, medical science, and the environ-
ment, In previous attempts to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, political
understandings were followed by improved commercial relations
Note : This chapter was prepared in 1973 by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday.
(529)
530
which, in turn, were expected further to facilitate improved political
relations. On those earlier occasions the seeming reconciliation of the
differences between the two systems led to an apparent assumption in
the United States that Sovietleaders would be willing to modify their
system for economic gains. In this earlier adversarial relationship
Soviet political concessions appeared to be equated with political gains
to U.S. interests. Now the idea that their loss is our gain — a zero-sum
game approach — has given way in official thinking to Dr. Henry Kis-
singer's notion of mutual interest and constraint. In reference to the
Joint Commercial Commission and the Summit accords, Mr. Willis C.
Armstrong, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business
Affairs, observed :
. . .These programs are leading us into a stage of practical forms of intimate
cooperation with the Soviet Union for years ahead. They constitute a framework
of interlocking agreements to build a vested interest on both sides in reducing
tensions and freeing us from confrontation.1
The linkage of the new commercial relationship to U.S. -Soviet polit-
ical relations highlights the need for careful scrutiny by the U.S. Con-
gress. Members of Congress have expressed interest in improved East-
West trade relations in a series of legislative proposals and hearings
dealing with import restriction, export controls, and credits. Congress
has already acted to reduce substantially the impact of export controls
on U.S. -Soviet trade. As of May 1973, other issues of East-West trade
await congressional action. The most important of these is considera-
tion of the President's request for authorization to extend most-
favored-nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. Favorable congres-
sional action on the President's proposal is necessary for the trade
agreement to enter into force. Congress may also be asked to consider
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) financing of U.S. -Soviet trade.
While no additional authorization is needed for Eximbank participa-
tion in trade with the Soviet Union, it is likely that Congress will be
asked to increase the Bank's overall lending authority and terms of
loans so that it may accommodate some proposed large transactions
between U.S. companies and Soviet foreign trade organizations.
A Net Assessment of U.S. Interests in Expanding Commercial Rela-
tions With the U.S.S.R.
This study will consider U.S. policymakers' expectations of diplo-
matic, national security, and economic gains to the United States from
expanded economic exchanges with the Soviet Union, and will attempt
to assess the net advantage to the United States. Are the projected
changes likely to be in the best economic interests of the United States?
What effect are increased economic exchanges, especially in technology-
intensive products, likely to have on U.S. foreign policy goals and on
U.S. national security?
A crucial consideration for U.S. policymakers is the Soviet leader-
ship's motivation for seeking better economic ties with the United
States. ( Jonsequently, this study will also attempt to provide a rationale
for the apparent Soviet change in foreign economic policy. How is the
1 Speech before the World Trade Institute of the World Trade Center at New York. N.Y.,
on November 28, 1972 (State Department press release 294 dated November 29).
531
new policy related to Soviet military-strategic goals? Does the Soviet
leadership's interest in economic ties with the United States portend
a new era of international stability and cooperation, or is it merely
an effort to gain temporary economic advantage? Are there changes in
Soviet security and foreign policy concomitant with expanding com-
mercial relations which are likely to provide net benefit to the United
States? Are there elements in the situation which could lead to poten-
tially dangerous forms of interaction and interdependence in future
U.S.-Soviet relations? If U.S. and Soviet leaders decide that ex-
panded economic relations are mutually advantageous, major institu-
tional changes may have to be made.
Trade mid Technology
A central feature of Soviet economic relations with Western indus-
trial countries, including the United States, has always been the trans-
fer of technology from highly advanced Western industrial sectors to
relatively backward Soviet industries. The Soviet Union has tradi-
tionally paid for its imports of technology primarily by exporting
valuable raw materials, including energy resources. Despite important
Soviet advances in certain industrial sectors, the technology gap be-
tween the Soviet Union and the West persists. Consequently, the basic
structure of U.S.-Soviet trade is likely to remain unchanged in the
foreseeable future.
Technology is transferred between countries in a number of ways.
Flows of published information, such as technical journals and books,
the foreign travel of students, scientists and engineers, technical aid
and cooperation programs arranged by governments, and foreign com-
merce, are frequently-used channels for transferring technical infor-
mation. While all of these channels may be used in future U.S.-Soviet
relations, commercial .exchanges of technology — the importation of
machinery, equipment, and relevant literature, agreements on patents,
licensing and know-how, and direct foreign investments and opera-
tions of multinational corporations — are the focus of this study.
A wide variety of U.S.-Soviet commercial exchanges are likely to
involve technology transfers. Transfers may take place in new, dy-
namic industries, such as those producing computers, chemicals and
electronics, or in traditional sectors, such as agriculture. Consequently,
while giving special attention to prospective technological transfers,
the study will consider the broad range of U.S.-Soviet economic
relations.
Current projections indicate a substantial increase in U.S.-Soviet .
economic exchanges. Improved economic relations are officially con-
sidered to be part of a pattern of changing U.S.-Soviet relations in
many areas. The trade agreement, along with the Summit agreements
on strategic arms limitations and other matters, links national security
considerations, economic relations, technology policy, and the conduct
of diplomacy between the two major powers.2 President Richard Nixon
2 The interaction of various aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations is perhaps best demonstrated
in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Communique issued at the conclusion of President Nixon's visit to
the Soviet Union on May 29, 1972. The communique enumerates a number of areas in which
the prospects for greater cooperation seemed favorable. See "Joint Communique," in Presi-
dent Nixon in Moscow (Washington, D.C. : United States Information Service, 1972),
pp. 18-24.
532
and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev both postu-
late that the changes occurring in U.S.-Soviet relations will influence
the stability of the international community for some years to come.
The prospect of increased U.S.-Soviet technology transfers raises
important questions of national security and creates special require-
ments for institutional changes that can insure mutual benefits in fu-
ture economic interactions. U.S. policymakers, legislative as well as
executive, will be faced with hard questions : What kinds of U.S. tech-
nology do Soviet leaders want to import? Can such technical informa-
tion be safely exported to the Soviet Union without enhancing its mili-
tary capabilities? What technological contributions will U.S.-Soviet
commercial exchanges make to U.S. industry? What risks will these
exchanges pose to specific U.S. industries and industrial corporations?
Such questions suggest some of the complex and difficult problems
which continue to be involved in the growing interaction of U.S. for-
eign economic policy, technology policy, and diplomacy.
II. Setting
The signing of the U.S. -Soviet trade agreement in Washington, on
October 18, 1072, represented the culmination of a gradual change in
U.S. foreign economic policy toward the Soviet Union. It came after
several years of discussion and review of a foreign trade policy de-
signed in the early years of the Cold War. The new commercial ar-
rangements are a part of an overall change in U.S. -Soviet diplomatic
relations. The political detente between the two countries has provided
a favorable atmosphere for long-term and mutually beneficial tech-
nology transfers. At the same time, the evolving commercial and tech-
nological relationship is likely to influence political decisionmaking
in both the United States and the Soviet Union.
TLR. -Soviet Commercial Relations After World War II
The central feature of U.S. foreign trade policy toward the Soviet
Union during the Cold War period was an attempt to deny the Soviet
Union the benefits of trade with the more advanced industrial West.
Those who advocated restrictions on U.S. -Soviet trade argued that the
United States should not contribute to the economic and military
power of a country whose domestic and foreign policies were inimical
to U.S. interests. This argument was based on the assumption that the
United States could retard the growth of Soviet economic and military
power by preventing U.S. companies from trading with the Soviet
Union. Exports of U.S. technology were considered to be particularly
important to the Soviet Union and were therefore singled out for ex-
tremely strict controls.
Another major argument against trading with the Soviet Union
was the alleged existence of unethical Soviet foreign trade practices.
Among the charges directed at Soviet foreign trade organizations
were those of dumping, pirating of foreign inventions, disruption of
Western markets for political purposes, and use of slave labor. Such
arguments were widely accepted in the early days of the Cold War. As
a result, numerous artificial barriers were erected to inhibit normal
economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Eco-
nomic rationality gave way to national security considerations as a
major determinant of U.S. -Soviet economic relations in the early
postwar period. The curtailment of commercial transactions with the
Soviet Union was consequently made an important U.S. foreign policy
goal.
U.S.-imposed restrictions were not the only causes of Soviet eco-
nomic isolation. To a large extent, Soviet foreign economic policy in
the late 1940's and early 195CFs was a continuation of its prewar strat-
egy of minimizing its economic ties to the industrial West. During the
1930's, Soviet foreign economic relations had been characterized by a
policy of self-sufficiency or autarky. Although the importation of
(533)
534
high-technology products and, for a time, the services of foreign engi-
neers were permitted to meet high-priority, short-run needs, minimum
reliance on the non-Communist world economy was a primary indi-
cator of economic success. Throughout his rule, Soviet Party Leader
Joseph Stalin adhered to the principle that the world was divided into
two hostile camps — the capitalist and socialist economic and political
systems.
The Soviet leadership's ideological hostility toward the United
States and the unresolved issue of Tsarist and Russian Provisional
Government debts (which Soviet leaders refused to pay) inhibited
economic relations between the two countries. The situation was
exacerbated by a sharp fall in the world market prices for Soviet raw
materials, which accounted for most of Soviet exports to the United
States. Despite these problems, the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions in 1933 and the signing of bilateral trade treaties in 1935 and
1937 provided the basis for some expansion of trade. However, the
Soviet Union's general pattern of autarkical foreign trade and isola-
tion from the West did not change.
The interwar policies were interrupted only temporarily by Soviet
alliances with Western countries during World War II. Expectations
that the wartime alliance might be followed by peacetime cooperation
proved unfounded. Discussions of U.S. aid and credits to the Soviet
Union and Soviet participation in a now multilateral world economic
system came to an end with the emergence of the Cold War. The
Soviet leadership's suspicion of Western "capitalist" countries and the
Soviet predilection for comprehensive planning and control of the
domestic economy probably led them to revert to a deliberate policy
of economic independence. The economic isolation of the U.S.S.R.
from the West reached a peak in the early 1950's, when less than 20
percent of its foreign trade was conducted with countries outside the
Communist area.
In the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's attitudes toward U.S.-
Soviet trade gradually changed in both countries. In the Soviet Union,
the post-Stalin leadership began actively to seek business deals with
Western industrial countries. Soviet Party Leader Nikita Khrushchev,
in his travels abroad, personally lobbied for improved economic rela-
tions. Typical was his appearance at the Leipzig Trade Fair in 1959,
where he presented himself as a businessman rather than a political
leader. The West European countries and Japan took advantage of
this economic opening to the East. Reduced trade restrictions, liberal
credit policies, and participation in joint industrial ventures allowed
them rapidly to expand their trade with the Soviet Union and other
East European countries. The attitudes of U.S. policymakers toward
East-West trade, however, tended to be more sensitive to political
differences with the Soviet Union. The Cuban crisis, the Vietnam War,
and the invasion of Czechoslovakia set back efforts to improve eco-
nomic ties with the Soviet Union.
In spite of the unfavorable political climate, small but significant
steps were made to remove some of the impediments to IT. S. -Soviet
trade. Several administrative changes, such as loosening export con-
trols and extending credits for Soviet agricultural purchases from the
United States, facilitated a gradual increase in U.S. -Soviet trade dur-
ing the 19fi(Vs. Moreover, the rationale for East-West trade restrictions
535
slowly eroded. Restraints on U.S.-Soviet trade were criticized on sev-
eral grounds. Advocates of expanded East-West trade claimed that
U.S. controls were not effective. Communist countries which were de-
nied certain U.S. poods could often import the same products from
other Western countries. It was argued that U.S. companies were
needlessly forced to forego mutually advantageous trade opportunities.
Those who favored more trade with the Soviet Union also claimed
that such trade would improve political ties between the two coun-
tries and would help to achieve a more stable international order. Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson appointed a special committee, headed by J.
Irwin Miller, to reexamine U.S. trade policy toward the Soviet Union
and other East European countries. The committee recommended sev-
eral trade liberalization measures and concluded:
The intimate engagement of trade, over a considerable period of time, when
taken with the process of change already under way, can influence the internal
development and the external polices of European Communist societies along
paths favorable to our purpose and to world peace. Trade is one of the few
channels available to us for constructive contacts with nations with whom we
find frequent hostility. In the long run, selected trade, intelligently negotiated
and wisely administered, may turn out to have been one of our most powerful
tools of national policy.3
Such arguments led President Johnson to urge increased economic
exchanges in order to "build bridges" to the East European countries.
Soviet- American Trade Prospects Come of Age
The U.S. domestic economic recession of 1969-70 and the recur-
ring balance-of-payments deficits gave rise to a far-reaching review
by the Nixon Administration of foreign economic policy. Expanded
trade with Communist countries was considered as a means of increas-
ing U.S. exports and stimulating domestic production and employ-
ment. Initially, however, the administration made no major effort to
increase U.S.-Soviet trade. The report of the Commission on Inter-
national Trade and Investment Policy, established by the President
in May 1970 to study major problems in the field of U.S. foreign trade
and investment, was cautious in its appraisal of U.S. foreign trade
policy toward the Communist world :
We see few economic problems in our trade relations with Communist coun-
tries. The course of these relations is mostly determined by political factors.
The volume of U.S. trade involved is small and is likely to remain so for the
1970's.4
While recommending change, the Commission expressed specific
reservations on expanding technological transfers and on the use of
bilateral arrangements in trade:
Within the bounds set by strategic considerations, the United States should
attempt to expand its trade with the Communist countries. To this end, we should
align our export restrictions and related regulations with those of other Western
nations.
However, transfers of technologies, production processes, and/or assistance in
the establishment of manufacturing facilities should continue to be subject to
•■""Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade With East European Countries and
the Soviet Union," Department of State Bulletin, May 30. 1966, p. 855.
4 A. L. Williams (Commission Chairman), United States International Economic Policy
in an Interdependent World (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Govt. Print. Off., July 1971),
Vol. I, p. 10. [Hereafter cited as: Williams Report.]
536
careful review by appropriate government agencies to ensure that they do not
contribute significantly to the military capabilities of Communist countries.
The President should be given authority to remove the existing tariff discrimi-
nation against imports from Communist countries, in return for appropriate
benefits for the United States.
We should explore with other Western governments possible multilateral ar-
rangements designed to loosen the existing bilateral constraints on East-West
trade.5
The Nixon Administration's "New Economic Policy," inaugurated
in August 1971, proposed a program for attacking foreign, as well as
domestic, economic problems. With the new initiative in foreign trade
matters, interest in East-West trade grew. The issue of expanding
East-West trade ties became more closely linked to the broader range
of security and political issues that were to make up the agenda of
the May 1972 Summit meeting of President Nixon and Party Secre-
tary Brezhnev. In December 1971, Mr. Peter G. Peterson, Assistant to
the President for International Economic Affairs (later Secretary of
Commerce), issued a report ranging broadly over the foreign economic
policy interests of the United States. The Peterson Report called for
a new U.S. approach to Communist trade in order to improve the trade
prospects of the United States and to open the way for the Communist
countries to join the world trading and monetary community.
Relations with the Communist world are now opening up rapidly. The United
States has a long way to go in matching the trade levels of East and West Europe
with each other. Presently, much of European trade with Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union is on the basis of bilateral agreements. A major effort may
now be needed to see how to fit the non-market Communist countries into the
multilateral framework of economic exchange among the Western economies.
We shall also have to review at home the kinds of guidelines to apply in trading
with non-market enterprises."
Mr. Peterson noted that the share of the United States in Western
trade with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe was about 3 percent of
exports and 2 percent of imports — roughly unchanged from 1960.
With the tripling of total Western exports to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe during the period 1960-1970 (from $3.7 to $10.0 bil-
lion). Western European and Japanese exports accounted for most
of the increase.7
The trips to Moscow by Maurice Stans, Secretary of Commerce, in
November 1971 and Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, in April
1972 resulted in optimistic appraisals of the future course of U.S.-
Soviet economic relations. Secretary Stans predicted that the level
of U.S. -Soviet trade would rise substantially in the next few years.
Secretary Butz was also optimistic, suggesting that significant grain
sales to the Soviet Union might take place for a number of years.
The Summit agreements in May 1972 did not, however, include a
commercial agreement. Instead, the Joint Commercial Commission
w;is set up to negotiate :
(a) an overall trade agreement including reciprocal most -favored-
nation agreement;
(b) arrangements for the reciprocal availability of government
credits;
s Ibid., pp. 15-16.
• Peter G. Peterson, A Foreign Economic Perspective (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Govt.
Print. Office, December 1971), p. 28. [Hereafter cited as Peterson (1971).]
7 Ibid., p. 23.
537
(c) provisions for the reciprocal establishment of business facili-
ties to promote trade ;
(d) an agreement establishing an arbitration mechanism for settling
commercial dudoates.8
The Joint Commercial Commission has no precise parallels in earlier
periods of temporary improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, although
it does parallel recent Soviet arrangements with the Japanese and
West Europeans. The Commission consists on each side of one princi-
pal, three deputies, and staff. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce and
the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Peter G. Peterson and Mr.
Nikolai Patolichev, respectively, were the first principals.9 The U.S.
staff for the new commission was supplied by a component of the new
East- West Trade Bureau of the Department of Commerce.
On March 6, 1973 an East- West trade policy committee was created
with George Shultz as chairman, and Frederick B. Dent, Secretary of
Commerce, as vice chairman. Other members are Secretary of State
Rogers, presidential assistants Henry A. Kissinger and Peter M. Flani-
gan, and Ambassador William D. Eberle, Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations. James E. Smith, Deputy Under Secretary of
Treasury is the executive secretary of the Committee.10
Even though the problems and issues of U.S.-Soviet trade were not
resolved at the May 1972 Summit meeting, there appeared to be a seri-
ous disposition on the part of Soviet authorities to press for their early
resolution. New York Times reporter Theodore Shabad reported a
discussion with Mikhail Misnik, deputy chairman of the Soviet State
Planning Commission, in which Mr. Misnik said :
It's about time we moved beyond the Stone age practice of, say, bartering a
sheep for half a camel ... if we advance beyond that stage into large-scale
arrangements in which the United States would provide plant and equipment and
we would pay with raw materials and the end products of such plants, then the
possibilities are indeed immense.
. . . Once we feel that there is serious interest in a joint venture, the problem
of access can be overcome.11
The issues were formally joined again during the summer. In a
report released by Secretary Peterson on his return from the first
meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, he suggested
that the United States was also willing to compromise — even in the
area of high technology transfers formerly restricted by association
with national security.
With the industrial and technological development of other major economies,
the U.S. no longer has the monopoly it once enjoyed in the production of certain
goods. Our overall trade balance is a melancholy reminder of these changed cir-
cumstances. The increased availability of high technology products elsewhere
rendered some of our original curbs on exports to the Soviet Union increasingly
anachronistic. The real loser from these particular restraints would have in-
creasingly been the U.S. producer and worker, not the Soviet consumer or the
Soviet economy. There comes a point at which we must face the fact that business
8 "Communique Regarding Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, May 26, 1972,"
Denartment of State Bulletin (June 26, 1972), p. 898.
8 On March 6, 1973, George Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, was designated to succeed
Mr. Peterson.
w Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1973.
11 New York Times, May 30, 1972, p. 19.
538
is business, and, if it is going to go on in any event, we might as well have a piece
of the action.12
The new attitudes expressed by Mr. Misnik and Mr. Peterson pro-
vided the impetus .for conclusion of a series of agreem™ r^ regulating
and promoting U.S.-Soviet trade. On July 8, 1972, an agreement was
reached providing credit through the U.S. Commodity Credit Cor-
poration for Soviet purchases of American grain. A maritime agree-
ment was concluded on October 14, 1972, which removed several bar-
riers to commercial shipping between the two countries. On October 18,
1972, a commercial agreement and a settlement of the Soviet Lend-
Lease debt were signed. The commercial agreement projected a trip-
ling of U.S.-Soviet trade within a three-year period and provided a
number of regulatory measures. The Lend-Lease settlement arranged
a repayment schedule for the Soviet World War II debt to the United
States.
The Disengagement of Congress From U.S.-Soviet Trade Negotiations
Dealing with the broad question of American international eco-
nomic policy, the Williams Commission Report in July 1971 made
clear that a major and direct role of Congress in trade negotiations was
necessary and desirable :
. . . The U.S. Congress has the constitutional responsibility for regulating
trade. It delegates the administration of this responsibility to the Executive,
which has the constitutional responsibility for negotiations with foreign govern-
ments. This makes it all the more important that we do our utmost to provide for
continuous, close communications between the Executive and the Congress, so as
to ensure the effective pursuit of our national objectives.
We recommend that the negotiations be buttressed in advance by appropriate
congressional action. In some areas, such as tariffs, a specific delegation of
authority to negotiate and proclaim changes in U.S. restrictions will be needed.
In other areas, the Administration should negotiate on the basis of a congres-
sional declaration of intent; the results of the negotiations would be submitted to
Congress, either for affirmative action, or preferably subject to an understanding
that they could be implemented by the Executive unless rejected by Congress
within, say, 60 days. Furthermore, some Congressmen should be included in the
United States delegations to the negotiations.1*
The Peterson Report in December 1971 also referred to a special
congressional role in fashioning a new international economic order:
Of critical importance in our efforts will be the new legislation needed to
equip American negotiators with the tools for constructing a new, open and fair
world trading system. Defining the negotiating authority we need will require
close collaboration with the Congress. In the international negotiations under-
taken with this authority, our intention will be to construct a new trading sys-
tem to take the place of the old."
However, no effort was made to involve Congress in U.S.-Soviet
trade negotiations. Congress did not pass enabling legislation to facili-
tate a trade agreement between the two countries. Only after the trade
agreement had been concluded did the Nixon Administration turn to
"Peter G. Peterson, U.S.Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era (Washington,
D.C. : Department of Commerce, August 1972), p. 13. [Hereafter cited as Peterson Report
(1972). 1
13 Williams Report, op. clt., pp. lfr-17.
u Peterson (1971) op. clt., p. v.
539
Congress for enactment of a law providing most-favored-nation treat-
ment for the Soviet Union.
The various executive department delegations to the Soviet Union
did not include congressional representation, nor was the Summit
meeting attended by representatives of Congress. Moreover, the bi-
partisan official visits to China by congressional leaders were not
repeated in the wake of the Moscow Summit, and the Joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission set up at the Summit did not include
congressional representation. Finally, the Peterson Report in August
1972 on the first meeting of the Commission made no direct reference
to Congress.
The absence of congressional participation in U.S.-Soviet negotia-
tions was in contrast with trade negotiations conducted under the
authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1873).
Section 243 of that Act stipulated that four members of Congress (two
members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and two of the
Senate Committee on Finance) must be accredited as members of the
U.S. delegation to trade negotiations authorized by the Act.
Congress necessarily will be involved in certain aspects of U.S.-
Soviet economic relations in the future. Congressional approval is
required for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union. More-
over, Congress may be asked to consider new arrangements to facilitate
U.S.-Soviet trade, such as expansion of U.S. Government credit
facilities.
Trade and Diplomacy
Increased trade has generally been assumed to encourage more ami-
cable and stable relations among nations. U.S. economic relations with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have specifically been assumed
to be an effective lever to further U.S. national interests. For example,
after World War II, U.S. leaders proposed including the Soviet Union
and East European countries in the Marshall Plan for European re-
covery, presumably in return for adherence to U.S. views on the politi-
cal settlements in Eastern Europe and other matters. U.S. leaders also
specifically linked economic benefits from trade to assured access routes
in the settlement of the 1948 Berlin Crisis. Again, Communist coun-
tries were apparently denied equal commercial relations because of
their participation in the Korean War and their repressive domestic
policies. Withdrawal of MFN status and imposition of export controls
Avere among the penalties applied by U.S. policymakers. Later Yugo-
slavia and Poland were rewarded for their independence from Soviet
domination and for a degree of moderation in domestic policies by a
moderating of U.S. foreign trade policy. Romania has also been sin-
gled out on various occasions for less restrictive commercial treatment
in recognition of its relatively independent foreign policy. Thus,
changes in U.S. foreign economic policy toward the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe have been used for a number of political ends deemed
consistent with U.S. foreign policy. Overarching the specific applica-
tions of economic leverage has been the general attitude that the Com-
munist nations were enemies of the United States and should be de-
540
nied any assistance in development of capabilities which might be a
threat to U.S. security. Although somewhat inconsistent in applica-
tion, a policy of reward-penalty appeared to be followed by the United
States, apparently with three main objectives :
(1) to encourage detente by reducing weapons development, lower-
ing force levels, and moderating crisis management ;
(2) to encourage detente through moderation and reform of the So-
viet regime's domestic policies, including religious tolerance, economic
reform, freedom of expression, and the right to emigrate;
(3) to encourage polycentrism in the Communist world, detente in
the foreign policies of the individual Communist countries other than
the U.S.S.R., and moderation in their domestic policies. The impor-
tance of these several objectives has varied over time, but each appears
relevant today.
Although the United States and the Soviet Union still have political
differences in various world crises, there is some evidence of a moderat-
ing of international tension. The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks (SALT) provide a mechanism for moderation in the devel-
opment of both strategic offensive and defensive weapons ; the Treaty
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, are evi-
dence of apparent progress.15 The multilateral European Security
Conference (ESC) and discussions of mutual and balanced force re-
ductions (MBFR) may reflect a similar development in the area of
military force reductions.16
At the same time, questions remain on the significance and enduring
character of the change in relations. In the three areas of detente —
hostilities and security, internal moderation and reform, and easing
of the control system in Eastern Europe — opinions vary on the changes
to date and future prospects. Indeed, quite divergent views on these
various aspects of the new relationship are expressed by different
observers :
(a) On hostilities and security. — Some observers argue that the
Soviet Union acts as a moderating influence on North Vietnamese and
Middle Eastern leaders and uses its leverage to dampen tensions and
hostilities. Others maintain that the Soviet Union fosters proxy wars
to its own benefit, and that the continuations of the Arab-Israeli and
Indoehinese conflicts are not incompatible with Soviet aims.
Moreover, some argue that Soviet leaders have a pressing need to
reorder priorities and that the SALT agreements permit them to pro-
ceed on badly needed civilian programs for modernization of the tech-
nologically backward Soviet economy. Others contend that the Soviet
Union, with a well-developed military research and development base,
will seek to turn its numerical advantage in strategic offensive weapons
into a position of overall superiority by closing the technological lead
"The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two deslg
nated areas in the United States and the Soviet Union, and at a low level. The Interim
Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces.
14 Preliminary talks on the European Security Conference began in Helsinki on Novem-
ber 22, 1972. The purpose of the Conference, which will include most of the countries of
East and West Europe, the United Stntes. and Canada, Is to attempt to solve problems of
European security and cooperation. Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions
began on January 31. 1973 in Vienna. The purpose of the talks Is to negotiate a reduction
of military forces in Europe.
541
of the United States with respect to such advances in weaponry as the
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV).
(b) On internal moderation or reform. — Some observers point to
a continuing need for moderation to encourage professionalism and
accommodate modernization. Others, however, point to the restrictions
on civil liberties, religious freedom, the right to emigrate, and access
to foreign media as evidence of a retrogression or toughening of the
Stalinist elements in the system.
(c) On the control of the bloc. — Some observers maintain that the
relaxation of Soviet-U.S. tensions, the potential reordering of Soviet
priorities, and a moderating of domestic controls may permit more
foreign policy independence and internal reform in Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union, given some relaxation of ten-
sions vis-a-vis the West, may decide it can get away with perpetuating
the post-Czech invasion "Brezhnev Doctrine," which severely limits
Eastern European independence from Moscow.
Recent expressions by Dr. Henry Kissinger appear to incline toward
the more hopeful, less threatening interpretation of the progress to-
ward detente to date, while accepting the view that opposing trends
and pressures exist. The Soviet leadership, Dr. Kissinger pointed out
in a congressional briefing in June 1972, is responding to the pressures
which make for detente as well as to the older, conservative pressures :
. . . Some factors — such as the fear of nuclear war, the emerging consumer
economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society —
have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the
United States. Other factors — such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the
catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas — have prompted pressures for
tactical gains."
Earlier in the same briefing, Dr. Kissinger noted :
But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment
of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political
strength.18
Dr. Kissinger also saw enhanced security in the collective benefits or
linkage among various agreements such as those on arms limitations,
trade, and the environment :
We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of
negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best
served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested
interest in mutual restraint.19
. . . The SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in
the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some
sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically to a chain of agreements and
to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers
of the nuclear age.20
The process of creating a "vested interest in mutual restraint" is
likely to be a very gradual and protracted one. Moreover, future
changes in Soviet foreign policy and the motivations of Soviet leaders
in their conduct of diplomacy will not be easily discerned. The political
17 Kissinger briefing to Congressional leaders, Congressional Record, June 19, 1972,
p. SOfiOO.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. S9600.
20 Ibid., pp. S9599-9600.
542
benefits to the United States must by their nature be uncertain of ful-
fillment, especially in the short run. On the other hand, the economic
benefits to the Soviet Union from improved commercial relations may
be certain and significant, even in the short run. Thus, the risk of un-
fulfilled expectations appears greater for the United States than for
the Soviet Union. More specifically, increased technology transfers to
the Soviet Union may show only long-term benefits to the United
States in the diplomatic and political area.
III. The Soviet Rationale for Expanded Foreign Economic
Relations
The Ninth Five- Year Plan Directives discussed at the Twenty-
Fourth Soviet Party Congress in March-April 1971 called for many
advances in technology. Technological change was projected to mod-
ernize the Soviet civilian economy, improve the quality of consumers'
real income, and raise the efficiency of economic planning and man-
agement. Meeting the targets in each of these areas required tech-
nological assistance from abroad, including the United States. This
reordering of priorities underlies Soviet interest in increased com-
mercial relations with the United States.
The Soviet leadership's emphasis on technological change in the
Soviet economy reflects a growing concern that Soviet technology lags
considerably behind that in the industrial West. While there are no
precise measures of technology levels, there is much evidence that a
technology gap between the Soviet Union and the West does exist.
Michael Boretsky, for example, examined a number of key techno-
logical innovations in the Soviet economy and concluded that the
overall level of Soviet technology in 1962 lagged behind that in the
United States by some 25 years.21 The existence of a technology gap
has been confirmed by many others, including Soviet observers.
Premier Alexei Kosygin asserted in 1965 : "The pattern of production
of machinery and equipment being turned out by the many branches
[of Soviet industry] does not conform to modern standards." 22 Three
Soviet scientists who have been critical of the leadership's policies
described the technology gap in more detail :
When we compare our economy with that of the United States, we see that
ours is lagging behind, not only quantitatively, but — and this is the saddest
part — also qualitatively. The more novel and revolutionary the aspect of the
economy, the wider becomes the gap . . . We are ahead of the U.S. in the
production of coal, but behind in the production of oil, gas, and electric power,
ten times behind in chemistry, and immeasurably behind in computer
technology ....
In the late 1950's, our country was the first to launch a sputnik and to send
a man into space. By the end of the 1960's, we have lost the lead in this field
(as in many others). The first men to set foot on the moon were Americans.
This is one of the outward signs of an essential and ever-growing gap between
our country and the West extending through the whole spectrum of scientific
technological activity.23
21 Michael Boretsky, "Comparative Progress in Technology, Productivity, and Economic
Efficiency: U.S.S.R. Versus U.S.A.," in U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. New
Directions in the Soviet Economy. Part II-A. Economic Performance. 89th Cong., 2d sees.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1966, p. 149.
23 Alexei Kosygin, "On Improving Management of Industry, Perfecting Planning and
Enhancing Economic Incentives in Industrial Production," in New Methods of Economic
Management in the USSR. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1965, p. 19.
-"• "Appeal of Scientists A. D. Snkharov. V. F. Turchin and R. A. Medvedev to Soviet
Party and Government Leaders," March 19, 1970. Translated in Survey, Summer, 1970,
pp. 160-170.
(543)
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 36
544
Another indicator of the technology gap is the difference in factor
productivity — the amount of output generated per unit of capital and
labor input. One comparison showed overall productivity in the Soviet
economy to be about one-third of that in the United States in the mid-
1960's. (See Figure 1.)
Mid-1960s
GNP from each combined unit
of capital and labor employed
Index: USA - 100
USA
Northwest
Europe
Japan
Italy
USSR
Figure 1. — The Levels of Technological Development: The U.S.S.R. Compared
With Other Developed Countries.
Source : Peterson Report, 1972. Annex A, p. 34.
The lower level of Soviet civilian technology is surprising in view
of a consistently higher share of Soviet GNP devoted to investment
than in the United States — 33 and 17 percent, respectively, in 1971.24
Presumably, both the military burden and the inefficiency in utiliza-
tion of investment had something to do with the disproportion. Like-
wise, labor productivity in Soviet industry and agriculture were a
fraction of the U.S. level — 41 and 11 percent, respectively, in 1971.25
Technological Requirements of the Ninth Fire-Year Plan
The Ninth Five- Year Plan enumerated several sectors of the econ-
omy which were to receive primary attention for technological change.
Most of the proposed changes have important implications for Soviet
foreign economic relations.
MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET INDTJSTRY
Soviet ability to stimulate economic growth through technological
change will depend largely on expansion of energy from hydrocarbon
sources. The exploitation of hydrocarbon resources with American
assistance would facilitate technological change in the Soviet Union
in at least three important ways: (1) it would bring in advanced U.S.
technology for the Soviet oil and gas industry; (2) it would provide
critically needed energy snpplies to Soviet industry; and (3) it would
provide a source, of foreign exchange earnings, which are needed to
import Western technology for other branches of Soviet industry.
M Peterson Report (1972), op. cit, p. 32.
* Ibid., p. 33.
545
Increased output of the more efficient hydrocarbon fuel sources, such
as petroleum and natural gas, is particularly important. Soviet energy
consumption in 1971 was about half that of the United States — 1,291
as compared with 2,130 million metric tons of coal equivalent — while
the respective GNPs of the two countries were 548.6 and 1,000.4 billion
1970 U.S. dollars. However, the structure of primary energy consump-
tion in the U.S.S.R. is less developed : coal still supplied 44 percent of
the energy as compared with 19 percent in the United States. (See
Figure 2.) Petroleum and natural gas accounted for all but about one
percent of the remainder in each case, with hydro and nuclear power
of negligible importance.
Percent
USSR
Natural Gas l Hydro
1960
1960
Nuclear
Negl 1 Hydro
Nuclear
Negl. 1 Hydro
1971 1971
Figure 2. — Primary Energy Consumption, United States and U.S.S.R.
Source : Peterson Report (1972). Annex A, p. 14.
The trend toward reduced coal utilization (from 66 to 44 percent
from 1960-1971) may continue if petroleum and natural gas produc-
546
tion goes according to the Plan, but at a diminished rate — another 5 to
6 percent reduction. (See Table 1.)
Success in this modest improvement in the energy balance will de-
pend on Soviet ability to expand hydrocarbon output in Western
Siberia, where two-thirds of the increased output is projected for the
Ninth Five- Year Plan.26 The West Siberian development, in turn,
requires considerable importation of extraction, transmission, and re-
finery equipment. Moreover, the technology of construction in perma-
frost may dictate some industrial cooperation with American firms
familiar with Alaskan Northern Slope technology. The projected ex-
pansion of the West Siberian energy project would require a huge in-
vestment. Consequently, Soviet decision makers may have to choose
between a major economic growth and modernization project and
costly defense programs.2
27
TABLE 1.-S0VIET ENERGY PRODUCTION, 1970 AND 1975
1970
Percentage of
Extraction Fuel and Extraction
and pro- Fuel re- power and pro-
duction sources resources duction
1975
Percentage of
Fuel and 1975 as
Fuel re- power percentage
sources resources of 1970
Oil, including condensed gas (million
metric tons)
Gas, natural (billion cubic meters)
Coal (million metric tons)
Peat, for fuel (million metric tons)
Oil shale (million metric tons)...
Firewood, for fuel (million cubic meters).
Fuel resources— total (million metric tons
of conventional fuel)
Hydroenergy (billion kWh)
Atomic energy (billion kWh)__
Fuel and power resources— total (million
metric tons of conventional fuel)
352.6
198.0
624.1
57.3
24.3
69.0
227.0
124.4
41.0
19.4
35.9
1.5
.7
1.5
100.0
39.6
18.6
34.6
1.4
.7
1.4
96.3
3.6
.1
100.0
505.0
320.0
694.9
78.3
32.7
55.5
1,639.0
165.0
25.0
1.703.5 ..
44.1
23.3
29.5
1.5
.7
.9
100.0
42.4
22.4
28.4
1.4
.7
.9
96.2
3.3
.5
100.0
143.2
161.6
111.3
136.6
134.6
80.4
133.6
132.6
3.5
700.0
274.3 ..
133.7
Source: Baibakov, p. 98.
In metal output, non-ferrous metals are particularly important in
the Ninth Five- Year Plan. In 1969 non-ferrous metals represented
only 8.75 percent of the total value of base metals in the Soviet Union
(as compared with 20 percent in the United States).28 An effort is
currently underway to increase the proportion of non-ferrous metals :
output of most important metals in this category are projected to in-
crease by 50 percent.29 Development of the aluminum, copper, and
other metal sources which are abundant in East Siberia, close to the
Soviet Union's low-cost hydroelectric system, is particularly attractive.
Increases in non-ferrous metal production are projected to provide
valuable inputs for modernizing other industrial sectors. A shift in
building materials to non-ferrous metals, paralleling the pattern in
other industrial countries, is prescribed.
n The first published Soviet plan In 30 years provides some detailed Insights on
projected Soviet cnorcv consumption : N. K. Baibakov, Gosudarstvcnnpi pyatiletnyi plan
raziitiia narodnoqo khoziaistr,, SSSR na 1971-1975 qodu. (State Five-Year Plan for
Development of the USSR National Economy for the Period 1971-1075) (Moscow,
GOftPlan, April 1072). (Hereafter cited as Baibakov.)
27 For a discussion of this .Soviet dilemma see below, Chanqinq Priorities in Allocation:
Growth in. Defense, pp. 24-20.
m Alexander Sutulov, The Soviet Challenge in Base Metals (Salt Lake City: The Univ.
of Utah Printing Service, 1971), 183.
29 Baibakov, p. 115.
547
The Directives of the Party Congress and the Five- Year Plan
specifically refer to "speeding the technological progress in machine-
building.30 Among the indicators of technological success for the
machine-building industry are lowering weight-to-power ratios, rais-
ing capacity and efficiency levels, and improving reliability. Some 26
lines of machines and equipment are listed as specific objects for tech-
nological change in the period 1971-1975.31
Other industries, such as chemicals and petrochemicals, are a part
of the technological plan, but with less specific technological targets.
QUALITY OF SOVIET LITE
The Ninth Five-Year Plan projected significant improvements in
the quality of consumer goods; it stressed the need for better diets,
clothing, personal transportation, and housing for the Soviet citizen.
The proposed improvements require not only increased output, but
also technological change in consumer industries.
The quality of the Soviet diet had been gradually improving for
several years before the Ninth Five- Year Plan, but the Plan's projec-
tions of considerable increases in quality foods underlie Soviet claims
that it is more consumer-oriented. (See Table 2.)
TABLE 2.-C0NSUMPTI0N OF SELECTED FOODS IN THE SOVIET UNION
[Yearly, per capita, in kilograms]
1975 as a
percentage of
1965 1970 1975 1970
Meat and meat products
Milk and milk products
Eggs
Fish and fish products
Sugar
Vegetable and melon products.
Source: Baibakov, p. 300.
In spite of an impressive increase of 14 percent in meat output from
1965 to 1971, the Soviet citizen averaged just one-third of the quantity
of meat consumed by his counterpart in the United States.32 More-
over, if the ambitious increase — about twice the earlier rate — is
achieved, the meat output per capita in 1975 will only approach the
level common in Eastern Europe today.33 In order to reach this goal,
improvement in animal husbandry, as well as a significant increase of
feed grain output and feed grain imports for a number of years, is
required. Foreign technology — the animal husbandry of American
agricultural business — could greatly assist Soviet agriculture. Specific
Soviet import needs include high-protein feed grains, better breeding
stock, and livestock raising and processing equipment.34 Although
30 Ibid., pp. 121ff.
31 Ibid., pp. 124-5.
32 Peterson Report (1972), op. clt., p. 23.
al Comecon, Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 1970, p. 300.
34 See Hubert H. Humphrey and Henry Bellmon, Observations on Soviet and Polish Agri-
culture, November-December, 1972. A trip report prepared for Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry of the U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973).
41.0
48.0
59
123
251.0
307.0
340
111
124.0
159.0
192
121
12.6
15.4
22
143
34.2
38.8
43
111
72.0
82.0
109
133
548
Soviet agriculture suffered a very bad weather year in 1972, Soviet
leaders appear committed to retain their livestock expansion plans.35
Increases in output of other consumer goods, such as clothing,
shoes, and household goods are also projected in the Ninth Five- Year
Plan. However, recent experience indicates that increases in output
alone will not satisfy the growing needs of Soviet consumers. Since
the early 1960's, poor quality, rather than insufficient quantity, of con-
sumer goods has been the major irritant to Soviet citizens. In the past,
increased output of consumer goods frequently resulted in increased
stocks and inventories. Soviet consumers refused to buy shoddy con-
sumer goods, choosing instead to put their money into savings accounts.
One attempt to solve this problem has been enterprise management
reform : 36 consumer industries were among the first to experiment
with market-oriented reforms. Another possible approach to improv-
ing light industry performance lies in importing foreign technology.
The 1972 agreement to purchase designs, engineering services and
equipment from two American firms for building tableware factories
in the Soviet Union 37 is an example of the latter approach.
The problem of low-quality consumer goods has also been attacked
by changing priorities on the types of consumer goods produced.38
Instead of further rapid expansion of inferior consumer goods, Soviet
officials have begun to rely more on production of key commodities, in
which quality is still not a major factor in the Soviet Union. Some
commodities, such as meat and automobiles, are so highly valued by
Soviet consumers that high prices and low quality are not likely to
deter them from spending their rubles. The manner in which auto-
mobile sales can be used to absorb excess spending power can be
readily comprehended by comparing the price of Soviet cars with
Soviet wages. Whereas the average industrial worker's gross monthly
pay is 135.4 rubles, he must pay 9,250 rubles for a new Volga auto-
mobile.39 Still, current payments are being offered against future
delivery for automobiles. The chronic repair problems for Soviet
domestic brands is presumably a reason why foreign producers were
sought to facilitate the current expansion. But even Soviet-produced
Fiats must meet problems of inadequate repair facilities and mechan-
ics. Domestic requirements for meat and automobiles underlie Soviet
interest in foreign animal husbandry and automobile technology.
Passenger car production in the Soviet Union is far below the level
needed to satisfy consumer demand. The Volga Automobile Plant in
ToFiatti, a cooperative venture between the Italian firm of Fiat and
the Soviet automobile industry, produced its first cars in 1970. While
the Fiat plant represents a significant increase in Soviet automobile
production, output will still fall short of Soviet needs. Future expan-
85 A January 1973 inventory Indicated that cattle holdings had Increased by 1.6 percent
In 1972, while swine holdings showed only a 7 percent decline. See Pravda, Jan. 30, 1973.
•■" See below, Improvement in Planning and Management, pp. 22-24.
37 Richard S. Frank, "Trade Report : U.S. Sees Surplus, More Jobs in Early Years of
Expanded Trade With Soviet Union," National Journal, vol. 4, No. 48 (Nov. 25, 1972),
p. 1800.
m Douglas B. Diamond, "Principal Targets and Central Themes of the Ninth Five- Year
Plnn." In Norton T. Dodge, ed., Analysis of the USSR's 2kth Party Congress and 9th
Fiii Year Plan ( Mechanicsville, Md. : Cremona Foundation. 1971), p. 52.
» \arodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, 1922-1972 gg. (Moscow Tsentral 'noe Statisticheskoe
Upravlenle, 1972, p. 350 ; Keith Bush, "Soviet Inflation," Radio Liberty Dispatch, Jan. 5,
1973. p. 5.
549
sion of the Tol'iatti and other automobile factories is expected.40 More
importation of foreign equipment and more industrial cooperation
with Western firms will undoubtedly be necessary for further prog-
ress. In addition to assisting in Soviet automobile production, Western
companies are likely to participate in related activities, such as road
building and construction of repair facilities.
Housing construction has been a treadmill for Soviet planners.
Urban growth accounts for most of the expansion in space. The in-
crease from about 6 to 7.5 square meters per capita for 1960-1970 is not
likely to be improved on much by 1975. Still more important is the
availability of reliable consumer durables and bathroom and kitchen
space. In 1972, Soviet citizens had about one-third to one-half of the
number of refrigerators, washing machines, and television sets per
capita found in American households. Moreover, many urban apart-
ments in the U.S.S.R. require the sharing of bathrooms and kitchens,41
and many household durable goods sold to Soviet consumers are ap-
parently of inferior quality. Much can be gained from technology
transfers from other industrial nations. For example, Soviet officials
arranged for adoption of French color television in 1965. As it has not
yet been perfected at competitive cost, the Soviets may have to look
elsewhere for assistance.
TRANSPORTATION
A key element in Soviet plans to modernize industry and improve
consumer welfare is the modernization of the Soviet transportation
system. Increases in pipeline construction and in auto transport (for
both freight and passengers) are highlighted in the Ninth Five- Year
Plan. (See Table 3.)
TABLE 3— TRANSPORTATION IN THE 9TH 5-YEAR PLAN
1970
1975 (planned)
Billions
Billions
1975 as a
of ton
Percent
of ton
Percent
percentage
kilometers
of total
kilometers
of total
of 1970
3, 829. 2
100.0
5,171.9
100.0
135
2, 494. 7
65.1
3, 050. 0
59.0
122
656.1
17.1
918.6
17.7
140
174.0
4.5
217.3
4.2
125
220. 8
5.8
338.0
6.5
153
1.9
.1
3.0
.1
161
281.7
7.4
645.0
12.5
229
Freight transport:
Turnover of freight transport (ton
kilometers)
railroad . . .
sea
lake
automobile
air
pipeline
Billions of
passenger
kilometers
Percent
of total
Billions of
passenger
kilometers
Percent
of total
Passenger transport:
Turnover of passenger transport
(passenger kilometers) 548.9 100.0 782.3 100.0
railroad 265.4 48.3 330.0 42.2
sea 1.6 .3 1.9 .2
lake 5.4 1.0 6.4 .8
automobile (bus) _ 198.3 36.1 311.0 39.8
air 78.2 14.3 133.0 17.0
1975 as a
percentage
of 1970
143
124
119
118
157
170
Source: Planovoe khoziaistvo (Planned Economy). No. 5, 1972, p. 16.
40 A large increase in passenger car production was projected In the Ninth Five- Year
Plan. An output of 1,335,000 cars is planned for 1975, compared with 392,000 in 1970.
See Baibakov, op. clt, p. 126.
41 Peterson Report (1972), op. cit, Annex A, p. 22.
550
Improvements in Soviet transportation have depended heavily on
imports of technology from abroad. Cooperative ventures with West-
ern European companies have aided in the construction of pipelines
from Siberia to Europe. The Soviet automotive industry is importing
large quantities of Western machinery, equipment, and know-how.
Major imports of Western technology, including American, have
aided in building the Kama River Truck Plant. The Kama Plant, cur-
rently under construction, is a massive project which will produce
150,000 trucks a year plus 250,000 diesel engines. About three-fourths
of all the machinery, equipment, and technology for the project is ex-
pected to come from Western firms.42
Improvement in Planning and Management
Soviet interest in foreign technology extends to planning and man-
agement techniques. Moreover acceptance of the conditions required
in joint ventures with Western market economies will tend to push
the Soviet economy further in the direction of economic change needed
to improve performance.
A new Five- Year Plan and a Soviet Party Congress are the usual
occasions for an assessment of past performance, current problems,
and future prospects of the world's second largest economy. The
discussions preceding the Ninth Five- Year Plan were of particular
interest because of the Party leadership's preoccupation with lagging
economic performance. The discussions in Party and professional cir-
cles ranged from issues relating to resource allocation policy to
changes in the system of planning and management.43 While plan
figures provide evidence of Soviet resource allocation policy, it is diffi-
cult to assess the leadership's dedication to economic reform.
The key elements in the economic reform discussions are the creation
of a new role for economic enterprises and a new approach to central
planning.44 The reformers propose more independence for enterprise
managers to decide on what and how to produce. Fewer guidelines and
success indicators would be handed down to enterprise managers from
the central bureaucracy. One new indicator would be profitability:
each enterprise would be required to take demand factors into consid-
eration and to generate sufficient sales to earn a profit. An important
aspect of the reforms is a renewed emphasis on material incentives —
profit incentives to encourage enterprise efficiency and wage incentives
to stimulate worker productivity. New planning techniques, a more
flexible price system, and increased reliance on market forces are key
aspects of the reforms.
The reform proposals represent a dramatic departure from past
Soviet practices and have predictably run into opposition from con-
servative elements in the Party and government bureaucracies. The
Party Congress was apparently delayed from the fall of 1970 to the
spring of 1971 to accommodate further debates on resource allocation
"Imogene Edwards, "Automotive Trends In the USSR." In U.S. Congress. Joint Eco-
nomic Committee. Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies. 93d Cong., 1st sess. Wash-
ington, DC. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973.
** Prnvdn Feb 4 1970- Interview of Mr. Gorecllnd of Gostilnn. \Io»kor»kaui Praraa,
Feb. 21, 1971 ; Pravda, July 4, 1971 ; Pravda, Feb. 14, 1971 ; Sovietskaia Rossiia, Feb. 4,
1970
«* See Richard Judv "The Economists," and John Hardt and Theodore Frankel, "The
Industrial Managers," In H. Q. Skllllng and Franklyn Griffith, eds., Interest Groups m
Soviet Politics (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1971).
551
and planning and management reform in the formulation of the Plan.
Yet the Plan Directives and the leadership speeches at the Congress
were disappointing as blueprints of the future course of reform in the
Soviet economy.
In the debate on planning and management, Party General Secre-
tary Leonid Brezhnev identified himself with a variety of differing
positions. He appeared to bless a conference chaired by Academician
Fedorenko in April 1970 which featured more professional techniques
in planning.45 He also supported the extension of market simulating
enterprise reforms, such as the Shchekino chemical plant experiment,
to all industrial enterprises. At the same time, by rhetoric, if not by
direct support, he aligned himself with traditional views of manage-
ment by criticizing labor disciplining and supporting the revival of
the revolutionary subbotnik (an unpaid "voluntary" Saturday work-
day by workers organized by the Party).46 Thus, Brezhnev was not
to be tacked down to any firm commitment on the system of planning
and management,
The evidence of the Congress or the pre-Congress deliberations did
not suggest that Soviet leaders were undertaking serious changes in
planning and management. Although the leadership was pushed by the
logic of rationalization to develop better models for forecasting and to
favor market simulating enterprise reforms, it apparently found the
political-economic cost of change unacceptable. At some point, the cost
of not changing may be perceived by the Soviet leadership to be
greater than the cost of change. Whether the need for change is fully
perceived by the leadership is unclear.
Alec Nove has suggested that the apparent setbacks of the reformers
or economic modernists are only temporary. Time, he claimed, is on
their side, and the search for a synthesis between a market and
planned economy must begin again.47 An important article written by
Soviet Academician T. S. Khachaturov shortly after the 24th Party
Congress provides some substantiation of Nove's view.48 Khacha-
turov's article, which argued in favor of planning and management
reforms, may have indicated the beginning of a policy swing of
the Brezhnev leadership back to reform. If it did, it may yet result in
significant changes during the Ninth Five- Year Plan.
How do the discussions of economic reform relate to Soviet foreign
economic relations? While Soviet reformers have not emphasized the
international implications of the reforms, it is clear that a more ra-
tional economic decision-making structure would facilitate the integra-
tion of the Soviet economy into the international economic system.
Rationalization of Soviet prices would encourage the importation of
goods produced inefficiently by domestic industries. At the same time,
by fostering efficiency in domestic enterprises, the Soviet Union may
be able to expand its exports to Western markets. Moreover, economic
reform would remove many of the features of Soviet central planning
45 Pravda, Apr. 14, 1970 ; Ekonomika i matematicheskie tnetodu, vol. VI, No. 4, 1970,
pp. 631-638.
« Pravda, Apr. 14, 1970 : Jan. 13, 1970.
47 See Netie Zuerrher Zeitunq. April 5. 1970 : and T. Kirstein. "The Controversy over the
Market and the Plan in the Soviet Union." Neue Zuercher Zeitung, March 31, 1971.
** Pravda, May 15, 1970. T. S. Khachaturov is a member of the Academy of Sciences
and editor of one of its publications, Voprosy ekonomiki (Problems of Economics).
552
which inhibit Western businessmen from dealing with Soviet foreign
trade organizations.49
Soviet economic reforms center on adoption of modern mathematical
methods, improved computer capability, and new management tech-
niques. Systems analysis in regional planning, and input-output analy-
sis in national economic planning, are examples of the new trend. More
computer capability is required to support the more sophisticated eco-
nomic analysis. If, or as, the change proceeds, more application of
Western techniques, analysis, and hardware will become relevant. The
professional bridge between Soviet and Western economists, statisti-
cians, and management science specialists will likely follow economic
reform in the Soviet Union. At the same time, industrial cooperation
or joint ventures of industrial nations with the Soviet Union may
encourage and facilitate these reform trends.
In this early stage of expanding U.S.-Soviet commercial relations,
the correlation between domestic economic reform and foreign eco-
nomic policy cannot be tested empirically. It could be argued that
the trends are offsetting rather than complementary. Thus, it may be
that Soviet awareness of a need for technological change and improved
efficiency in the domestic economy has convinced the leadership that
thev should turn to foreign technological assistance as a substitute
for domestic reform. Only future experience in East-West economic
cooperation will resolve the question of the interrelationship of foreign
involvement and domestic reform in the Soviet economy.
Changing Priorities in Resource Allocation: Growth. Versus Defense
The technological priorities in the Ninth Five- Year Plan, which are
designed to modernize the civilian economy, improve the quality of
living, and raise the efficiency of planning and management, imply a
shift in resource allocation policy from military to civilian invest-
ment and consumption. These goals are suggested in the detailed pub-
lication of planned targets. An increase in civilian programs above
past levels suggests a decrease in the prior defense priorities. The
specific goals for increased energy output — focusing on the West Si-
berian oil-gas complex — provide evidence of a reordering of priorities.
The Soviet leadership's commitment to new priorities in resource
allocations, if sustained, will have important implications for Soviet
foreign economic relations. Increased expenditures on major invest-
ment projects, such as oil and gas exploration, and on consumer goods,
such as quality foods and automobiles, will increase Soviet demand
for imports of foreign technology. Presumably, Western technology
is needed less during a defense-priority period, since Soviet military
technology is widely considered to be near parity with that in the
West, and, in any event, military technology is not generally trans-
ferred to the Soviet Union in normal commercial transactions. Thus,
in assessing future Soviet needs for U.S. technology, it is important
to evaluate the prospects for a reorientation of Soviet priorities.
A firm commitment to new priorities runs counter to the traditional
policy of the Party and is also uncharacteristic of Party Secretary
49 See below, pp. 62-64.
553
Brezhnev's past record. During the period preceding the announce-
ment of the Plan (i.e., 1969-1971), Brezhnev voiced his displeasure
over the performance of the economy, but committed himself firmly
to neither a reform of planning and management, nor a new set of
priorities. Indeed, he advocated a variety of programs in the pre-
Congress period. He favored the military in a speech at the Dvina
River Maneuvers in February 1970; he favored agricultural invest-
ment in the July 1970 Party Plenum and at the meeting of the Col-
lective Farmers (Kolkhozniki) Congress; he apparently approved a
call for more housing in a February 1971 revision of the Plan; and he
identified himself with technological change by personally signing the
Plan Directives that same month. Finally, he approved the publica-
tion of the Ninth Five- Year Plan, under the editorship of his State
Planning Committee Chairman, N. K. Baibakov, in April 1972. In
short, on the allocation of resources, he behaved like a politician who
was securing his position by supporting everyone's programs. But the
grim fact faced by all politicians, whether the President of the United
States or the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, is that choice
is the inexorable requirement of political economy. Especially when
growth is slow, a leader must be against some programs to be for
others. Specifically, there was no indication that the high military
priority of the 1960's was being scaled down as it had been by
Khrushchev in 1959.
If expensive development of weapons systems is to continue, the
level of military claims on resources will then be at least equal to past
levels and will probably require a large share of the new resources
generated by modest economic growth. Unless military spending is
curtailed, increased requirements for modernization and consumer im-
provement must lead to overcommitment in the Ninth Five- Year Plan.
Brezhnev's dilemma illustrates that the two central economic policy
issues in Soviet politics remain civilian investment versus military
output, and the question of changes in planning and management.
In view of Brezhnev's equivocation on economic issues in the past,
why should he be expected to pursue the politically risky changes in
economic policy projected by the Ninth Five- Year Plan ? A possible
answer is that Brezhnev for the first time is able and willing to con-
vince conservative Party interests to permit such change. The Gen-
eral Secretary appears to have emerged from the 24th Party Congress
with more power and responsibility than he enjoyed in the pre-
Congress Brezhnev-Kosygin collegial leadership.50 At the same time,
Brezhnev's future tenure in office and position of power are likely to
depend to a large extent on economic performance. Thus, there is a
more persuasive post-Congress logic for Brezhnev to make firm deci-
sions and reasonable commitments that he judges will facilitate im-
proved economic performance. A stronger power base might enable
Brezhnev to overcome Party conservatives who oppose economic
change and to resist greater military outlays to compete with the
United States, to meet the Chinese threat, and to exploit the oppor-
tunities of Middle Eastern instability. A decision to change priorities
would be reinforced by success in the SALT talks, by possible Euro-
pean troop cuts, and by other post-Summit developments.
^ »Te }l3^on Ru8h. "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue," Problems of Communism, vol.
XX, No. 4 (July-August 1971), pp. 9-15.
554
The progress of the SALT talks could also have a negative influence :
i.e., failure of the talks would strengthen the influence of those resist-
ing change, even if Brezhnev should decide to change priorities. It is
important to assess whether Brezhnev was influenced by the interpre-
tations placed on the Interim Agreement by members of Congress who
insisted on future parity in the number of strategic weapons as a pre-
condition for SALT and for a comprehensive agreement on offensive
weapons. The Soviet press has been critical of congressional reserva-
tions on the SALT agreements. It was also critical of Secretary of De-
fense Melvin Laird's view that an acceleration of certain weapons sys-
tems development was necessary to assure parity and stability. This
critical reaction points to some uncertainty among Soviet leaders on
future military spending.
History has provided two scenarios which suggest alternative
courses for the present Soviet leadership — one in 1956 which led to a
reduction in the emphasis on defense, and one in 1962, an upgrading of
the defense priority. In 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, Minister of Defense
Zhukov, and the Party leadership agreed to reduce military manpower
and modernize the Soviet armed forces. The stimulus to economic
growth from the release of resources was a factor in the continued
high growth rates and may have led Khrushchev subsequently to
promise to overtake and surpass the United States. It was only later,
after the first Kennedy budget and the Cuban missile crisis, that
Khrushchev apparently reversed these priorities, initiating the buildup
of some of the weapons now deployed by the Soviet Union and tem-
porarily stopping the progress of military manpower reduction. This
reversal and the concurrent, and possibly resultant, poor economic per-
formance may have been a factor in Khrushchev's removal from power.
The interrelationship of political and economic variables in these
two scenarios may be relevant to the current scene. Leonid Brezhnev
is certainly no Khrushchev in power or personality, but the political
context in which he perceives himself may influence his interpretation
of economic alternatives, as an earlier political context influenced
Khrushchev. Is Brezhnev emulating the Khrushchev of 1956 or the one
of 1962? Some evidence suggests the 1956 scenario: (1) the apparent
commitment of a very high priority to the West Siberian development ;
and (2) repeated evidence that Western technology is highly valued
and required for completion of civilian programs.
The Soviet leadership's policy in the West Siberian development
best illustrates how military and civilian claimants may be competing
for scarce investment funds. The explicit Party and Government direc-
tive of January 1970 on the West Siberian development called for co-
ordination of many Ministries, including the Ministry of Dcfen.se In-
dustries (a rare public reference), to bring about the expeditious com-
pletion of the regional development. r>1 Moreover, the number of proj-
ects related to the West Siberian development specifically mentioned
in the Plan Directives suggests continuing high priority consideration
in 1972. In the Ninth Five- Year Plan a good portion of the identified,
large projects are directly related to the West Siberian complex." To
have effective priority, the particular new claims of the Siberian proj-
ects would appear to be competitive with military hardware output
51 Pravda, Jan. 15, 1970, p. 1.
83 Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 6 (June 1971), p. 3 ; Pravda, Apr. 11, 1971.
555
for high test metals, sophisticated machines, manpower, and other im-
portant inputs. Military leaders would thus appear to have an interest
in downgrading the priority for the Siberian projects.
Significant progress could perhaps be made in critical military areas,
such as installation of MIRV warheads for the existing Soviet ICBM
inventory, without new construction of either silos or missiles. This
alone would tend to convert numerical advantage into a strategic ad-
vantage by offsetting the technological leadership of the United States.
In this special sense, it is conceivable that the Soviets could continue
to improve their strategic position and reorder priorities. However,
MIRV retrofitting may not be a low-cost operation, if the Soviet mili-
tary is not already well developed in this area.
The potential competition between military projects and the West
Siberian development has a special time dimension to it. The longer
the Siberian development proceeds in time, the more compelling the
logic to allocate the necessary resources to bring it to full effectiveness.
If the development of new strategic systems, e.g., the SS-0, SS-11,
and SS-17 ICBMs, should involve a long, risky, and expensive proc-
ess— the gestation period for such systems is said to be 8-10 years— the
question would arise as to whether the two patterns of resource alloca-
tion could be simultaneously supported. If both military and civilian
projects were begun, at what point could overcommitment be per-
ceived and resources shifted to bring the effort having first priority to
timely completion? Vnderfunding and delay of both military and
civilian programs would not be an attractive prospect to the Party
or its leader.
Moreover, if overcommitment should be permitted, it might be diffi-
cult, even technologically impossible, to shift resources from one pro-
gram to the other. The long completion times required for such
sophisticated military and civilian projects create both technological
and management problems in conversion, and the ability to shift re-
sources committed to these projects becomes increasingly limited over
time.
Brezhnev may soon have to act decisively in order to avoid over-
commitment on two competitive, nonconvertible patterns of resource
allocation. If Brezhnev views the West Siberian development and the
deployment of SS-9 and SS-11 missiles as competitive patterns of
resource allocation, and if some relatively irreversible decisions on al-
locations are necessary, he may be inclined to divert resources from the
potential military program to bring to fruition the civilian invest-
ment project. At present, it appears that there may be a delay in the
program for further buildup of the SS-9 and SS-11.53 Commitments
may not yet be made to a new round in strategic weapons buildup. On
the other hand, the West Siberian oil-gas complex appears to be moving
ahead, possibly with support from the military industries.
Although oil and gas targets were not met in the 1972 Plan, and the
1973 Plan has scaled down targets, the West Siberian priority appears
intact. A four-day visit by Premier Kosygin to the Siberian oil and
gas fields in January 1973 may have been intended to give further evi-
dence of the leadership's support for the Siberian project.54
ra New York Times, Mar. 8, 1971, p. 1 and Mar. 27, 1971, p. 1. Some indications suggest
the MIRV-equipped SS-lls are being tested. New York Times, Oct. 9, 1972.
64 New York Times, Jan. 15, 1973.
556
Another problem area in the Soviet leadership's dilemma over re-
source allocation is the chronic manpower shortage in the Soviet econ-
omy. Although only limited information is available, the Plan direc-
tives indicate the severity of the problem. Increased labor productivity
is planned to account for 87-00 percent of the total increment in out-
put during the Ninth Five-Year Plan. While the total labor force is
to increase at an annual rate of 1.7 percent, the key industrial force is
stipulated to grow by only one percent. This modest increase in the
industrial labor force is about one-third the rate realized during the
Eighth Five- Year Plan (1.0 percent as compared to 2.8 percent). In
the past, overambitious plans for increased labor productivity were
offset by highe»'-than-planned expansion of the industrial labor force
at the expense of "buffer" sectors such as agriculture and services.
However, shifts from low priority sectors are becoming more difficult.
As noted by Murray Feshbach of the Commerce Department, "in most
years prior to the 1960's the planned number of workers and employ-
ees was met, and in industry the actual number frequently was 200,000-
300,000 persons above the plan. In 1965, however, the actual number
for industry was barely 25,000 above the plan, and by 1967 there was
a shortage of 125,000 industrial-production personnel relative to plan
requirements.'' 55 This fact graphically measures the end of "buffer"
sectors to cover shortfalls in industry manpower needs.
At present, not only is labor unlikely to be released from other sec-
tors to meet industrial needs, but in the current Plan, income, invest-
ment, and administrative policy are designed to keep skilled workers in
agriculture from migrating to urban industrial jobs. Nonetheless, 90
percent of the high school graduates from rural schools still seek ur-
ban employment.50 Shortfalls in ,the improvement in labor produc-
tivity are likely to aggravate the labor shortage. While labor produc-
tivity was scheduled to rise by 6.1 percent in 1972, it grew by only 5.2
percent/'7 Improvement in labor productivity may turn on technolog-
ical change in output — better energy and equipment — and such im-
proved managerial techniques as the Shchekino experiment and the
agricultural zveno.58
Demobilization of some 3 million members of the armed forces in the
late 1950's (from 5.S to 3.0 million in the period 1955-1961) eased
Khrushchev's labor problem and coincided with rather good years of
economic performance.59 Although the reduction in military manpower
may have been facilitated by technological modernization of the mili-
tary forces and a reduction of such missions as the withdrawal from
Austria, it may provide a precedent for current Soviet policy. Again,
at a time when manpower deficiencies are becoming more serious, no
ready major source of labor — ('specially young males to meet civilian
needs — is available other than the military forces. Military demobiliza-
tion would probably be stoutly resisted but not necessarily with suc-
63 Murray Feshbnoh. Manpower Trrtuls in the TTRS!R ( Washington, D.C. : Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Annlvsis, Mnv 1071) pp. 1, 18.
MTb!d., p. 12.
BT TzveaUya, .Inn. 30. 1073. p. 1.
^ Tho Shchekino experiment provides a sot of Incentives which oneourase tho enterprise
to fulfill its plan without Increasing employment or by reducing It. At the 24tli Tarty Con-
cress. Brezhnev specifically endorsed the Shchekino experiment. Tin' zveno provides a con-
tinuous relationship of the work unit and tlie common plot — a partial property rijrht.
John Godaire. "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment." T'.s. Congress.
Joint Economic Committee, Dimcnxions of Soviet Economic Power, S7th Cong., 2d sess..
1962. p. 43.
557
cess. Indeed, demobilization was apparently quietly resumed after
1961, as noted by Xikita Khrushchev in 1963 at the Party Plenum; by
1965 his original target of 2.4 million in military manpower reduc-
tion was reached.150 Soviet military leaders probably did not favor the
reduced term of service in the 1967 draft reform, but they were over-
ridden by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. With the China border
crisis and the Czech invasion, the strength is apparently again above
the 1961 level of about 3 million, possibly as high as 3.6 million (in-
cluding the border guards and internal security forces). ni The logic for
reduction in the size of the military force might now again be based
on improved economic performance, especially if Soviet leaders decide
to reduce substantially the number of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
However, the Sino-Soviet border situation would seem to preclude a
massive cutback in military manpower.
Thus, three options for economic change open to the Soviet leader-
ship are, in order of probability: (1) a reduction of the priority for
new strategic weapons systems; (2) a cutback in military manpower;
and (3) a withdrawal of Party control and involvement in the economy
so as to permit improved efficiency through economic reform. All are
issues which will be influenced by both the international situation and
domestic political considerations. A downward revision in the priority
for further military weapons buildup, for example, is likely only if the
economic rationale is persuasive and the domestic political and inter-
national climate are favorable.
The Moscow Summit agreements, the Vietnam settlement, and prog-
ress in solving other political problems in East -West relations should
help to provide the basis for a change in Soviet domestic economic
priorities. Increasing Soviet interest in technologically oriented trade
may be evidence that the Soviet leadership is indeed committed to a
reordering of priorities. The linkage of moderation in the strategic
arms race and settlement in Vietnam to a mutually beneficial trade
agreement, as described by Dr. Kissinger, may be a valid intercon-
nection, especially in the minds of Leonid Brezhnev and Richard
Nixon.
U.S. -Soviet Technology Transfers
Secretary Peterson remarked on his return .from the first meeting of
the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission in August 1972
that the United States had let the other industrial countries steal a
march on trade with the Soviet Union, and that U.S. businessmen are
now anxious to get "a piece of the action." This "action" includes tech-
nological transfers and industrial cooperation that was characteris-
tic of Soviet-U.S. relations before but not after World War II. The
prospect of resuming the pre-World War II relationship raises im-
portant questions. What contribution will U.S. technology make to
Soviet economic and military development? In the past, U.S. export
control legislation was enacted under the assumption that controls
would retard Soviet development bv limiting transfers of U.S. tech-
nology to Soviet industry. Soviet achievements in military technology
"" Confirmed in an interview of Marshal Sokolovskv. See Neiv York Times, Feb. 18,
19R5. d. 6.
91 Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1970-1971, London, 1972, p. 6.
558
and in selected areas of civilian technology surest the need for re-
assessing that assumption.
Another important question involves the ability of U.S. companies
to compete with other Western exporters in sales of high-technology
products to the Soviet Union. In view of evidence of the loss of Amer-
ican technological leadership in many areas to Japan and Western
Europe, why should Soviet importers prefer the United States to other
Western sources? Two hypotheses may help to explain an apparent
Soviet inclination to expand trade with the United States — especially
in high-technology products. First, there is a traditional Soviet view
that American technology is the best. Second, and perhaps more per-
suasive, U.S. technology and the ability of U.S. industry to deal in
large projects is attractive. Specifically in areas such as petroleum and
natural gas development, computer systems, and agribusiness the abil-
ity of the United States to supply the latest technology and the neces-
sary credit .facilities are demonstrably superior.
U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO 194 6
Most students of Soviet economic development agree that foreign
technology played an important role in Soviet industrialization. In
the pre-World War II period. Soviet industries imported advanced
Western machinery and equipment, purchased foreign technical in-
formation, and employed industrial specialists from the West. Ameri-
can technology was imported and applied in many sectors of the Soviet
economy. The U.S. -Soviet technology transfer continued during the
war. largely through the Lend-Lease program.
Antony Sutton, who has published comprehensive studies on West-
ern technology and Soviet economic development, has concluded thf>*
"Western technical assistance was the major causal factor in Soviet eco-
nomic growth for the period 1928-1945. '" r>2 Sutton's conclusion differs
somewhat from the findings of other scholars and may overstate Soviet
dependence on Western technology. Richard Moorsteen and Raymond
Powell, for example, concluded in a 1966 study that the major part of
Soviet economic growth can be attributed to increments of capital and
labor, rather than technological progress.63
Nevertheless, the importance of the technology transfer from the
United States and other Western countries is undeniable. Certainly,
the high regard for U.S. technology is well documented in Soviet
sources. For example, the admiration of the American engineer Hugh
Cooper, who supervised the building of both Muscle Shoals (a dam
on the main stream of the Tennessee River) and the Dnepr River
hydroelectric system (a key project in the Soviet First Five-Year
Plan) was symbolic of the Soviet view of American technical assist-
ance. Moreover, the American approach to mass production in
machine-building was chosen in the First Five-Year Plan over the
European small-scale operations. The Soviet tractor and automobile
industry were applications of American mass production techniques.6*
U.S. technological contributions were frequently acknowledged by
•"Antony Sutton. Wentern Tcchnoloau and Soviet Economic Development , vol. II : 1910-
19iS (Stanford : Hoover Institution Press. 1071). p. 330.
"Richard Moorsteen and Ravmond P. Powell. The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962
(Homewood. 111. : Richard I) Irwin. Inc.. 1966).
"* David Granlck. Soviet Metal Fabricating and Economic Development (Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1907). pp. 24. 40, 41.
559
Soviet political and industrial leaders. Even Joseph Stalin paid hom-
age to American work techniques :
American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recog-
nizes obstacles: which with its businesslike perseverance brushes aside all
obstacles: which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it
is a minor task ; and without which serious constructive work is inconceivable.*5
Sutton claimed that Soviet industry generated very little tech-
nology of its own in the period prior to 1946 :
No major plant under construction between 1030 and 1045 has been identified
as a purely Soviet effort. No usable technology originated in Soviet laboratories
except in the case of synthetic rubber. . . .60
Soviet achievements since World War II in military and space
technology, presumably independent of technology transfers from the
West, raise doubts of the current validity — even accepting its earlier
basis — of the view that Soviet industry is incapable of generating
necessary technological change. Certain civilian sectors have also made
important technological innovations. Huge Soviet expenditures on re-
search and development have apparently created a new capability for
generating technology. Thus, while Soviet officials are again showing
an interest in importing U.S. technology, the present situation differs
somewhat from that of the prewar period.
CURRENT SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS
In official negotiations of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial
Commission and in private talks with U.S. businessmen, Soviet officials
are again expressing an interest in importing various kinds of U.S.
technology. Soviet representatives have shown most interest in those
areas in which the United States appears to have a legitimate claim to
world technological leadership : .
(1) large-scale petroleum and natural gas extraction, transmission,
and distribution systems, including special permafrost problems and
oil recovery systems ;
(2) management control systems utilizing computer facilities;
(.3) mass production machinery output, such as of trucks and ears;
(4) animal husbandry as characterized by U.S. agricultural busi-
ness; and
(5) tourist systems including hotels, packaged tours, and transport.
Each of these technological areas requires large-scale financing, con-
sortium operations, and marketing systems. The experience of U.S.
multinational corporations might lend itself to industrial coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union.
European and Japanese firms may wish to limit their commitments
to the Soviets. For example, Italian Fiat and French 'Renault in-
volvement in the Tol'iatti and Kama plants, respectively, may be as
far as they wish to go. Japanese leaders may prefer some joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. -Japanese arrangements.
For political reasons, the Soviet leadership may wish to spread the
participation of non-Communist countries to minimize outside lever-
age. Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germanv have been the lead-
65 Joseph Stalin. The Foundations of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1950). p. 160.
66 Sutton, op. cit, p. 346.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 37
560
ing non-Communist trading partners with the U.S.S.R. (See Table
4.) It may well be that a more balanced pattern — with the share of the
United States increasing — is in line with Kremlin policy.
TABLE 4.-S0VIET TRADE WITH SELECTED WESTERN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN i
[In million U.S. dollars]
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Japan:
Exports 239 353 391 357 379 419
Imports 224 166 185 264 345 396
Turnover 463 519 576 621 725 815
United Kingdom:
Exports 330 303 367 427 465 452
Imports 169 197 273 240 248 222
Turnover 499 501 640 667 713 674
West Germany:
Exports 189 196 215 229 257 292
Imports 144 176 242 350 375 484
Turnover 333 372 457 579 632 776
Finland:
Exports 257 244 244 262 287 359
Imports 217 269 266 294 303 273
Turnover.. 474 513 510 556 590 632
Italy:
Exports 155 233 232 232 212 259
Imports 95 154 208 317 313 291
Turnover 251 387 441 548 524 550
France:
Exports 130 145 137 141 140 216
Imports 160 188 294 323 319 313
Turnover 290 333 432 464 459 529
United States:
Exports 47 39 43 61 64 60
Imports 63 63 57 117 115 143
Turnover 110 102 99 177 179 203
Canada:
Exports 15 23 20 12 8 18
Imports 346 141 126 33 131 151
Turnover 361 163 146 45 139 164
Total Soviet trade with the developed counties:
Exports 1.711 1,886 2.051 2.230 2,345 2.712
Imports 1,742 1,782 2,144 2,495 2,780 2.859
Turnover 3,453 3,668 4,195 4,725 5,125 5,571
1 Components may not add to the totals shown because of rounding.
Source: Peterson report (1972), annex B, p. 13.
»
Soviet Balance-of -Payments Potential
For the past few years, Soviet exports to the United States have
lagged far behind imports (see Table 4). While Soviet exports to the
561
United States expanded significantly in 1972, they still totaled only
$95 million, and the trade deficit worsened (imports from the United
States were $547 million). In 1973, the imbalance is likely to be at
least as great because of the large amounts of grain purchased by the
Soviet Union. Thus. Soviet obligations to the United States can be
expected to grow at a rapid rate. How will these obligations be met?
The following are areas in which increases in Soviet dollar earnings
are possible :
(1) Increased Soviet exports of raw materials, such as energy
sources and metals, and industrial goods ;
(2) Gold sales;
(3) Non-trade income, such as tourism and shipping;
(4) Multilateral relations, such as balancing a trade deficit with
the United States by a trade surplus with Japan ;
(5) Cooperative ventures; and
(6) Credits (only a short-term consideration, as eventual repay-
ment is required, plus interest) .
SOVIET EXPORT POTENTIAL
Soviet exports to the developed West (see Table 5) appear to include
several commodities with inelastic demand, i.e., regardless of the price
of Soviet exports, the foreign demand is unlikely to change much.
Foreign demand for Soviet furskins, for example, appears to be in-
elastic. Other commodity exports such as petroleum, natural gas. and
some non-ferrous metals face more elastic demands. For this latter
group, development of rich Soviet sources in Siberia may facilitate a
reduction in price and an increase in supply. If the Northern Sea
Route in the Arctic Ocean should become economically usable on
closer to a twelve-month basis, the transport by water of wood and
wood products, coal and coke, and some other raw materials to Europe,
the United States, and Japan might help to expand Soviet exports.
Metal products such as nickel, palladium, platinum, and chrome ore
have been the Soviet Union's biggest exports to the United States (see
Table 6). An expansion of U.S. -Soviet trade would bring some in-
crease in Soviet exports of these commodities, as the demand of certain
U.S. industries for them is growing. Palladium and platinum, for
example, are becoming increasingly important in the automobile indus-
try for antipollution catalytic exhaust devices. Chrysler Corporation
reportedly contracted to import 100,000 ounces of Soviet palladium
in 107.3 at a price of $00 an ounce.07 U.S. imports of nickel, traditionally
important in U.S. -Soviet trade, are also increasing.
87 U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 16, 1972.
562
E
<
ooooNfONOOinr^
u-iir>oooo^oo*rt£>r»
r^ _ m coj,^ roar
irifiintfjff'NOfnin
E
to
UJ
a
LlJ
o.
o
_l
LU
>
UJ
o
i =
CC ».
E
<
CM* U">" »£l •— " 00 ui CM ^ co
Cn. — •— « CM
■* N ro oo m o n «r run
U-, __ m cnj __ rnm
OCMinm^OTJCM^fOT)
.-" m' in co "*"•• oo" cm* co cm
CM *-• «— "CM
oo in id k ^ oo <j> 01 o
«D "-1 ^f (^ ^ CT> ^r <7> ^h
^ .— > co •— • ^- cm in
^•" ^" <£)in'OrC cm' in co"
^ m m ©» r»» ~- o
(fifJrNinmrvte
cm <x> i/"> o «— • in -—
*r oo — « r^ oo ct> r^-
o co cm .-• co -«r •— «
o
o
in ~- r-.^- »
<
o co ^r *r in
tooeocM°co^r**
oococD'Ti^rin^-ou
m^m^N^ cocm
com,— ir^.oor«.cJ»cMco
o I co iT) r-." in c^ r*^ cm\d o
2I~ ■" "
^f- — • ro ~- «^ ~-i ro ^^
O
O
o
o
>
o
CO
00
I
CD
E
<
E
<
f-jirs^^icMiro
~^ I ix) o oo o 5fi in co —> co
— . tD O O** OO ^ — - <£> <X> OO
r^. CO^CM CM ^- CM*-«
E
<
ey> r-* ^ cm o co in
O"* CO •— « CM OO O"* CO
O CO CM .— • CM in .— .
OO — ■ UD ~- — ' O CSJ
n I oorvutooicoo
T> I -> r- ^- cm rv o oo
» I — ~->CM CMU-) ^*
oo co .— ■ co ~- r*. co
to r-» in •— • ot> cm CM
o*> m o*> cm in cm o*>
oo ^- ~- *-» cm *r
t£> *J- CO CM CO 00 CM
o cm tr> r*. ct» <x> o
r-» co t£> **• — « o ^r
l£> — — — CNI »T
•-» cm cm r-» r»* in in
cm in oo* co" (X> ~-» cm
o ~- cm co to in co
co o> ^r ~- — • r*» ^r
in .— « ^- ~- co
__ "OJ3*-
— ° c «j c
2 o> <o _ c """*
w UO>OCDLlU.O
E
a.
=3
3
o
a
F
c
cr
a> *o
TO
c
a>
XT
TO
l/l
«
in
-o
n
d
h
o
C
h-
m
U
n
5CDO
■c
S m
563
TABLE 6.-U.S. IMPORTS FROM U.S.S.R.
II n thousands of dollars)
Major commodity type' 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Crude materials 16,377 14,410 15,505 14,470 18,314 15,388
Furskins 6,302 4,227 4,633 5,059 3,334 2,731
Chromeore 6,323 6,785 7,297 7,807 13,691 11,147
Nonferrous metal scrap 739 914 1,332 700 767 1,292
Mineral fuels and related materials 2 5 5 1,777 2,807 652
Chemicals 1,387 1,125 1,017 1,312 913 1,062
Organic chemicals 9 98 8 429 399 220
Inorganic chemicals _ 1,208 822 857 727 143 584
Manufactures 30,251 21,725 39,969 32,079 46,451 35,725
Glass . .... 931 1,050 1,264 1,315 1,492 1,614
Diamonds and precious stones 3,542 6,810 10,828 11,018 13,439 11,244
Platinum, etc . .. 19,048 10,725 24,963 14,063 22,887 19,515
Nonferrous base metals.. 1,041 2,993 2,228 5,295 7,996 2,728
Miscellaneous 459 557 1,071 1,610 2,666 3,044
Manufactured articles: Jewelry and precious metal articles 943 1,872 1,973
Total imports 49,414 41,046 58,357 51,504 72,312 57,598
1 Subcommodity types may not add to total because of omission of insignificant items.
Source: "Peterson Report" (1972), Annex B, p. 16.
Other products which the Soviet Union now exports in large quan-
tities to the industrial West are crude oil and petroleum products and
wood and wood products. The United States currently imports rela-
tively little of these two categories from the Soviet Union. (See Tables
5 and 6.) With a relaxation of barriers to U.S. -Soviet trade, the Soviet
Union is unlikely to increase substantially its sales of wood products to
the United States (a net exporter of wood) ; probably, only small
quantities of certain types of wood not produced in the United States
would be sold. However, rising prices and timber product shortage in
the United States may generate a greater demand for Soviet wood. On
the other hand, Soviet exports of petroleum products (which the
United States imports in ever increasing quantities) would undoubt-
edly expand rapidly if the Soviet Union could produce sufficient
surpluses.
A major hard-currency earner for the Soviet Union is diamonds.
Although Soviet foreign trade officials do not reveal the value of
diamonds sold to Western countries, it is reported to be quite large.
For example, the Soviet Union reportedly sells up to $200 million worth
of diamonds every year through a London bank.08 Other sales have
been reported in New York, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam.69 Be-
cause the Soviet Union does not enjoy MFX status, Soviet diamonds
are at present subject to high U.S. tariffs. If MFN status is granted,
Soviet exporters will undoubtedly increase their sales of diamonds in
the United States.
The potential for Soviet exports of high-technology industrial prod-
ucts to the United States remains uncertain. Unlike that of most in-
dustrialized countries, the structure of Soviet exports remains heavily
biased toward raw materials, foodstuffs, and semi-manufactures. The
commodity composition of Soviet exports may result from the leader-
ship's priorities — that is. potentially exportable, technologically ad-
vanced products may be reserved for high-priority domestic civilian
88 Economist, Jan. 6, 1973, p. 18.
09 "The USSR's Undisclosed Assets," Radio Free Europe Research, Jan. 11, 1973.
564
and defense programs. Conceivably. Soviet leaders might change pri-
orities and concentrate on development of high-technology products
for export, as the Japanese have done.
Soviet foreign trade organizations have demonstrated their ability
to export high-technology products in certain sectors. Those exports
demonstrate that the Soviet Union now has the capacity to generate
technology. Some Soviet industries have undoubtedly benefited from
technological spin-off of high-priority military and space programs.
Other industries may have developed independent technologies in
response to foreign export control policies which deprived them of
some technical information from the West.
Listed below are some types of Soviet machinery and equipment —
the most technologically intensive category of exports —which have
been exported by the Soviet Union, or which Soviet officials have said
they want to sell: 70
Machinery and mechanical equipment. — Forging and pressing
equipment; rolling equipment : mining machinery : power equipment —
hydraulic and steam turbines; machinery for food preparation ; textile
machines; printing equipment; road-building machinery: and parts
of machines — anti-friction bearings.
Electrical machinery and equipment. — Generators, transformers:
radio receivers and components ; and electronics components.
Transportation equipment. — Aircraft — supersonic airplanes, heli-
copters; motorcycles; seagoing freighters — tankers, dry cargo; sea-
going passenger ships — hydrofoils ; and tractors.
Miscellaneous equipment. — Measuring instruments — optical, meteor-
ological, et cetera; medical equipment: tools, watches and com-
ponents; cameras, photographic accessories; and movie projectors and
accessories.
While many of these items will probably prove noncompetitive in
the U.S. market, some of them should find buyers. Soviet ability to ex-
port machinery and equipment to the United States will depend
largely on whether the Soviet Union receives most-favored-nation
treatment.71
One very marketable commodity of the Soviet Union is its gold
stock. Soviet state gold reserves in 1972 were estimated to be 1800
metric tons, and annual gold production was believed to be about 220
metric tons.72 Gold has been exported in large quantities when Soviet
hard currency needs were particularly pressing, as in 1964. 1965, and
1972, to pay for large grain imports. (See Table 7.) It is uncertain
how much gold Soviet leaders will be willing to export in the future:
they appear to share the "Midas complex" of their Western counter-
parts in associating great value to a substantial gold stock. As large
sales of gold in 1972 and 1973 have reduced state reserves. Soviet of-
ficial^ may be reluctant to export gold in future commercial transac-
tions. They may prefer to accumulate' gold in the event of another
T" Siiv for p\nmplp. Hnherl II. Hnmphrev nnrl Henry s Ki'iks. Ohscrrations <>» Emit-West
Economic delation*: U.S.S.R. and Poland. A trip report prepare] for the U.S. Congress
Joint Rconomlo Pommltri • (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government I'rintlnp Office, 1973).
71 See below, V.8. Restrictions on Imports from the Soriet Union : the Issue of Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment, pp. r>2 ."p.r>.
"Keith Hush. "The Rest Western Estimates on Soviet Gold." Radio Libert)/ Dispatch,
Aup. lift. H»72 ; "The USSR's Undisclosed Assets," op. clt.
565
agricultural crisis. The Soviet preference for maintaining considerable
state reserves may preclude a policy of continuous export of gold.
TABLE 7.— ESTIMATES OF SOVIET GOLD OUTPUT AND DISPOSITIONS (METRIC TONS)
Domestic
Sales to
Sales to
Changes in
Year
Output
consumption
Comecon
West
reserves
1964
145
12
5
401
-272
1965
.___•_ 156
14
5
488
-351
1966
167
16
5
(')
+146
1967
177
19
5
13
+140
1968
188
22
6
10
+ 151
1969
... 198
36
6
0)
+157
1970...
208
42
6
(')
+ 160
1971
212
52
6
202
+134
1972
220
(3)
<3)
250
-90
1 Negligible.
2 Samuel Montagu & Co. Ltd., "Annual Bullion Review 1971," London, 1972, p.6 suggests a figure closer to 65 tons.
3 No estimates available.
Sources: Michael Kaser, "Soviet Gold— Production and Use," Gold 1971 and "Soviet Gold Production and Sales in 1971,"
Gold 1972; "The U.S.S.R.'s Undisclosed Assets," Radio Free Europe research, Jan. 11, 1973.
SOVIET EARNINGS FROM INVISIBLE TRADE
Yugoslavia and other East European countries have demonstrated
that a rapid expansion in tourism is possible even for Communist
countries. In Yugoslavia, for example, the tourist business is thriving.
In recent years, tourism has been a major factor in improving the
Yugoslav balance of payments; $335 million was earned in the first
nine months of 1972." Perhaps the uneven quality of Intourist, Aero-
flot, and other Soviet tourist facilities will continue to restrict tourism
in the Soviet Union to a more modest scale. However, there are signs
that the Soviet Union may try to capture a larger share of the tourist
trade. Arrangements have been made with Western airlines and hotel
chains to provide better facilities for foreign visitors. Further Soviet
changes, such as a relaxation of travel restrictions and security harass-
ment, could lead to a substantial increase.
Tourism has already brought a small, but significant, inflow of hard
currency. Intourist claimed that 2.5 million visitors would visit the
Soviet Union in 1972, an increase of 12 percent over 1971.74 Generally,
a larger number of tourists travel from hard currency countries to the
Soviet Union than vice versa.75 Thus, the Soviets have a considerable
positive balance in the tourist trade. Without major changes in present
policies, the Soviets are unlikely to be as successful as their East
European neighbors in promoting tourism.
Soviet merchant shipping has expanded at an impressive rate in re-
cent years. The merchant marine now totals over 16 million gross
registered tons, and is the sixth largest fleet in the world. During the
current five-year plan, 1971-1975, the Soviet merchant marine plans
to add five million tons. Soviet ships now carry most goods shipped to
and from the Soviet Union, and Soviet shipping officials have recently
begun to compete for cargoes in other parts of the world. For example,
they now do a considerable amount of business on the Australia-to-
Europe shipping routes.
73 Zdanko Antic, "Yugoslav Balance of Payments Improving," Radio Free Europe
Research, Nov. 29, 1972.
74 "The Tourist In Russia," Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1972.
75 For Soviet travel statistics, see International Union of Official Travel Organizations.
International Travel Statistics.
566
Its enlarged fleet gives the Soviet Union the capacity to earn sub-
stantial sums of hard currencies. Since the early 1960s. Soviet mer-
chant shipping has made net contributions to the Soviet balance of
payments with hard currency countries. One estimate, for example,
put the Soviet merchant marine's net hard currency earnings in li)6fi
at 106 million rubles.76 Its earning capacity is undoubtedly growing.
However, the Soviet fleet's contribution to its balance of payments in
Soviet-American trade will be limited by the terms agreed to in the
recently signed maritime agreement. The agreement stipulates that
vessels of each country would have the opportunity to carry one-third
of all cargoes between the two countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union
contracted to pay higher than world rates for shipments of agricul-
tural goods in U.S. ships.
MULTILATERAL RELATIONS
Although the Soviet Union has shown a preference for bilateral
trade in the past, it could conceivably attempt to use multilateral bal-
ancing arrangements to alleviate its negative trade balance with the
United States. The Soviet Union has enjoyed a favorable balance of
trade with some of the major trade partners of the United States,
including Japan and the United Kingdom. Ideally, it could transfer
its positive balances with those countries to pay for needed imports
from the United States. A precedent for multilateral balancing in
East-West trade is the pattern of Soviet trade with the Sterling Area.
The Soviet Union has used its earnings from trade with the United
Kingdom to buy from other countries in the Sterling Area.
However the potential for multilateral balancing arrangements is
limited at present. The Soviet Union does not have many positive
balances in its trade with hard-currency countries, partly because
some hard-currency countries are unwilling to accept deficits in then-
trade agreements with Communist countries. Generally, the Soviet
Union runs an overall deficit in its trade with Western industrial
countries.
COPRODUCTION AGREEMENTS 77
New forms of industrial cooperation between Soviet state enter-
prises and Western firms help the Soviets to import high-technology
machinery and equipment without large outlays of hard currency.
Most joint ventures in the Soviet Union involve the technical and
financial participation of Western firms in the exploitation of natural
resources or the construction of plants. The Western partners generally
78 Robert E. Athay, The Economics of Soviet Merchant-Shipping Policu (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 6S.
77 A distinction Is sometimes made between the terms "reproduction arrangement" and
"joint venture" on the grounds that the latter involves equity ownership and more control
by the foreign investor. In this paper, the terms are used synonymously.
567
supply equipment and technical services on credit and are repaid by
deliveries of raw materials or commodities produced in the joint ven-
tures. Western European shipments of gas pipeline in return for
natural gas, and joint Soviet-Japanese exploitation of Siberian timber
resources, are examples of East-West coproduction arrangements.
Representatives of several American companies have discussed co-
production ventures with Soviet officials. By far the largest project
envisioned at present is a bid by several U.S. and Japanese companies
to help finance development of Soviet natural gas reserves. The trans-
action could reportedly result in repayment delivery of $45.6 billion
of natural gas to the United States and Japan.78 Several other large
projects for raw material development have been discussed. If U.S.-
Soviet cooperative ventures on this scale should be established and the
central problem of credits resolved, the U.S. -Soviet balance of pay-
ments would look quite different. For a number of years, large U.S.
surpluses in the trade balance would be offset by outflows of U.S. cred-
its. Some of the projects now being discussed would increase Soviet
export capabilities only after an extended development period.
Potential Level of U.S.-Soviet Trade
A number of optimistic estimates have been made on the future ex-
pansion of U.S.-Soviet trade. The former Secretary of Commerce
Maurice Stans predicted that Soviet-U.S. trade turnover increases
might cumulate $5 billion from 1971-1975.79 This would imply a trade
turnover of over $1 billion in 1975, as compared with $200 million in
1971. The U.S.-Soviet commercial agreement more modestly forecast a
threefold cumulative increase in three years (1972-75), over the pre-
vious three years ( 1969-71 ) .
Mr. Steven Lazarus, Director of the Bureau of East-West Trade in
the Department of Commerce, speaking in Houston in January 1973
stated:
We hope the volume of U.S. East-West trade will approach 4 billion and will
yield a positive contribution to our trade balance of approximately one billion
annually by the end of the decade.60
The trade imbalance of a billion dollars implies U.S. exports of $2.5
billion and imports of $1.5 billion with Communist countries. How
much of the trade was projected for the U.S.S.R. and how much for the
East European countries and the People's Republic of China in 1980
is not clear.
The Lazarus projection may well be very conservative. Preliminary
estimates of individual analysts in the Department of Commerce indi-
cate that U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries might reach $2.6 billion in 1978.81 (See Table 8.)
w Washington Post. Nov. 3. 1972 and Dec. 26, 1972.
™?>~eic York Times, Nov. IS. 1971, p. 1.
* World Trade Club, Houston. Tex.. Jan. 16, 1973.
81 Erast Borissoff and Stephen Sind, Projections of U.S. Exports to U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade. Research Note No. 3.
May 1973.
568
TABLE 8.-T0TAL PROJECTED U.S. EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION (UNDER VARYING
CONDITIONS)
[Millions of U.S. dollars]
1972, if 1973. if 1973, if 1978, if 1978, if
trade trade trade trade trade
1972 were is were is is
actual Classifi- "normal- "main- "normal- "main- "normal-
exports cation ized" tained" ized" tained" ized"
High.
Total Eastern Europe/U.S.S.R 816.45 Middle.
Low
1,272.83
1," 10107"
530.03 1,441.60
"439."i6"Tl819T
964. 04
588" 52"
High 804.61
Eastern Europe 269.84 Middle. 736.03
Low 654.83
U.S.S.R.' 2 546.61
High 468.62
Middle
Low 448.24
348. 64
309. 50
273. 64
181.79
"165." 46"
905. 97
806. 94
696. 40
535. 63
487.51"
356. 65
232.12"
2,601.13
"l," 572" 34
607.39 1,500.32
464. 52 1, 238. 54
356. 40 888. 42
1,050.81
"683.92
1 Projections exclude any possible grain deals of the type concluded in July 1972, whose nature and causes prevent them
from being estimated.
-2 1972 actual includes grain.
Source: Office of East-West Trade Analyssis, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce.
This estimate suggests a trade turnover of over $5 billion in 1978 and
presumably larger by 1980. If U.S.-Chinese trade is added to this
figure,82 total U.S. trade with Communist countries might exceed S7
billion by the end of this decade.
The basis for such optimistic estimates appears to be the large import
requirements of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries for
Western goods and services. A 1973 estimate by a Soviet observer con-
firms that these requirements are substantial. The Soviet projection
placed import requirements in 1980 (from Western industrial coun-
tries) at $7-7.5 billion for the U.S.S.R. and $17-18 billion for all of
the nations of Comecon,83 also from Western industrial countries.
I Iowever. in 1972 the Soviet t rade deficit with the United States was
si.Vj million (Soviet imports totaled sr> 1 7 million, while exports were
only *(.)~> million). It is unlikely that t he Soviets will be able or willing
to maintain such deficits in future trade1 with the United States. Thus.
in order to rapidly expand their trade with the United States, the
Soviets must either increase their commodity exports or offset the im-
balance with invisible trade earnings from tourism, gold sales and
shipping, or with credits from the Export-Import Bank or private
commercial banks.
In assessing these projections, it i^ best to concentrate on Soviet
ability to export to the United States, because Soviet dollar earnings
will be a major constraint on future trade. Soviet dollar earnings from
tourism, shipping, and gold sales are likely to grow in the next few
years: but without changes in present policies, these items may add
only several hundred million < lobars to Soviet hard-currency holdings.
I f the Soviet I nion adopts a new policy of maximizing income in dol-
lars from gold sales, tourism, and shipping, annual earnings of nearly
$r>00 million do not seem unattainable. This amount would involve
83 James B. Stopanck oltos estimates of IT. S. -Chinese trade In 19SO of S.r>00 million to
si billion. Sino-Amertcan Trade (Washington, D.C. : Library of Congress. Congressional
Research Service, May 1973). p, 54,
93 X, Shmelev, "Novye gorlzonty ekonomichesklkh sviazey" (New Horizons of Economic
Relations), Mirovata ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 1. January 1973, p. 13.
569
sales of the bulk of the U.S.S.R.'s annual gold output, a more effective
system of attracting American tourists, and a full exploitation of the
new shipping opportunities for both freight and passengers. Joint ven-
tures in the tourist and shipping areas would probably be necessary to
teach the higher levels.
In assessing Soviet export trade potential, the following variables
are most relevant :
(.1) Soviet willingness to shift exports of oil and gas from other
markets, including domestic and Comecon, to the United States;
(2) the size of L7.S. Government (P^xport-Import Bank and Com-
modity Credit Corporation) and private credits to the Soviet Union
as part of large-scale joint ventures for raw material extraction proc-
essing, transportation, and marketing. Without large-scale projects,
potential energy, metal, timber and other raw material resources may
not be economically exploitable. Moreover, without Western capital,
credit, and technology, many of the rich potential Siberian resources
may not be exploited for decades. Increased output marketed by West-
ern multinational corporations may permit a significant net increase
in export capability above that required to repay the financing.
(3) U.S. willingness to extend most-favored-nation treatment to
the Soviet Union;
(4) Soviet ability to launch a major effort to produce industrial
products for the AVestern market facilities that provide efficient mar-
keting not subject to market disruptions problems. Use of such multi-
national companies, as International Telephone and Telegraph Cor-
poration, which might involve trade of machine tools for electric
equipment — an industrial version of the Pepsi for vodka barter ar-
rangement— could prove attractive.
These variables will largely determine the size of total U.S.-Soviet
trade turnover in the years ahead. With current Soviet priorities for
technologically advanced goods, the detente environment, and the
equalization of U.S. commercial policy toward the U.S.S.R. with that
of other industrial countries through liberalized export control and
credits, the Soviet demand for U.S. imports is likely to run ahead of
their ability to pay. Therefore, the Soviet-U.S. trade turnover may be
expected to maintain its current level, increase modestly, or rise signifi-
cantly, depending on the above noted variables.
These three steps in potential turnover of 1980 may be illustrated
by the following estimates :
(1) A diversion of Soviet oil and gas exports and other hard cur-
rency earning exports to the United States and modest credit allow-
ances, for example, might lead to an expansion of trade to an average
annual level of $700-800 million.
(2) If the Soviet Union receives MFN status and liberal credits
and initiates an aggressive industrial product sales effort, a $2-3 bil-
lion trade turnover is possible.
(3) A projection of $4-5 billion annual trade turnover is conceiv-
able if negotiations on joint U.S.-Soviet development of Siberian nat-
ural gas resources are successful. The two Liquified Natural Gas
(L.NG) projects under discussion could total investments of $5-6 bil-
lion each with repayment presumably over an 8-10 year period (the
presumed Export-Import Hank maximum).
IV. U.S. Interest in Expanded Economic Relations With the
Soviet Union
In assessing the new U.S. -Soviet commercial relationship, the pri-
mary task for U.S. policymakers is to determine its effect on the U.S.
economy and on U.S. foreign policy goals. The United States has an
obvious interest in importing valuable raw materials and selected
manufactured goods from the Soviet Union. But how will U.S. -Soviet
trade influence the U.S. economy as a whole? In view of the small
volume of trade, can U.S. consumers and producers expect significant
benefits? Administration officials have frequently cited improved U.S.-
Soviet diplomatic relations as a primary motivation for expanding
commercial relations. What diplomatic benefits will the United States
reap, in terms of specific U.S. foreign policy goals?
Economic Benefits for the United states
The economic advantages of Soviet-U.S. economic relations are
likely to be significant in particular sectors, rather than for the na-
tional economy as a whole. Grain traders and petroleum companies,
for example, may benefit, but the overall effect on the national econ-
omy will be modest.
U.S. trade with the Soviet Union represented less than 1 percent
of total U.S. foreign trade in 1971. In 1072. trade turnover increased
substantially. However, if U.S.-Soviet trade should increase in eight
years to $3 billion — a remarkable attainment — it would still be only
about 2 percent of U.S. foreign trade. Currently, the United States
imports as much in a week from Canada as it imports in a year from
the Soviet Union.84 As a result, a major relative change or increase
in trade with the Soviet Union could be offset by a relatively minor
change in U.S. trade relations with its major trading partners. More-
over, job creation, economic growth, and other economic benefits asso-
ciated with increased trade would be modestly affected by Soviet or
East -West trade.
Furthermore, the U.S. trade and balance-of-payments deficits will
probably not be substantially reduced by increased Soviet trade. Al-
though "the United States is likely to have considerable surpluses in its
trade with the Soviet Union, they will be small in comparison with
overall U.S. deficits.
Stability of U.S. Trade Gains
Soviet foreign trade organizations have frequently been criticized
by Western businessmen as erratic and unreliable trade partners. In-
deed, several aspects of past Soviet practices support this notion:
i Peterson (1971), op. cit., Appendix 1 1, pp. is. 23.
(570)
571
agricultural trade is periodic, depending on the grain harvest; trade
may take place in technologically advanced products, to fill short-run,
non-recurrent needs; and some trade is required to meet unexpected
bottlenecks in Soviet domestic plans.
Soviet imports of cereal grains are particularly unstable. The So-
viet Union changes from a net exporter in good weather years to a
substantial net importer in bad years. (See Table 9.) The United
States exported large amounts o,f grain in 1964 and in 1972-1973.
However, in the intervening years, exports were negligible, as the
Soviet Union returned to its role as a net grain exporter. Moreover,
the Soviet Union may not buy from the United States even when it
is a net importer (as in 1965 and 1966). In 1972-1973, the Soviet
Union might have traded more extensively with Canada, Australia,
or France, if those countries had not already exhausted their export
capability. France exported a million tons to the Soviet Union in 1972.
Canada and Australia reportedly could not take any more orders be-
cause of grain shortages and saturation of their transport facilities.
TABLE 9.— SOVIET EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GRAIN (EXCLUDING GROATS AND FLOUR)
|ln thousands of metric tons)
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Cuba 462 516 464 492 513 481 526 550 574
Czechoslovakia... 1,501 900 1,169 1,242 1,349 1,422 1,383 1,378 1,489
Egypt 1,000 298 301
GDR 1,577 1,191 1,054 1,148 1,187 1,256 1,488 1,596 1,913
Hungary 141 15 378 101 277 288 114 426
North Korea... 50.. 100 118 251 105 130 247 152
Poland 820 110 491 504 1,042 830 1,272 1,073 2,133
United Kingdom.. 276 49 224 404 302 283
Total exports including 6,260 3,514 4,330 3,557 6,248 5,406 7,205 5,698 8,640
Argentina ._ 6 106 763 1,443 21 30 165 196
Australia 273 1,402 1,239 137 277
Canada 2,323 3, f 85 3,310 4,494 1,613 1,289 30 1,634 1,805
France.... 834 1,168 171 1 437
United States 1,785
Total imports including 3,103 7,287 6,375 7,746 2,185 1,606 639 2,200 3,500
Netexports... 3,157 4,063 3,800 6,566 3,498 5,140
Netimports 3,573 2,045 4,189..
Sources: USSR. Ministerstvo Vneshnei Torgovli. "Vneshniaia torgovlia za 1964-71 god; statisticheskii obzor, Mos-
cow 1965-72, and "The Soviet Grain Trade Balance," Radio Liberty Dispatch, Aug. 30, 1972.
Soviet imports of other goods may also be sporadic. In the past, the
Soviet Union has occasionally chosen to import, rather than tool up, to
meet short-run, high-technology requirements. The short-term require-
ment of diesel locomotives in the 1959-1965 Seven-Year Plan, im-
ported largely from France, is a case in point. The Soviet reluctance
to manufacture large-diameter gas transmission pipe may be another
example. Pipe is currently imported from West Germany and Italy.
The Soviet Union also imports to meet unexpected bottlenecks in
high-priority economic activities. Once this type of requirement is
satisfied, it may not recur. Such unforeseen requirements may be caused
by shifts in priorities, rather than technical bottlenecks. A classic ex-
ample occurred in 1954: the British textile industry tooled up to meet
an apparent Soviet demand for consumer goods brought on by Premier
Malenkov's new economic policies. However, another change in leader-
ship, the replacement of Premier Georgi Malenkov by Khrushchev,
572
led to a further revision in Soviet economic priorities, and large orders
for British textiles were not forthcoming.
The traditional Soviet foreign trade policy of autarky or self-suf-
ficiency seems to foster instability in foreign trade relations. Soviet
leaders who advocated an autarkical foreign trade policy believed that
continued reliance on foreign sources would be politically undesirable
and economically hazardous. There was a tendency among Soviet pol-
icy makers to overestimate the political and economic dangers of trad-
ing in the "anarchic" capitalistic markets. The present Soviet leader-
ship appear to be willing to reassess the ideological underpinnings of
the traditional policy of autarky: if so. the Soviet Union may become
a steadier customer over time.
Certainly, the new policy of industrial cooperation with Western
industrial countries would suggest a change in policy. Coproduction
ventures with Western firms to develop oil and gas resources in Siberia
would presumably be negotiated to continue for a decade or more.
Moreover, feed grain sales and other agricultural exports to extend
over multiple years — three at the outset — may create a more stable pat-
tern of trade.
Increasing U.S. sales in agribusiness facilities, petroleum and natu-
ral gas equipment, computer systems, and a variety of other high-tech-
nology lines may be an effective wedge into the Soviet market: once
begun, these sales tend to accelerate over time. Soviet purchases of T \S.
computers, for example, may lead to follow-up sales of software, to
new Soviet requirements for peripheral equipment, and to broader
Soviet requirements for managerial expertise. The complexity of mod-
ern technology transfer creates a need for long-term commitments. In
many cases, the Soviet Union will be required to make substantial pur-
chases over a number of years in order to receive and continue to bene-
fit from T'.S. technology. Thus, requirements for long-term technologi-
cal transfers will tend to stabilize the pattern of Soviet foreign trade.
Tt clmvlogiral Export Policy
Increased Soviet demand for U.S. high-technology products should
help to achieve the U.S. goal of increasing that type of export. Such
industries as elect ionics, agribusiness, petroleum refining, and automo-
tive tooling and forging equipment are characterized by economies of
scale, i.e., the larger the volume of production, the lower the per unit
cost. At a time when government investment, subsidies, and tax incen-
tives are being used to ensure that U.S. prices are competitive in the
world market, an expansion of foreign markets is a factor that may
facilitate reductions in cost and presumably prices. The opening of
the Soviet market to U.S. businesses may provide the basis for a larger,
more economical scale of domestic output. Moreover, an expanding
market may encourage research and development on a scale that would
help U.S. industries mail it am their competitive position.
Two important considerations should be kept in mind in assessing
the advantages of increased U.S. -Soviet technology transfers. First.
does the sale of high-technology products to the Soviet Union encour-
age or discourage Soviet military preparedness? " Second, will such
86 See above, Changing Priorities in Resource Allocation: Growth vs. Defense, pp. 24-29.
573
technology transfers produce long-term advantages for the U.S. econ-
omy? The Soviet leadership may be intent on absorbing U.S. tech-
nology in as short a time and as inexpensively as possible. Thus, in
assessing the net benefit of increasing transfers of technology to the
Soviet Union, U.S. policy makers must attempt to answer the ques-
tion of whether or not Soviet leaders are reordering priorities toward
a civilian economy that is increasingly linked to the world economic
system. The question may be raised in different contexts : (1) Do Soviet
requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods of commit-
ment that was the case in the past? (2) Does the trade agreement rep-
resent a part of a new pattern of relationship between the Soviet
Union and the United States? and (3) Does the agreement presage a
new relationship between the Soviet economy and the non-Communist
world economic system? If these questions can be answered affirma-
tively, the outlook for political and economic net benefits to the United
States will be favorable.
High Technology Trade and a Pattern of Economic Involvement
Current Soviet requirements for high technology assistance from
the United States appear to represent a pattern of technical and man-
agerial interrelatedness that would limit the ability of Soviet leaders
to take short-term advantages, borrow technology', and then withdraw
from continued U.S.-Soviet economic relations in particular lines.
Formal agreements, such as the arrangements with Fiat and Renault
in auto and truck production, respectively, extend for a decade. In-
formal continuity derives from a continued need for technology trans-
fer. Some examples follow :
(1) Advanced industrial systems. — Several kinds of U.S. technology
might be applied in the Soviet Union's oil and natural gas industry :
Alaska Northern Slope technology, advanced drilling techniques,
transmission and construction materials, and oil recovery systems
(especially applicable in the Soviet Union's older Caucasian fields).
Presumably, agreements on cooperation in this field will involve a
degree of joint managerial responsibility, a definite period of repay-
ment— largely in natural gas and oil deliveries — and a continuing
technological interdependence.
(2) Management-Control -Communications /Systems. — The Soviets
are clearly interested in advanced American computer and electronic
hardware, but they also seem to be interested in the systems that the
hardware represents. The Soviet postal, telephone, and telegraph
sj'stem will be improved by installation of an electronic message
switching system valued at $1.3 million from a French subsidiary of
the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. The system
will process six million messages a month and will be in operation by
the end of 1973.8C
Computer-assisted systems would appear to have a wide applica-
tion throughout the Soviet economy. The many Soviet managerial
service specialists studying the United States may stimulate Soviet
interest in this area. European experience suggests that the field is
one in which the United States not only has the leadership, but seems
■* Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 1972.
574
able to maintain and expand on its advantages. Transfer of this sort
of technology appears to create markets for export rather than satisfy
them.
(-i) Mass Production Machinery Output. — Traditionally, the Soviet
machine-building industry has patterned itself after the" large-scale
industries of the United States. The Gorki auto works, patterned
after the Ford Plant in Michigan in the 1930s, was an example of
this pattern. Although the Soviets are at present relying on Italian
and French assistance in auto and truck production, there is still a
major role for U.S. technology. Some- of the key equipment for the
new Soviet auto and truck plants was purchased from the United
States by European companies for installation in the Soviet Union.
The trade agreement includes a special arrangement for a Soviet pur-
chasing office in New York to buy American equipment for the new
Kama River Truck Plant. If the Soviet economy is "entering the auto-
motive age," then a continuing requirement may be expected. Like-
wise, in other areas where production for the large American market
justifies assembly line and mass production techniques, the machinery
outputs of the United States may find an expanding market.
(4) Agribusiness : A System and A Technological Development. —
If the Soviet planners are serious in seeking a qualitative improve-
ment in the diet by increased meat output, the agricultural approach
prevalent in the United States — the so-called "■agribusiness"- -would
be an appropriate approach for them to adopt. The performance of
Soviet leaders after the poor 1972 harvest suggests a genuine com-
mitment to attain their new goals for food output. It was estimated
that nearly $24 billion was shifted to agriculture because of the
crop failures.87 The Soviet Union also exported substantial quantities
of gold. Major outlays of scarce hard currency were made in order to
import feed grains and wheat. "While purchases on the 1972 scale are
unlikely to recur, large imports of agricultural commodities and tech-
nology will be needed.
A new system of animal husbandry for the Soviet Union would in-
volve imports of soybean products, feed grains, breeder stock, and
technical advice. Also, improved meat supplies would require storage.
transport, and sales facilities. These needs add up to a sizeable in-
vestment over time. Nikita Khrushchev attempted to increase meat
production by introducing a new program for corn and pig produc-
tion. But discovery of the corn-hog cycle was not enough to raise the
meat supply, particularly when livestock holdings were sharply di-
minished in the poor crop year of L963. The Soviet livestock inventory
was again threatened during the even more extreme crop failure in
l!)Ti^, hut survived without major reductions.
(-'7) Tourist Systems. — With better facilities. Soviet tourist income
from the United States, Western Europe, and Japan might rise sub-
stantially. Judging by the changes in tourism in developing coun-
tries— including Yugoslavia a consortium or Western-Soviet joint
venture approach seems most appropriate. The tourism package in-
-7 Veto York Times. Oct. 31, 1972.
575
volves travel facilities, hotels, and a tourist agency to arrange the
trips. Aeroflot, Soviet hotels, and lntourist are not the greatest stimu-
lants to tourism; such comparable Western concerns as Pan American
Airlines, Holiday Inn, and Cooks, Ltd. might be more conducive to
foreign travel in the Soviet Union. The opening of direct Pan Am
flights to Moscow and the Soviet agreement in principle with Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation to build a Holiday Inn facility suggest
that this sort of development is possible. The easing of Soviet restric-
tion on internal travel, the availability of tourist credit facilities such
as American Express, and improved facilities for foreign sales of
Russian goods might stimulate the development of tourism.
Such an arrangement would not lend itself to short-term advan-
tages for the Soviet Union. However, if the political costs of tourism
could be tolerated, the advantages would build over time. A Soviet
decision to accept the political costs and promote tourism could create
a demand for more goods and services from the U.S. tourist industry.
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1-38
V. Restrictions on Soviet Trade With the United States
The Nixon Administration and the Congress are considering steps
that would bring U.S. trade policy toward the Soviet Union more
closely into line with those of other Western industrial nations. Among
the changes which are under active consideration or which have al-
ready been made are: reducing tariffs on imports from the Soviet
Union to the same level as those of other trade partners, i.e., granting
most -favored-nation treatment : making available more credits, at
better terms; limiting export controls to items with direct military
applications; and reducing restrictions on shipping between the two
countries. What impact will such changes have on the volume of
U.S. -Soviet trade ? The answer hinges on a number of economic and
political variables — Soviet export capabilities, Soviet preference for
U.S. technology over that of other Western countries, the willingness
of the U.S. business and banking community and the Export-Import
Bank to finance transactions with the Soviet Union, and the ability
of the Soviet Union to adapt its institutions and practices to new roles
in expanded U.S. -Soviet economic relations.
The following is a discussion of past obstacles to U.S. -Soviet trade
and of the likely consequences of prospective changes.
U.S. Controls on Exports to the Soviet Union
Several legislative enactments since 1945 have provided the author-
ization for the U.S. export control program. Their original purpose
was primarily to deny the Soviet Union and other Communist coun-
tries exports which could facilitate their industrial growth and en-
hance their military potential. The following text describes the major
acts which have regulated U.S. exports to the Soviet Union.
The Export Control Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. App. 2021 et seq., 1964)
authorized the President to "prohibit or curtail" all commercial ex-
ports except shipments to U.S. territories and most exports to Can-
ada. The purpose of the Act was to use export controls : (1) to prevent
domestic economic shortages; (2) to protect the national security:
and. (.'>>) to promote the foreign policy of the United States. The Act
was extended several times through December 1969. with some modi-
fications. The 1962 extension of the Act specified that its intent was to
prevent a significant contribution not only to a Communist country's
military potential, but also to its economic potential.
To regulate U.S. exports, a licensing system was established. Under
this system, which is still in effect, the Office of Export Control of
the Department of Commerce regulates virtually all U.S. exports
by granting (or not granting) one of two types of licenses: a gen-
eral authorization which permits shipment of certain types of goods
to certain destinations without a specific application by the exporter,
or a validated license to an individual exporter for a specified export.
( r,76)
577
i»fost U.S. exports are made under general licenses. Validated li-
censes are required for commodities and technical data of a more sen-
sitive nature which may not be exported freely to designated countries.
To administer the program the Department of Commerce maintains
the Commodity Control List which identifies, for each listed com-
modity, the destinations to which a validated license is required. For
export control purposes, the Soviet Union is classified in Country
Group Y with most of the Eastern European countries, Mongolia, and
the People's Republic of China. Other Government agencies, such as
the Department of State, the Federal Power Commission, and the
Atomic Pmergy Commission, exercise authority (under other legisla-
tion) for regulating exports of specialized commodities and technical
data. The most important criteria for approval or denial of a com-
modity for export to Communist countries are: (1) the military
applicability of the item; (2) the nature of the technological contri-
bution which the item is likely to make to the military or economic
potential of the country; and (3) the availability of the item from
other countries.
In March 1951. all general licenses to export to the Soviet Union were
revoked. This requirement for validated licenses was relaxed somewhat
in 1956, when a number of specified items was again made exportable
to the U.S.S.R. under general licenses. Since that time, there has been
a gradual trend toward relaxation in the licensing of exports to East-
cm p:urope. Poland, in 1957, and Romania, in 1964, were placed in a
separate category for which validated licenses for fewer exports were
required. In 1966, the requirement for validated licenses for exports
to the other Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union,
was removed for over 400 items. In subsequent years, several hundred
more commodities were placed in the general license list for export to
p]astern Europe.
This trend toward relaxation accelerated in the late 1960s, particu-
larly after passage of the Export Administration Act of 1969 (50
U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq., 1970), which replaced the Export Control
Act. The new Act maintained export controls, but called for a review
of control regulations and control lists. It called on the Commerce De-
partment to lift controls on commodities freely available to Communist
countries from non-U. S. sources and on items that are only marginally
of military value. In short, the 1969 legislation represented a congres-
sional mandate for a new direction in export controls. Whereas the
thrust of the Export Control Act of 1949 was to limit East-West trade,.
the new legislation was designed to foster such trade. The Export Ad-
ministration Act expired on June 30, 1971, but Congress enacted resolu-
tions (twice in 1971, once in 1972) extending export controls to Au-
gust 1, 1972.
Upon expiration of the Export Administration Act on August 1,
L972, the President invoked the authoritv of Section 5(b) of the Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act of 1917 (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b) 1970) to con-
tinue the export control program. That Act authorized the President
to prohibit all private financial and commercial transactions with
U.S. enemies and their allies during time of war or during any period
of national emergency. In the postwar period, this law had previously
578
been used to regulate trade with North Korea, the People's Republic of
China, and North Vietnam (it no longer applies to trade with ( 'hina).
On August 29, 1972, the Export Administration Act was extended
and amended. The new law called for further relaxation of controls
on exports freely available from sources outside the United States. It
also directed the Secretary of Commerce to report to the President and
to the Congress on the progress of export control liberalization.
A number of laws regulate the export of specific commodities to
the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Among these are the
Mutual Security Act of 1954 (22 U.S.C. 1934. 1970) which authorizes
the President to restrict the exportation to any nation of arms, muni-
tions, implements of war. and related technology. Another such law is
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, :ls
amended (7 U.S.C. 1691-l736d, 1970) which prohibits sales agree-
ments on agricultural commodities for local currencies or long-term
dollar credit to some Communist countries.
The United States also attempts to coordinate its strategic export
controls with the foreign trade policies of its XATO allies (except
Iceland) and Japan. In 1949. a Consultative Group of seven countries
(later increased to 15) set up the Coordinating Committee ( COCOM)
to discuss the embargo and control lists that the members were to
apply in their trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Euro-
pean' countries. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 19~>1
or "Battle Act*' (22 U.S.C. 1611 et se<]., 1970) provides the legisla-
tive basis for U.S. support of the coordinated approach to export
controls.
The Battle Act (subsequently amended in 1961) not only prohibits
the export of implements of war, atomic energy materials, and other
strategic commodities to Communist countries, but also provides that
all U.S. military, economic, or financial assistance be denied to any
nation that knowingly permits shipment of such goods to the Commu-
nist Bloc. Although the President may waive this provision if he
finds it in the national interest, its enactment provided him with a
bargaining tool for persuading other countries to apply the strategic
embargo.
As COCOM has no formal charter, its decisions are not binding on
member countries. Rather, it is an advisory board which issue< rec-
ommendations of goods to be embargoed or controlled. These are re
garded as minimum li-ts to which each member might add commodi-
ties. Since its inception, COCOM has steadily reduced its list of
embargoed items. The U.S. Commodity Control List has considerably
more controlled items than COCOM's International List. Perhaps be
cause of their traditional trade ties with the Soviet Union and other
East European Communist countries, the other members of COCOM
have consistently lobbied for fewer controls, while the United States
has favored more. For example, Japan and the European NATO
countries have exported advanced electronics, communications and
transport equipment, and many other items that are still prohibited
for export in t he I nited States.
The COCOM liberalization of export controls has been paralleled
(at a much slower rate) by the trend in U.S. export control policy.
579
The Export Administration Act has effected significant changes in
the U.S. administration of export controls. In the first year after its
passage, 1,550 commodities were made available under general license
for countries in Group Y. Trade with Romania was further liberal-
ized, and in 1971 the President relaxed the U.S. embargo on Commu-
nist China, freeing many nonstrategic goods for export to China under
general license. Since passage of the law in 1969. there has been a sus-
tained effort to remove controls from most items not controlled by
other COCOM countries. Most of the export license applications for
Eastern Europe that have been denied by the U.S. Government have
been for items also under COCOM controls. In its 100th quarterly
report, for example, the Commerce Department reported that all appli-
cations that were denied for the second quarter of 1972 involved com-
modities subject to COCOM controls.88 The reduction of the number
of embargoed items has been accompanied by new export clearance
procedures to expedite the licensing process.
The U.S. exporter to Communist countries is still confronted with
greater barriers than his counterparts in other Western countries. U.S.
businessmen complain that tighter T'.S. controls and time-consuming
procedures for licensing exports of technology give other Western
companies a considerable advantage. Foreign competitors sometimes
obtain information on pending U.S. exports which puts them in a
favorable competitive position. Approval of applications of export
licenses can take from a few weeks to several months.
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that relaxation of controls has rap-
idly expanded opportunities for sale of American technology to the
Soviet Union. In 1971, for example, there was a significant increase
in the dollar value of export licenses for the Soviet Union: the total
dollar value in 1971 was $1.27 billion, compared with only $1.51 million
the year before.89 The bulk of the increase was attributable to the
licensing of U.S. machinery and. technology for the Soviet automotive
industry. In accordance with the Export Administration Act, the De-
partment of Commerce has narrowed the range of exports subject to
controls. Many items embodying modern technology but having no di-
rect military significance are now exportable to the Soviet Union under
general licenses. Among the items decontrolled in recent months are
construction and agricultural equipment, electronic equipment, se-
lected synthetic rubber manufactures, selected metals and metal man-
ufactures, chemicals, and photographic equipment. Moreover, many
exports of technical data, blueprints, and patented processes which
were formerly controlled are now exportable under general licenses.
In the past, export controls have been the most direct barrier to the
transfer of technology from the United States to the Soviet Union.
However, changes brought about by the Export Administration Act
have minimized the effect of export controls on U.S. -Soviet economic
relations. In conjunction with other changes in Soviet-American trade
relations, export control liberalization paves the way for U.S. ex-
porters to expand their sales in the Soviet Union. The ability to export
88 Export Control, 100th Quarterly Report, 2d Quarter 1972. Washington, D.C., U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, 1972, p. 7.
** Export Control, 99th Quarterly Report, 1st Quarter 1972. Washington. D.C.. U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, p. S.
580
commodities embodying modern technology will undoubtedly make
U.S. exports more attractive to Soviet buyers. At the same time, the
changes will allow the Soviet Union to import needed technology for
certain sectors of its economy.
U.S. Restrictions on Import* From the Soviet Union; the Issue of
Most-Fa vored-Nation Treatment
U.S. tariff discrimination against Communist countries has its
origin in the Trade Agreement* Extension Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 72).
Section 5 of that Act directed the President to :
. . . suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate
of duty, or binding of any existing customs or exercise treatment, or other con-
cession contained in any trade agreement ... to imports from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and to imports from any nation or area dominated
or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement.
Section 11 directed the President to prevent the importation of ermine,
fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furskins from the
Soviet Union and Communist China. The rationale for section 5 was
grounded in heightened international tensions, particularly during the
Korean War. The position was taken that Communist nations which
were aiding aggression in Korea should not share in the benefits of
trade concessions made by the U.S. to other countries. Section 11 may
have been enacted in part to protect domestic producers from foreign
imports.
In accordance with the law. all concessions granted by the U.S.
in trade agreements with Communist countries (except Yugoslavia)
were suspended. With respect to U.S. -Soviet trade, this measure re-
sulted in abrogating the trade agreement concluded between the two
countries on August 4, 1937. That agreement had, in effect, granted
conditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the Soviet
Union in return for Soviet guarantees to import specified quantities
of American goods.90
The denial of trade concessions to Communist countries and the ban
on the importation of certain furskins were later embodied in section
231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (ID U.S.C. 1861, 1970) and
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1202, Schedule 1, Pari 5, Subpart B,
1970). The MFN provision of the Trade Expansion Act differed some-
what from the 1951 legislation. While the original law in effect ap-
plied only to countries that, in the President's opinion, were controlled
by the world Communist movement, the 1902 Act was made applicable1
to all Communist countries. Therefore, Yugoslavia and Poland, which
had previously enjoyed MFN treatment, were no longer eligible for it.
However, this provision was relaxed in L963 to allow those two coun-
tries to regain their MFN status. Subsequently, in the late 1960s and
early 197<>s. unsuccessful attempts were made to extend MFN status
to Romania and ( Jzechoslovakia. The prohibition against trade conces-
sions to the Soviet Union remains in effect, despite several attempts
nt repeal (most recently, in the proposed "East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1971").
"n See Vladimir N Pregelj ''Most -Favored Nation" Principle: Definition, Brief History,
and is, bu thi United state--. (Washington, D.C. : The Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Oct. 26, 1972. Report No. 72-226E).
581
New legislation would be required to extend MFN treatment to the
Soviet Union. Such legislation is certain to run into strong congres-
sional opposition. Many congressmen have opposed trade concessions
to the Soviet Union because of repressive Soviet domestic policies.
Soviet policy of restricting emigration of Soviet citizens has become
the focal point of recent efforts to block MFN status for the Soviet
Union. The proposed "Jackson Amendment." endorsed by a majorit}'
of the members of the Senate, ties trade concessions to Soviet domestic
policies :
... no nonmarket economy country shall be eligible to receive most-favored-
nation treatment or to participate in any program of the Government of the
United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guaran-
tees, directly or indirectly, during the period beginning with the date on which
the President of the United States determines that such country —
(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate; or
(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or
other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatso-
ever ; or
(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on
any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the
country of his choice. . . .91
The issues of tariff discrimination and most-favored-nation treat-
ment were among those discussed at the 1972 U.S. -Soviet trade
negotiations. Tariff negotiations between the United States and
Communist countries tend to be more complex than others because of
the differences in the conduct of foreign trade in the two economic
systems.
Since 1923, U.S. policy has been to extend MFN treatment to its
trade partners automatically and unconditionally. Such treatment as-
sures equal access to the domestic market for all trade partners. Gen-
erally, the United States expects only equivalent treatment, assuring
non-discrimination against U.S. exports. The Soviet Union also ac-
cords its trade partners MFN treatment. However, under the Soviet
system of state-directed foreign trade, a grant of MFN tariff treatment
does not guarantee access to its domestic market. Soviet enterprises
do not purchase freely abroad according to their production needs
and cost limitations. Imports are planned by government agencies and
are purchased by government-controlled foreign trade enterprises.
Thus, Avhen the Soviet Union reduces its tariffs on U.S. exports, pur-
chases of American goods do not automatically increase.
Consequently, in trade negotiations with the U.S.S.R. the United
States has traditionally taken the position that MFN status is a nego-.
tiable trade concession which requires some special form of reciproca-
tion from the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders, however, regard MFN
status as a symbol of good will and friendship; they believe that the
Soviet Union is entitled to the same treatment as other U.S. trade
partners. For this reason, they have taken the position in trade nego-
tiations that MFN status is not a matter for quid pro quo bargaining,
but a natural concomitant to improved diplomatic relations.
As part of the comprehensive trade agreement between the two coun-
tries, concluded on October 18, 1972, the President agreed to submit
81 Amendment Xo. 1691 to S. 2620, 92d Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 4, 1972. 260 members of the
House of Representatives cosponsored similar legislation (the "Mllls-Vanlk Amendment")
In the first session of the 93rd Congress (H.R. 3910).
582
legislation to the first session of the 93rd Congress to extend most-
favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union. The agreement enters
into force only after such legislation is enacted. While the issue of
reciprocity was not explicitly addressed in the agreement, perhaps in
deference to Soviet views, the agreement included several features
which were undoubtedly related in part to the MFN question. The
Soviet agreement to repay the Lend-Lease debt, the assurance that
business facilities would be provided in Moscow for American busi-
nessmen, and the understanding that the level of U.S.-Soviet trade
would expand rapidly may all be interpreted as reciprocal concessions.
These provisions are intended to assure that the United States will
receive reciprocal benefits in future U.S.-Soviet economic relations.
The new business facilities to be established in Moscow for U.S. busi-
nessmen should provide them with some of the necessary trade infra-
structure to expand their operations in the Soviet Union. Furthermore,
the understanding that the level of U.S.-Soviet trade will triple oyer
the next three years and the Soviet Government's announced intention
to place "substantial" orders for U.S. machinery, plant and equipment,
agricultural products, industrial products, and consumer goods portend
considerable benefits for U.S. exporters.
Soviet leaders also expect considerable economic benefits from MFN
treatment. Some Soviet exports currently face very high U.S. tariffs
which would be substantially reduced if the U.S.S.R. received MFN
status. The Soviet Union will need to increase its exports to the United
States if it is to pay for the American technology and agricultural
products it apparently needs. The effect of MFN treatment on Soviet
exports is uncertain. In the past, most Soviet exports to the United
States have consisted of raw materials and primary products. Such
goods are largely unaffected by the absence of MFN treatment because
the rates of duty in the U.S. tariff schedules tend to escalate according
to the degree of processing. A recent U.S. Tariff Commission study
suggests that, with the current structure of exports by the Soviet
Union to the United States, no significant increase in exports would
result from MFN treatment.5'-
However, if the structure of Soviet trade should change — for ex-
ample, if some industrial products of advanced technology and Soviet
manufactured goods were available for export— MFN status might
bring significant advantages. Given the Soviet Union's chronic need
for hard currency, Soviet foreign trade enterprises might be expected
to take advantage of lower tariff rates and make a vigorous effort to
export machinery and manufactured goods to the United States. In
some lines, this effort might he successful. For example, businessmen
in the United States and other developed countries have already shown
mi interest in advanced Soviet metal-working machinery, machine-
building and electronics industries, electrical engineering technology,
mid other areas. Furthermore, some low and medium quality machin-
ery and consumer manufactures may become competitive in segments
of the U.S. market.0
O2.\nton P. Mnlisli. Jr., United States-East European Trade Considerations Involved in
Granting MostFavored-Nation Treatment to the Nations of Eastern Europe (Washington,
D.C. : United States Tariff Commission, 1972).
93 See above, p. 30.
583
By facilitating imports of Soviet machinery and industrial prod-
ucts, the United States might reap an unexpected benefit from ex-
panded trade ties with the Soviet Union, namely, the acquisition of
new Soviet technology in a few industrial sectors. In certain high-
priority industries, the Soviet Union has devoted considerable re-
sources to research and development. Some Soviet industries have
made important technological innovations which could prove very
valuable to U.S. firms. The steel and aluminum industries and certain
mining industries are examples of U.S. sectors which could benefit
from such an exchange of technology.
The structure of Soviet exports to other industrial nations does not,
however, suggest that a dramatic shift in the pattern of Soviet-Ameri-
can trade would follow tariff concessions. While the volume of trade
between the Soviet Union and Western industrial nations increased
in the 1960s, the structure of trade remained fairly stable. Although
some new Soviet products will inevitably be sold to U.S. buyers, past
experience indicates that the pattern of U.S.-Soviet trade outlined by
Secretary Peterson and others of U.S. exports of capital-intensive
products in return for Soviet raw materials will dominate U.S.-Soviet
economic relations in the near future.
U.S. Restrictions on Credit Transactions With the Soviet Union
In trade negotiations with the United States, Soviet representatives
have indicated that the availability of credits is an indispensable con-
dition to expanded U.S.-Soviet trade. Because of the Soviet Union's
shortage of foreign exchange reserves and its limited export possibili-
ties, the availability of credit is, in fact, crucial to expanded commercial
relations. Soviet leaders are seeking two types of credit from the
United States. First, Soviet trade enterprises need deferred-payment
credits for specific transactions. These are routine, short- or medium-
term loans which are 'commonplace in all foreign trade transactions.
Secondly, the Soviet government wants long-term "project loans" for
such large-scale projects as the exploitation of Siberian mineral re-
serves. U.S. Government restrictions have, in the past, inhibited both
types of credits.
The Export-Import Bank plays an important and expanding role
in most U.S. foreign trade. However, past legislation has restricted its
participation in the extension of credits to the Soviet Union. Title III
of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
1965 (P.L. 88-634) prohibited the Eximbank from lending or in any
other way participating in the extension of credits to any Communist
country except when the President made a determination that credits
to a particular Communist country would be in the national interest.
This prohibition was later included in Section 2 of the Export-Import
Act of 194S (12 U.S.C. 635, 1970), by an amendment approved on
March 13, 1968. The 1968 legislation added an absolute prohibition on
Eximbank participation in the extension of credit to any country fur-
nishing by direct government action "goods, supplies, military assist-
ance or advisers'' to a nation which engages in armed conflict with the
armed forces of the United States. The latter prohibition was not
subject to Presidential waiver.
584
In 1971, the Export Expansion Finance Act (85 Stat. 345) removed
the absolute prohibition on Eximbank credit operations in trade with
those Communist countries not in armed conflict with the United
States. Only North Vietnam is currently prevented by legislation
from receiving Eximbank credits. All other Communist countries are
eligible for such credits if the President determines that credit trans-
actions with a specific Communist country would be in the national
interest. In conjunction with the comprehensive U.S. -Soviet trade
agreement of October 18, 1972. the President used the authority of the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, to .allow Eximbank
credits and credit jruarantees to the Soviet Union.
The Johnson Debt Default Act of 1931* (18 U.S.C. 955. 1970) as
amended, prohibits private persons or institutions in the United States
from extending loans to, or purchasing or selling bonds, securities or
other obligations of a foreign government which is in default on obli-
gations to the United States (unless the country is a member of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development). At the time of the bill's passage, the
Attorney General found that the Soviet Union was among those coun-
tries in default in their payments of obligations to the United States.
In October 1963, in connection with the proposed sale of wheat to the
Soviet Union, the Attorney General issued an Opinion to the effect
that the intent of the Johnson Debt Default Act was to prohibit the
extension of financial loans to countries in default, but that it did not
intend to rule out supplier's credit, which he defined as "the assign-
ment or negotiation by an American seller, in the ordinary course of
business, of contract rights or commercial paper resulting from sales
of goods on normal commercial terms." 94 This Opinion was reaffirmed
by the Attorney General in 1967.
The Attorney General Opinions and the settlement of the Soviet
Lend-Lease debt in 1972 have left some questions about the applicabil-
ity of the Johnson Act to U.S. -Soviet transactions. The Soviet Union
is still technically in default on Russia's World War I debt to the
United States. Therefore, private long-term loans are illegal. Private
commercial credits, or loans made directly by Government agencies or
with the participation of Government agencies (e.g., Eximbank guar-
antees) are permitted under the Act. The distinction between private
loans and commercial credits is not always clear and is subject to legal
interpretation. Generally, any financial arrangement which has an un-
derlying business transaction and is made on normal commercial terms
is considered exempt from the Johnson Act.
In past negotiations on credit matters the U.S. position has been that
no major concessions were possible until the Soviet Lend-Lease debt
was settled. The debi proved to be a major st umbling block to expanded
l'.S. Soviet trade. The two Governments unsuccessfully attempted to
negotiate a settlement on several occasions. Negotiations took place in
I960 and broke up after only two weeks. At that time, the U.S. repre-
sentatives demanded $800 million and Soviet negotiators offered $300
million. The U.S. assessment of the debt was based on the value of
civilian goods or military goods usable in the civilian economy, which
"* t'.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, Communication from the
President of the United States. Document No. 163, 88th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 29, 1963.
585
were delivered under Lend-Lease and remained in the hands of the
Soviet Union after World War II. The major element in the disparity
between the U.S. and Soviet figures was the determination of which
goods were essential to the Soviet war effort — the United States did
not try to collect for those goods — and which were civilian goods not
consumed by the end of the war. In addition, there were problems in
setting an appropriate rate of interest and repayment schedule for the
Lend-Lease debt. The U.S. negotiating position was recently summar-
ized by Sidney Weintraub, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Finance and Development :
The original value of all lend-lease equipment provided the Soviet Union dur-
ing World War II is estimated at $10.8 billion. This figure excludes both mer-
chant and naval vessels which, for technical reasons, were not included under
the lend-lease agreement.
In lend lease settlement negotiations with all our allies including the Soviet
Union, it was our policy to seek payment only for those goods which had useful-
ness in the civilian economy. After repeated requests for an inventory of these
"civilian-type" articles in the Soviet Union went unanswered, the United States
estimated their value at approximately $2.6 billion.
In reaching agreements with our other World War II allies, we settled for a
percentage of the value of the "civilian-type" equipment. As noted in this testi-
mony to which this explanation is appended, the U.S. Government has made
specific settlement offers of $1.3 billion and $800 million. Both offers were rejected
by the Soviet Union. Our present negotiations are approaching a figure which
will compare favorably with the final terms reached with other lend-lease re-
cipient countries.*5
The Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the amount of the
Soviet Lend-Lease debt on October 18, 1972. The total debt was finally
assessed at $722 million, of which the Soviet Union paid $12 million
on the day of the agreement. $24 million is to be paid on July 1. 1973.
$12 million on July 1, 1975, and the balance in 28 equal annual install-
ments of $24,071,429 through the year 2001. The Soviet Union is per-
mitted four postponements provided interest is paid at an additional
three percent a year. The settlement covers all Soviet World War II
indebtedness to the United States. However, Soviet repayment of the
debt is contingent on U.S. extension of MFN status to the Soviet
Union. At the same time, the Soviet Union executed an operating
agreement with the Eximbank which provides that its foreign trade
enterprises would receive equal treatment with those of other U.S.
trade partners in all credit matters — amount of credit, interest rate
and repayment provisions.
Settlement of the Soviet debt and the President's determination'
that Eximbank financing .for the Soviet Union is in the national in-
terest removed most major governmental restrictions on credit trans-
actions. Xot only are direct Eximbank credits available, but the way is
now open for private individuals and institutions to extend Exim-
bank-guaranteed credits — both short term and long term — to the So-
viet Union.96 Because of Eximbank's unique role in U.S. foreign trade,
05 U.S. Conrjress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Delinquent International
Debts Owed to the United States. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, 92d Cong.. 1st and 2d sess.. 1072.
p. 125.
90 The Jackson Amendment and similar legislation could prohibit the Soviet Union from
participating in U.S. Government credit operations. See above, U.S. Restrictions on Im-
ports from the Soviet Union; the Issue of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, p. 53.
586
its programs may play a particularly important role in future Soviet-
American trade.97 Eximbank extends direct credits and serves as guar-
antor and insurer only when private financial institutions are unable
or unwilling to do so. As some private institutions may balk at dealing
with Soviet foreign trade enterprises because of inadequate credit
worthiness information or because of general unfamiliarity with the
Soviet economy, frequent Eximbank participation may be required.
The Eximbank extends credits at a favorable rate of interest — cur-
rently 6 percent on direct loans to foreign borrowers. This practice
has raised some controversy over whether such credits are a form of
export subsidy.98 The question of whether the Soviet Union should
continue to receive such low-cost credits is certain to be an important
issue when Congress is asked to extend the Eximbank's franchise.
(It is currently authorized to operate through June 1974.)
That the Eximbank, with its present resources, can fill all Soviet
credit needs is unlikely. Its current overall operational authority is
$20 billion, and its largest exposure to any single country is about $1.3
billion.99 Soviet negotiators have indicated that they hope to attract
huge sums of American capital — far more than Eximbank could pro-
vide— for projects in the Soviet Union.100 Such large-scale financing
is available only from private institutions in the United States. Fur-
thermore, no Government program is available for insuring large,
long-term capital investments in the Soviet Union. Government pro-
grams such as those of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
are denied to the Soviet Union, unless a Presidential waiver is granted,
by Section 620(f) of the Foreign. Assistance Act of 1961 as amended
(22US.C.2151 etseq., 1970).
Despite these problems, the removal of restrictions on Eximbank and
private credits represents a major step toward improved U.S. -Soviet
economic relations. The Soviet Union is expected to run heavy deficits
in its balance of trade with the United States, and U.S. credits
will be needed to help finance them. Soviet trade with most other
Western industrial countries has followed a similiar pattern: imports
from these countries have continually exceeded exports in recent years,
and liberal credit policies have been necessary. If U.S. exporters are
to compete effectively with other Western exporters to the Soviet
Union, large amounts of credits will have to be made available.
Shipping Arrangements in U.S.-Soviet Trn<](
Various shipping regulations have been issued by U.S. Government
agencies in their administration of legislative restrictions on commerce
with the Soviet Union. Department of Commerce Transportation
Order T 1 regulates the transport by U.S. ships or aircraft of certain
controlled commodities (even though originating in a foreign port) to
07 While the Eximbank's operations have generally been credited with Increasing the
level of U.S. exports, this view was disputed in a 1072 article. Sec Douglas R. Bolii. "Export
Credit Subsidies and D.S Exports: An Analysis of the U.S. Eximbank," in V S. Congress.
Joint Economic Committee. The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs. 92d Cong.. 2d
sess.. 1972. pp. 157 175, For a contrasting view, see Howard S Piquet. The Export-Impori
Bank of the United states: An Analysis of Some Current Problems. (Washington, D.C. :
National Planning Association, 1970).
'"■See articles bv Bohl and Piquet, Ibid. Also see Congressional Record. Jan. 23. 1973,
pp. Si 1 70 S1188
»» Peterson Report (1972). op. cit.. p. 20.
100 Ibid., p. 20.
587
most Communist countries, including the Soviet Union. Such ship-
ments are prohibited unless a validated license (for shipments from
U.S. ports) or an authorization issued by the Assistant Secretary (for
shipments from foreign ports) has been obtained.
Soviet ships are also affected by U.S. restrictions on shipping to
Cuba and North Vietnam. Foreign vessels which call on Cuban or
Xorth Vietnamese ports are not allowed to carry U.S. Government-
financed cargoes shipped from U.S. ports (pursuant to National
Security Action Memoranda No. 220, dated February 5, 1963, and
No. 340, dated January 25, 1966). This restriction applies to Com-
modity Credit Corporation-financed grain shipments to the Soviet
Union. Moreover, the sale of petroleum fuels and other petroleum
products to vessels and aircraft which have recently called on, or will
soon be calling on, Cuban or North Vietnamese ports is prohibited.
Until recently, Soviet merchant shipping in U.S. waters was severely
restricted by various port security regulations. For example, Soviet
ships were allowed to call on only 15 U.S. ports and were required to
give 14 days notice in advance. (The Soviet Union maintained similar
restrictions on U.S. shipping.) These restrictions were considerably
lightened by the Soviet-American maritime agreement signed on Octo-
ber 14, 1972. The agreement opened ports in each country to the ships
of the other upon four days' notice. Soviet ships are now able to call
at East and Gulf Coast ports for the first time since 1963.
The maritime agreement also resolved the difficult problem of deter-
mining U.S. and Soviet shares of the maritime business between the
two countries. In the 1963-64 grain sales to the Soviet Union, shipping
was a major problem. Reacting to domestic political pressures, Presi-
dent Kennedy stipulated that 50 percent of all U.S. grain sold to the
Soviet Union must be shipped in American vessels. This provision
proved to be a barrier to further grain shipments. Because of the high
cost of U.S. shipping, U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet Union vir-
tually ceased. President Nixon rescinded the 50 percent requirement
in June 1971. The maritime agreement stipulates that each country's
ships will have the opportunity to carry at least one-third of the car-
goes between the tAvo countries. Third country ships can compete for
the remaining third. The agreement also provides that the Soviet
Union will have to pay shipping rates that are higher than the world
average for goods transported on American ships.
Soviet Institutions and Practices
A major barrier to expanded U.S. -Soviet economic relations is the
unfamiliarity of U.S. businessmen with Soviet foreign trade tech-
niques, with Soviet import needs and export possibilities, and with
provisions of Soviet law pertaining to foreign trade matters. Serious
problems inevitably arise from any attempt to widen commercial ties
between two countries with very different political, economic, and
legal systems. The U.S. -Soviet trade agreement has provided a mech-
anism for resolving some of the problems and facilitating commercial
exchanges between American companies and Soviet foreign trade
organizations. Other important problems remain to be solved.
588
PROBLEMS OF SOVIET LAW AND TJ.S.-SOVIET TRADE
By Soviet law, a foreign visitor to the Soviet Union is accorded the
same legal rights and obligations that any Soviet citizen enjoys. In
actual practice, foreign businessmen enjoy considerably more rights,
such as private property ownership privileges denied to the average
Soviet citizen. The rights of foreign corporations are somewhat more
nebulous. The trade agreement stipulates only that American corpo-
rations "shall be recognized as having a legal' existence" in the Soviet
Union. The Soviet legal code adds little to this. It provides only that-
foreign juridical persons" (a term that presumably includes U.S.
corporations) may conclude foreign trade transactions with officially
designated Soviet foreign trade organizations.101
Issues involving Soviet accreditation of foreign corporations, banks,
and other commercial institutions are now being negotiated. Currently,
accreditation confers no special rights, such as the right to deal di-
rectly with Soviet enterprises or to travel freely in the Soviet Union.
In recent years, the Soviet Union has entered into coproduction
agreements with Japanese and West European firms. Under such
arrangements, foreign companies generally provide machinery and
equipment and technical assistance for Soviet projects on long-term
credit and receive a share of the output in return. However, direct
foreign investments in the sense of equity ownership would appear to
be ruled out by Soviet law and by recent Soviet practice. Since the
early 1930s, the Soviet Government has prohibited agreements which
would allow foreign firms to participate in management or in control
over profits of economic activities inside the Soviet Union. A resolution
of the All-Union Soviet of People's Commissars on December 27, 1930,
discontinued the practice of granting foreign concessions for manufac-
turing and mining operations in the Soviet Union.102 Furthermore,
private ownership of the means of production is prohibited by the
Soviet Constitution.
If future joint Soviet-American projects require very large outlays
of American private capital, the usual coproduction arrangement may
prove to be inadequate. U.S. companies are unlikely to make huge in-
vestments without some managerial control. Soviet willingness to com-
promise on this issue is one of the important intangibles in future
Soviet-American relations. In a recent interview with the West
German magazine Der Spiegeh Dzherman Gvishiani, deputy chairman
of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, suggested
that there were no basic obstacles "in principle" to the establishment
of foreign owned property in the Soviet Union :
. . . Even now in our country the trend for multinational property is emerg-
ing. For instance, we are ready to set up and organize joint research institutes.
In Dubna we have the research institute for atomic energy, which is the property
of the countries participating in it. I think that this is no goal in itself. What
really matters is to find a favorable form of cooperation with the partners.103
However, he added that he saw no practical need for such arrange-
ments at the present time.lc
104
101 James Henry Glffen, The Legal and Practical Aspects of Trade With the Soviet Union
(New York, Praeper Publishers, 1071), pp. 1!">1-152.
"'-' Sutton, op. Clt.. p. 17.
m Dzherman Gvishiani. interview with Der Spierjcl (May 1, 1972, pp. G7-73), translated
In Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Western Europe), May 3, 1972, p. U3.
,n« Ibid., p. U2.
589
The foreign businessman who wants to buy from or sell to the Soviet
Union generally conducts his business with a Soviet foreign trade
organization which specializes in a given line of imports or exports.
The Soviet foreign trade organization has a somewhat ambivalent
status. On the one hand, it is an official agency of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade which conducts its foreign trade operations in strict
accordance with governmental dictates. On the other hand, it is a
juridical person under Soviet law which can possess property, acquire
rights to property under its name, incur obligations, and sue or be
sued.105 The foreigner may enter contracts with a foreign trade orga-
nization, as long as the organization is operating in accordance with
the charter which is granted to it by the Soviet Government. In short,
the foreign trade organization has a legal status which is somewhat
similar to that of Western corporations. Some legal complications
may arise in foreign trade transactions, however, because of the Gov-
ernment's foreign trade monopoly. The Ministry of Foreign Trade
may refuse to issue or revoke an export license. There are also strict
Soviet regulations to prevent the foreign trade organization from
making contracts that the state considers contrary to national
interests.
Arbitration of foreign trade disputes involving Soviet foreign trade
organizations must normally take place under the auspices of the
Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, a panel of 15 Soviet
nationals which convenes in Moscow. While Western specialists
acknowledge that the Commission's procedures have been generally
fair, the United States has insisted that parties to a dispute should
have the right to have arbitrators from a third country, in accordance
with the Arbitration Rules of the Economic Commission for Europe.
The latter procedure was agreed to in the U.S.-Soviet trade treaty,
although parties to a dispute are permitted to decide upon any other
form of arbitration which they mutually prefer.
For the American corporation considering the export of commod-
ities embodying new technology, Soviet laws dealing with protection
of patents, trademarks, and copyrights are a crucial consideration.106
Soviet laws and practices have changed considerably in recent years.
The widely publicized Soviet practice of buying prototypes and copy-
ing them is no longer the most prevalent method of acquiring foreign
technology. Soviet leaders have apparently concluded that the older
method did not enable Soviet industry to keep pace with the rapid
growth of technological innovation in the rest of the world. Not only
did it inhibit Western corporations from exporting technology to the
Soviet Union, but Soviet enterprises frequently found that by the
time a prototype was obtained from the West and readied for pro-
duction, it was already obsolescent. Moreover, as Soviet expenditures
on research and development grew, Soviet leaders became more con-
cerned about protecting Soviet innovations.
Symbolic of the Soviet leadership's new attitude toward the inter-
national exchange of technology and know-how was their ratification
i05 Giffen, op. cit., pp. 152-156.
108 For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of Soviet law, see Samuel Plsar. Coexist-
ence and Commerce (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 336-374.
590
in 1965 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property. The terms of the Paris Convention require signatories to
extend to individuals and companies of other signatories the same
degree of protection as the country provides its own citizens.
Soviet law provides protection for both foreign patents and foreign
trademarks. Trademarks may be registered in the Soviet Union and
are protected for a specified period of time, in much the same manner
as in Western countries. Soviet patent law, however, is quite different
from Western laws. Under Soviet law, an inventor is given the option
of receiving a patent or an inventor's certificate for his innovation.
The foreign inventor who submits an application to the Soviet Union
is given the same choice. The certificate gives the inventor recogni-
tion for his achievement and assures him of a predetermined financial
reward, but vests in the state all rights to use, develop, and exploit
the invention. The Soviet patent is similar to its Western counterpart ;
the patentee gains the right to exploit his invention for his own per-
sonal profit, up to a ceiling established by law. As an innovation by a
Soviet citizen can generally be exploited only by a state enterprise, the
incentive to own a patent is reduced. Moreover, legal requirements
for obtaining a patent and various tax benefits and compensation ad-
vantages for certificate holders induce most Soviet inventors to apply
for certificates.
Most foreign inventors prefer the Soviet patent; they generally
consider the certificate's scale of remuneration too small. However, the
Soviet patent does not provide the foreigner the same protection as
most Western patents. A patented invention can be exploited only
by a state enterprise. If the patentee is dissatisfied with the way it is
to be used, or with the state enterprise's terms of compensation, he
cannot go to a competitor. Furthermore, Soviet enterprises generally
have inadequate provisions for the kind of inspection and reporting
that could insure the patent-holder's compensation rights. For ex-
ample, there is often no way for the patent-holder to insure that he is
being compensated according to volume of output or the savings his
innovation generates. There is also no independent judicial authority
to handle disputes involving patents; the}7 are handled by the Soviet
Chamber of Commerce. These and other problems involving patents
have not been resolved in U.S.-Soviet trade negotiations.
The problem of copyrights was also examined by the Joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission. Until 1973, the Soviet Union did
not belong to the Universal Copyright Convention and had few bi-
lateral treaties dealing with copyrights. Nor did Soviet law provide
for protection of copyrights of materials first published outside the
Soviet Union. Many U.S. books and articles, especially in the scientific
and technical fields, have been published in the Soviet Union without
compensation for U.S. authors. The Soviet decision to adhere to the
Universal Copyright Convention on May 27, \»7:\ should help to
solve this longstanding problem.
SOVIET STATE TRADING
Some of the barriers to expanded U.S.-Soviet trade arise from the
natun of Soviet state trading itself. The essence of the Soviet state
trading monopoly is State control over all Soviet foreign business
591
activities. The State not only performs the regulatory function com-
mon to all Governments, but also acts as manufacturer, merchant, and
banker. A fundamental problem of the U.S. businessman trading with
the Soviet Union or of a government agency attempting to regulate
and promote such trade is that of operating in an entirely new com-
mercial environment. Westerners who have traded with the Soviet
Union frequently complain that Soviet institutions are not conducive
to normal commercial ties.
One feature of Soviet state trading to which Western businessmen
object is the necessity of dealing with Soviet foreign trade enterprises.
The foreign businessman is prevented from conducting business di-
rectly with Soviet producers, consumers and distributors. Instead, he
must deal with middlemen in the foreign trade apparatus who may
lack firsthand information about items being bought or sold. Although
Soviet foreign trade enterprises are specialized according to export
or import lines, they often cannot give the foreigner exact specifica-
tions for the import needs and export offerings of domestic enterprises.
In addition, since Soviet foreign trade enterprises have no domestic
competitors, they can exercise monopolistic bargaining power when
dealing with a single foreign company. The U.S. businessman has the
choice of dealing with a Soviet export-import monopoly or not dealing
at all. The Soviet foreign trade enterprise, on the other hand, is free
to take advantage of the competition among American companies or
between American companies and their foreign competitors.
Another Soviet institution which encumbers commercial ties with
the West is central economic planning. As Soviet production and con-
sumption are centrall}7 planned, the U.S. businessman cannot estimate
potential supply and demand conditions in the Soviet economy. Nor
can he judge, on the basis of arbitrary Soviet prices, which goods are
marketable in the Soviet Union. Centrally planned foreign trade can
also be extremely unstable because the government sometimes uses
trade to dispose of unplanned surpluses or to meet unplanned short-
ages. Furthermore, since there is no necessary link between cost of
production and price in the Soviet economy, it is difficult for U.S.
Government agencies to regulate dumping or market disruption on the
part of Soviet exporters. The U.S. -Soviet trade treaty addresses the
latter problem by establishing a procedure for imposing import quotas
or other restrictions for preventing market disruptions.
Soviet isolation from the international trade community also creates
problems for Western companies seeking to buy from or sell to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union lacks some of the fundamental re-
quirements for unencumbered foreign trade transactions, such as a
convertible currency and a realistic exchange rate. The 1972 agree-
ment in which Pepsi Co., Inc., agreed to market Soviet vodka in the
United States in return for a Pepsi Cola franchise in the Soviet Union
typifies many Soviet foreign trade transactions. This characteristic
often leads Soviet foreign trade enterprises to insist on barter trade,
tied transactions, and other clumsy arrangements. Another Soviet de-
ficiency which results from its traditional isolation from Western mar-
kets is the lack of a basic foreign trade infrastructure for Soviet-
American trade. Such basic requirements as office space, communica-
tions services, and advertising facilities are virtually nonexistent. In
the 1972 commercial agreement, provisions were made to alleviate this
96-525 O - 77 - vol. 1 - 39
592
deficiency. Business facilities for U.S. companies and a large trade
center are to be built in order to facilitate U.S. -Soviet foreign trade
transactions.
Another set of problems arising from Soviet institutional arrange-
ments is related to the necessity of dealing with state agencies. As dis-
cussed above, trading with a government agency raises a number of
difficult legal problems. In addition, state trading can degenerate into
politically motivated trading. A state trading monopoly may reward
or punish a trade partner for purely political reasons. Among the
political devices at the state trading monopoly's disposal are market
disruption, preemptive buying, discrimination against imports, and
denial of exports. As the State decides what to buy and sell on a some-
what arbitrary basis, the existence of such practices may be difficult to
prove and counteract.
Prospects for Removal of Barriers to U.S.-Soviet Trade
A definite trend toward trade liberalization has characterized recent
Soviet-American economic relations. U.S. policy changes with regard
to exports, imports, credits, and shipping arrangements have removed
many of the artificial barriers to normal economic relations with the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the maritime and trade agreements and
the agreement on the Soviet Lend-Lease debt have demonstrated a
willingness on the part of both countries to make concessions on many
substantive matters.
The Nixon Administration took another step toward normalization
of U.S.-Soviet trade relations when it submitted the "Trade Reform
Act of 1973" to Congress on April 11, 1973.107 Among the measures
in the comprehensive trade legislation were two important sections
which are applicable to U.S.-Soviet trade. One proposal would grant
the President the power to extend most-favored-nation treatment to
countries not now enjoying it (including the Soviet Union). Another
would repeal the Johnson Debt Default Act, thus removing another
barrier to U.S.-Soviet credit operations.
Some innovations and experiments in the Soviet foreign trade sys-
tem may in the long run help to normalize U.S.-Soviet commercial
relations. Export councils composed of government officials and in-
dustry representatives now act as a liaison between domestic industries
and foreign trade enterprises. This development could alleviate some
of the problems confronted by the foreigner who deals with the Soviet
foreign trade apparatus. A small percentage of Soviet foreign trade
is now conducted by local officials in border regions of the Soviet
Union. Such decentralized state trading is now taking place between
outlying regions and neighboring countries including Japan, North
Korea, Iran, Turkey, and several European countries adjoining the
Soviet Union.108 Material incentives have been introduced to encourage
production for export. Industrial enterprises which successfully fulfill
their export targets are allowed to use part of their foreign currency
107 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. Trade Reform Act of
197 S (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973).
108 Keith Bush, "A New Impetus for Border Trade," Radio Liberty Dispatch, August 21,
593
earnings for imports of needed machinery and equipment.109 Such
changes may portend a more flexible Soviet foreign trade system for
the future. However, the evolution has not proceeded very far.
In recent years, important new practices have helped to expand
Soviet commercial ties with the West. Coproduction ventures, joint
marketing arrangements, licensing agreements, and other special ar-
rangements play an increasingly important role in East-West trade.
Such practices will undoubtedly be used in furthering U.S.-Soviet
economic cooperation.
However, many potential roadblocks remain. The trade agreement,
Export- Import Bank financing, and the Lend-Lease agreement, for
example, are contingent on congressional approval of MFN status for
the Soviet Union. Moreover, U.S. financial institutions may be unable
to provide sufficient credits to meet Soviet needs. Eximbank's resources
are apparently inadequate, and the Johnson Act still restricts private
loans to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, considerable differences of
opinion remain over interest rates and repayment schedules. Even if
all U.S. restrictions should be removed, limited Soviet export capabil-
ities might be a serious constraint on the volume of future trade. An-
other uncertainty is the adaptability of some Soviet foreign trade in-
stitutions to large-scale economic cooperation with the United States.
Furthermore, there is still considerable opposition in the United
States to exports of certain kinds of U.S. technology. Although export
controls have been relaxed, questions on the national security and in-
dustrial espionage aspects of foreign trade continue to be raised. Even
technology transfers to long-time allies are sometimes questioned. The
sale of the Thor-Delta rocket to Japan, for example, was cited by a
representative of the AFL-CTO to Congress as an export of technol-
ogy with adverse national security implications.110 Many technology
transfers to the Soviet Union are likely to be more controversial.
The changes that have already been made seem likely to strengthen
trade ties between the United States and the Soviet Union, but many
obstacles to completely normalized economic relations remain. The
long-run growth of Soviet-American economic relations will depend
in large part on the continuation of the liberalization process.
109 Nikolai Patolichev, U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (Moscow:
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d.), p. 131.
110 Mr. A. Biemieller to the Senate Finance Committee. Congressional Record, Mar. 6,
1973, S3977-3982.
VI. Issues in the Interplay of Technology, Trade, and Diplomacy
U.S. foreign trade policy toward the Soviet Union has always been
motivated by a combination of political and economic factors. U.S.
policymakers have encouraged trade with the Soviet Union — in the
mid-1980s, in the immediate postwar period, and in the past few
years — because they believed that benefits would accrue to the U.S.
economy and that U.S. -Soviet diplomatic relations would improve.
At other times — in the 1920s and early 1930s and in the Cold War
period — trade has been restricted in order to discourage Soviet leaders
from pursuing policies considered hostile to U.S. interests. Indeed, this
inclination to use trade for political purposes is a deeply imbedded
tradition in American diplomacy dating back to the earliest years of
the republic. Moreover, commercial relations have been used to further
foreign policy goals. As observed by Professor Harold Berman,
Of course, in one sense, all trade is "embedded in politics," but in another
sense, trade, like diplomacy and cultural and scientific exchange, is a way of
maintaining mutually advantageous relations among countries whether or not
they are politically antagonistic to each other.1"
U.S.-Soviet trade has been characterized by the exchange of U.S.
technologically-advanced goods and services for Soviet raw materials.
While the absence of normal U.S.-Soviet trade relations has probably
been an economic burden to both countries, U.S. leaders have acted
under the assumption that the promise of trade (and U.S. technology)
to the Soviet Union was an effective lever for exacting political con-
cessions. Denial of trade, on the other hand, has been assumed to be a
barrier to Soviet industrial and technological progress.
The U.S.-Soviet technology transfer, the new commercial relation-
ship, and U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations present an interrelated pat-
torn of policy issues, illustrated by the following questions:
(1) How will the emerging commercial relationship benefit the U.S.
economy ?
(2) How can economic exchanges with the Soviet Union, particu-
larly those involving technology transfers, be used to further U.S.
foreign policy?
(3) What changes are needed in negotiating procedures and commer-
cial institutions necessary to insure that the United States maximizes its
political and economic benefits?
Rene-fit x to tlie United States From Expanded Trade With the Soviet
Union
The U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union in 1972-73 and prospective
U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Siberian natural gas exploitation demon-
strate some of the potential benefits and costs of expanded U.S.-Soviet
1,1 New York Times, Letter to the Editor, Apr. 2, 1973, p. 34.
(594)
595
commercial relations. Both the 1972-73 grain deal and the potential
gas deal have important implications for the U.S. economy and for
U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations.
THE 19 72-73 GRAIN SALES
The experience gained in 1972 by private grain exporters and U.S.
Government officials should provide valuable guidelines for future
U.S.-Soviet transactions. With respect to U.S. economic benefits, the
grain sales raised an important question : How good a, market is the
Soviet Union?
In the summer of 1972, the Soviet Union purchased an estimated
440 million bushels of wheat from the United States, about one-fourth
of the total U.S. crop.112 From July 7, 1972, when the Soviet grain sale
was first announced, to September, when Soviet agents stopped buying,
the price of U.S. hard red winter wheat, the principal kind sold to
the Soviets, rose from $1.69 to $2.49 per bushel. The Soviet Union pur-
chased the wheat at approximately $1.63 per bushel. The difference
between the price paid by the Soviet Union and the U.S. domestic
price was made up by U.S. Department of Agriculture subsidy pay-
ments to grain exporters, which totaled approximately $300 million
for the July-September period.
The U.S. Government's role in the sales caused considerable con-
troversy. For almost two years prior to the sales, the Department of
Agriculture had pegged the world market price of wheat at $1.63 a
bushel. However, because of a world shortage of wheat in 1972, the
competitive world market price judged by normal commercial prac-
tices should have been much higher. In fact, the world price without
price supports would have approximated the U.S. domestic price be-
cause the United States was the only country exporting significant
quantities of wheat. Inasmuch as the United States was the only source
for large amounts of wheat and as its domestic price equaled the
competitive world market price, the subsidies represented a net price
advantage for the Soviet Union.
U.S. grain exporters had been involved in major grain sales to the
Soviet Union on one previous occasion in 1963-64.113 In those sales,
as in the 1972-73 sales, the United States appeared to be a source of
last resort for the Soviets : Soviet buyers went into the U.S. market
only after their traditional sources were exhausted. In 1963 the Soviets
had already purchased large amounts of wheat from Australia and
Canada.114 In 1972, France had exported to the Soviet Union, while
Canada and Australia had been unable to supply large amounts to the
Soviets. Moreover, in the period between the large U.S.-Soviet trans-
actions of 1963-64 and 1972-73, the Soviet Union had chosen to buy
from traditional trade partners rather than the United States.114 (See
Table 9, p. 43.)
112 For a discussion of Soviet agricultural purchases, see Humphrey and Bellmon,
op. cit.
^ For details of the 1963-64 grain sales, see Leon M. Herman, The 1963-64 Wheat Sales
to Russia: A Summary of Major Developments. (Washington, D.C. : The Library of Con-
gress, Legislative Reference Service, Apr. 7, 1964.)
u* Correspondence made public by Congressman John Melcher reveals that both the
Australian and Canadian Wheat Boards had advised the U.S. Department of Agriculture
as early as July 1972 to reduce U.S. export subsidies and allow world prices to rise. The
reduction came In September 1972 after most of the Soviet orders were placed. See the
Congressional Record, Apr. 9, 1973, H2501-2502.
596
Thus, the United States was in a monopoly position, apparently
selling to a buyer with inelastic demand (quantity not sensitive to
price) , and there was little historical evidence that the purchases could
be tied to future, continual sales. The 1972-73 situation was probably
an ideal one for extracting high profits. Instead, U.S. grain ex-
porters provided a consumer's or purchaser's surplus to the U.S.S.R.
A reassessment of the exchange may give insights into the criteria to
be employed in future U.S.-Soviet commercial transactions involving
high-technology products.
Grain exporters and Agriculture Department officials claimed that
Soviet buyers were offered low prices because no one knew the extent
of Soviet needs. Soviet agents kept their buying intentions a closely
guarded secret. It is interesting to note that the 1963 U.S.-Soviet grain
sale was also criticized because Soviet agents, by dealing secretly, were
able to buy at low prices. Certainly, a seller can never know precisely
the shape of the buyer's demand curve, i.e., the quantity demanded at
different price levels. However, he should try to improve his knowledge
of the buyer's situation and of world supply and demand conditions.
He should also attempt to maximize his return from the sale or, if not.
carefully weigh the benefits of a non-profit-maximizing policy.
The grain sales point up the need for the Government's active and
impartial participation in trade with centrally planned economies. The
role of Government agencies in East- West commercial transactions
should be to safeguard the interests of U.S. producers, consumers, and
taxpayers. From the standpoint of some exporters and producers, the
1972-73 grain deal may have provided maximum benefits. However, its
impact on some farmers, on the U.S. consumer, and on the Federal
budget was certainly less than maximally beneficial. Soviet purchases
contributed to a sharp rise in U.S. domestic food prices and resulted in
high Government subsidy payments to exporters and shippers. Some
U.S. farmers, who sold their grain before Soviet needs became known,
suffered substantial losses of income. A study conducted by the General
Accounting Office faulted the Department of Agriculture for some of
these problems.115 The study found that the Department had not prop-
erly used and disseminated available information on Soviet needs for
U.S. grain.
Despite these shortcomings, grain exporters and Government officials
rightfully claimed that the 1972-73 grain sales brought considerable
benefits to the U.S. economy. The balance-of -payments benefits were
estimated to exceed $700 million.116 Many farmers benefited from
higher prices and increased sales, and employment and earnings in
transportation industries and agribusinesses were stimulated. More-
over. Government expenditures for farm subsidies and grain storage
were greatly reduced. Finally, American grain exporters may have
established close commercial ties with Soviet importers which could
facilitate future sales.
The outcome of the grain sales suggests that the United States can
benefit economically by trading with the Soviet Union. However, some
«* Elmer R Staats, "The Russian Wheat Sales and Agriculture's Role In Expanding U.S.
Wheat Exports," in Remarks of Hubert H. Humphrey, Congreaaional Record, vol. 119,
Mar. 8, 1973, S4124-S4127.
"« Ibid., S4124.
597
Government policies and institutions should be reexamined. The grain
sales raise questions as to the appropriate role for the U.S. Govern-
ment in future commercial transactions. What should U.S. pricing
policy be? Pricing policy may differ depending on whether the U.S.
Government considers the Soviet Union a preferred customer and on
what the elasticity of Soviet demand is assumed to be. If credit is
necessary, but not commercially available, what Governmental risks
and costs are justified? Are there other ways in which the U.S. Gov-
ernment can assist American businesses dealing with Soviet trading
monopolies ? Each o.f these questions is relevant to future U.S.-Soviet
commercial relations, not only in grain sales but in advanced tech-
nology transfers.
JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIAN NATURAL GAS RESOURCES
In assessing potential Soviet exports to the United States, there
are also important questions on investment, pricing, and supply pol-
icy. The proposal for joint development of Soviet Siberian natural
gas resources, for example, raises the question, How good an invest-
ment is Soviet energy exploitation? The two natural gas projects
might require a U.S. investment of about $10-12 billion, largely for
pipeline and tankers. Upon completion of the projects, gas would flow
from Urengoy, in West Siberia, to Murmansk by pipeline ; from there
it would be shipped to the U.S. East Coast. A second pipeline would
carry gas from Yakutsk, in East Siberia, to Nakhodka, where it would
be loaded for shipment to Japan and the U.S. West Coast. (See map,
Figure 3.)
598
599
Of the two projects, the West Siberian development appears clos-
est to realization. Negotiations are currently underway between Soviet
officials and a consortium of three American companies — Tenneco,
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, and a Halliburton Com-
pany subsidiary. While all of the details of the transaction are not
completed or agreed to and have not been officially announced, some
tentative figures have been published, which appear to be the basis of
current negotiations.117 The entire West Siberian development would
cost about $7.6 billion. Of that sum, the Soviet Union would invest
about $1.5 billion ,for drilling, gas-gathering, and cleaning equipment.
The remainder would be invested by the U.S. consortium for building
20 liquefied natural gas tankers (costing about $2 billion) and for
construction of a 1,500-mile pipeline, compressors, a gas liquefication
plant, and loading facilities.
The contract would run for 25 years, with gas deliveries to. the
United States valued at $150 million per year to begin in 1980. The
U.S. credit would be repaid over a 12-year period with seventy-five
percent of the gas deliveries used to pay off the principal and interest
on the loan, and the remaining twenty-five percent used to buy other
U.S. capital goods. After the U.S. loan was repaid., the gas deliveries
to the United States would continue for the duration of the contract
with the proceeds convertible to purchases in the United States.
The U.S. Export-Import Bank and a consortium of private U.S.
banks could be expected to finance the deal. Under the terms currently
being discussed, the Soviet Union would receive somewhat better
treatment than other U.S. trade partners. No "progress payments"
(i.e. payments made while the project was under construction) would
be required. Payments would begin only after construction was com-
pleted and the project was in operation. The Soviets might also be
granted a longer-than-usual repayment period. Mr. Kearns, chairman
of the Eximbank, reported after lengthy discussions with Soviet of-
ficials in Moscow that the Eximbank's normal terms and rules of dis-
closure were posing problems for Soviet officials.118 Either a U.S. de-
cision to compromise and give the U.S.S.R. preferred status or an un-
precedented disclosure of information and acceptance of commercial
terms by the Soviets will be required if the transaction is to be financed
by Eximbank.
Moreover, the projected cost of Soviet natural gas would be consid-
erably higher than the present U.S. price. The U.S. companies would
buy the gas in Murmansk for 60 cents per thousand cubic feet and
spend an additional 65 cents to deliver it to an East Coast port.
The total figure, $1.25, compares with a $0.45 delivered price for
U.S-produced natural gas in 1972. Although most U.S. energy special-
ists appear to agree that the current price is too low, few seem to argue
that the U.S. price should be raised to $1.25. U.S.-produced gas will
be more expensive in the 1980s : a recent estimate which allows for in-
flation puts the price of U.S. gas in 1985 at about 93 cents.119 Moreover,
U7 See James Flanigan, "Farewell to Adam Smith," Forbes, vol. 110, No. 11 (Dec. 1,
1972), pp. 25-26.
118 New York Times, Apr. 4, 1973, p. 67.
118 Edward W. Erickson and Robert M. Spann, "Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Natural Gas," In Balancing Supply and Demand for Energy in the United States. (Denver :
Rocky Mountain Petroleum Economics Institute, 1972), p. 105.
600
U.S. negotiators claim that the price impact on U.S. consumers would
be minimal because cheaper U.S. sources would still provide most of
the domestic supply and fixed costs make up most of the price. A
provision for "rolling in" the foreign gas into domestic supply would
prevent large price increases for U.S. consumers.
The large-scale and the long-term nature of the projected natural
gas transaction make it especially important that U.S. Governmental
and private interests carefully study the terms of the arrangement to
insure that the United States receives maximum benefits. The follow-
ing are some of the important questions which should be examined:
1. What economic benefits will the United States receive? The gas
project involves a huge outlay of U.S. investment funds. Will the im-
ports of natural gas and the stimulus to U.S. shipbuilding and other
capital goods industries provide an adequate economic return?
2. What are the alternative costs of obtaining the same energy sup-
plies from other sources? Mr. Thornton F. Bradshaw, President of
Atlantic Richfield Company, suggested that, at the currently projected
price of Soviet gas, the same supply could be obtained from domestic
natural gas reserves, gasification of coal, and other domestic sources.120
Alternative foreign sources also warrant consideration.
3. What are the appropriate roles for the U.S. Government and pri-
vate industry? How much of the American investment should be
financed or guaranteed by the Eximbank? What should the Govern-
ment's policies be with regard to other aspects of the arrangement, such
as shipbuilding subsidies and import regulation ?
4. What kinds of commercial arrangements are needed for U.S.-
Soviet cooperation in this area? Business facilities in the Soviet Union
are inadequate for an operation of this scale. Although private owner-
ship is not likely or necessary, some clear assurances of authority and
managerial responsibility will be needed.
5. What are the indirect economic costs of the project? How much
would be added to fuel prices for U.S. consumers ? Would financing for
the Soviet project saturate the U.S. capital market and drive up inter-
est rates for long-term capital ?
<■». Is the Soviet project a preferred investment, eligible for lower
rates, more favorable terms, and higher risks than other investments?
If preferential treatment for the natural gas project is warranted by
political factors, what are the net political benefits?
POLITICAL BENEFITS FROM EXPANDED U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Peterson, and other U.S. officials have attached
great political significance to expanded commercial relations with the
Soviet Union. Both the grain sales and the natural gas negotiations
may test the assumption that increased economic ties lead to improved
diplomatic relations. The commercial relationships established by U.S.
agribusinesses and by the U.S. oil and gas industry with their Soviet
counterparts may be long term. The potential gas project would be
based on a 25-year contract. While grain sales are unlikely to recur
on the l!)7'_J-7.') scale, considerable sales of feed grains and agricultural
technology are likely in the future.
• i • i •
U.S. exports of grain, technical assistance, and capital investment
would be balanced in part, on an economic balance sheet, by U.S. im-
v>0 Panel Discussion at the National Association of Manufacturers* "U.S.-Sovlet Trade
Conference," Feb. 28, 1973, Washington, D.C.
601
ports of raw materials. But technology transfer on a long-term basis
must also be assessed in terms of political costs and benefits. An inter-
esting aspect of both the grain sales and the natural gas negotiations
is the suggestion that the Soviet Union may now be receiving prefer-
ential treatment in U.S. foreign trade policy. The Soviets purchased
U.S. grain at a price that was lower than warranted by the world
market situation, and the price which has been mentioned for U.S.
purchases of Soviet natural gas seems high. Is preferential treatment
for the Soviet Union justified by potential diplomatic gains for the
United States? .
The following are among the political costs of the new commercial
relationships:
1. The risks involved in the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a
supplier of important raw materials. Reliance on the Soviet Union as
a source for vitally needed energy resources appears to be a particu-
larly risky undertaking.
2. Contributions to the Soviet fund of technical knowledge that
could be translated into security programs or which could result in
the release of resources for military programs.
3. Potential leverage to the Soviet Union that could result from So-
viet control over U.S. investments and personnel — a possible source
of economic blackmail, or an economic hostage system.
The following are some of the political benefits :
1. Soviet reliance on the United States as a source of supply and ex-
pertise. Soviet dependence on U.S. agricultural products and ad-
vanced technology, for example, is a potential source of U.S. political
leverage.
2. Encouragement to the Soviet Union to reorder priorities between
military and civilian programs. Expanded commercial relations may
serve as an economic reinforcement of the arms control and other
agreements between the two countries.
3. Encouragement of domestic change in the Soviet Union. The
presence of many American citizens in the Soviet Union with some
decisionmaking power and a wider exchange of ideas may in the long
run contribute to a moderation of the Soviet political control system
and command economy.
In summary, expanded economic relations which facilitate massive
technology transfer from the United States to the U.S.S.R. may create
new, potentially dangerous dimensions in U.S. diplomacy. On the
other hand there is at least a possibility that the process of integrating
the centrally planned Soviet economy into the market economy of
the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world might un-
leash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in turn,
contribute to international interdependence and stability.
Concluding Observations
POLITICAL, GAINS LIKELY TO OUTWEIGH ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO
UNITED STATES
The volume of Soviet trade with the United States by any projec-
tion is not likely to represent a large share of U.S. trade or GNP.
Economic advantages to the United States are likely to be centered
on such specific sectors as imports of petroleum and natural gas, and
602
exports of soybeans, feed and cereal grain, and computers, and other
high-technology products. The balance of payments deficit of the
United States and our program for expanding the export of high
technology may receive benefits which are, at best, only marginal
compared to those which may derive from potential changes in eco-
nomic relations with non-Communist countries.
At the same time, if the Soviet Union should reorder its priorities
and permit more foreign decisionmaking involvement in domestic co- •
operative ventures, significant long-run benefits of a predominantly
political nature might accrue to the United States such as: a) the
potential reduction of the Soviet threat to our security from reordered
Soviet priorities; b) a degree of Soviet acceptance of the international
system, implied by the U.S.S.R.'s permitting domestic involvement
of foreign corporations as partners; and c) political advantages in-
herent in increasing international commercial and financial inter-
course. Overall, such political gains might far outweigh the relatively
modest economic returns.
RELATIVE INCREASE IX U.S.-SOVIET TRADE MAY BE IMPRESSIVE BY 19 SO
Still, the relative increase in trade may be impressive. From a level
of about $200 million (exports plus imports) before the commercial
agreement, the exchange may rise by the end of the decade to between
$800 million and $5 billion if the presently favorable environment for
expanding commercial relations continues. Three alternative dollar-
volume levels seem possible, depending on key variables in trade.
a. Projection of Current Trends. — Up to $800 million average an-
nual turnover through expansion of Soviet raw material exports, in-
cluding diversion of oil and gas sales from other developed economies
to the United States, additional Commodity Credit Corporation
credits for agricultural imports (feed grains and soybeans), and ex-
pansion of tourism.
b. Changed Credit and Export Structure. — Up to $2-3 billion if
MFN status is granted to the Soviets and if Soviet foreign trade orga-
nizations give priority to exporting industrial products. U.S. -Soviet
joint ventures in energy and raw material extraction, industrial pro-
duction, shipping, and development of tourism and increases in Soviet
gold exports could also push US.-Soviet trade turnover to this level.
c. Major Joint Venture Development. — Up to $4—5 billion if (in
addition to the activities cited above) the several massive Siberian
liquefied gas projects in West and East Siberia are consummated.
These would probably bring about a very extensive American involve-
ment in Soviet exploration, construction, and production activity and
an equally unprecedented acceptance of risk by the U.S. Government
and private banks.
FUTURE U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC TIES DEPENDENT ON CONTINUED
RELAXATION OF INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BARRIERS
The degree of Soviet flexibility in permitting cooperative ventures
to go beyond agreement on I:.S. financing and sharing in output,
toward managerial and investment decision participation, will deter-
mine how broad or narrow are the limits on change. The U.S. relaxa-
tion of barriers to East-West trade is symptomatic of a new willing-
603
ness to provide the same trade and credit arrangements other indus-
trial nations have had with the U.S.S.R. for some years. Revision of
export controls, restrictive tariffs, and credit constraints will raise the
potential for hard-currency earnings (i.e., dollars), and credit ar-
rangements in the joint ventures will influence Soviet decisions to
import and ability to expand commercial relations.
NEW SOVIET EMPHASIS ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND MATERIAL
INCENTIVES STIMULATES TRADE PROSPECTS
The increased Soviet interest in improved economic relations with
the United States results from an apparent reordering of Soviet prior-
ities. Reordered priorities appear to favor technological change and
an improvement in the availability of desirable consumer goods to the
Soviet workers and peasants.
In bringing about technological improvement, energy, especially as
supplied by oil and gas, plays a central role. In the development of
the rich Siberian resources, Soviet trade with the United States can
be expected to expand as to both imports and exports : imports of tech-
nologically advanced petroleum and gas extraction, transmission, and
processing facilities, and exports of the natural gas and oil produced.
Likewise, imports of products such as breeder stock and feed lots
which permit Soviet animal husbandry to borrow from U.S. agri-
business are singularly designed. to increase meat output, which in
turn may facilitate improvement in labor productivity. Few products
represent as clear a means of absorbing increased money wages as
meat.
DEFENSE AND CONTROL VERSUS ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROFESSIONAL
PERFORMANCE ARE SOVIET CHOICES
The extent to which priorities have been or will be reordered turns,
in large part, on how much of the Soviet output goes to defense and
on the volume of Soviet trade with other nations. If the Soviet leaders
view new strategic systems as characterized by rapidly rising costs
and very modest benefits — a post-summit view expressed by Dr. Henry
Kissinger — then civilian claimants will probably do better in receiv-
ing shares of Soviet economic growth. If, in contrast, the Soviets ap-
pear to follow the view expressed by others that the arms race will
continue and accelerate in those areas not specifically limited by the.
SALT agreements, then the reordering of priorities may further
strengthen the priority of defense outlays, as in the 1960s. Without
change in the traditional defense priority, increases in Soviet-U.S.
economic relations may be largely dependent on modest shifts of trade
and other activities from other industrial nations to the United States.
Only upgraded civilian requirements will generate significant new
import needs and provide a basis for releasing resources for export.
COST TO SOVIETS OF SUPPLYING RAW MATERIALS TO EASTERN EUROPE
IS HIGH AND RISING
A potential for significant improvement in Soviet export capabili-
ties to the West, especially in petroleum and natural gas. lies in a
possible shift away from the current and projected supply to Eastern
604
Europe and Cuba— i.e., member nations of COMECON. The Soviets
might also find it advantageous to reduce a drain on hard currency
by limiting transshipment of grain to Eastern Europe and Cuba on
Soviet account. The 1972 Soviet purchase financed by gold sales or
dollars of U.S. wheat to meet delivery requirements to Poland is a
case in point. This kind of reappraisal, although increasing potential
trade with the United States in the short run, poses serious longer-
range political and strategic problems of control for the Soviet Union
in the Communist world.
STATE TRADING POSES PROBLEMS FOR A COUNTRY WTITH A MARKET
ECONOMY SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES
Commercial relations between a market economy and a centrally-
planned economy with a state trading monopoly pose problems of
effective administration and may place the United States at a disad-
. vantage.
Most Soviet-Japanese trade transactions are on a Soviet trading
agency — Japanese Corporation basis and are effectively resolved in
kind. This Soviet pattern of bilateral trade, accepted not only by
Japan but also by European countries, will inhibit a shift of balance-
of-payment surpluses from those industrial nations' accounts which
could otherwise help to balance possible Soviet deficits on the U.S.
account. U.S. trade too is thus likely to be tied to bilateral relations
with the Soviet Union. Similarly, these bilateral criteria, in coopera-
tive ventures with other industrial nations like Japan, may in turn
restrict the volume of hard-currency earnings available to support a
negative Soviet trade balance with the United States.
One approach to trading with the Soviet Union might be the estab-
lishment of a governmental trading agency like the Canadian Grain
Board. There might also be other agencies, such as a Computer Board.
It is of mutual interest to have the most knowledgeable technical
people on each side working directly with each other. But there is a
possibility that all suppliers would not have equal access to the Soviet
market. The Occidental Petroleum Corporation made a commercial
agreement without Government help or knowledge. Is this to be dis-
couraged? Government participation runs the risk of Government
favoritism, whereby one or more companies might become "chosen
instruments.'' Although such a restraint of trade, under special cir-
cumstances where the national interest is involved, might perhaps be
permitted by U.S. law, there might also be serious reservations about
it in the Congress and in the country as a whole.
The U.S. Government might provide improved information serv-
ices for U.S. business interests to keep them informed on economic
conditions and market prospects in the Soviet Union. It is also impor-
tant to take measures to protect U.S. citizens and their investments
in the Soviet Tnion. Even formal treaty negotiations on the status
of U.S. citizens in the Soviet Union, similar to "Status of Forces"
agreements on U.S. troops abroad, might be considered. For example,
the U.S. grain exporters and computer corporations should have
specific governmental connections with whom they may share
information.
605
Other industrial nations such as France and Japan have developed
counterparts of Soviet institutions in order to accommodate the Soviet
state trading monopoly. U.S. leaders may prefer to encourage more
institutional changes on the part of the Soviet Union.
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN U.S. PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR
ADMINISTRATION AND NEGOTIATION
To maximize the net economic and political benefits to the United
States, the negotiating process and the mechanism for commercial
relations (i.e., U.S. membership in the Joint Commercial Commis-
sion), should be reevaluated. In order to link the broadest security and
diplomatic interests with the commercial arrangements, the involve-
ment of high-level policymakers is essential. Specialists on the Soviet
Union, foreign trade specialists, and private businessmen are also in-
dispensable to provide guidance in their areas of expertise.
The long-term process of negotiation, its specialized character, and
the broad national interests inherent in U.S.-Soviet relations require a
permanent working blend of experienced people with the following
characteristics :
a. Top politicians from both executive and legislative branches,
authorized to speak for the White House and Congress as a whole;
b. Governmental trade specialists from the Departments of Com-
merce, Treasury, State^ and other agencies.
c. Specialists on Soviet political -economic affairs from governmental
or academic positions ; and
d. Representatives of private business and banking.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks team in SALT I was appar-
ently successful in combining the appropriate elements of authority
and expertise. The Soviet SALT team was roughly representative of
opposite numbers. In negotiations between different systems it is not
easy to make such comparisons. For example, the Supreme Soviet, the
Soviet legislature, need not be represented, as it does not have the
power or responsibility of the U.S. Congress. In the U.S. system of
checks and balances, on the other hand, it would be particularly bene-
ficial to include Members of Congress in the commercial negotiations.
Congressional involvement would permit a broader representation
of U.S. public opinion and facilitate passage of legislative measures
needed to improve U.S.-Soviet commercial relations. Without continu-
ous involvement of the Congress and private interests, it could be diffi-
cult to have an informed debate on important issues. The establish-
ment of a special congressional committee or subcommittee to deal
with East-West trade, roughly paralleling the Jackson Subcommit-
tee on SALT,121 might be appropriate. The creation of the Jackson
Subcommittee gave evidence of congressional interest, involvement,
and authority.
Direct congressional involvement would seem especially desirable
in view of the complex, significant, and long-term nature of the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission deliberations. Such involvement
on a continuing basis could facilitate effective treatment of issues con-
cerning statutory authority, such as Most- Favored -Nation Agree-
121 Subcommittee to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, Chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson.
606
ments, and in general those in which congressional interest is high,
e.g., export-import credits.
It would also appear desirable that the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com-
mercial Commission include a blend o.f political leaders (from both
executive and legislative branches), technical trade specialists, and
Soviet area specialists. As the effective protection of U.S. interests
requires a continued high-level political and lower-level technical in-
volvement, institutional means should be sought for keeping attention
at all levels high. Moreover, the principle of professional continuity:
at the working level should be adhered to in order to meet the level
of Soviet competence in negotiations and administration in the
Commission.
THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS
IS CRUCIAL
The present period appears to be a critical one in U.S. -Soviet rela-
tions. If the two countries move ahead in developing commercial re-
lations, progress in political, cultural, and other areas may be facili-
tated. The failure to do so may engender disappointments, frustra-
tions, and suspicions which could ultimately result in a return to the
pre- Summit atmosphere. In short, an opportunity is now available to
the United States which might conceivably lead to either substantially
expanded relations over a 10- to 20-year period or, if the opportunity
is not seized and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade is not now expanded, to con-
tinued diversion of the Soviet market to Western European and Jap-
anese suppliers and to a sharp deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations.
RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP CAN BE REDUCED
BUT NOT ELIMINATED
Because political benefits are the main measure of net gain to the
United States from any pattern of increased U.S.-Soviet trade, care-
ful calibration of the risks and uncertainties is in order.
If the Soviet Union is indeed in the process of reordering priorities
and accepting greater involvement in the international political and
economic system — i.e., accepting the rules of behavior of that system —
a significant reduction of impediments to trade may result ; this would
be much more beneficial to the United States than would the modest
economic gains to be derived from expanding markets.
If, however, Soviet trade overtures do not extend further than a
willingness to settle old accounts, such as Lend Lease, and purchase of
more grain and technologically advanced equipment, in exchange for
relaxation of trade and credit restrictions, U.S. policymakers may be
well advised to limit concessions and engage in hard bargaining, with
expectation of only modest political and economic benefits.
The policies followed by the United States and the Soviet Union will
greatly influence the probabilities of alternative outcomes. As the
policy objectives of the Soviet leaders are especially crucial to such a
projection, it cannot be known for some time with any certainty which
different alternative courses, or what compromise between them, is
being followed.
Thus, as knowledge of which of the alternatives will prevail may not
be evident for several years, very careful official and public scrutiny of
each step in the progress of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Com-
mission discussions would appear to be in order for both the executive
and legislative branches.
Live Music
Archive
Librivox
Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland
Museum of Art
Internet
Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American
Libraries
TV News
Understanding
9/11